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ABSTRACT 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) is one of the various proactive policing strategies that have 
been developed since the 1970s. It has been claimed that POP has had a considerable effect 
in reducing crime (Weisburd et al., 2010). However, its role in the crime drop that has been 
experienced in England and Wales and across the world since the 1990s (Tseloni et al., 2010) 
is not yet known (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018). Therefore, this thesis explores the role 
of POP in the burglary drop at the police force area (PFA) level in England and Wales 
between 1988 and 2007/08. 
The theories that underpin both POP and this study are opportunity-related theories (rational 
choice and routine activity theories), social disorganisation theory, and the new public 
management concept. The empirical component of the study is divided into three phases, 
where each phase employs different methods (e.g. multilevel negative binomial regression) 
to analyse a rich array of data sources (e.g. the Crime Survey for England and Wales). The 
results of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
1. A number of police forces in England and Wales were consistently committed to 
POP over time. 
2. There seemed to be a relationship between POP and the fall in burglaries and repeat 
burglaries in a number of POP-committed PFAs between 1995 and 2007/08. 
3. Although POP-committed police forces experienced fewer burglaries in 2003/04, 
POP did not result in a statistically significant reduction in burglaries between 1995 
and 2003/04. 
4. Conversely, POP-committed police forces saw a statistically significantly higher 
number of burglaries in 1997. 
5. Police forces with a higher number of police officers per 1000 residents experienced 
a statistically significant reduction in burglaries in 2003/04. 
In light of the above findings, this thesis sheds new light on the crime drop and policing 
literature. Consequently, the findings inform the theoretical and practical aspects of POP that 
can be used by police and other crime prevention agencies to reduce burglary victimisation.  
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of contents 
Copyright statement ......................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of contents .............................................................................................................................. v 
List of tables ..................................................................................................................................... x 
List of figures ................................................................................................................................. xii 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Overarching aim and objectives of the study ......................................................................... 3 
1.3 Research questions ................................................................................................................. 4 
1.4 Research methodology ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Original contribution to knowledge ....................................................................................... 8 
1.6 Overview of chapters ............................................................................................................. 8 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................................. 11 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING ............................................................................................ 11 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 Theoretical framework ......................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Routine activity theory .................................................................................................. 13 
2.2.2 Rational choice theory .................................................................................................. 13 
2.2.3 Situational crime prevention ......................................................................................... 14 
2.2.4 Social disorganisation theory ........................................................................................ 15 
2.2.5 New public management ............................................................................................... 16 
2.3 Brief history of policing ....................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Towards POP ................................................................................................................ 19 
2.3.2 Birth of POP .................................................................................................................. 20 
2.3.3 Rise of POP in the UK .................................................................................................. 22 
2.4 Major objectives of policing and POP ................................................................................. 26 
2.4.1 Organisational characteristics ....................................................................................... 26 
2.5 Core operational strategies of police and POP ..................................................................... 28 
2.6 Relating POP to other policing strategies ............................................................................ 29 
2.7 How can the effectiveness of POP be measured? ................................................................ 35 
2.7.1 The SARA framework .................................................................................................. 36 
2.8 Does POP work? .................................................................................................................. 45 
2.8.1 Narrative reviews .......................................................................................................... 46 
2.8.2 Systematic reviews ........................................................................................................ 47 
vi 
 
2.8.3 Studies targeting repeat victimisation ........................................................................... 49 
2.9 Factors limiting the implementation of POP ........................................................................ 50 
2.9.1 Limitations of POP projects via the SARA framework ................................................ 50 
2.9.2 Organisational and frontline factors .............................................................................. 54 
2.10 Factors facilitating the implementation of POP ................................................................. 55 
2.10.1 Leadership and management ....................................................................................... 55 
2.10.2 Training and resources ................................................................................................ 56 
2.10.3 Rewards and incentives ............................................................................................... 56 
2.10.4 Sharing good practice.................................................................................................. 57 
2.11 Chapter summary ............................................................................................................... 57 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................................. 60 
THE CRIME DROP: A PUZZLING PHENOMENON ................................................................ 60 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 60 
3.2 The crime drop hypotheses .................................................................................................. 62 
3.2.1 Economic hypotheses .................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2 Offender-based hypotheses ........................................................................................... 65 
3.2.3 Substance abuse hypotheses .......................................................................................... 69 
3.2.4 Security and opportunity-related hypotheses ................................................................ 71 
3.2.5 Criminal justice system hypotheses .............................................................................. 74 
3.2.6 Policing-related hypotheses .......................................................................................... 77 
3.3 Burglary risk and protective factors ..................................................................................... 85 
3.4 Chapter summary ................................................................................................................. 87 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................................. 89 
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 89 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 89 
4.2 Overview of data .................................................................................................................. 89 
4.3 Problem-oriented projects .................................................................................................... 90 
4.3.1 Projects submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley awards ................................................. 91 
4.3.2 Projects applied as part of government-supported crime reduction programmes ......... 95 
4.4 The related literature ............................................................................................................ 99 
4.5 The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) ............................................................ 99 
4.5.1 Sampling and coverage ............................................................................................... 100 
4.5.2 Reference periods ........................................................................................................ 104 
4.5.3 Questionnaire structure ............................................................................................... 104 
4.5.4 Questions asked .......................................................................................................... 104 
4.5.5 Types of incidents reported ......................................................................................... 105 
4.5.6 Household weights ...................................................................................................... 105 
vii 
 
4.5.7 Validity of the CSEW ................................................................................................. 106 
4.5.8 Limitations of the CSEW ............................................................................................ 106 
4.6 Police data .......................................................................................................................... 106 
4.6.1 Limitations of police recorded crime data .................................................................. 107 
4.6.2 Concluding remarks regarding police-recorded crime data ........................................ 107 
4.7 The UK Census data .......................................................................................................... 107 
4.8 Variable selection ............................................................................................................... 108 
4.8.1 Dependent variable ..................................................................................................... 108 
4.8.2 Independent variable ................................................................................................... 109 
4.8.3 Control variables ......................................................................................................... 110 
4.9 Analysis plan ...................................................................................................................... 114 
4.9.1 Phase one .................................................................................................................... 115 
4.9.2 Phase two .................................................................................................................... 117 
4.9.3 Phase three .................................................................................................................. 120 
4.10 Chapter summary ............................................................................................................. 130 
CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................ 132 
ANALYSING THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT OF POLICE FORCES TO POP ................. 132 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 132 
5.2 Analysing indicator one: problem-oriented project submissions to the awards ................. 133 
5.2.1 What types of crime were targeted, when and where? ................................................ 140 
5.3 Analysing indicator two: problem-oriented crime reduction programmes ........................ 145 
5.3.1 The Safer Cities Programme ....................................................................................... 145 
5.3.2 The Targeted Policing Initiative ................................................................................. 145 
5.3.3 The Reducing Burglary Initiative................................................................................ 147 
5.4 Reviewing the related literature ......................................................................................... 151 
5.5 Policing strategies of police forces .................................................................................... 155 
5.6 Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP ......................... 162 
5.7 Chapter summary ............................................................................................................... 164 
CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................................ 166 
ANALYSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POP AND THE BURGLARY DROP: A 
COMPARATIVE TREND ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 166 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 166 
6.2 Overview of crime trends ................................................................................................... 166 
6.3 Testing hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 168 
6.3.1 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented project submissions (1) .................................. 168 
6.3.2 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented project submissions (2) .................................. 182 
6.3.3 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented crime reduction programmes ......................... 188 
6.3.4 Testing hypotheses: the related literature .................................................................... 196 
viii 
 
6.3.5 Testing hypotheses: repeat victimisation .................................................................... 199 
6.4 Chapter summary ............................................................................................................... 205 
CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................................ 206 
DID POP HAVE A STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON BURGLARIES? ........... 206 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 206 
7.2 Descriptive statistics .......................................................................................................... 206 
7.3 Principal component analysis............................................................................................. 211 
7.3.1 Principal component analysis, 1997 ............................................................................ 213 
7.3.2 Principal component analysis, 2003/04....................................................................... 217 
7.3.3 Summary of principal component analysis ................................................................. 222 
7.4 Modelling strategy ............................................................................................................. 222 
7.4.1 The effect of POP on burglary rates in 1997 ............................................................... 223 
7.4.2 The effect of POP on burglary rates in 2003/04 ......................................................... 224 
7.4.3 Summary of multilevel negative binomial regression ................................................ 226 
7.4.4 Results ......................................................................................................................... 227 
7.5 Chapter summary ............................................................................................................... 235 
CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................................................ 237 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 237 
8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 237 
8.2 Overarching aim ................................................................................................................. 237 
8.3 Summary of findings .......................................................................................................... 239 
8.3.1 Phase one .................................................................................................................... 240 
8.3.2 Phase two .................................................................................................................... 243 
8.3.3 Phase three .................................................................................................................. 247 
8.4 Limitations of the study ..................................................................................................... 248 
8.5 Theoretical contribution ..................................................................................................... 251 
8.5.1 POP-committed senior leadership in policing ............................................................. 251 
8.5.2 Policies targeting repeat victimisation ........................................................................ 252 
8.5.3 Disconnect between theory and practice of POP and some other factors ................... 253 
8.5.4 Increasing number of police officers........................................................................... 254 
8.6 Policy implications regarding policing .............................................................................. 254 
8.6.1 Increasing awareness regarding the related literature ................................................. 255 
8.6.2 Having POP-committed senior leaders ....................................................................... 255 
8.6.3 Establishing partnerships ............................................................................................ 256 
8.6.4 Considering the interests of other governmental parties ............................................. 256 
8.6.5 Increasing perceived time for POP ............................................................................. 257 
8.6.6 Hiring specialist crime analysts .................................................................................. 257 
ix 
 
8.6.7 Providing internal training .......................................................................................... 257 
8.6.8 Increasing incentives ................................................................................................... 258 
8.7 Methodological implications.............................................................................................. 258 
8.8 Original contribution to knowledge ................................................................................... 259 
8.9 Recommendations for future research ............................................................................... 260 
8.10 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................... 260 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 262 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 291 
Appendix 1.1: Definition of burglary in England and Wales .................................................. 291 
Appendix 2.1: Before/after studies from the UK ..................................................................... 293 
Appendix 4.1: Problem-solving checklist ................................................................................ 295 
Appendix 4.2: Recoding .......................................................................................................... 297 
Appendix 4.3: Most similar police force groups ...................................................................... 300 
Appendix 5.1: Hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6 ............................................................... 304 
Appendix 5.2: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects by PFA ............................................ 306 
Appendix 5.3: The Reducing Burglary Initiative projects by PFA .......................................... 309 
Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP ....... 313 
Appendix 6.1: The CSEW sample size (adults, unweighted) and proportion of all victims that 
suffered more than one burglary in the reference period (Weighted), 1995-2007/08 .............. 323 
Appendix 7.1: Correlation matrix, 1997 .................................................................................. 326 
Appendix 7.2: Correlation matrix, 2003/04 ............................................................................. 327 
 
  
x 
 
List of tables 
Table 2.1: Key developments in crime prevention in England and Wales, 1976-2001 ................ 22 
Table 2.2: The Crime Reduction Programme schemes ................................................................. 24 
Table 2.3: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects ..................................................................... 25 
Table 2.4: Dimensions of intelligence-led, community and problem-oriented policing ............... 31 
Table 2.5: Comparison of policing strategies ............................................................................... 33 
Table 2.6: Twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention .............................................. 42 
Table 2.7: Studies cited in narrative reviews ................................................................................ 46 
Table 2.8: Development of problem-solving process ................................................................... 53 
Table 3.1: The crime drop hypotheses .......................................................................................... 62 
Table 4.1: Application requirements for TPI project proposals .................................................... 98 
Table 4.2: The CSEW sample size (adults) by PFA, 1996-2007/08 ........................................... 101 
Table 4.3: Household-level structural control variables ............................................................. 122 
Table 4.4: Observed frequency distribution of burglary victimisations (unweighted) ............... 126 
Table 5.1: Tilley and Goldstein Award submissions by PFA, 1997-2008 .................................. 134 
Table 5.2: Anti-burglary winner submissions by PFA and year, 1997-2008 .............................. 141 
Table 5.3: Anti-burglary finalist submissions by PFA and year, 1997-2008 .............................. 142 
Table 5.4: Total number of anti-burglary submissions by category and year, 1997-2008 .......... 144 
Table 5.5: Phase one Safer Cities projects by city/borough, PFA and budget, 1989-1993......... 146 
Table 5.6: Phase two anti-burglary Safer Cities projects by city/borough and PFA, 1994-1998 147 
Table 5.7: Total number of TPI projects and the amount of funding received by PFA, 1999-
2002 ............................................................................................................................................. 148 
Table 5.8: Total number of RBI projects and the amount of funding received by PFA, 1999-
2002 ............................................................................................................................................. 149 
Table 5.9: Early implementers of POP in England and Wales ................................................... 151 
Table 5.10: Police forces which were implementing POP during the 1990s and the 2000s ....... 154 
Table 5.11: Policing strategies adopted by police forces before August 2001 ........................... 157 
Table 5.12: Revised policing strategies of police forces before August 2001 ............................ 160 
Table 6.1: Was there a greater decrease in burglaries in POP-committed PFAs? ...................... 181 
Table 6.2: Anti-burglary winner and finalist award submissions by starting and submission year 
and PFA ....................................................................................................................................... 182 
Table 6.3: Was there a gradual decrease in burglaries in PFAs that became a winner or finalist?188 
Table 6.4: Was there a greater decrease in PFAs that received funding for anti-burglary TPI and 
RBI projects between 1999 and 2002/03? ................................................................................... 196 
Table 6.5: Did being an early implementer of POP matter? ....................................................... 199 
Table 6.6: Was there a gradual decrease in repeat burglaries at the national and PFA levels 
between 1995 and 2007/08? ......................................................................................................... 204 
xi 
 
Table 6.7: Was there a greater decrease in repeat burglaries in PFAs that were early 
implementers of POP? ................................................................................................................. 205 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of characteristics of households and PFAs, 1997 and 2003/04 207 
Table 7.2: KMO and Bartlett's test (1), 1997 .............................................................................. 212 
Table 7.3: Component matrix (1), 1997 ...................................................................................... 212 
Table 7.4: KMO and Bartlett's test (2), 1997 .............................................................................. 212 
Table 7.5: Component matrix (2), 1997 ...................................................................................... 212 
Table 7.6: Eigenvalues and total variance explained, 1997 ........................................................ 214 
Table 7.7: Multicollinearity test among extracted components and variables excluded from PCA, 
1997 ............................................................................................................................................. 216 
Table 7.8: Correlation matrix, 1997 ............................................................................................ 216 
Table 7.9: KMO and Bartlett's test (1), 2003/04 ......................................................................... 218 
Table 7.10: Component matrix (1), 2003/04 ............................................................................... 218 
Table 7.11: KMO and Bartlett's test (2), 2003/04 ....................................................................... 218 
Table 7.12: Component matrix (2), 2003/04 ............................................................................... 218 
Table 7.13: Eigenvalues and total variance explained, 2003/04 ................................................. 219 
Table 7.14: Multicollinearity test among extracted components and variables excluded from 
PCA, 2003/04 ............................................................................................................................... 221 
Table 7.15: Correlation matrix, 2003/04 ..................................................................................... 221 
Table 7.16: Mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced and ICC values, 
1997 and 2003/04 ......................................................................................................................... 226 
Table 7.17: Model fit tests, 1997 and 2003/04 ............................................................................ 227 
Table 7.18: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the 
number of burglaries, 1997 .......................................................................................................... 228 
Table 7.19: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the 
number of burglaries, 2003/04 ..................................................................................................... 231 
Table 7.20: Pearson (point-biserial) correlations between POP and the mean number of 
burglaries ..................................................................................................................................... 235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
List of figures 
Figure 2.1: Problem analysis triangle ........................................................................................... 38 
Figure 2.2: Problem analysis double triangle................................................................................ 38 
Figure 3.1: Number of total offences (thousands), the CSEW and PRCD, 1981-2015/16. .......... 61 
Figure 3.2: Number of burglaries (thousands), the CSEW and PRCD, 1981-2015/16................. 61 
Figure 4.1: Structure of the variables used in Chapter 7 ............................................................. 109 
Figure 4.2: Structure of the data used in Chapter 7 .................................................................... 125 
Figure 5.1: Total number of anti-burglary winner submissions by year, 1997-2008 ................. 141 
Figure 5.2: Total number of anti-burglary finalist submissions by year, 1997-2008 ................. 142 
Figure 5.3: Total number of anti-burglary other submissions by year, 1997-2008 .................... 143 
Figure 6.1: Number of burglaries (thousands), the CSEW and PRCD, 1981-2015/16............... 167 
Figure 6.2: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and Leicestershire, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................................... 172 
Figure 6.3: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and Kent, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 172 
Figure 6.4: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and Nottinghamshire, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 174 
Figure 6.5: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and Hertfordshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................................... 174 
Figure 6.6: Mean number of burglaries in the Metropolitan and Greater Manchester, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................ 176 
Figure 6.7: Mean number of burglaries in Cleveland and Northumbria, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................................... 176 
Figure 6.8: Mean number of burglaries in Merseyside and the West Midlands, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 178 
Figure 6.9: Mean number of burglaries in Cumbria and North Wales, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................................... 178 
Figure 6.10: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset and Essex, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 180 
Figure 6.11: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 184 
Figure 6.12: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 184 
Figure 6.13: Mean number of burglaries in Devon and Cornwall, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 185 
Figure 6.14: Mean number of burglaries in Hampshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 185 
Figure 6.15: Mean number of burglaries in Northamptonshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 186 
Figure 6.16: Mean number of burglaries in Staffordshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08186 
Figure 6.17: Mean number of burglaries in England and Wales, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 187 
xiii 
 
Figure 6.18: Police recorded burglaries in the Metropolitan and Greater Manchester, 1988-
1998 ............................................................................................................................................. 189 
Figure 6.19: Police recorded burglaries in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester, 1988-
1998 ............................................................................................................................................. 189 
Figure 6.20: Mean number of burglaries in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................ 191 
Figure 6.21: Mean number of burglaries in Kent and Leicestershire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 191 
Figure 6.22: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset and Essex, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 192 
Figure 6.23: Mean number of burglaries in Derbyshire and Cumbria, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................................... 192 
Figure 6.24: Mean number of burglaries in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................ 194 
Figure 6.25: Mean number of burglaries in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ............................................................................................................ 194 
Figure 6.26: Mean number of burglaries in South Yorkshire and South Wales, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 195 
Figure 6.27: Mean number of burglaries in Surrey and Dorset, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 198 
Figure 6.28: Mean number of burglaries in Thames Valley and Hampshire, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 ................................................................................................................... 198 
Figure 6.29: Mean number of burglaries in Hampshire and Sussex, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 199 
Figure 6.30: Proportion of repeat burglaries in England and Wales, the CSEW, 1995-2007/08 200 
Figure 6.31: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Leicestershire and Kent, the CSEW, 1995-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 202 
Figure 6.32: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Surrey and Dorset, the CSEW, 1995-2007/08 . 202 
Figure 6.33: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Thames Valley and Hampshire, the CSEW, 1995-
2007/08 ........................................................................................................................................ 203 
Figure 6.34: Proportion of repeat burglaries in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester, the 
CSEW, 1995-2007/08 .................................................................................................................. 203 
Figure 7.1: Scree plot showing the number of components extracted, 1997 .............................. 215 
Figure 7.2: Scree plot showing the number of components extracted, 2003/04 ......................... 220 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The history of American policing was divided into three eras by Kelling and Moore (1988): 
(1) the political era, (2) the reform era, and (3) the community problem-solving era (see also 
Reisig, 2010). In the political era (the 1840s-the early 1900s), there were close ties between 
police and politicians, with the former supporting the latter during election periods. The 
reform era was a reaction to the political era when visible patrols, rapid responses to calls, 
and follow-up investigations were considered successful strategies to the control of crime. 
“It took hold during the 1930s, thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, began to erode during 
the late 1970s” (Kelling and Moore, 1988: 8). With the end of the political era, proactive 
policing strategies, which could be attributed to the principles suggested by Sir Robert Peel 
in London in 1829, started to emerge. These policing strategies include community policing, 
intelligence-led policing, hot spots policing and problem-oriented policing (POP). Indeed, 
Kirkby (1997: 3) speculated that “Perhaps the earliest recorded champion of problem-
oriented policing was Robert Peel in 1829.” 
The community problem-solving era began with Goldstein’s (1979) seminal work Improving 
Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Herman Goldstein, an American professor of law 
and former adviser to the Chicago Police Department, further elaborated on his ideas in 
Problem-Oriented Policing, as published in 1990. POP mainly aims to enhance the crime 
prevention capacity of police forces by changing the organisational mindset from one of 
reactivity to proactivity. In practice, its intention is to eradicate the underlying conditions of 
recurring problems rather than targeting incidents on per incident basis. It is a scientific 
approach (Scott, 2000) which involves the following steps (Goldstein, 1990): 
• identifying problems 
• analysing problems 
• the search for alternatives (developing tailor-made responses) 
• reflections on implementation efforts. 
Since its development, POP has been implemented by police forces not only in the US but 
in many countries worldwide, including the UK (Leigh et al., 1996; 1998; Clarke, 1997; 
Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al., 2006; Eck and Weisburd, 2006; Boba and 
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Crank, 2008; Heaton, 2009a; Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010; Tilley, 2010; Weisburd et al., 
2010; Tilley and Scott, 2012). By 2000, nearly all police forces purported to endorse POP in 
England and Wales (Read and Tilley, 2000). In addition, POP-related interventions were 
encouraged by the UK government (Newburn, 2008) through the funding of large-scale 
crime reduction programmes that applied a problem-oriented approach, such as the Safer 
Cities Programme (1988-1998) (Ekblom et al., 1996; Sutton, 1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001) 
and the Crime Reduction Programme (1999-2002) (Bullock et al., 2002; Hope et al., 2004; 
Millie and Hough, 2004; Homel et al., 2004; Hirschfield, 2007). Moreover, police forces in 
England and Wales submitted nearly 900 problem-oriented projects to the Tilley and 
Goldstein Award schemes, which are intended to spread the POP-related best practice, 
between 1997 and 2011 (https://popcenter.asu.edu/). Although these schemes are good 
examples of disseminating the best practice of POP, the Tilley Award scheme  ultimately 
ceased due to financial issues in 2010. However, South Yorkshire Police received a £6.35 
million Police Transformation Fund Award in 2017 and officially opened the Tilley Award 
for application on 7th September 2018 for the first time in eight years (South Yorkshire Police, 
2018). 
The question of course is whether the application of POP to that extent affected crime rates 
at the national- and police force area (PFA) levels in England and Wales over time. 
According to the ONS (2018), crime recorded by both the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (CSEW) and police has been decreasing substantially in England and Wales since the 
1990s. This reduction has been heralded as constituting the ‘crime drop’ phenomenon. Since 
crime first started to decline in the US, initial studies examining the cause of its decrease 
focussed on the US context. For instance, Blumstein and Wallman (2006) published a 
collection of US-based studies concentrating on violent crimes. However, it was observed 
that the crime drop was not confined to the US. Zimring (2007) compared crime trends in 
the US and Canada and found a concurrence between them (see also Ouimet, 2002). Tonry 
(2014) subsequently suggested that there had been an international crime drop, while Tseloni 
et al. (2010) went one step further and proposed that there might have been a global crime 
drop. Additionally, Farrell et al. (2014) critically summarised at least seventeen crime drop 
hypotheses and argued that the only reasonable hypothesis was the security hypothesis, 
which proposes that increased security of homes and vehicles decreased offender 
opportunities, and that crime therefore, fell. However, Farrell et al. (2014) did not conduct a 
comprehensive analysis as to whether POP played a role in the crime drop in England and 
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Wales and cited Eck and Maguire (2006) to eliminate the policing-related crime drop 
hypotheses in favour of the security hypothesis. However, Eck and Maguire (2006) did not 
actually criticise POP, which is the primary focus of the current study; indeed, they even 
concluded that POP is a plausible policing strategy.  
Innovative and proactive policing strategies were cited as being amongst the more significant 
factors in the reduction of crime since the 1990s (Zimring, 2007; 2012; Weisburd et al., 
2017). With regard to POP, narrative reviews (Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 
2004) and systematic reviews (Mazerolle et al., 2006; Weisburd et al., 2010; Braga and 
Weisburd, 2012; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Gill et al., 2014; Braga et al., 2015; Telep and 
Weisburd, 2016) noted that POP reduces crime and disorder in certain circumstances and 
small areas (e.g. police beats). However, it is still not known whether and to what extent 
POP has influenced the crime drop at the PFA level in England and Wales since the 1990s, 
as per Weisburd and Majmundar’s (2018: 15) suggestion that “there has not been study of 
whether a problem-oriented approach used widely in a city [or a PFA] would reduce overall 
crime in that jurisdiction”. Therefore, it is clear that research on the role of POP in the crime 
drop at the PFA level in England and Wales - whilst controlling for other socio-demographic 
characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers in a PFA - 
represent a vital contribution to the existing policing and crime drop literature.  
1.2 Overarching aim and objectives of the study 
The overarching aim of the current study is to explore whether there is a relationship between 
the implementation of POP and burglaries1 2 at the PFA level in England and Wales between 
1988 and 2007/083. The following objectives have been developed in order to accomplish 
the overarching aim of the study: 
1. to critically review the existing literature concerning POP in order to identify the nature 
of POP and its role in crime reduction 
2. to critically review the existing literature concerning the crime drop to determine the 
nature and validity of existing empirical studies 
 
1 This thesis is interested in burglary with entry only and excludes attempted burglaries (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.8.1 for specific reasons). Therefore, ‘burglary’ refers to burglary with entry throughout the thesis. See 
Appendix 1.1 for the definition of burglary in England and Wales. 
2 Burglaries, mean number of burglaries, and mean number of burglary victimisations are used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis. 
3The reasons for choosing certain time periods (1988-2007/08 in Chapter 6; 1995-2003/04 in Chapter 7) to be 
analysed and the units of analysis can be found in Chapter 4, sections 4.9.2 and 4.9.3. 
4 
 
3. to identify highly POP-committed police forces 
4. to identify policing strategies of police forces over time 
5. to separately determine the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 
2003/04 
6. to examine the extent and nature of changes to both CSEW and police-recorded 
burglaries at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08 
7. to explore whether there was a relationship between POP and the drop in burglaries at 
the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08 
8. to examine whether the implementation of POP had a statistically significant effect on 
the mean number of burglary victimisations (also controlling for socio-demographic 
characteristics of households and PFAs) between 1995 and 2003/04 
9. to critically reflect upon the relationship between POP and the drop in burglary in 
England and Wales in light of the empirical evidence presented within this thesis in order 
to make appropriate theory and policy recommendations. 
The next step is to present the specific research questions that have guided the empirical 
component of the research. 
1.3 Research questions 
The overarching empirical research question of this study is: 
Was there a relationship between the implementation of POP and the fall in both 
Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and police recorded burglaries in 
England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08? 
The empirical component of the study is divided into three phases (chapters 5-7) to address 
the overarching empirical research question. Each phase answers a number of sub-questions 
to address the overarching empirical research question of this original research.  
Phase one (Chapter 5): 
• Which police forces in England and Wales were highly committed to POP?4 
• What were the policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales? 
• What was the level of commitment to POP by police forces in England and Wales in 
1997 and 2003/04? 
 
4 Whilst highly POP-committed police forces are identified, 10 hypotheses are proposed to be tested in Phase 
two (see Appendix 5.1). 
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Phase two (Chapter 6): 
Was the drop in both CSEW and police-recorded burglaries between 1988 and 
2007/08 much greater in highly POP-committed PFAs compared to their most 
similar PFAs which were not committed to POP to the same extent? 
Phase three (Chapter 7): 
Did POP have a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations (also considering household composition and PFA characteristics) 
between 1995 and 2003/04?  
1.4 Research methodology 
As an overarching strategy, this thesis uses ‘triangulation’ (Denzin, 1989) because no single 
dataset, theory or method is sufficient to analyse the effect of POP on burglaries. There are 
five types of triangulation (see below), which this section briefly explains along with data 
sources, analysis strategies and units of analysis that were used in each phase (chapter) of 
the empirical research.  
According to Denzin (1989), the various types of triangulation are as follows:  
• Data triangulation 
• Investigator triangulation  
• Theory triangulation 
• Methodological triangulation 
Thurmond (2001) adds data-analysis triangulation to this list. Briefly, data triangulation has 
three subtypes (time, space and person) about which researchers can collect data (Denzin, 
1989). Using more than one data analyst or interviewer in a study is considered investigator 
triangulation. A researcher can use multiple theories (related or otherwise) when testing a 
phenomenon, which is referred to as theory triangulation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for 
details). Methodological triangulation is somewhat confusing as it can refer to either data 
collection methods or research designs (Thurmond, 2001); the combination of interviews 
and questionnaires in a study could be considered an example of such (Denzin, 1989). 
Finally, data-analysis triangulation is the combination of two or more methods of analysing 
data (Thurmond, 2001). Here, the researcher uses triangulation to increase their confidence 
in the results of this present thesis (Jick, 1979).  
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Each phase (chapter) of the empirical research addresses different research questions using 
different methods (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9 for details). Briefly, Chapter 5 argues “simply 
counting the number of agencies that claim to be using … [a policing strategy] … is a poor 
indicator of the diffusion of the innovation” (Eck and Maguire, 2006: 245). However, 
previous research regarding the level of commitment of (all) police forces in England and 
Wales to POP is limited. Therefore, Chapter 5 makes an original contribution to current 
knowledge through identifying and collating highly POP-committed police forces using two 
indicators of commitment to POP that were selected by the researcher (data triangulation):  
• problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award 
schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 2008 5 
(https://popcenter.asu.edu/) 
• problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces in England and Wales as 
part of the large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes which applied 
a problem-oriented approach, such as  
a. the Safer Cities Programme (1988-1998) (Tilley and Webb, 1994; Ekblom et 
al., 1996; Sutton, 1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001) 
b. the Crime Reduction Programme (1999-2002) (Tilley et al., 1999) 
i. the Reducing Burglary Initiative (1999-2002) (Hope et al., 2004; 
Millie and Hough, 2004; Homel et al., 2004; Hirschfield, 2007)  
ii. the Targeted Policing Initiative (1999-2000) (Bullock et al., 2002; 
Bullock and Tilley, 2003).   
Chapter 5 also reviews the POP-related literature to complement and triangulate the findings 
from the analysis of the two indicators (data triangulation). Further, Chapter 5 revisits 
previous studies on the policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales and revises 
their findings (data triangulation). Finally, Chapter 5 determines the level of commitment of 
all police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. The limitations of the data sources 
used in Phase one and the reasons for selecting them can be found in Chapter 4 (sections 
4.3.1.3, 4.3.2.3 and 4.4).  
Based on the findings from the first phase, Chapter 6 is merely an initial exploration of the 
extent to which POP has, or has not, played a role in the burglary drop at the PFA level in 
 
5 The first problem-oriented project submission to the award schemes by a police force (the West Midlands) in 
England and Wales was in 1997. Since the last point in time to be analysed is 2007/08, the present study uses 
problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the award schemes between 1997 and 2008. 
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England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08. In other words, the goal is to obtain an initial 
indication of whether there is any relationship between POP commitment and burglary levels 
without testing the statistical significance of any given POP effect. Chapter 6 uses both the 
CSEW and police-recorded crime data (PRCD) to calculate the mean number of burglaries 
in 42 PFAs6 (data triangulation). Thereafter, trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries in 
highly POP-committed PFAs are compared to the trends in their most similar PFAs7, but 
which were not committed to POP to the same extent, between 1988 and 2007/08.  
In reality, there is a whole set of factors that may explain burglary trends. Taking account of 
these contextual factors, Chapter 7 goes one step further and analyses whether POP had a 
statistically significant effect on burglaries between 1995 and 2003/04. Chapter 7 starts by 
conducting a multilevel negative binomial regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Tseloni, 
2006) which controls for characteristics of households (which are identified by drawing upon 
opportunity-related theories) and PFAs (which are identified by drawing upon social 
disorganisation theory) that correlate well with crime (theory triangulation, see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2) and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA to examine 
whether POP had a statistically significant and independent effect on burglaries in 1997 and 
2003/04, separately8 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9.3 for particular reasons for selecting the 
years analysed). The data for this analysis comes from the CSEW (1998 and 2003/4), UK 
Censuses (1991 and 2001), and police workforce statistics (the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy - CIPFA) (data triangulation). Chapter 7 then tests bivariate 
correlations between POP and the mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04 using 
the CSEW sweeps (1996-2003/04)9 (data-analysis triangulation, see also Chapter 6).  
Households, and the PFAs where those households reside, were chosen as two units of 
analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. There are two main reasons for this decision. Firstly, burglary 
is a household crime (ONS, 2018); secondly, the structure of the data used is hierarchical 
due to the CSEW sampling selection (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1 for further information). 
 
6  There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales. However, City of London is merged with the 
Metropolitan in the CSEW. 
7 See Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2 for a definition. 
8  The independent variable of this analysis (the level of commitment of police forces to POP) has four 
categories: (3) high-commitment, (2) medium-commitment, (1) low-commitment, and (0) no-commitment. 
9 The independent variable of this analysis (POP status) has two categories: (1) POP forces, (0) No-POP forces. 
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1.5 Original contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes a number of original contributions to knowledge. Firstly, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge it is the only empirical study to identify and collate highly POP-
committed police forces in England and Wales over time (Chapter 5). Secondly, in criticising 
previous research on policing styles of police forces over time, it provides crucial revisions 
to the findings of earlier studies (Chapter 5). Thirdly, it develops an original methodology 
to determine the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, 
separately (Chapter 5). Fourthly, it uses ten sweeps of the CSEW (1996-2007/08) along with 
PRCD (1988-2007/08) to investigate, for the first time, the relationship between POP and 
the burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08 (Chapter 
6). The fifth original contribution to knowledge is related to repeat victimisation (Chapter 
6). Previous research (Thorpe, 2007) examined whether there is a relationship between the 
drop in repeat burglary victimisations and the overarching burglary drop at the national level. 
However, this thesis focusses on the relationship between POP and the drop in repeat 
burglary victimisations at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1995 and 2007/08 
for the first time. The final original contribution of the thesis concerns the exploration of 
whether POP had a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations in England and Wales between 1995 and 2003/04 in two steps (Chapter 7). 
The first step takes the level of commitment of police forces to POP into account and controls 
for the effects of characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers 
per 1000 residents in a PFA to test whether POP had a statistically significant and 
independent impact on burglaries in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. The second step 
examines the extent of bivariate correlations between POP and burglaries from 1995 to 
2003/04. 
1.6 Overview of chapters 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first two substantive chapters (2 and 3) review the 
previous literature regarding POP and the crime drop, respectively. Specifically, Chapter 2 
is concerned with the theoretical and practical aspects of POP. It first sets out the theoretical 
framework of the study. Secondly, it briefly reviews the history of policing, including any 
associated circumstances, which paved the way for the birth of POP and the developments 
regarding the rise of POP in the UK. Thirdly, it notes the major objectives and strategies of 
policing and POP. Fourthly, it discusses the similarities and differences between POP and a 
number of proactive policing strategies. Fifthly, it argues how one can measure the 
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effectiveness of POP and explains the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment 
(SARA) framework (Eck and Spelman, 1987), which is the most common way of 
implementing POP, in detail. Sixthly, it reviews previous research concerning the 
effectiveness of POP. Finally, factors limiting and facilitating the implementation of POP 
are summarised.  
Chapter 3 begins with an introduction to the crime drop phenomenon, followed by a critical 
review of the most commonly cited crime drop hypotheses in six parts: (1) economic, (2) 
offender-based, (3) substance abuse, (4) security and opportunity-related, (5) criminal justice 
system, and (6) policing-related hypotheses. In doing so, Chapter 3 eliminates implausible 
hypotheses for the crime drop in England and Wales in order to accurately assess the 
relationship between POP and the burglary drop in England and Wales. It also summarises 
burglary risk and protective factors.  
Chapter 4 explains the methodology adopted in this study. It begins with an overview of the 
data used, and the strengths and limitations of those data sources are discussed. Variable 
selection for Chapter 7 is described in detail by referring to relevant theories (routine activity 
and social disorganisation). It finally outlines the analysis plan (research design) and 
elaborates how the three phases of the empirical research address the empirical research 
questions.  
Chapter 5 (Phase one) firstly identifies and collates highly POP-committed police forces 
using the two indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher (see Section 1.4). 
It also reviews the related literature to supplement and triangulate the findings from the 
analysis of the two indicators. Secondly, it revisits previous research on the policing 
strategies adopted by police forces over time and revises their findings. Thirdly, it determines 
the level of commitment of (all) police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. 
Throughout the chapter, 10 hypotheses are proposed for testing in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 6 (Phase two) is an initial exploration of the extent to which POP has or has not 
played a role in the burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 
2007/08. It starts with an overview of crime trends. It then explores whether there is a 
relationship between the implementation of POP and the drop in both CSEW and PRCD 
burglaries at the PFA level between 1988 and 2007/08. For this, it compares the trends in 
burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs identified in Chapter 5 with the trends in 
burglaries in their most similar PFAs that were not committed to POP to the same extent. In 
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other words, it tests the 10 hypotheses proposed in Chapter 5 along with two additional 
hypotheses regarding repeat victimisation before conducting a comprehensive statistical 
analysis in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 7 (Phase three) starts by reporting descriptive statistics of the variables to be used 
in multilevel negative binomial regression modelling. Secondly, it employs principal 
component analysis (PCA) to eliminate the multicollinearity problem (which refers to high 
correlation amongst the PFA level continuous variables) and ready the data to conduct 
multilevel negative binomial regression modelling to identify whether POP had a statistically 
significant and independent effect on the mean number of burglary victimisations whilst 
controlling for characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA in England and Wales in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Thirdly, it 
tests bivariate correlations between POP and the mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 
2003/04. Finally, it presents the findings of the above.  
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which firstly returns to the original aim of this study. 
Secondly, it summarises its main findings. Thirdly, the limitations of the study are presented. 
Fourthly, theoretical contributions of the study are provided according to four categories: (1) 
POP-committed senior leadership in policing, (2) policies targeting repeat victimisation, (3) 
the disconnect between theory and implementation of POP and other factors, and (4) 
increasing the number of police officers. Fifthly, policing-related policy and methodological 
implications are discussed. Sixthly, it notes the original contributions to knowledge that the 
current study has made. Finally, it suggests directions for future research, with the chapter 
finishing with a number of concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the theoretical and practical aspects of problem-oriented 
policing (POP) and aims to identify a gap in knowledge in relation to the effect of POP on 
crime. The chapter begins with the theoretical framework underpinning both POP and the 
study. Secondly, it briefly reviews the history of policing, including the circumstances, 
which paved the way to the birth of POP, and the developments regarding the rise of POP in 
the UK. Thirdly, the chapter describes major objectives and operational strategies of policing 
(in general) and POP (in particular). Fourthly, it discusses similarities and differences 
between POP and a number of proactive policing strategies. Fifthly, it discusses how one 
can measure the effectiveness of POP and defines the methodology of problem-solving, 
namely the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) framework (Eck and 
Spelman, 1987), which is the most common way of implementing POP. Sixthly, the chapter 
reviews previous research to have considered the effectiveness of POP to identify the related 
gap in knowledge. This review leads the reader and the researcher to the problems with the 
implementation of POP, whilst finally reporting the factors that can help overcome them.  
2.2 Theoretical framework 
“While police officers are essential entry points to social services for many people, 
they are best positioned to prevent crimes by focusing on the situational opportunities 
for offending rather than attempting to manipulate socio-economic conditions that 
are the subjects of other governmental agencies. Theories that deal with the “root 
causes” of crime focus on interventions that are beyond the scope of most problem-
oriented projects. Theories that deal with opportunities for crime and how likely 
offenders, potential victims, and others make decisions based on perceived 
opportunities have greater utility in designing effective problem-oriented policing 
interventions” (Braga, 2008: 4-5). 
In addition to the justification made in the above quote for using opportunity-related theories 
in designing effective POP activities, traditional criminological theories (e.g. social control, 
strain, social learning, and labelling) “were of little practical value to police” (Scott et al., 
2008: 234; see also Eck and Madensen, 2013) and were unable to explain both increases and 
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decreases in crime rates (Aebi and Linde, 2010). In contrast, opportunity-related theories 
(namely routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), rational choice theory (Cornish 
and Clarke, 1986) and situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980; 1997)) were used as 
theoretical frameworks to explore both increases in crime rates in the 1960s (e.g. Wilkins, 
1964, cited in Clarke, 1997), and decreases in crime rates in the 1990s (e.g. van Dijk et al., 
2012; Farrell et al., 2014). Scholars (e.g. Tseloni, 2006) have also used opportunity-related 
theories (particularly routine activity theory) in conjunction with social disorganisation 
theory to model crimes over household and area characteristics because while the routine 
activity theory explains why people become victims of crime at the micro-level (e.g. 
household), social disorganisation theory does so at the macro-level (e.g. police force area).  
The integration between POP, this present study, and opportunity-related theories and social 
disorganisation theory is twofold. First, POP draws upon opportunity-related theories to alter 
environmental conditions that give rise to crime and to reduce opportunities for offenders in 
order to prevent and control crime (Reisig, 2010). Second, Chapter 7 of this present thesis 
conducts various statistical analyses to examine the effect of POP on burglaries which are 
affected by factors both at the micro-level (e.g. household) and area level (e.g. police force 
area). Therefore, Chapter 7 draws in particular upon routine activity theory to identify 
burglary risk factors at the household level (e.g. household income) and social 
disorganisation theory at the macro-level (e.g. poverty).  
Finally, it can be argued that the use of the “New Public Management” (NPM) concept 
(Hood, 1995; Hoggett, 1996) has increased the prevalence of POP or that POP is a reflection 
of policies that draw upon the NPM concept, as NPM promotes an innovative problem-
solving management model – like POP – to effect organisational change in policing (Ashby 
et al., 2007).  
Considering the above discussion and the overarching aim of the thesis (i.e. exploring the 
role of POP on the burglary drop in England and Wales), the present thesis uses multiple 
theories (theory triangulation, see Section 1.4) to approach the analyses from multiple 
perspectives (Denzin, 1989). In other words, this thesis uses opportunity-related theories, 
social disorganisation theory and the NPM concept as a theoretical framework, considering 
their suitability in designing POP interventions and explaining the crime drop of the 1990s 
and the introduction of POP to the policing agenda in England and Wales. Sections 2.2.1-
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2.2.5 explain these theories in detail and how they relate to POP and police activity on the 
ground. 
2.2.1 Routine activity theory 
Routine activity theory was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979). Its basic argument is 
that if there is not a capable guardian (e.g. police, neighbour), handler (e.g. parent, relative, 
peer, teacher), or manager (e.g. store clerk, owner of a place, agent) to protect targets (e.g. 
cash, laptops, cell phones, people), then motivated offenders will commit crime. Apart from 
these elements, some tools ease the commission of a crime (e.g. guns, cars) or help prevent 
crime from occurring (e.g. gates, fences). In the absence of tools for offenders and the 
presence of tools for guardians, crime is more likely to be prevented. Moreover, the routine 
daily activities of people (or lifestyles) influence the convergence of these elements (capable 
guardian, target, and motivated offender) to cause crime to occur and determine the visibility 
and accessibility of targets at particular times. The relationship between this theory and POP 
comes from the fact that during the analysis phase of the SARA framework, crime analysts 
collect data about these three elements to identify which component is most susceptible to 
police intervention (Read and Tilley, 2000). Thereafter, police officers develop tailor-made 
responses to address those elements to prevent crime. For example, police forces may work 
with other government agencies to add streetlights to prevent burglaries by reducing 
opportunities for offenders at some particular location (Braga, 2008). In particular, Santos 
(2015: 108) argued that routine activity theory is one of the cornerstones of police crime 
analyst work and contended that “police crime analysis is fundamentally grounded in 
applying Routine Activity Theory and its concepts through the practical perspective of the 
theory, the adoption of problem-oriented policing strategies, and the focus of police crime 
reduction on geography and the clustering of crime by place”. 
2.2.2 Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory was developed by Cornish and Clarke (1986) to provide a conceptual 
framework for situational crime prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2008), as will be discussed 
in the following section. This theory is often combined with routine activity theory to explain 
criminal behaviour during criminal events (Clarke and Felson, 1993). It also has an apparent 
affinity with the deterrence doctrine as both apply utilitarian philosophy to crime (Akers, 
1990). According to Cornish and Clarke (2008: 24), the assumptions of the theory are as 
follows: 
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• Criminal behaviour is purposive. 
• Criminal behaviour is rational. 
• Criminal decision-making is crime specific. 
• Criminal choices fall into two broad groups: ‘involvement’ and ‘event’ decisions. 
• There are separate stages of involvement. 
• Criminal events unfold in a sequence of steps and decisions. 
However, the theory does not provide a complete explanation of criminality. Instead, it is 
concerned with how to prevent or disrupt crime and examine crime from offenders’ 
perspectives (Cornish and Clarke, 2008). An effective approach for the police is to be crime-
specific when analysing offender decision making and choice selection. Particularly, police 
crime analysts should consider offenders’ decisions regarding different steps of participation 
in crimes separately. For instance, they should differentiate offenders’ decisions regarding 
initial involvement in the crime and choice of target (Cornish and Clarke, 2008). Following 
the analysis, police officers can develop tailor-made responses to crime problems to 
eliminate opportunities for perpetrators and intervene in their motives at the response stage 
of the SARA framework. For example, police forces may implement traditional law 
enforcement tactics (e.g. directed patrols, crackdowns, and stop-and-search interrogations) 
to increase the risk of arrest for burglary or drug offences in a neighbourhood (Reisig, 2010). 
2.2.3 Situational crime prevention  
“There has been some alignment between POP and Situational Crime Prevention, 
which have affinities with one another. Those with interest in SCP have seen POP as 
a vehicle for its implementation. Those with interest in POP have seen SCP as a major 
resource for working out what to do in dealing with problems” (Tilley and Scott, 2012: 
128; see also Eck and Madensen, 2013). 
The theories discussed above are cognate theories of situational crime prevention (Tilley and 
Scott, 2012). While routine activity theory considers the situations that cause crime-related 
problems from the perspective of problem solvers, situational crime prevention looks at 
conditions from the perspectives of offenders (Scott et al., 2008: 236); that is, situational 
crime prevention as summarised by Clarke and Eck (2003): 
• increases the perceived effort that perpetrators must make to commit a crime 
• increases the perceived risks that perpetrators must take in completing a crime 
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• reduces the anticipated rewards that perpetrators expect to obtain from commission of a 
crime 
• removes excuses that perpetrators may use to justify their actions. 
Although POP and situational crime prevention have different origins and purposes (Tilley, 
2008), they aim to improve the effectiveness of the police in crime control (Hope, 1994). 
While situational crime prevention is a set of methods (see Section 2.7.1.3.1 for 25 
techniques of situational crime prevention) that the police can use to reduce crime (Clarke 
and Eck, 2003), POP is an approach or a philosophy that uses those methods to change the 
mindset of the police (Goldstein, 1990). For example, the police may work with other 
government agencies to fit gates in alleyways, which is an effective way of reducing 
burglaries (Bowers et al., 2004; Sidebottom et al., 2018). Partnerships between police and 
other government agencies have another crucial role in crime prevention, as the police 
themselves do not have a monopoly on crime prevention. According to Clarke (1997), a 
closer relationship between POP and situational crime prevention can help build partnerships 
between the police and other government agencies and therefore help the police change their 
mindset.  
Overall, opportunity-related theories have had a remarkable influence on policing (Eck and 
Madensen, 2013). For the police, it is more practical to develop a response to a crime 
problem by altering the conditions that create opportunities at the micro-level (Braga, 2014). 
For example, an analysis of 59 projects submitted to the Goldstein award scheme shows that 
55% of the projects were place-based projects (Eck and Madensen, 2013) and where POP 
applied situational crime prevention methods at a local level, they were successful in 
reducing crime (Clarke, 1997). However, this is not to say that the police only deal with 
crime at the micro-level; they may also develop partnerships with other agencies to deal with 
factors affecting crime at the macro-level (Bullock et al., 2006). 
2.2.4 Social disorganisation theory 
The aforementioned opportunity-related theories predominantly focus on micro-level risk 
factors. Although some aspects of social disorganisation theory also operate at the micro-
level (e.g. street), it is usually used to explore the underlying causes of crime problems at 
the macro-level. The theory suggests that structural factors, such as “economic status, ethnic 
heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption”, have an impact on crime within 
an area (Sampson and Groves, 1989: 774).  
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Social disorganisation theory is not directly related to POP and is limited in terms of 
providing insights into how the police can improve factors that give rise to crime (Reisig, 
2010). However, the theory can be used at the response stage of the SARA framework where 
the police and other community organisations work together to alter criminogenic 
neighbourhood conditions, as suggested by Goldstein (1990). The police may also work 
directly with residents to strengthen collaboration and increase informal social controls 
(Sampson and Grove, 1989).  
2.2.5 New public management 
Scholars have demonstrated that reactive policing does not help to reduce crime (see Eck 
and Spelman, 1987). Accordingly, a number of reform efforts in policing (and in other 
agencies in the public sector), such as community policing (Alderson, 1977) and POP 
(Goldstein, 1979), have emerged since the 1970s. With the advent of these reforms, police 
officers are expected to do their jobs in a proactive manner, as POP suggests (scanning crime 
problems, conducting a comprehensive analysis of the crime problems, developing a tailor-
made response to the crime problems, and assessing the effect of the responses on the crime 
problems (Goldstein, 1990)). It can be therefore argued that POP is an example of the NPM 
reforms that aim to increase the quality and efficacy of public institutions (Hood, 1995; 
Hoggett, 1996; Andersson and Tengblad, 2009). In addition, a number of reforms in policing, 
which reflect the NPM concept, have influenced the approach adopted by the police service 
in the UK since the 1990s (Cope et al., 1997; Butterfield et al., 2005; Ashby et al., 2007): 
• Sheehy Inquiry (an inquiry into police responsibilities and rewards) 
• White paper on police reform 
• Police and Magistrates’ Court Act 1994 
• Home Office review of police core and ancillary tasks.  
These reforms addressed issues regarding the organisational structure and core functions of 
policing. For example, the Sheehy Inquiry concentrated on whether the police should be 
responsible for the guarding of premises and people. Therefore, it can be argued that there 
might have been some consequences of these reforms aligning with routine activity theory 
that the police use to determine their tactics, and thus where police resources will be targeted. 
In addition, according to the Sheehy Inquiry “Performance indicators are being put in place 
to measure the efficacy of forces and individual officers and to prioritise community needs 
as opposed to organisational needs. This involves a renewed commitment to working with 
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other social services and local government departments to tackle local crime and social 
problems. The multi-agency approach is an explicit acknowledgement that the police cannot 
solve crime problems on their own” (McLaughlin and Murji, 1993: 101). Therefore, it can 
be speculated that these reforms pushed the police to deal with certain risk factors at the 
macro-level, which is the concern of social disorganisation theory.  
With regard to the integration between POP and NPM, instead of adopting a hierarchical 
traditional management style, NPM stresses a decentralised, innovative problem-solving 
management model (Butterfield et al., 2005) such as POP (Goldstein, 1990). In addition, the 
essential components of NPM correspond with certain elements of POP, such as: 
• increasing accountability 
• high performance (e.g. increasing the effectiveness of police forces in terms of 
preventing burglaries) 
• restructuring bureaucratic agencies (e.g. police service) 
• redefining organisational missions (e.g. being proactive not reactive, engaging with the 
community) 
• decentralising decision making (e.g. making fuller use of rank-and-file police officers) 
(Goldstein, 1990; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). 
In sum, this study is concerned with POP, which has affinities with routine activity and 
rational choice theories and the situational crime prevention perspective. In particular, the 
present study draws upon routine activity theory and social disorganisation theory to identify 
burglary risk factors at the household- and police force area levels. It also uses the NPM 
concept to relate the reforms in policing and the advent of POP in the UK since the 1980s. 
2.3 Brief history of policing  
Societal, demographic and economic changes arising from the urbanisation and expansion 
of the population during the industrial revolution necessitated the development of policing. 
British society, particularly its elites, were worried about being victimised by poor and 
unemployed people in London (Emsley, 2008). As a result, Sir Robert Peel, the then chief 
of the London Metropolitan Police, introduced the Metropolis Police Act to the House of 
Commons in April 1829 (Taylor, 1997). After lengthy discussions about the Act, Sir Peel 
established the London Metropolitan Police, the first modern police force, in 1829 to restore 
“the social cohesion that was claimed to have been lost through urbanisation and 
industrialisation” (Rawlings, 2012: 1). Peel also aimed to create an impartial and impersonal 
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police image and win respect within the community (Miller, 1977, cited in Reisig, 2010). 
Peel’s Act was followed by the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, the 1839 Rural 
Constabulary Act, and the 1856 County and Borough Police Act, which paved the way for 
the establishment of police constabularies (forces) in all English counties and boroughs 
(Taylor, 1997), and indeed many American and European cities. 
Peel’s main success was to establish police forces that deal with crime and disorder 
problems, which is distinct from the objectives of an army. Peel’s nine principles regarding 
law enforcement can be cited as follows (Reith, 1948: 64): 
1. The primary mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. 
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval 
of police actions. 
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance 
of the law to be able to obtain and maintain the respect of the public. 
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes 
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force. 
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by 
consistently demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law. 
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law 
or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is 
found to be insufficient. 
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives 
reality to the historical tradition that the police are the public and the public are 
the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-
time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of 
community welfare and existence. 
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never 
appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary. 
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible 
evidence of police action in dealing with it. 
Over the last four decades, a number of innovative and proactive policing strategies that 
might be considered related to Peelian principles have emerged. They include community 
policing (Peelian principles 3-5, and especially 7), intelligence-led policing (Peelian 
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principles 1, 4, and 9), hot spots policing (Peelian principles 1 and 9) and POP. Indeed, 
Kirkby (1997:3) speculated that “Perhaps the earliest recorded champion of problem-
oriented policing was Robert Peel in 1829.”  
2.3.1 Towards POP 
Scholars divided the history of American policing into three eras: (1) the political era, (2) 
the reform era, and (3) the community problem-solving era (Kelling and Moore, 1988; 
Reisig, 1990). In the political era (the 1840s-the early 1900s), and likewise in London, 
unified police forces were established in New York, Chicago, and other big cities (Reisig, 
2010). However, there were two salient differences between them, although early American 
policing did replicate Peel’s principles. Firstly, there were close ties between the police and 
politicians in America, as opposed to England, as American police were decentralised and 
operated under the authority of local municipalities and politicians who had the power to 
appoint police officers. The relationship between the police and politicians was based on 
mutual interest. While the politicians maintain the police in office, the police helped the 
politicians by encouraging citizens to vote for them. By contrast, the English police were 
centralised and functioned under the management of police chiefs who were appointed by 
the central authority of the Crown (Kelling and Moore, 1998). Secondly, the main focus of 
American police was that of sustaining security and law enforcement, while English police 
focussed on peace and crime prevention (Stevens, 2003, cited in Sozer, 2009). 
In the reform era (the 1930s-the late 1970s), American policing focussed on crime-fighting 
rather than public service (Kelling and Moore, 1988). The main strategies adopted to fight 
crime were random car and foot patrols, rapid response to calls, and follow-up investigation. 
The police were insulated from political influence as the appointment of police officers by 
politicians was partly eliminated (Palmiotto, 2000, cited in Sozer, 2009). However, the 
relationship between the police and the community was not strong. Besides, crime rates, 
complaints and protests about unfair police practices had increased. Consequently, national 
commissions, such as the President’s Commission and the Kerner Commission, were 
established by the then American government to address these issues. In light of the 
recommendations of these commissions, comprehensive studies on policing (e.g. the Kansas 
City Preventive Patrol Experiment), which were funded by civil foundations (e.g. the Police 
Executive Research Forum), were carried out to reduce crime rates and recover the 
relationship between the police and the community (Kelling and Moore, 1988).   
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The community problem-solving era began with Goldstein’s (1979) seminal work Improving 
Policing: A Problem-oriented Approach, which suggested that the police should deal with 
underlying factors that create recurrent problems proactively rather than just dealing with 
individual incidents. In the meantime, a number of innovative policing strategies, such as 
community policing, intelligence-led policing and hot spots policing, have emerged. 
Although different theories underpin these approaches (see Section 2.6), some scholars (e.g. 
Sparrow, 2016) suggested that they are reduced forms of POP (see also Sherman and Eck, 
2002; Eck and Gallagher, 2016).  
2.3.2 Birth of POP 
POP is based upon Goldstein’s criticism regarding the situation of policing in the reform era. 
Goldstein first argued that, as in other top-down bureaucratic systems, the police were 
interested in internal procedures or means (e.g. the structure, staffing, and equipping of the 
police) instead of developing effective strategies to achieve the goals of policing itself. 
Goldstein called this ‘means-over-ends syndrome’ (Goldstein, 1979; 1990). That is, police 
forces deviated from their main aim, namely that of “tackling recurrent police-relevant 
problems [e.g. repeat burglary victimisations] of concern to the local community” 
(Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010: 1).  
Secondly, Goldstein discussed the ineffectiveness of the professional model of policing 
(incident-driven policing), which applies visible car and foot patrols, rapid response to calls, 
and follow-up investigation (Goldstein, 1990). These methods were thought to be the most 
effective way of deterring offenders from committing crime in the reform era (Scott et al., 
2016). However, Goldstein (1979) criticised the fact that they focus on individual incidents 
instead of solving recurring problems. Eck and Spelman (1987: 35) summarised the findings 
concerning the professional model of policing as follows:  
“First, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment questioned the usefulness of 
random patrol in cars (Kelling et al., 1974). Second, studies of response time 
undermined the premise that the police must rapidly send officers to all calls (Kansas 
City Police Department, 1980; Spelman and Brown, 1984). Third, research suggested, 
and experiments confirmed, that the public does not always expect a fast response by 
police to non-emergency calls (Farmer, 1981; McEwen, Connors, and Cohen, 1984). 
Fourth, studies showed that officers and detectives are limited in their abilities to 
successfully investigate crimes (Greenwood, Petersilia, and Chaiken, 1977; Eck, 
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1982). And, fifth, research showed that detectives need not follow up every reported 
unsolved crime (Greenberg, Yu, and Lang, 1973; Eck, 1979). In short, most serious 
crimes were unaffected by the standard police actions designed to control them. 
Further, the public did not notice reductions on patrol, response speed to non-
emergencies, or lack of follow-up investigations”. 
The third critique of the reform era by Goldstein was about lack of community engagement 
in crime prevention. He argued that community engagement is crucial to learn what the 
community wants from the police. “A community must police itself. The police can, at best, 
only assist in that task” (Goldstein, 1990: 21). However, he also discussed to what degree 
the community could affect the decision-making process (ibid: 25).  
Fourthly, Goldstein criticised the role of rank-and-file officers in the reform era. He 
suggested that rank-and-file police officers should constantly take part in the fight against 
crime. However, the education of these officers had been neglected, and they had not been 
given sufficient authority to solve appropriate problems; police resources had not been used 
to improve their talents. Goldstein suggested that providing more freedom to those officers, 
who know community problems first-hand, could enhance the crime prevention capacity of 
the police and encourage officers to be more willing to solve problems within their 
communities.  
Goldstein provided further criticism of the reform era where he argued that the power of the 
police subculture against innovation had not been sufficiently recognised (Goldstein, 1990). 
In addition, the police did not consider existing problems holistically. Goldstein, therefore, 
suggested that police organisations should have a plan to do so and determine the 
implications of that plan for the police service (Goldstein, 1990). 
Based on the above criticisms, Goldstein (1990) defined POP as a proactive policing strategy 
that emphasises the importance of understanding the underlying conditions of recurring 
problems rather than targeting individual incidents when they occur (Goldstein, 1990). It is 
a scientific approach (Scott, 2000) which involves the following key processes to accomplish 
the major objectives of policing in general, and POP in particular, as discussed in Section 
2.4 in detail: 
• identifying problems 
• analysing problems 
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• the search for alternatives (developing tailor-made responses) 
• reflections on implementation efforts (Goldstein, 1990). 
2.3.3 Rise of POP in the UK 
Police forces, especially in the US and the UK, have been implementing POP since the 1980s 
(Leigh et al., 1996; 1998; Clarke, 1997; Bullock et al., 2006; Boba and Crank, 2008; 
Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010; Tilley, 2010; Weisburd et al., 2010; Tilley and Scott, 2012; 
Eck, 2014; South Yorkshire Police, 2018). The UK government has promoted the problem-
solving approach either implicitly or explicitly since the 1980s (Bullock et al., 2006; Tilley 
and Scott, 2012). For example, Bullock et al. (2006) argued that several developments 
regarding the ‘police reform’ agenda under the Blair government were equivalent to POP, 
even though they were not framed explicitly as such. The Blair Government emphasised (a) 
improving the performance of the police service, (b) making the police more flexible, (c) 
increasing capacity and reducing bureaucracy, (d) training and development, and (e) 
investing in communications, IT, forensic and best practice (see Section 2.2.5). Tilley (2002) 
summarised key developments that contributed to the popularity of POP amongst the police 
forces in England and Wales (see Table 2.1, see also Laycock and Clarke, 2001; Newburn, 
2002). Particularly, Ron Clarke’s studies on situational crime prevention, which is one of 
the theories underpinning POP “got a bit of wind behind it” (Mayhew, 2016: 4) in the early 
1980s and “materially contributed to a number of policy initiatives” after the ‘nothing works’ 
era (Laycock and Clarke, 2001: 237).  
Table 2.1: Key developments in crime prevention in England and Wales, 1976-2001 
Development Year 
The Effectiveness of Sentencing: A Review of the Literature 1976 
Crime as Opportunity 1976 
Designing out Crime 1980 
Co-ordinating Crime Prevention Efforts 1980 
‘Situational Crime Prevention’ 1980 
First British Crime Survey report 1983 
Crime Prevention Unit Set up 1983 
Home Office Standing Conference 1983 
Home Office Circular 8/84, Crime Prevention 1984 
First Crime Prevention Unit Paper 1985 
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Table 2.1: Key developments in crime prevention in England and Wales, 1976-2001 
(continued) 
Five Towns Initiative 1986 
Gas and Suicide 1988 
Getting the Best out of Crime Analysis 1988 
Safer Cities 1988 
Crime Concern  1988 
First Kirkholt Report, Beginning of Repeat Victimisation Focus 1988 
Crash Helmets and Motorbike Theft  1989 
Home Office Circular 44/90 1990 
Morgan Report  1991 
Police Research Group Established  1992 
Single Regeneration Budget 1993 
First CCTV Challenge 1995 
Repeat Victimisation Task Force Set up 1996 
First Issues of International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 1996 
National Training Organisation 1998 
Home Office Research Study 187 1998 
Policing and Reducing Crime Unit Established 1998 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and Guidance  1998 
Beating Crime 1998 
Crime Reduction Programme 1999 
Safety in Numbers 1999 
Crime Targets Task Force 1999 
Foresight Programme 1999 
Calling Time on Crime 2000 
The Home Office Policing and Crime Reduction Directorate  2000 
Appointment of Regional Crime Directors 2000 
Preparation and Publication of ‘Toolkits’ to Deal with Specified Problems 2001 
Sources: Tilley (2002); Laycock and Clarke (2001) 
The then Conservative Government funded, for example, the Safer Cities Programme as part 
of a broader programme (Actions for Cities) to tackle a wide range of crimes (e.g. repeat 
residential burglary). The first phase of the programme was inaugurated in 1988 and ended 
in 1995 and covered 20 cities or boroughs (in London) at the local level in England and 
Wales. All Safer Cities projects intended to use a problem-oriented (multi-agency or 
partnership) approach and widely applied target hardening, community-oriented, and 
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offender-oriented strategies (Ekblom et al., 1996). Of those Safer Cities projects (n = 2,300), 
33.3% targeted residential burglary; 3.9% targeted theft from vehicles, and 2.6% targeted 
theft of vehicles. Overall, 500 schemes targeted domestic burglary (ibid: 5-6). 
Large-scale problem-oriented projects indeed prospered after the New Labour Government 
came into power in 1997. They legislated the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 (Laycock and 
Clarke, 2001), which was informed by a comprehensive literature review and which 
summarised what works in crime reduction (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998). Then, the Crime 
Reduction Programme (CRP), which was an evidence-based and cost-effective policy 
programme in crime reduction, was instigated in 1999 (Tilley et al., 1999; Hamilton-Smith 
and Kent, 2005). The CRP was the “best resourced and most comprehensive effort for 
driving down crime ever attempted in a Western developed country” (Homel et al., 2004: v). 
Similar to the Safer Cities Programme, much of the CRP followed the logic of POP (Bullock 
and Tilley, 2003). Of those projects, 246 targeted domestic burglary (see Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2: The Crime Reduction Programme schemes 
Initiative 
Number of 
Projects 
Initiative 
Number of 
Projects 
CCTV 683 Neighbourhood wardens 85 
Targeted policing 59 Vehicle crime 13 
Reducing domestic burglary 246 On Track 26 
Drug arrest referrals 1 Sentencing 3 
Treatment of offenders 1 Summer play schemes 147 
Effective school 
management 
38 Design against crime 4 
Violence against women 58 Distraction burglary projects 3 
Youth inclusion 70 
Distraction Burglary 
Taskforce 
1 
Locks for pensioners 1 Tackling prostitution 11 
Source: Bullock and Tilley (2003) 
The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) merits special mention here. It was intended (a) to 
reduce repeat burglaries nationally by targeting hot spots using a problem-solving approach, 
and (b) to roll out effective anti-burglary projects (Tilley et al., 1999; Homel et al., 2004). 
The RBI was comprised of three funding rounds. The first round started in 1998, and it 
included 63 projects (also known as Strategic Development Projects (SDPs)). The second 
round began in 1999 and funded 161 projects. The third round was a ‘rolling round’, which 
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started in April 2000 (Homel et al., 2004). Three consortia evaluated the first round of 
projects (the Midlands, the Northern and the Southern) (Hope et al., 2004; Millie and Hough, 
2004; Hirschfield, 2007). Further to the CRP and RBI, the government funded the Targeted 
Policing Initiative (TPI), which funded 59 projects. Bullock and Tilley (2003) listed some 
of these projects (see Table 2.3). They aimed to roll out the problem-solving approach in 
England and Wales, but did not primarily target burglary. In sum, it could be argued that 
POP had become the primary way of policing in England and Wales as nearly all police 
services purported to endorse POP by 2000 (Read and Tilley, 2000). 
Table 2.3: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects  
Project 
Bringing evidence-based POP to Knowsley (Merseyside) 
Implementation of the National Intelligence Model 
Using POP in a rural area 
Cycle theft in Cambridge 
Gang-related shootings in Manchester 
Violent crime linked to alcohol abuse in Nottingham 
Alcohol-related violence in Cornwall 
Alcohol-related street violence in Cardiff 
The stolen goods market in a northern town 
The stolen goods market in a southern town 
Racially motivated crime in Hounslow, Greenwich, Merton and Tower Hamlets  
Hate crime in Southwark 
Hate crime in Brighton and Hove 
Anti-social and low-level criminal behaviour in a large housing estate in Hull 
Drug use and drug-related crime in Dalston 
Vehicle crime in Islington, Camden and Southwark 
Crime and disorder in remote rural locations in Northumbria 
Vehicle crime in Calderdale 
Source: Bullock and Tilley (2003) 
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2.4 Major objectives of policing and POP 
Fundamental objectives for the police that were proposed by Sir Peel and characterised in 
Goldstein’s seminal work (Policing a Free Society), as cited in Scott (2000: 83), are as 
follows: 
• to prevent and control conduct threatening to life and property (including serious 
crime) 
• to aid crime victims and protect people in danger of physical harm 
• to protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right to free speech and assembly 
• to facilitate the movement of people and vehicles 
• to assist those who cannot care for themselves, including the intoxicated, the 
addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the elderly, and the young 
• to resolve conflict between individuals, between groups, or between citizens and 
their government 
• to identify problems that have the potential of becoming more serious for 
individuals, the police or the government 
• to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community. 
Scott (2000) further stated that while the police mission can be characterised in other ways, 
Goldstein’s characterisation is still a complete and suitable reference for managing police 
practices in general, although there are police forces with specialised roles (see also Sparrow, 
2015). The same author suggested that “[t]he entire edifice of problem-oriented policing is 
built on the foregoing ideas about the fundamental objectives of the police [as] [t]he ultimate 
aim of problem-oriented policing is to continually make the police better at accomplishing 
each of the above objectives to better prevent crime, to better assist victims, to make 
communities feel safer, and so forth.” (Scott, 2000: 84-85).  
2.4.1 Organisational characteristics 
Indeed, the objectives listed in Section 2.4 seem to be the ones at the operational level. At 
the strategic or organisational level, the principal aim of POP is to change the mindset of 
policing from one of being reactive to proactive (Goldstein, 2018), which can be achieved 
by changing (1) organisational structure, (2) organisational culture, and (3) management 
style (Eck and Maguire, 2006).  
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2.4.1.1 Organisational structure 
Police organisations traditionally have a military-type hierarchical system (Bullock et al., 
2006). However, Goldstein (1990) stresses that a flattened hierarchical system that gives 
more authority and flexibility to frontline officers is needed to reply to problems within the 
community more efficiently (see also Eck and Spelman, 1987).  
2.4.1.2 Organisational culture 
Attempts of introducing innovative behaviour in the public sector have never disappeared 
but rather have always been a challenge (Osborn and Brown, 2011). Police organisations are 
not an exception (Goldstein, 1990, 2003; Scott, 2003) because police officers always 
consider crime fighting, rapid response to calls and arresting offenders to be ‘real police 
work’ and they resist changing their views (Goldstein, 1990). When they practice an 
innovative strategy, they do it superficially (Weisburd et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important 
to be able to manage changes.  
Lewin’s three-stage model (1947) of organisational change, which took form after his death 
(Cummings et al., 2016), has been popularly used to implement new strategies within 
organisations. The model comprises three steps: (1) unfreezing the present way of working, 
(2) changing to a new way of working, and (3) refreezing the new way of working, which 
must be achieved by not only senior management but also others involved. An example of 
the first step would be to convince officers that most of the reactive strategies to address the 
underlying causes of crime will inevitably fail, and the role of police is not just one of 
catching the criminals. In the second step, the specific aims and objectives of the new way 
of working (e.g. POP) are clarified; suitable management and internal structures are 
developed. In the final step, the aim is to freeze the new way of working and monitor whether 
officers tend to revert to the old way. For example, POP-related activities might take some 
time to produce significant outcomes and officers might revert to the reactive strategies that 
they used previously (Townsley et al., 2003).  
In addition to the Lewis model, senior management might prefer different kinds of top-down 
or bottom-up approaches to implement POP force-wide or individual problem-oriented 
projects. Bullock (2007) examined whether these approaches are sufficient to explain the 
implementation of problem-oriented projects and concluded that, in fact, neither is sufficient. 
Overall, senior management have a number of options to change the mindset of their 
organisations from reactive to proactive but there are issues of organisational culture that 
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might inhibit the implementation of POP or problem-oriented projects even if these 
approaches are applied with commitment; these are discussed in Section 2.9.2 in detail. 
2.4.1.3 Management style 
According to the organisational psychology literature (e.g. Bass and Avolio, 1994), there are 
two types of leaders: (1) transactional and (2) transformational (Bass, 1997). For 
transactional leaders, order and structure is important, as in the military or police. Their main 
aim is to complete objectives on time. In places where transactional leaders command, there 
is not sufficient scope for change and creativity (Bass, 1997; Judge and Piccolo, 2004). As 
Goldstein stated, police managers were interested in internal procedures or means (e.g. the 
structure, staffing, and equipping of the police) instead of developing effective strategies to 
achieve the goals of policing. He called this ‘means-over-ends syndrome’ (Goldstein, 1979; 
1990). On the contrary, transformational leaders motivate and inspire their subordinates for 
change and creativity. They are charismatic, provide intellectual stimulation, and act as 
mentors or coaches (Bass, 1997; Judge and Piccolo, 2004).  
A meta-analysis of leadership styles (Burke et al., 2006) showed a positive association 
between transformational leadership and innovative activities. Therefore, it could be argued 
that leadership/management style plays an important role in changing the mindset of a police 
force from reactive to proactive (e.g. implementing POP). Recently, Mazerolle et al. (2012) 
argued that having transformational police leaders is crucial to the successful 
implementation of POP (see also Goldstein, 1990; Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; 
Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Townsley et al., 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006; Tilley 
and Scott, 2012) and found that the problem-solving model that was applied by 
Commissioner Hyde, who was strongly committed to transformational leadership, reduced 
crime significantly in South Australia.  
2.5 Core operational strategies of police and POP 
Based on the assumption that Goldstein’s articulation concerning the objectives of the police 
is correct, Scott (2000: 85) conceptualised police work and listed core strategies at the 
operational level to achieve the fundamental goals of policing in general, and POP in 
particular: 
1. preventive patrol 
2. routine incident response 
3. emergency response 
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4. criminal investigation 
5. problem-solving 
6. support services. 
The first four strategies are the conventional operational strategies that the police have been 
applying since the 1930s. Support services are ancillary services provided to the community 
by the police. “Problem-solving is a new operational strategy, introduced in Goldstein's 
problem-oriented policing concept” (Scott, 2000: 84), and can be implemented in various 
ways in various contexts. For example, it can be applied in hot spots using situational crime 
prevention tactics. Specific tactics that can be applied to address crime problems will be 
discussed later in Section 2.7.1.3.  
It is clear from the above statement that Scott (2000) distinguished problem solving from 
POP (see also Clarke, 1997). According to Scott, POP describes a comprehensive framework 
to improve the capacity of the police to address their objectives. In contrast, problem solving 
describes the mental process which is at the core of POP. Scott argued that problem solving 
is a more limited concept than POP. According to Clarke (1997), the difference between 
problem-solving and POP is a matter of the scope of the initiative. While problem-solving 
efforts are concerned with repeated problems involving a single location or person, actions 
that can be considered POP make more systematic improvements in the response against 
entire classes of problems.  
The terms ‘problem solving’ and ‘POP’ are often used interchangeably in the literature. For 
example, problem-solving is widely used in the UK policing context (Burton and McGregor, 
2018), partly as a matter of taste but “the link between Goldstein and problem-orientation is 
usually acknowledged” (Bullock et al., 2006: 7). For the current study, they are also used 
interchangeably because it is concerned with both small- and large-scale problem-oriented 
projects that have been applied by police forces in England and Wales since the 1980s.  
2.6 Relating POP to other policing strategies 
This section looks at the similarities and differences between POP and a number of proactive 
policing strategies. It starts with the relationship between POP and community policing and 
intelligence-led policing, drawing upon Tilley (2008). Thereafter, the section examines the 
relationship between POP and evidence-based policing, hot spots policing and crime 
mapping, drawing upon Bullock et al. (2006), Scott (2000; 2017), and Eck (2014). 
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According to Tilley (2008), the origins and rationales of the policing strategies discussed 
here differ substantially (see Table 2.4). However, there are considerable areas of overlap in 
practice. Importantly, POP is an approach that can be used for the full range of problems that 
are targeted by other policing strategies (Eck, 2014: 12). Indeed, “Goldstein is clear about 
what types of problem should be addressed by a problem-oriented approach: any that is 
identified as a cause of community concern and leads to demand for a police response” 
(Bullock et al., 2006: 8). These include the targets of intelligence-led policing (e.g. prolific 
offenders and criminal organisations) and the targets of community policing (police-relevant 
community problems). 
In addition to intelligence-led policing and community policing, Bullock et al. (2006), Scott 
(2000; 2017) and Eck (2014) pointed out the similarities and differences between POP and 
evidence-based policing, hot spots policing, crime mapping, broken-windows policing, 
predictive policing and CompStat (see Table 2.5 for a comparison of common policing 
strategies). According to Bullock et al. (2006), POP is a form of evidence-based policing 
(see also Sherman et al., 2002), and when applied correctly it reduces crime by using an 
analytical approach and asking for evidence of effectiveness (see also Eck, 2014). In this 
regard, it is an evidence-based approach. Secondly, the assessment of POP efforts can assist 
in creating a knowledge base from which evidence-based solutions can be drawn. Thirdly, 
the language and the processes of POP fit well with the language and philosophy of 
evidence-based policing. 
One of the essential elements of POP is to identify and analyse crime hot spots. Therefore, 
hot spots policing, crime mapping and POP are related (Scott, 2000). In addition, crime 
mapping matches well with situational crime prevention (ibid), which is one of the 
philosophies underpinning POP. However, Scott (2000) stated that crime mapping is not as 
comprehensive a crime prevention approach as POP. 
POP also deals with disorder and quality of life issues that are targeted by broken-windows 
policing (Eck, 2014). The difference between the two policing strategies is that while 
broken-windows policing applies strong enforcement activities, which increase arrest rates 
and therefore cost to taxpayers, POP focusses on the few offenders and places generating 
most of the crime and disorder problems. Hence, its harm to society is less compared to 
broken-windows policing (ibid). 
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Table 2.4: Dimensions of intelligence-led, community and problem-oriented policing  
Dimension Intelligence-Led Policing  Community Policing  Problem-Oriented Policing  
Background and raison d ’être  
1. Problem addressed  Poor detection rates  Lack of legitimacy  Demand exceeding capacity  
2. Critique of traditional policing  
Ineffective at clearing crime, 
inadequate at providing protection  
Detached from community which 
funds policing and on whom policing 
depends; issue of consent 
Ineffective in dealing with 
spiralling demand, not oriented to 
core problems 
3. Inspiration  David Phillips  John Alderson, Robert Trojanowicz  Herman Goldstein  
Conception of policing and police officers  
4. Police mission  Law enforcement  Community governance  Deal with police-relevant problems  
5. Who defines policing needs  Police  Community Constitution/law/rights  
6. Scope of policing  Narrowed to law enforcement  
Broadened to all community 
concerns/demands  
Mid-range, police function defined  
7. Dominant discourse  Law Politics/ideology  Science 
8. Core personnel  
Intelligence units/Tasking and Co-
ordinating groups  
Community beat officers  Analysts 
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Table 2.4: Dimensions of intelligence-led, community and problem-oriented policing (continued) 
Dimension Intelligence-Led Policing  Community Policing  Problem-Oriented Policing  
9. Openness to others  Enforcement contingent  Value in itself  Problem contingent  
10. Source of legitimacy  Government/authority  Local community  Core police functions  
11. Appeal  To the police  To the community  To government  
Characteristic forms of thinking and action 
12. Problem diagnosis  Bad people  Communities in need  Unintentional crime opportunities  
13. Intervention focus  Person Place Event pattern  
14. Analytic inputs  Evidence/intelligence  Community concerns  Data 
15. Technology  Computerised intelligence  Not important/mobile phone!  Computers  
16. Preferred tactic  Arrest Community mobilisation  Any – problem contingent  
17. Preferred control mechanism  Incapacitation Informal social control  Blocked opportunity  
18. Key police quality  Action/brawn  Empathy/heart  Reason/brain  
Success criteria 
19. Main indicator  Serious/prolific villains caught  Satisfied community  Police functions performed effectively  
20. Expected benefit  Reduced crime  Reduced crime  Reduced crime  
Source: Tilley (2008: 387-388) 
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Table 2.5: Comparison of policing strategies 
 
Problem-
Oriented 
Policing 
Community 
Policing 
CompStat Hot Spots 
Policing 
Broken-
Windows 
Policing 
Intelligence-
Led Policing 
Predictive 
Policing 
Evidence-
Based 
Policing 
Addresses full 
range of 
community 
demands 
Yes Yes No Crime only Crime and 
disorder 
Crime only Crime only Possible 
Relies heavily on 
law enforcement 
Limited Limited Yes Yes Yes Variable Yes Possible 
Relies heavily on 
partnership 
Yes Yes No No No Variable  No Possible 
Uses an analytical 
approach 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Relies on officer 
expertise 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No Possible 
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Table 2.5: Comparison of policing strategies (continued) 
 
Problem-
Oriented 
Policing 
Community 
Policing 
CompStat Hot Spots 
Policing 
Broken-
Windows 
Policing 
Intelligence-
Led Policing 
Predictive 
Policing 
Evidence-
Based 
Policing 
Evidence for 
effectiveness 
Yes Limited No Yes No Unclear Unclear Unclear 
Principle value An 
approach 
for the full 
range of 
police 
problems 
Builds sound 
community 
support 
Builds internal 
accountability 
Focuses 
on the 
worst 
places 
Attentive to 
disorder 
Highlights 
the use of 
criminal 
intelligence 
Values new 
analytical 
techniques 
Demands 
strong 
scientific 
support for 
actions 
Principle risk Difficult 
to 
implement 
Becomes a 
feel-good 
approach 
Supports a 
whack-a-mole 
approach and 
stifles 
innovation 
Supports a 
whack-a-
mole 
approach 
Justifies 
excessive 
stopping of 
youth and 
profiling 
Does not 
look beyond 
a law 
enforcement 
approach 
Supports a 
whack-a-
mole 
approach 
Stifles 
innovation 
Source: Eck (2014: 12) 
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Finally, POP, predictive policing and CompStat apply a robust analytical approach to 
identify problems. However, when it comes to responding to problems, POP implements a 
variety of solutions, while other strategies often use law enforcement activities. In addition, 
predictive policing is a new strategy, and there is limited research regarding its effectiveness 
and CompStat is more of a managerial approach (Eck, 2014).  
Overall, it could be argued that although the origins and rationales of these policing styles 
are different, they apply similar strategies to reduce crime problems in practice. This is why 
Sparrow (2016) argued that all other forms of policing strategies are a reduced form of POP 
(see also Sherman and Eck, 2002; Eck, 2014). 
2.7 How can the effectiveness of POP be measured? 
The effectiveness of POP can be measured in three main ways. Firstly, Scott (2017: 29) 
suggested that one can compare POP with other policing approaches in terms of their effects 
on crime rates (see also Eck and Gallagher, 2016). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
previous studies that compare POP and other policing strategies in terms of their effect on 
crime rates in England and Wales have been somewhat limited. For example, Heaton (2009a) 
compared the effects of intelligence-led policing with POP, partnership policing and 
geographic policing. However, there are a number of limitations to Heaton’s study which 
are discussed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.5) in detail. 
Secondly, one can establish whether the ‘POP movement’ has been successful. In other 
words, one can examine whether POP has become the everyday practice of a police force 
(Scott, 2000) or to what extent police forces are committed to POP. In this regard, previous 
research is limited. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary examined the state of 
problem solving in the police service nationally (HMIC, 1998), which was later followed up 
(HMIC, 2000) to monitor the associated progress. Read and Tilley (2000) then published a 
research report that accompanied the inspection. However, they did not report the level of 
commitment of individual police forces to POP. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
the only study that reported the level of commitment of two police forces to POP was that 
of Bullock et al. (2006). Their study examined the development of POP in Lancashire and 
Hampshire and noted that they “can be considered to be amongst the UK’s very best in terms 
of vigour and resources that have gone into it [POP]” (Bullock et al., 2006: 12). However, 
their study did not examine whether POP affected crime rates in these counties. 
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Finally, one can examine whether POP projects make communities safer by reducing crime 
and disorder. Particularly, one can test whether POP projects reduce repeat victimisation. 
Indeed, the majority of the existing studies used POP projects to reach a conclusion in 
relation to the effectiveness of POP (see Section 2.8 for details), however, “there has not 
been study of whether a problem-oriented approach used widely in a city would reduce 
overall crime in that jurisdiction” (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018:15). The next section 
explains the stages of the SARA framework, which is the most common way of applying 
POP projects. 
2.7.1 The SARA framework 
The SARA framework was developed by Eck and Spelman in 1987 in the Newport News 
(Virginia) in the US to facilitate the implementation of POP. It is the acronym for scanning, 
analysis, response, and assessment. It should be immediately noted that POP can be practised 
via other frameworks, such as PAT (Eck, 2003), PROCTOR (Read and Tilley, 2000); the 
5Is (Ekblom, 2008); SPATIAL (Burton and McGregor, 2018); and ID PARTNERS (Henson, 
2005, cited in Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010). Respectively, PAT refers to Problem Triangle 
Analysis; PROCTOR to PROblem, Cause, Tactic, or Treatment, Output and Result; the 5Is 
to Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, and Impact; SPATIAL to Scan, 
Prioritise, Analyse, Task, Intervene, Assess, and Learn; and, finally, ID PARTNERS to 
(I)dentify the demand, (D)rivers, (P)roblem, (A)im, (R)esearch and analysis, (T)hink 
creatively, (N)egotiate and initiate responses, (E)valuate, (R)eview, (S)uccess (cited in 
Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010: 7). The remainder of this section explains the SARA 
framework in detail. 
2.7.1.1 Scanning: What are the problems10? 
Scanning involves (a) identifying recurrent problems and their characteristics, which 
concern the community and the police, (b) prioritising those problems, and (c) selecting 
problems for further analysis. Most common features of problems are as follows: behaviour 
(e.g. noise), territory (e.g. neighbourhood), persons (e.g. the elderly), and time (e.g. festivals) 
(Goldstein, 1990: 67-68). Problems can be identified by the community, police management, 
and rank-and-file officers, for example, using (a) calls for service data, (b) crime data, (c) 
letters of complaint, (d) elected officials, (e) other governmental agencies, and (f) media 
(Goldstein, 1990; Eck, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Bullock, 2007; Scott et al., 2016). 
 
10 Questions are adapted from Eck (2003: 81). 
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Goldstein (1990) insistently noted the importance of the personal experiences of rank-and-
file officers. He argued that they are “in the best position to identify problems from the 
bottom-up” (ibid: 73).  
Having identified problems, they can be prioritised through a variety of means: (a) making 
judgements regarding the impact of the problem on the community (e.g. cost); (b) analysing 
whether the problem affects the lives of residents; and (c) examining the degree of interest 
of the community to the inquiry and recommendations in relation to the problem (Goldstein, 
1990; Bullock, 2007). 
2.7.1.2 Analysis: What causes the problems? 
Analysis is the most comprehensive understanding of a crime problem (Scott, 2000; Scott et 
al., 2016). It “focuses on the who, why and how of the specified problems, to inform 
decisions about responses” (Bullock et al., 2006: 110; see also Clarke and Eck, 2003). In 
other words, it is an attempt to understand the nature of crime problems, which is called “a 
broad enquiry” by Goldstein (1990, see pages 82-83 for the detailed questions to be asked 
in this step). For this, all the available data about the problem is gathered and then examined 
by trained analysts to understand the conditions that give rise to the problem. Sources of 
information could be the relevant literature, police files and department archives, rank-and-
file officers, victims, offenders, other government agencies, and the wider community 
(Goldstein, 1990: 84-88). 
After gathering the data from various sources, the critical issue is now the rigour of the 
inquiry. For this, the need for specialist analysts is crucial. Once police forces have specialist 
analysts, they can use several means to analyse the selected problem. The analysis can be 
conducted through using, for example, the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) (Eck, 2003), 
which has apparent affinities with routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) that was 
defined in the same year that POP was first developed (Goldstein, 1979); it also complements 
the theory of POP (Scott et al., 2016). It analyses crime problems from three perspectives: 
offender, target/victim, and place. All three elements need to come together at the same time 
and place for a crime to occur. For instance, if a motivated offender has a chance of stealing 
a suitable target from a house due to the absence of a guard, it is highly likely that this crime 
will occur. Therefore, the police need to prevent those elements from coming together at the 
same time and place through collecting information about all three components of the 
triangle. The location element of PAT needs more attention since both likely offenders and 
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suitable targets (e.g. valuable and removable goods) may converge at problematic locations 
and, generally, these locations lack capable guardians (e.g. unoccupied houses in deprived 
areas) (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005). However, Clarke and Goldstein (2003: 265) 
observed that “the police view of the problem was focused mostly on offenders and victims, 
rather than on the locations”. In addition, ‘crime attractors’, ‘crime generators’ and ‘crime 
enablers’ are three essential concepts (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1998; Sidebottom and 
Worthley, 2016) in the identification of hot spots where crimes mostly occur (Clarke and 
Eck, 2003; Weisburd, 2015). Crime attractors are places that attract perpetrators because 
they offer plentiful opportunities (e.g. drug markets, red-light districts). Crime generators 
are places which include suitable targets for opportunistic offenders (Clarke, 1998). These 
places might be shopping centres, concert areas, car parks without capable guardians, and so 
on. Finally, crime enablers are locations where there is an absence of capable guardians (e.g. 
unattended houses). 
Source: https://popcenter.asu.edu/ 
Eck (2003) improved the basic PAT presented above and developed the Problem Analysis 
Double Triangle. He added ‘handlers’ (e.g. parents, neighbours, police officers) to prevent 
likely offenders from committing crime; ‘managers’ (e.g. property owners, lifeguards, 
teachers in classrooms) to protect places; and ‘capable guardians’ (e.g. friends protecting 
friends) to protect potential victims from offenders (Scott et al., 2016: 245). According to 
Bullock et al. (2006: 112), this “has the greatest preventive potential”. 
Figure 2.1: Problem analysis 
triangle 
 
Figure 2.2: Problem analysis 
double triangle 
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Analysts can also use concepts of ‘crime scripts’ (Cornish, 1994) and ‘crime chains’ (Felson 
and Clarke, 1998). Cornish (1994) coined the concept of ‘crime script’ to identify patterns 
of crime. He asserted that crimes are committed in the same way by different offenders. For 
example, a theft of vehicle script would be as follows: (1) gather tools, (2) enter car park, (3) 
loiter unobtrusively, (4) select vehicle, (5) approach vehicle, (6) break into vehicle, (7) take 
vehicle, (8) reverse out of bay, (9) leave car park (Cornish, 1994: 164). If the police can 
intervene at any stage of this script, it becomes straightforward to prevent the crime. 
However, this is not to say that offenders do not have any flexibility. The idea of a ‘crime 
chain’, which was proposed by Felson and Clarke (1998), suggests that a crime may occur 
due to another crime. For instance, criminal damage may occur when a burglary is being 
committed.  
2.7.1.3 Response: How can we find effective solutions to the problems? 
The next step is to develop tailor-made responses to crime problems in light of the 
comprehensive analysis conducted. “The development of appropriate responses is closely 
linked with the analysis that is performed” (Braga, 2008: 22; see also Braga, 2014). It is a 
step towards finding the most effective way of fighting the identified problem. As Goldstein 
(1979: 250) stated that this step is an “uninhibited search for alternative responses that might 
be an improvement over what is currently being done”. In other words, “identifying practical 
interventions that have a real chance of reducing the identified problem” (Bullock, 2007: 17) 
is crucial. For example, focussing on too narrow a set of problems, such as bullying around 
one school, or working on too broad a set of problems, such as violent crime, should be 
avoided (Goldstein, 1990; Clarke, 1997).  
POP can be divided into two types: “enforcement” and “situational” (Braga, 2008: 55). The 
former applies mostly traditional tactics in a proactive way. For instance, a police force may 
apply directed patrols covering hot spots. However, Goldstein advocated situational POP by 
which situational responses, based on a thorough analysis of crime problems, are applied 
(Braga, 2008). Indeed, there are a number of alternative ways in which to respond to crime 
problems, which Goldstein (1990: 104-140) noted in his book:  
• concentrating attention on those individuals who account for a disproportionate 
share of a problem (e.g. repeat offenders [victims]) 
• connecting with other government and private services (e.g. referral to another 
agency for a solution to the problem) 
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• using mediation and negotiation skills (e.g. to solve a dispute between tenants and 
landlords) 
• sharing information with the community (e.g. to reduce anxiety and fear) 
• mobilising the community (e.g. organising a neighbourhood crime watch against 
burglary) 
• making use of existing forms of social control in addition to the community (e.g. 
the influence of a teacher over a student) 
• altering the physical environment to reduce opportunities for problems to occur 
[situational POP]. 
One may find these strategies in individual POP projects, which are the unit of work in 
problem solving (Scott, 2000). The remainder of this section discusses, in particular, 
strategies of situational POP as they have “produced alternative responses that problem-
oriented policing is designed to produce” (Goldstein, 1990: 103). Targeting repeat 
victimisation is also discussed as it is one of the alternative and conventional ways of 
responding to crime problems (Goldstein, 1990; Laycock and Farrell, 2003; Scott et al., 
2016). In addition, it has been one of the major police performance indicators in the UK 
(Tilley, 2002).  
2.7.1.3.1 Situational crime prevention responses 
There is strong evidence that situational crime prevention is an effective way of reducing 
crime (Eck and Madensen, 2013). Importantly, it is highly likely that the conclusion drawn 
by Skogan and Frydl (2004) regarding the effectiveness of POP owed much to the 
relationship between POP and situational crime prevention (Scott et al., 2016). There are 
five main components of situational crime prevention: (1) increasing the effort, (2) 
increasing the risk, (3) reducing the rewards, (4) reducing provocations, and (5) removing 
excuses (Clarke and Eck, 2003; Clarke, 1997). Table 2.6 summarises 25 techniques of 
situational crime prevention based on these five main strategies. These strategies can be used 
against various types of crime, especially property crimes. Drawing upon the Reducing 
Burglary Initiative (RBI), these strategies are discussed in the following sections, 
respectively. 
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Increase the effort 
The purpose of this strategy is to prevent offenders from accessing houses by applying 
physical prevention techniques, such as target hardening. For instance, fences and alleyway 
gating were popular and effective RBI interventions (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005). 
Increase the risk 
This strategy often involves installing burglar alarms, street lighting, security lighting and 
‘occupancy’ lighting (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005) to increase the risk for offenders. A 
variety of alarms (e.g. pendant alarms, cluster alarms) were used in RBI projects, and they 
were found to be effective. However, it was unclear which kind of alarms affected burglaries 
(Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005). In addition, ten RBI projects used street lighting, half of 
which were found to be effective in reducing burglaries.  
Reduce the rewards  
The rationale of this strategy is reducing the value of targets for perpetrators. This can be 
done through, for example, property marking (Forrester et al., 1988; Hamilton-Smith and 
Kent, 2005). Few RBI projects used property marking as a way of reducing burglaries and 
evidence regarding its effectiveness was limited (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005). 
Reduce provocations  
This strategy is implemented, for example, through education to prevent the influence from 
peers to commit burglary. A number of RBI projects used these techniques, but the evidence 
as to their effectiveness was not compelling (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005).  
Remove Excuses 
Interventions under this strategy include deterrent publicity (e.g. keeping an eye on 
offenders), rental agreements (e.g. threat of eviction), antisocial behaviour orders (ASBOs - 
which no longer exist), and private rental sector measures to prevent offending through 
place-specific rules (Hamilton-Smith and Kent, 2005).  
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Table 2.6: Twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risk Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocations Remove Excuses 
1. Target Harden 6. Extend guardianship 11. Conceal targets 
16. Reduce frustrations 
and stress 
21. Set rules 
Steering column 
locks and ignition 
immobilisers 
Go out in a group at night Off-street parking 
Efficient lines and polite 
service 
Rental agreements 
Anti-robbery screens Live signs of occupancy 
Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
Expanded seating Harassment codes 
Tamper-proof 
packaging 
Carry cell phone 
Unmarked armoured 
trucks 
Soothing music/muted 
lights 
Hotel registration 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
7. Assist natural surveillance 12. Remove targets 17. Avoid disputes 22. Post instructions 
Entry phones Improved Street lighting Removable car radio 
Separate seating for rival 
soccer fans 
“No parking” 
Electronic and card 
access 
Defensible space design Women’s shelters Reduce crowding in bars “Private property” 
Baggage screening Support whistle-blowers 
Pre-paid cards for pay 
phones 
Fixed cab fares “Extinguish campfires” 
3. Screen exits 8. Reduce anonymity  13. Identify property  
18. Reduce temptation 
and arousal 
23. Alert conscience 
Ticket needed for 
exit 
Taxi driver IDs Property marking 
Controls on violent 
pornography  
Roadside speed display 
boards 
Export documents “How is my driving?” decals 
Vehicle licensing and 
parts marking 
Enforce good behaviour on 
soccer field 
Signatures for customs 
declarations 
Electronic 
merchandise tags 
School uniforms Cattle branding Prohibit racial slurs “Shoplifting is stealing” 
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Table 2.6: Twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention (continued) 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risk Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocations Remove Excuses 
4. Deflect offenders 9. Use place managers 14. Disrupt markets 
19. Neutralise peer 
pressure 
24. Assist compliance 
Street closures CCTV for double-deck buses Monitor pawn shops  “Idiots drink and drive” Easy library checkout 
Separate bathrooms 
for women 
Two clerks for convenience stores 
Control on classified 
ads 
“It is OK to say No” Public lavatories 
Disperse pubs Reward vigilance License street vendors 
Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
Litter receptacles 
5. Control 
tools/weapons 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
15. Deny benefits 20. Discourage imitation 
25. Control drugs and 
alcohols 
“Smart” guns Red-light cameras Ink merchandise tags Rapid repair of vandalism Breathalysers in bars 
Restrict spray paint 
sales to juveniles 
Burglar alarms Graffiti cleaning V-chips in TVs 
Server intervention 
programmes 
Toughened beer 
glasses  
Security guards 
Disabling stolen cell 
phones  
Censor details of modus 
operandi 
Alcohol-free events 
Sources: Clarke and Eck (2003); Clarke and Bowers (2017) 
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2.7.1.3.2 Targeting repeat victimisation 
As noted in Section 2.3.2, POP aims to prevent persistent crime problems via thorough 
analysis, which informs appropriate responses to such problems (Goldstein, 1990). Indeed, 
persistent crime problems refer to repeat victimisation of individuals, places (particularly hot 
spots), and households that have been victims of a crime once are more likely to be 
victimised again (Ellingworth et al., 1997; Pease, 1998; Bowers and Hirschfield, 1999; Eck, 
2003; Tseloni and Pease, 2005; Farrell and Pease, 2007; Tseloni et al., 2010), often within a 
first few days of the first incident (Johnson et al., 1997). 
There has been a particular interest in reducing repeat burglary victimisation in England and 
Wales over the last three decades (Forrester et al., 1988; 1990; Tilley, 1993; Tilley and Webb, 
1994; Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Clarke, 1998; Laycock and Farrell, 2003; Farrell and Pease, 
2007; Grove, 2011; Grove et al., 2012). The police have been advised to focus on repeat 
victimisation since the 1980s (Laycock and Farrell, 2003), and indeed repeat victimisation 
became a police performance indicator in the early 1990s (Tilley and Webb, 1994). By 1999, 
all police forces in England and Wales had a policy and system for identifying repeats and 
reducing (especially) repeat burglary victimisation (Farrell et al., 2000; Laycock and Farrell, 
2003; Farrell and Pease, 2007). 
The government promoted a ‘partnership approach’ officially via the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 to facilitate the prevention of repeat victimisation. Laycock and Farrell (2003: 221-
22) stated that the government also took a number of measures to raise awareness about 
repeat victimisation, such as: 
• Six “roadshows” on repeat victimisation, which were held across the country, and 
drew the research and its implications to the attention of relevant agencies, 
including the police. 
• A “task force” on repeat victimisation was established within the central 
government research agency. 
• A police officer was designated as repeat victimisation liaison officer in each of 
the 43 forces in England and Wales. 
• The police were encouraged to present reports on their work at both practitioner 
and academic conferences.  
• Continued investment was obtained in a research programme to demonstrate that 
reducing repeat victimisation could reduce crime. 
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• Reducing repeat victimisation was included as one of the Home Secretary’s 
performance indicators for the police. 
Overall, targeting repeat victimisation is an effective way of reducing crime. In particular, 
police forces in England and Wales have targeted repeat burglaries over the last three 
decades. POP also emphases the importance of targeting repeat victimisation. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the UK government has implicitly promoted POP since the 1990s. 
2.7.1.4 Assessment: How can we learn from problem solving? 
The key role of assessment is to find out ‘what works’ in terms of reducing crime along with 
avoiding the ‘means-over-ends syndrome’ (Braga, 2008; Scott et al., 2016). Therefore, 
police should not neglect the last step not only to allow them to learn lessons but also to 
assist others (Clarke, 1997). However, this stage has its own challenges (Goldstein, 1990), 
which will be discussed later in this chapter (see Section 2.9.1.4). Goldstein called upon the 
police to develop relationships with universities and other government agencies to be 
assessed independently, and therefore avoid repeating ineffective responses and save 
resources. 
2.8 Does POP work? 
Having explained how POP projects are implemented, the next step is to answer whether 
POP actually works. In Section 2.3.3, it was noted that the UK government has promoted 
POP either implicitly or explicitly since the 1980s (Bullock et al., 2006; Tilley and Scott, 
2012). Police forces have applied small- and large-scale problem-oriented projects since the 
1980s. Did applying POP to that extent have any impact on the level of crime rates in 
England and Wales? Indeed, there is a body of research in relation to the effectiveness of 
POP on crime and disorder (Braga, 2014). They include (1) narrative reviews (Skogan and 
Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004), (2) systematic reviews (Mazerolle et al., 2006; 
Weisburd et al., 2010; Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Gill et al., 2014; 
Braga et al., 2015; Telep and Weisburd, 2016) and (3) studies targeting repeat victimisation 
(Forrester et al., 1988; Grove, 2011; Grove et al., 2012). The remainder of this section 
reviews these studies in turn. However, it should be noted that previous research used 
problem-oriented projects to examine the effectiveness of POP and “there has not been study 
of whether a problem-oriented approach used widely in a city [or a PFA] would reduce 
overall crime in that jurisdiction” (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018: 15). 
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2.8.1 Narrative reviews 
Skogan and Frydl (2004) and Weisburd and Eck (2004) summarised the studies examining 
the effectiveness of POP on various crime problems (see Table 2.7). They stated that 
previous studies consistently suggest that problem solving is capable of reducing crime and 
disorder. Weisburd and Eck (2004: 56) also noted that “[e]vidence of the effectiveness of 
situational and opportunity-blocking strategies, while not necessarily police-based, provide 
indirect support for the effectiveness of problem solving in reducing crime and disorder”. 
As noted in Section 2.2, POP has a link with routine activity theory, rational choice theory, 
and situational crime prevention. In particular, Weisburd and Eck (2004) cited several 
studies examining the effect of problem-solving strategies (e.g. blocking crime and disorder 
opportunities in small places). The studies they cited (e.g. Poyner, 1981; Weisburd, 1997; 
Eck, 2002) found reductions in targeted crime and disorder. However, they noted that the 
studies they reviewed applied relatively weak designs.  
Table 2.7: Studies cited in narrative reviews  
Study name Targeted problem 
Cordner (1986) Fear of crime 
Eck and Spelman (1987) Violent and property crime 
Kennedy et al. (2001) Firearm-related youth homicide 
Capowich and Roehl (1994) Various forms of disorder 
Eck and Spelman (1987) Various forms of disorder 
Hope (1994) Various forms of disorder 
Mazerolle et al. (2000) Violent and property crime 
Clarke and Goldstein (2002) Theft of appliances from new home construction sites 
Braga et al. (1999) Violent and property crime 
There are also studies that did not report findings that favoured POP. For example, Weisburd 
et al. (2008) cited Stone (1993) and Stokes et al. (1996). The former study found a higher 
rate of being asked to buy or sell drugs in the treatment area. Although violence decreased 
in the intervention area, total and property crimes increased at a rate greater than the 
comparison sites. The latter study reported that student victimisation increased in the target 
school, while control schools experienced less student victimisation. 
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2.8.2 Systematic reviews 
A specific systematic review on the effectiveness of POP (Weisburd et al., 2010), which is 
a more rigorous study than narrative reviews in terms of methodology, included ten eligible 
experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation studies (for the main analysis) and 45 
before/after evaluation studies (for the secondary analysis) from amongst 5,500 articles and 
reports for further analysis. Out of ten experimental and quasi-experimental studies, nine 
studies (90%) were from the US, and only one study (10%) was from the UK. Thirty-two of 
the before/after evaluation studies (71%) were from the Goldstein and Tilley Award 
submissions (14 of which were from the UK); six were from peer-reviewed articles (two of 
which were from the UK). The rest mostly included published and unpublished reports (two 
of which were from the UK). Overall, Weisburd et al. (2010: 32) concluded that “the results 
[modest, but statistically significant reduction in crime and disorder] are similar whether we 
look at experimental or non-experimental studies”.  
Mazerolle et al. (2006: 409) reviewed street-level drug law enforcement interventions and 
concluded that “[t]he results of the meta-analyses, together with examination of forest plots, 
reveal that problem-oriented policing and geographically-focused interventions involving 
cooperative partnerships between police and third parties tend to be more effective at 
controlling drug problems than community-wide policing efforts that are unfocused and 
spread out across a community”. The hot spots policing review by Braga et al. (2014) 
concluded that the effect of POP at hot spots was greater than other policing strategies. The 
legitimacy in policing systematic review by Mazerolle et al. (2013) concluded that POP 
could be used to promote and enhance citizen satisfaction. The disorder policing review by 
Braga et al. (2015: 580), which included 20 studies applying community problem-solving 
tactics, concluded that “[t]he results of our systematic review and meta-analysis suggest that 
disorder policing strategies generate noteworthy crime control gains. Importantly, these 
strategies yielded consistent crime reduction effects across a variety of violent, property, 
drug, and disorder outcome measures”.  
The main problem with the above reviews is that the majority are from the US. Tuffin et 
al.’s (2006) study (National Reassurance Policing Programme - NRPP), which was included 
in both the community policing review (Gill et al., 2014) and the POP review (Weisburd et 
al., 2008; 2010), is one of the eligible studies coming from the UK. The NRPP was intended 
to address the ‘reassurance gap’, which refers to “the gap between the public perception of 
rising crime and the falling crime rate” (Tuffin et al., 2006: x) at 16 sites in England between 
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2003/04 and 2004/05. This programme was developed drawing upon the idea of ‘signal 
crimes’ (Innes, 2004). That is, some crime problems are more important than others in the 
eyes of the community. Tactics used to reassure citizens in the programme included (1) 
having easily accessible and visible police officers (e.g. Police Community Support Officers) 
and people from the local authority; (2) involvement of the community in identifying and 
prioritising problems; and (3) targeted problem-solving policing approaches.  
Having implemented the programme, Tuffin et al. (2006) assessed the impact of the NRPP 
on key outcome indicators (e.g. crime, perceptions of anti-social behaviour, feelings of 
safety after dark, and public confidence in the police) at six sites. Tuffin et al. (2006) 
compared six trial sites with six control sites before and after the implementation of the 
programme in Surrey, England. Conducting victimisation surveys and through the use of 
police-recorded crime data (PRCD), Tuffin et al. (2006) assessed the impact of the 
programme and concluded that the decrease in the outcome indicators was associated with 
the NRPP and there were no improvements in risk or worry with regard to burglary. 
Although Tuffin et al. (2006) concluded an association between the implementation of the 
NRPP and the decrease in key outcome indicators, the sites were not selected randomly, and 
only two of the six treatment sites fully implemented the programme (Tuffin et al., 2006). 
The other four sites had problems in engaging with the community and implementing the 
problem-solving approach. In addition, the trial and comparison sites were only matched on 
population density, percentage of minority backgrounds, and percentage of managerial 
positions. That is, they omitted possible factors that could well have affected crime rates. 
There were also concerns about the victimisation survey, such as sample size and 
representativeness (see also Weisburd et al., 2010).  
Morris (2006) evaluated the impact of the NRPP in the remaining ten sites in seven police 
force areas. Overall, total crime decreased significantly in only one site (Morris, 2006). In 
addition, “across the majority of sites, there was a positive change in public perceptions of 
crime” (ibid: 1). There were significant decreases in burglary and vehicle theft for five sites, 
but these decreases were not seen in wider Basic Command Units11 (ibid). One of the main 
 
11 “Basic command units (BCUs) are local policing areas in England and Wales. NB – not all forces have BCUs 
as some use local policing units or operational districts. BCUs vary in size from over 1,000 officers to just 
under 100; some serve densely populated, ethnically diverse inner cities, while others cover vast tracts of 
sparsely populated countryside. What they do share are certain key aims and objectives, specifically to work 
with partner agencies in reducing crime and disorder in their areas, and to do so with integrity” (HMIFCRS, 
2018). Available at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/our-work/article/basic-command-unit-
bcu-reports/ [Accessed on 10 April 2019]. 
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limitations of this evaluation is that there were no control sites. Therefore, it is challenging 
to associate significant reductions in crime with the implementation of the NRPP; the falling 
crime rates may be an independent result. Secondly, the change in crime rates was measured 
using PRCD, which ultimately is not a reliable source (HMICFRS, 2017).  
In addition to Tuffin et al.’s (2006) work, the POP review (Weisburd et al., 2010) included 
20 methodologically less rigorous (before/after without comparison groups) UK studies. 
They included problem-oriented projects submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley Award 
schemes by police forces in England and Wales before 2006 and published articles and 
unpublished reports (see Appendix 2.1). These studies targeted various crime problems, 
including burglary and car crime. However, they had a number of limitations. The main 
limitation of these studies was the absence of control/comparison groups. This creates the 
potential for internal validity issues. Moreover, “these studies rarely took statistical steps to 
account for “history,” the idea that crime rates may be rising or falling independent of the 
specific problem-oriented policing project” (Weisburd et al., 2008: 30). A third limitation 
was that they were heavily reliant on PRCD as a measure of assessment. Victimisation 
surveys were rarely used to assess differences in crime rates before and after the 
implementation of the projects. Fourthly, since these projects were submitted with the 
prospect of winning an award, they were biased toward success (Weisburd et al., 2008). 
Finally, similar to Tuffin et al.’s (2006) work, time and area coverage of these studies were 
limited.  
2.8.3 Studies targeting repeat victimisation 
There are also studies which focussed explicitly upon repeat victimisation initiatives using 
POP strategies. One such was the Kirkholt Burglary Project, which is a well-known project 
on repeat victimisation across the world. In the Kirkholt burglary project, “a detailed analysis 
of the burglary problem, as would be required for any problem-oriented approach” (Laycock 
and Farrell, 2003: 215) was carried out and repeat victims specifically targeted. As a 
consequence, burglaries fell by 75% in three years (Forrester et al., 1988). However, 
replications of the Kirkholt project were not successful to the same extent (Tilley 1993a).  
Grove (2011) conducted a systematic review of 22 individual studies on repeat burglary 
victimisation from three countries (the UK, the US, and Australia). Grove et al. (2012) 
expanded that study to 31 studies on repeat victimisation, including crime types other than 
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burglary (22 of which were anti-burglary projects). They concluded that the projects from 
the UK were, overall, successful (see also Braga, 2008: 121-123).  
Overall, although previous research (e.g. Weisburd et al., 2010) found that POP reduces 
crime, there is a limited number of high-quality studies examining the effectiveness of POP 
in the UK. For instance, the street-level drug law enforcement review did not include any 
eligible study from the UK (Mazerolle et al., 2006). Similarly, the pulling-lever policing 
review, which is a “problem-oriented policing framework to prevent gang and group-
involved violence”, did not include any eligible study from the UK (Braga and Weisburd, 
2012: 5). The hot spots policing review (Braga et al., 2014), which also included studies on 
POP, consisted of no eligible studies from the UK. Overall, there is a lack of rigorous studies 
from the UK, except for Tuffin et al.’s (2006) work. Targeting repeat victims is a promising 
method by which to reduce crime rates. Section 2.9 discusses factors that limit the 
implementation of POP, followed by Section 2.10, which explains the factors that facilitate 
the practice of POP.  
2.9 Factors limiting the implementation of POP 
This section explores both limitations of POP projects through the lens of the SARA 
framework, and the constraints imposed by organisational and frontline factors. 
2.9.1 Limitations of POP projects via the SARA framework 
2.9.1.1 Scanning 
The main aim of the scanning phase of POP is to identify and group recurrent incidents and 
then prioritise them for further analysis. However, selecting too broad or too small a set of 
problems are typical implementation failures of problem-oriented projects (Goldstein, 1990; 
Clarke, 1998; Scott, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Cordner and Biebel, 2005; Bullock et 
al., 2006; Scott, 2006; Boba and Crank, 2008; Carson and Wellman, 2018). Further, police 
forces appoint frontline officers, who are mainly in the rapid management of crime problems 
(Boba and Crank, 2008: 383) and can identify a problem by experience and observation 
(Cordner and Biebel, 2005), in problem-identification. Another issue in the scanning step as 
highlighted by Schnobrich-Davis et al. (2018) is that most police forces expect frontline 
officers to identify problems, but they should be identified not only by frontline officers but 
also by other possible resources such as interviews and surveys.  
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2.9.1.2 Analysis 
It is only possible to develop high-quality responses to problems when a high-quality 
analysis is conducted (Bullock and Tilley, 2009). “Provision of data, analytic software for 
analysis and competent analysts” were found as essential factors encouraging proper analysis 
(Bullock and Tilley, 2003: 7; see also Goldstein, 1990; Clarke, 1998). However, studies 
(Leigh et al., 1996, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006) 
suggest that there is a lack of high-quality analysis in practice due to inadequate analytic 
capacity and high-quality data. For example, Bullock et al. (2006) concluded that 15% (n = 
22) of the Tilley Award projects (n = 150) conducted no or little quantitative analysis.  
Read and Tilley (2000) scrutinised the implementation of POP across 43 police forces in 
England and Wales and found that most of the project reports written by police forces did 
not include the nature of problems and omitted the findings of the analyses. Further, studies 
suggested that police forces did not use alternative data sources from other governmental 
agencies and widely used PRCD (Leigh et al., 1998; Clarke, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; 
Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006). For instance, according to Leigh et al. (1998), 
police officers in Cleveland mainly used their own experience to analyse problems (see also 
Cordner and Biebel, 2005). Read and Tilley (2000) found similar results as 61% of the 
projects that they analysed used PRCD.  
Finally, police forces did not use analysts in the correct position. The analysts generally dealt 
with data management rather than conducting high-quality analysis to develop responses to 
problems. Instead, police officers conducted analysis. For instance, analysts from Lancashire 
and Hampshire Police mostly worked on performance management monitoring and the 
National Intelligence Model (Bullock et al., 2006). 
2.9.1.3 Response 
Scott (2006) suggested that developing effective responses to crime problems is difficult as 
a result of inadequacy in: 
1. the ability to wrangle data 
2. using the related literature 
3. using alternative response strategies 
4. working with other governmental agencies and the community 
5. conducting rigorous analysis. 
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Firstly, wrangling data is not an easy process and is often found difficult and time-consuming 
by police officers. As Leigh et al. (1998) found in Cleveland, police officers did not use 
official data to develop responses, even though they were provided with it. Secondly, police 
officers do not use related literature to conduct robust analyses; for instance, Read and Tilley 
(2000) concluded that police officers used what they learnt from their colleagues (see also 
Bullock et al., 2006). Thirdly, police officers do not use alternative response strategies and 
mostly rely on existing traditional policing tactics, such as patrolling and arresting (Read 
and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Clarke, 1998; Rojek, 2003; Scott et al., 2016). For example, 
Leigh et al. (1998) found that almost half of the actions taken by Cleveland and 
Leicestershire Police were representative of traditional police tactics. Fourthly, police forces 
rarely coordinate with other agencies (Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock et 
al., 2006). For example, Cleveland Police implemented 31% of the responses without any 
collaboration with other agencies (Leigh et al., 1998). Half of the Tilley Award projects (n 
= 75) were applied only by police forces (Bullock et al., 2006). Finally, developing effective 
responses to crime problems is difficult if analysis is not rigorous. For instance, Bullock et 
al. (2002) examined some problem-oriented projects and found that police forces could not 
develop rigorous responses to problems due to inadequate analysis.  
2.9.1.4 Assessment  
Scott et al. (2016) suggested that in order to avoid repeatedly making the same mistakes, the 
assessment step of POP is crucial. However, high-quality evaluation of responses is 
technically difficult (Goldstein, 1990; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al., 
2006). Therefore, police forces commonly skip this step (Clarke, 1998; Eck, 2003). In 
studies conducting assessments, reductions in crime and disorder are mostly reported 
without linking the findings to specific responses. They also do not have a treatment and a 
control group. When they do so, they compare different locations (Clarke, 1998; Scott, 2000; 
Bullock et al., 2006).  
Although there are obvious problems in the implementation of POP according to the studies 
cited above, it should be noted that a recent study (Schnobrich-Davis et al., 2018: 12) which 
analysed the problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Goldstein Problem-
Oriented Policing award between 1993 and 2017 reported that “[t]here is significant progress 
in the development of problem-solving and its continuation as a practice within police 
agencies” (see Table 2.8 for details).  
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Table 2.8: Development of problem-solving process 
 1993-2004 2005-2017 % Change 
Scanning 
Citizen complaint 47 40 -15 
Town complaint 13 12 -8 
Police observation 42 58 38 
Calls for service 53 57 8 
Publicised incidents 12 35 191 
Survey results 18 29 61 
Analysis 
Citizen surveys 28 32 14 
Offender surveys 11 10 -9 
Victim surveys 4 10 150 
Business surveys 9 10 11 
Citizen interviews 30 21 -30 
Offender interviews 28 16 -43 
Victim interviews 13 8 -38 
Business interviews 22 14 -36 
Incident data 86 88 2 
Offender data 14 31 121 
Crime mapping 13 53 308 
Response  
Third party 78 78 0 
Enforcement 71 82 15 
CPTED 61 68 11 
Communication/media 63 68 8 
Community involvement 54 51 -6 
Information/data collection 45 57 27 
Legislation/ordinance 42 27 -36 
Other  20 17 -15 
Assessment 
Use of crime data 54 84 56 
Use of crime mapping 11 38 245 
Discuss diffusion of benefits 0 27 --- 
Discuss crime displacement 19 42 121 
Use of researcher 16 30 88 
Source: Schnobrich-Davis et al. (2018: 11) 
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2.9.2 Organisational and frontline factors 
In Section 2.4.1.2, the author briefly discussed issues of organisational culture (particularly 
police culture) that explain why reforms fail. In addition to these, this section elaborates 
some of the factors that specifically inhibit the implementation of POP. Townsley et al. 
(2003) split these factors into two groups: (1) organisational and (2) frontline. Organisational 
factors are as follows: 
• rapid turnover of staff who are arguably best suited to a problem-oriented 
approach (Townsley et al., 2003) 
• little attention from middle management, who are responsible for translating force 
policy into local action, to POP (Townsley et al., 2003) 
• constant change in priorities of police forces (Townsley et al., 2003) 
• not taking POP seriously (Townsley et al., 2003; Scott, 2003; del Castillo, 2018) 
• considering POP as a delaying mechanism (Townsley et al., 2003; Applegate, 
2004; Cordner, 1998) 
• inability/unwillingness to involve partner agencies, which is mainly due to the 
variety in the speed of progress amongst agencies. 
Frontline factors are as follows: 
• police officers making their decisions quickly and therefore giving reactive 
responses (Townsley et al., 2003; Corder and Biebel, 2005; Mazerolle et al., 2013) 
• limited amount of knowledge in relation to solutions (responses) to crime 
problems (Townsley et al., 2003) 
• “I do not know” phobia and “I know best” syndrome, which are due to inadequate 
analysis of problems, and lack of knowledge regarding the problems (Townsley 
et al., 2003) 
• tensions between frontline officers and managers (Reuss-Ianni, 1983) 
• unwillingness of frontline officers to adopt top-down strategic reforms due to 
scepticism and mistrust as they do not believe that their departments would 
support their decisions if and when something went wrong (Allen, 2002). 
Skogan (2008: 23) also summarised a number of issues that cause reform failure: 
“I summarize what I have gleaned about obstacles to change in police organizations 
in 11 categories. Many of them reflect processes internal to police agencies. These I 
mostly attribute to the career and bureaucratic interests and managerial outlook of the 
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parties involved. At the top, executives worry about keeping their jobs and the rank-
and-file working hard and out of trouble. Sergeants may not want to stray from what 
they know how to do in order to keep out of trouble. Street officers do not want to be 
plagued by out-of-touch programs that add to their workload and give them tasks that 
lie outside their comfort zone. Elite units such as detectives frequently are able to 
avoid getting involved, while union leaders keep a careful eye on their strategic 
situation vis-a-vis management. Other obstacles are probably endemic to public 
sector organizations: these include problems of interagency coordination, the 
competing demands of differing constituencies, and the inability of the police to 
measure their success in the absence of a profit-and-loss statement. External to the 
police are community and political forces that can stymie change as well.” 
 
It is obvious that police forces have had numerous difficulties while implementing POP. 
However, previous research suggested that although there has been a disconnect between the 
theory and practice of POP, “problem-oriented policing interventions may not need to be 
implemented in the ways envisioned by Herman Goldstein to produce a crime prevention 
effect” (Braga and Weisburd, 2006: 134, see also Eck, 2003). 
2.10 Factors facilitating the implementation of POP 
This section discusses some of the factors facilitating good practice in POP (Goldstein, 1990; 
Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006; Bullock, 2007). These factors 
may minimise the problems mentioned above.  
2.10.1 Leadership and management 
Leadership plays a vital role in mainstreaming POP within a police force area (Goldstein, 
1990; Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Townsley et al., 
2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006; Tilley and Scott, 2012; Mazerolle et al., 2013; del 
Castillo, 2018). Read and Tilley (2000) found that police forces managed by leaders who 
were committed to the principles of POP were better at putting it into practice (see also 
Goldstein, 1990). For instance, Bullock et al. (2006: 12) noted that Lancashire and 
Hampshire “can be considered to be amongst the UK’s very best in terms of vigour and 
resources that have gone into it [POP]” owing to their leaders’ commitment to the principles 
of POP. In addition, an empirical analysis of whether POP-committed leadership reduces 
crime rates in a southern state in Australia (Mazerolle et al., 2013) demonstrated that 
implementation of POP strategy at the organisational level under the leadership of 
Commissioner Mal Hyde had a statistically significant impact on overall crime, which was 
mostly due to reductions in property crime. This result might be a reflection of employing a 
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flexible management style, which gives more freedom to subordinates and fosters their 
creativity (Goldstein, 1990). However, it should be noted that this kind of leadership is rare. 
Lastly, the implementation of POP usually depends on committed and enthusiastic 
individual police officers (Bullock et al., 2006). However, relying heavily on individual 
police officers may cause problems in terms of sustainability. Once those POP-committed 
leaders and police officers retire or leave their forces, its implementation might cease. 
Therefore, POP should be practised by all staff for the sake of sustainability (Scott, 2000).  
2.10.2 Training and resources 
Training is one of the key factors facilitating the practice of POP (Goldstein, 1990; Bullock 
and Tilley, 2003; Townsley et al., 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Tilley and Scott, 2012). 
Townsley et al. (2003: 206) added that “Retraining as compulsory would raise the status of 
problem-solving considerably”. In proper training, police officers first need to understand 
the principles and benefits of POP. Secondly, police officers and the community should be 
informed about the importance of dealing with the causes of problems rather than targeting 
incidents when they occur (Bullock et al., 2006). Thirdly, they need to know good and bad 
examples of POP in practice, and the general problems discussed above (Goldstein, 1990). 
For example, it has been found that the more police provide training, the better they are at 
implementing POP (Read and Tilley, 2000), as in Lancashire and Hampshire (Bullock et al., 
2006). 
Proper implementation of POP also depends heavily on sufficient and available resources 
such as finances, authority, and staffing (Scott, 2006). For example, a recent study (del 
Castillo, 2018) reported that lack of resources challenged the implementation of POP in 
Montevideo, Uruguay. 
2.10.3 Rewards and incentives 
Previous studies found that rewards and incentives play an important role in running POP 
effectively within a police force (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). They might include a trip to 
another country (Leigh et al. 1998), appraisal of individuals (Read and Tilley, 2000), and 
providing funding for outstanding problem-oriented projects to be presented at national or 
international conferences (Bullock et al., 2006). For instance, Bullock et al. (2006) found 
that incentives (e.g. an internal award scheme) were an important driver to the application 
of POP in Lancashire.  
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Townsley et al. (2003) suggested that making promotions based on POP-related efforts 
might reinforce organisational change towards a problem-oriented approach. Two 
requirements for promotion to any rank might be (a) “a thorough understanding of the 
problem-solving policing ethos, and (b) evidence of problem-solving participation” (ibid: 
204, see also Goldstein, 1990). Once police officers believe that POP is a requirement of 
promotion, they might pay more attention to it. For example, Del Castillo (2018) found that 
economic incentives offered by another programme challenged the implementation of POP 
in Montevideo as a significant number of officers asked to be transferred to that programme.  
2.10.4 Sharing good practice 
The more police forces applying POP share their good practices, the more others get 
interested in it (Scott, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006). Therefore, it is 
important to have platforms to spread good practice in POP. For example, those interested 
in applying POP might access a number of useful resources, including:  
1. the Police Online Knowledge Area (POLKA) 
2. National Police Library 
3. What Works Centre for Crime Reduction 
4. College of Policing toolkit 
5. Evidence-Based Policing Matrix 
6. POP website (https://popcenter.asu.edu/). 
In addition, conferences might be a good opportunity to follow the POP-related 
developments. For example, Lancashire held annual conferences where they presented their 
local problem-oriented projects to national and international attendees (Bullock et al., 
2006:51). It could be argued that these conferences enabled Lancashire to become one of the 
leading police forces implementing POP across the world (Scott, 2000).  
2.11 Chapter summary  
This chapter started by describing the theoretical framework underpinning both the 
implementation of POP and the current study. It highlighted the strong relationship between 
POP, routine activity theory, rational choice theory, and situational crime prevention. In 
particular, routine activity theory was selected to identify the characteristics of households 
(micro-level) to be used in the statistical models in Chapter 7. The theoretical framework 
also included social disorganisation theory, which was selected to identify the characteristics 
58 
 
of PFAs (macro-level) to be used in the statistical models in Chapter 7. Finally, it was argued 
that basic components of new public management match up with the components of POP.  
Following a brief history of policing, the chapter discussed how Goldstein developed POP, 
drawing upon his criticisms against the reform era of policing when random car and foot 
patrols, rapid response to calls and follow-up investigation were considered the best methods 
to control crime. The chapter noted that after the development of POP, the UK government 
has promoted POP either implicitly or explicitly since the 1980s.  
The chapter outlined the major objectives and strategies of policing in general and POP in 
particular, followed by a discussion of the relationship between POP and other policing 
strategies. Notably, it was noted that the main objective of POP is to change the mindset of 
the police from one of being reactive to proactive. Problem solving is the operational strategy 
of POP, and its unit of work is problem-oriented projects. Police forces have applied small 
and large-scale problem-oriented projects since the 1980s, which is why this chapter argued 
that one can measure the effectiveness of POP using problem-oriented projects. In addition, 
one can measure the effectiveness of POP by asking whether the ‘POP movement’ has been 
successful. That is, one can ask whether problem-solving methodology has been integrated 
into everyday policing operations. The chapter argued that one cannot assume that if a police 
force claims to apply POP it is a POP-committed police force. Therefore, applying POP 
should not be the sole measurement to test the effectiveness of POP. Instead, the level of 
commitment to POP must be taken into account. However, the chapter identified that no 
previous research categorised all police forces in terms of level of commitment to POP. 
The chapter reviewed previous research in relation to the effectiveness of POP under three 
sub-headings: (1) narrative reviews, (2) systematic reviews, and (3) studies targeting repeat 
victimisation. Although previous research suggested that POP reduces crime in certain 
circumstances, there is a lack of high-quality studies in this regard. However, it was noted 
that even weak applications of POP can reduce crime rates (Weisburd et al., 2010; Braga, 
2014; Laycock and Tilley, 2018), which is one of the main inspirations to conduct the current 
study. The most significant gap in knowledge this chapter identified is that there has been 
no research investigating whether widespread application of POP in a PFA would reduce, 
for example, burglary in that PFA. The chapter finally discussed the factors limiting and 
facilitating the implementation of POP, respectively. 
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The next chapter critically reviews some of the crime drop hypotheses according to six sub-
headings: (1) economic hypotheses, (2) offender-based hypotheses, (3) substance abuse 
hypotheses, (4) security and opportunity hypotheses, (5) criminal justice system hypotheses, 
and (6) policing strategies to identify whether they played a role in the burglary drop in 
England and Wales. By doing so, it will help the researcher select the control variables to be 
used in Chapter 7, to assess whether there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the implementation of POP and the mean number of burglary victimisations in England and 
Wales between 1995 and 2003/04.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CRIME DROP: A PUZZLING PHENOMENON 
3.1 Introduction  
Victimisation surveys and police recorded crime data (PRCD) suggest that crime has 
dropped dramatically (with variation in timing, magnitude, and trajectory) in Western 
industrialised countries since the 1990s (Aebi and Linde, 2010; Tseloni et al., 2010; van Dijk 
et al., 2012b; Tonry, 2014; ONS, 2017). Crime first started to decrease in the US. As such, 
initial studies focussed on the US context. For instance, Blumstein and Wallman (2006) 
published a collection of US-based studies that concentrated on violent crime. However, 
some scholars observed that other countries experienced falls in crime as well (Tseloni et al., 
2010). For example, total crime (excluding fraud and computer misuse) recorded by the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) dropped by 67% in England and Wales 
between 1995 and 2015/16 (ONS, 2017; see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 also reveals four crucial 
points:  
1. There is a significant difference between the CSEW and PRCD in terms of the total 
number/volume of crime. 
2. The decline in total crime after the mid-1990s is more marked in the CSEW. 
3. While total crime recorded by the CSEW decreased sharply and consistently, especially 
between 1995 and 2004/05, total police-recorded crime increased between 1997 and 
2002/03 due to changes in Home Office Counting Rules (ONS, 2017).  
4. It is evident that according to both data sources, total crime decreased after the mid-
1990s if the period during which changes were applied to PRCD is ignored.  
If we focus solely upon burglaries (excluding attempted burglaries), CSEW burglaries, for 
example, decreased by 68% between 1993 and 2015/16 (ONS, 2017; see Figure 3.2).  Figure 
3.2 also shows that both CSEW and PRCD burglaries started to decrease in 1993. It seems 
that the new Home Office Counting Rules enacted in 1999 did not affect PRCD burglaries 
as they continued to decline after 1999. This result might be due to the fact that burglary is 
generally well-reported to the police (ONS, 2017).  
So, what might explain the fall in crime recorded by the CSEW and PRCD? This chapter 
seeks an answer to this question by critically reviewing the existing crime drop hypotheses 
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Figure 3.1: Number of total offences (thousands), the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1981-2015/16. 
 
Source: Adapted from ONS (2017) 
Figure 3.2: Number of burglaries (thousands), the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1981-2015/16 
 
 Source: Adapted from ONS (2017) 
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according to six categories (see Section 3.2). By doing so, it is hoped that it will become 
possible to accurately assess the relationship between POP and the burglary drop in England 
and Wales in Chapters 6 and 7. This chapter also reviews burglary risk and protective factors 
to be entered into the statistical models in Chapter 7.  
3.2 The crime drop hypotheses 
Many studies have attempted to explain possible reasons for the crime drop. However, they 
have not been able to offer convincing explanations to solve this puzzle (Zimring, 2007; 
Farrell et al., 2010; Tseloni et al., 2010). Therefore, it has become challenging to deduce 
reasonable outcomes from the existing studies for policy purposes. The remainder of this 
chapter critically reviews existing outstanding crime drop hypotheses under six sub-headings: 
(1) economic hypotheses, (2) offender-based hypotheses, (3) substance abuse hypotheses, 
(4) security- and opportunity-related hypotheses, (5) criminal justice system hypotheses, and 
(6) policing-related strategies (see Table 3.1, as adapted from Farrell et al., 2014).  
Table 3.1: The crime drop hypotheses 
Economic 
Strong Economy 
Consumer Confidence 
Offender-Based 
Ageing Population 
Legalisation of Abortion 
Childhood Lead Exposure 
Civilising Process 
Immigration   
Substance Abuse 
Waning Crack Market 
Heroin Market in the UK 
Security and Opportunity-Related 
Improved Security 
The Keystone and Debut Crime  
The Internet 
Phone Guardianship 
Criminal Justice System 
Imprisonment 
Death Penalty 
“More Guns, Less Crime” 
Policing-Related Strategies 
More Police 
Community-Oriented Policing 
Intelligence-Led Policing 
Hot Spots Policing 
Repeat Victimisation 
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3.2.1 Economic hypotheses 
3.2.1.1 Strong economy 
3.2.1.1.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis suggests that a decrease in unemployment rates or growth in income have 
played a significant role in inducing the crime drop (Blumstein and Wallman, 2006; Zimring, 
2007; Rosenfeld and Messner, 2009).  
3.2.1.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Rosenfeld and Messner (2009) analysed burglary trends across the US and European 
countries and concluded that a strong economy was one of the factors that contributed to the 
crime drop. They suggested two mechanisms for the crime drop: (1) “the structural 
similarities and interdependence of the world’s leading market economies”; and (2) “the 
major incentives and controls that shape acquisitive criminal behaviour in developed 
societies” (Rosenfeld and Messner, 2009: 450). In addition, Aebi and Linde (2010) 
suggested that the drop in property crimes was related to the changes in the socio-economic 
situation in Europe, while Brown (2015) concluded that 11% of offenders he interviewed 
cited the increase in affluence as the reason for the drop in property offences in Australia. 
On the contrary, Spelman (2005), drawing upon 68 studies which were conducted to examine 
the link between economy and crime, noted that the results were mixed depending on the 
level of aggregation being analysed (e.g. county versus nation). Spelman (2005) stated that 
studies examining the relationship at high levels of aggregation did not show any effect of 
unemployment on crime. Therefore, Spelman (2005) suggested disaggregation to understand 
the relationship between economy and crime, and found that one-quarter of the drop in 
property crime could be attributed to the booming economy in Texas. A more recent study 
by Baumer et al. (2012: 9) criticised this hypothesis and concluded that: 
“Overall, we find moderately strong evidence that the assumed main effects of wages 
and unemployment rates in most previous studies are questionable. The influence of 
these economic conditions on contemporary crime trends is contingent on other 
conditions, and this may be one reason why past research yields highly inconsistent 
empirical patterns for these attributes”. 
3.2.1.1.3 Critique 
Mechanisms for this hypothesis do not appear convincing as the principal cause of the crime 
drop (Farrell et al., 2010; van Dijk et al., 2012b) as the increase in crime rates in the 1980s 
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can equally be explained by increased economic growth. Scholars argued that the wealthier 
people became, the more opportunities there were for offenders (e.g. more phones, more 
tablets) and the more crimes were committed in the 1980s. If this were the case, this 
hypothesis cannot be the principal explanatory factor for drops in crime (van Dijk et al., 
2012b).  
On a different note, Zimring (2007) concluded that Canadian economic growth was not 
similar to American economic growth. Therefore, this hypothesis cannot explain the decline 
in crime rates in Canada. This hypothesis is also unable to explain why some types of crime 
(e.g. phone thefts and internet crimes) increased if a strong economy decreases crime (Farrell, 
2013; Farrell et al., 2014). Most importantly, Knepper (2012) questioned why property crime 
rates fell during the 2008 recession in England and Wales. 
Overall, available evidence suggests that this hypothesis is not the main driver of the crime 
drop, but it is potentially worth analysing the effect of household desirability and 
attractiveness (which might be indicated by high household income, socio-economic status 
of the head of a household, owner-occupied households and number of cars - see Section 3.3 
in this chapter) on burglary rates.  
3.2.1.2 Consumer confidence 
3.2.1.2.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that when people earn more money, they do not tend to buy second-
hand goods, thus undermining the sustainability of the stolen goods market. Therefore, 
property crimes decrease; offenders do not engage in risky activities anymore; and violence 
also reduces (Rosenfeld and Fornango, 2007; Rosenfeld and Messner, 2009).  
3.2.1.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Rosenfeld and Messner (2009) concluded that there is an association between increased 
consumer confidence and the decline in burglaries in the US and nine European nations, 
excluding the UK. Research in the UK context is limited. 
3.2.1.2.3 Critique 
Roeder et al. (2015) criticised Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) and argued that using the 
Index of Consumer Sentiment is limited as a method as respondents could easily 
miscalculate the timing or importance of individual economic conditions. In addition, 
Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) did not control for technological developments and other 
65 
 
crucial variables that may affect theft or burglary. Moreover, Farrell et al. (2011: 149) 
criticised the hypothesis by saying “we remain uncertain how this hypothesis reconciles with 
the improving economies and increasing crime rates of the post-World War II period, and 
the hypothesis appears largely untested in the absence of evidence relating to stolen goods”. 
Although consumer confidence declined with the reduction in the strength of the global 
economy in 2008/09, crime at this point was still decreasing (Farrell et al., 2015). It also 
does not appear to provide strong evidence for the variation in the crime drop between 
countries and crime types (ibid).  
3.2.2 Offender-based hypotheses 
3.2.2.1 Ageing population 
3.2.2.1.1 Rationale 
The relationship between age and crime has been an important research subject to scholars 
to date (e.g. Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Blonigen, 2010). This hypothesis proposes that 
as a result of longevity and declining fertility rates, the number of young people (aged 16-
24 and considered potential offenders) as a proportion of the overall population has 
decreased in many societies and crime rates have accordingly fallen. 
3.2.2.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Zimring (2007) compared the US crime trends with Canada and concluded that the ageing 
population seems to be one of the factors contributing to the crime drop in both countries. In 
addition, Baumer and Wolff (2014a; 2014b) asserted that there is a strong relationship 
between an ageing population and cross-national homicide downward trend. However, more 
recently, Kaylen et al. (2017) analysed the relationship between changes in individuals’ 
demographic characteristics and aggravated assault victimisations using the National Crime 
Victimisation Survey in the US, but found no significant links between them.  
3.2.2.1.3 Critique 
It was argued by Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008: 21) that “during the sharp crime drop of 
the 1990s; age composition changes were trending in the wrong direction: the number of 18-
year-olds in the U.S. population was increasing while crime rates were declining for other 
reasons”. Additionally, Roeder et al. (2015) stated that the proportion of the US population 
aged between 15 and 30 did not essentially change from 2000 to 2013. Therefore, they 
concluded that the ageing population hypothesis did not work for the 2000s when crime rates 
were still decreasing. Further, if demographic changes account for the crime drop, then it is 
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not clear why some types of crime increase, such as phone theft and internet crimes (Farrell 
et al., 2014). In England and Wales, the ratio of old-to-young increased substantially during 
the early 1990s (ONS, 2017), when crime increased markedly. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
unlikely to be the cause of the crime drop in England and Wales. However, Tseloni (2006), 
using the CSEW 2000 sweep, found a statistically significant relationship between age and 
burglary rates in England and Wales. Hence, it is worth analysing the effect of age on 
burglaries in Chapter 7.  
3.2.2.2 Legalisation of abortion 
3.2.2.2.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that abortion legalisation in the US in 1973 had an impact on the 
crime drop (Donohue and Levitt, 2001; 2004; 2008; Levitt, 2004). That is, after the 
legalisation was passed, fewer unwanted children, who are deemed potential future offenders, 
were born in the most ‘at risk’ groups, and therefore crime rates went down. 
3.2.2.2.2 Empirical evidence 
According to Donohue and Levitt (2001), legalised abortion was the primary reason for the 
falls in murder, property and violent crimes in the US in the 1990s. However, Joyce (2004; 
2009) criticised Donohue and Levitt and argued that they failed to acknowledge illegal or 
unreported abortion and fertility rates and concluded that there is little evidence to support 
their hypothesis. Also, Zimring (2007) criticised Donohue and Levitt (2001) in terms of 
methodology and conducted a more rigorous analysis, which considered the variation across 
states and found that there was no relationship between the abortion legalisation and the 
crime drop. Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) also found that property crimes did not drop 
until 1994, although the first cohort after the abortion legalisation celebrated their 21st 
birthdays. More recently, Shoesmith (2017) disaggregated Donohue and Levitt’s national 
panel-data models to the state level and found that their results in 2001, 2004 and 2008 
articles were driven by high concentrations of teenage abortions in a few of the states, and 
concluded that unwanted pregnancy is not a significant factor. 
3.2.2.2.3 Critique 
Zimring (2007) was not convinced to consider this hypothesis as the main driver of the crime 
drop due to the variation of government policies and timings across European countries. 
Therefore, he criticised the methodology and core idea of the hypothesis and suggested that 
there is no evidence that it is applicable in other countries. Conversely, Dills et al. (2010) 
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found that while the hypothesis is accepted in Canada, France, and Italy, it is rejected in 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Poland. In Japan and Norway, crime decreased before the 
abortion legalisation, and indeed the decrease subsequent to the legalisation being enacted 
was not immediate. Also, this hypothesis cannot explain why e-crimes and phone theft 
increased (Farrell et al., 2010). In the UK, Kahane et al. (2008) conducted a study and found 
no effect of the abortion legalisation on the crime drop. They concluded that although 
abortion was legalised in the UK about five years earlier, total crime in the UK began to drop 
at about the same time as in the US. 
3.2.2.3 Childhood lead exposure 
3.2.2.3.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis suggests that the decrease in early childhood lead exposure, which is linked 
to lower IQ scores and behavioural problems, is associated with the decline in crime in the 
US ( Nevin, 2000; 2007; Stretesky and Lynch, 2004; Reyes, 2007).  
3.2.2.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Reyes (2007) found that the reduction in childhood lead exposure is responsible for the 
significant decline in violent crime in the US. However, the same author concluded that there 
is no statistically significant relationship between the decrease in early childhood lead 
exposure and property crimes, including burglary, in the 1990s.  
3.2.2.3.3 Critique 
Farrell et al. (2011) quite reasonably asked why some types of crime increase while others 
decrease if this hypothesis is correct. In addition, Dills et al. (2010) stated that the use of lead 
increased substantially between 1910 and 1970 and argued that if the hypothesis was correct, 
crime rates should have increased between 1930 and 1985. However, murder rates in the US 
decreased between 1930 and 1950.  
As noted above, the critical point is that this hypothesis is confined to particularly violent 
crimes, and the proponent of the hypothesis did not report a statistically significant 
relationship between the decrease in early childhood lead exposure and the burglary drop, 
which is the focus of the current study. 
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3.2.2.4 Civilising process 
3.2.2.4.1 Rationale 
The very basic idea of this hypothesis is that the more educated society is, the less violent 
crime is committed (Ouimet, 2002).  
3.2.2.4.2 Empirical evidence 
In his extensive research on the decline in homicide across Western countries, Eisner (2014) 
argued that a number of factors associated with pacified behaviour in communities caused 
decreases in crime. They include the establishment of states and criminal justice systems, 
disciplining policies that control the daily life of individuals and the diffusion of literacy, 
which support conscience and self-control (see also Pinker, 2011). According to LaFree 
(1998), these factors increased trust in political institutions, improved economic well-being, 
increased support for criminal justice, welfare and educational institutions in the 1990s (see 
also Lappi-Seppala and Lehti, 2014). Ouimet (2002) also proposed that the civilising process 
may have played a considerable role in the crime drop. However, Farrall (2017) argued that 
there is no real evidence to accept the hypothesis because all suggestions proposed by the 
proponent of this hypothesis are vague. He also asked why crime rates increased between 
1960 and 1990 if the hypothesis is correct. 
3.2.2.4.3 Critique 
Farrell et al. (2014) argued that the terms “increasing trust” and “increasing support”, which 
are used to support this hypothesis, are “extremely general” and “extremely unclear” in terms 
of explaining falls in crime ranging from property crimes to domestic violence (see also 
Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2019). In addition, Farrell et al. (2014) asked that if the civilisation of 
society reduces homicide substantially, why would mobile thefts and internet-related crime 
increase. Besides, it is unclear why there are still some quite significant differences both 
within countries and between countries (Farrell et al., 2014). 
3.2.2.5 Immigration 
3.2.2.5.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis argues that the rise of immigration caused a decline in crime rates (Sampson, 
2008; Stowell et al., 2009; Lee and Martinez, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010).  
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3.2.2.5.2 Empirical evidence 
A number of studies conducted in the US concluded that there is a relationship between the 
increase in immigration and the decrease in crime (Sampson, 2008; Stowell et al., 2009; Lee 
and Martinez, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). More recently, Ousey and Kubrin (2018) conducted 
a comprehensive review and meta-analysis of US-based studies and concluded that the 
relationship between immigration and crime is negative but very weak. Importantly, as this 
study examines the burglary drop in England and Wales, it should be noted that the late 
1990s’/early 2000s’ wave of immigration slightly increased property crime while the wave 
after 2004 did not have any impact on crime rates in England and Wales (Bell et al., 2013). 
3.2.2.5.3 Critique 
The hypothesis still needs clearer and more convincing evidence to explain why phone theft 
or e-crime, for example, increase if immigration accounts for the crime drop. The hypothesis 
also cannot “accommodate the variable trajectories of crime in different countries and for 
different crime types” (Farrell et al., 2014: 448). Immigration was rising not only in the 
1990s but also before the 1990s (Farrell, 2013). Overall, it seems that this hypothesis cannot 
account for the burglary drop that has been experienced in England and Wales since the 
1990s. However, Sampson and Groves (1989) found that ethnic heterogeneity is one of the 
main factors affecting crime rates due to a lack of trust amongst ethnic groups in a 
community. It also affects social ties in a community, which may lead to increased crime 
rates. Therefore, it should be included in the analysis at both household- and PFA level to 
increase the power of the analysis. 
3.2.3 Substance abuse hypotheses 
3.2.3.1 Waning crack market 
3.2.3.1.1 Rationale 
The basic rationale behind this hypothesis is that the decline in the crack market caused the 
crime drop (Levitt, 2004). 
3.2.3.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Levitt (2004: 181) noted: “[a]lthough the research is limited, I nonetheless believe that crack 
has quite likely played an important role in the decline in homicide in the 1990s, at least for 
homicide”. More importantly, the same author’s study found no impact of the waning crack 
market on property crime, which is the focus of this thesis. Berg et al. (2016) used individual-
level data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study to assess whether the 1990s crime drop reflected 
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a decrease in prevalence and incidence of offending. However, they did not find a significant 
difference in illegal drug sales during the period. 
3.2.3.1.3 Critique 
Farrell et al. (2014) are not convinced that this hypothesis can explain the discrepancies with 
the trends in crime across different countries (see also Zimring, 2007; Aebi and Linde, 2010). 
Notably, it does not seem to account for the decrease in burglary, and car theft in England 
and Wales (Farrell et al., 2014) since the patterns of drug use were different from the US 
(Morgan, 2014). Finally, this hypothesis fails to offer a convincing explanation of why some 
types of crime increase while others fall (Farrell et al., 2014).  
3.2.3.2 Heroin market in the UK 
3.2.3.2.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that crime rates dropped due to the decrease in heroin usage in the 
UK (Bennett et al., 2008).  
3.2.3.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Although many studies have examined the relationship between drug use and crime (see 
Bennett et al. 2008 for a comprehensive review), research on the long-term relationship 
between the heroin market and the crime drop in the UK is limited. A Home Office report 
written by Morgan (2014) suggested that the decreased use of heroin had a significant impact 
on the crime drop in the UK. However, the study is far from being convincing, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.2.3.2.3 Critique 
The use of heroin increased in the 1980s and then dropped in the 1990s. Farrell et al. (2014) 
argued that this decline might have been due to improved security. The idea behind this 
suggestion is that since offenders commit crime as a means of financing heroin usage, 
improved security prevented offenders from committing a crime and then the heroin usage 
dropped as the offenders could not finance heroin. Overall, improved security caused the 
crime drop rather than the decline in the heroin market. They also argued that if the decline 
in the heroin market is responsible for the crime drop in the UK, why would phone theft and 
e-crime increase? In addition, Pierce et al. (2015) stated that previous research mostly 
focussed on the relationship between drug usage and acquisitive crimes and, therefore, the 
link between the falls in violent or sexual crimes and the decrease in heroin usage is unclear. 
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A particular critique of Morgan (2014) is that the study used PRCD, which is not recognised 
as a national data source by the ONS. Therefore, Morgan’s (2014) conclusions should be 
read with caution. 
3.2.4 Security and opportunity-related hypotheses 
3.2.4.1 Improved security 
3.2.4.1.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that increased security of homes and vehicles decreased offender 
opportunities, and crime therefore fell (Farrell et al., 2011).  
3.2.4.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Proponents of the security hypothesis (Farrell et al., 2010; Farrell et al., 2011; Farrell, 2013; 
Farrell et al., 2014; Tseloni et al., 2017) argued that improved security is the primary driver 
of the crime drop. Mainly, they studied burglary and vehicle-related theft in England and 
Wales. For instance, Farrell et al. (2014) concluded that temporary vehicle theft (for 
joyriding or transportation) fell by 76% and permanent vehicle theft (for selling) fell by 44% 
in England and Wales between 1995 and 2001. They proposed that this was due to the 
extensive use of central locking systems, tracking devices and electronic immobilisers as 
deterrent mechanisms. In terms of the decline in burglary, Tseloni et al. (2017) concluded 
that there is strong evidence that improved security caused the burglary drop in England and 
Wales in the 1990s. However, Tseloni et al. (2017) noted that the findings presented in the 
study do not prove the security hypothesis for the global crime drop. They concluded that 
the use of window locks, internal lights on a timer and external lights on a sensor and 
deadlocks on doors (in combination) can reduce burglaries considerably.  
3.2.4.1.3 Critique 
One of the limitations of the security hypothesis is the lack of evidence concerning its effect 
on other types of crimes, such as violence (Tonry, 2014). The security hypothesis draws 
upon opportunity-related theories (e.g. routine activity theory and situational crime 
prevention). According to Tonry (2014), although situational crime prevention initiatives 
reduce property crimes, it is not conceivable to associate them with the drop in lethal and 
sexual violence. Second, homicide figures have tracked similar trends in the Western 
developed countries for 50 years. However, the implementation of situational crime 
prevention strategies has varied across countries. Therefore, Tonry (2014) argued that the 
hypothesis cannot be the leading cause of the precipitate drop in crime rates. The proponents 
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of the security hypothesis have developed the keystone and debut crime12 hypotheses to 
respond to these criticisms.  
3.2.4.2 The keystone and debut crime hypotheses 
3.2.4.2.1 Rationale 
Farrell et al. (2011) proposed two more hypotheses to confront the criticisms aimed against 
the security hypothesis: the keystone and debut crime hypotheses (see also Farrell et al., 
2014; Farrell et al., 2015). The first hypothesis proposes that “there is an analogy with the 
removal of the keystone from an arch wherein the other stones tumble, such that this 
relationship has been term the keystone hypothesis” (Farrell et al., 2014: 474). For instance, 
once a possible keystone crime (e.g. shoplifting and car theft) is removed, that might lead to 
declines in other crime types (Farrell et al., 2014). The second hypothesis suggests that 
property crimes, such as burglary and car theft, are debut offences by which offenders start 
their careers. Therefore, preventing those types of crime may prevent offenders from 
becoming career criminals. For instance, reducing property crime (e.g. burglary) may reduce 
violent crimes. 
3.2.4.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Previous research regarding the impact of these hypotheses on the crime drop is limited. 
Farrell et al. (2015) acknowledged that further evidence is required from other countries with 
high-quality analytic approaches and data signatures to accept or reject these hypotheses. It 
was suggested by Tseloni et al. (2017) that future research could test the relationship between 
these hypotheses and the drop in acquisitive crimes using longitudinal career criminal data.  
3.2.4.2.3 Critique 
Tonry (2014) argued that it is impossible to think that lesser incentives to commit burglaries 
or thefts may lead to fewer killings and rapes. Rather, he suggested that deeper forces of 
causal cross-national salience are at work. Recently, Tcherni-Buzzeo (2019) argued that 
there are important differences between property crimes and violent crimes, particularly in 
terms of offender motivation. Therefore, more research is needed. It should be noted that 
these hypotheses have been suggested to explain the decreases in other types of crime. 
Therefore, this is outside of the scope of this thesis, which focusses on burglary.  
 
12 Although the debut crime hypothesis is related to offender-based hypotheses, which are discussed in Section 
3.2.2, it is discussed here to provide all responses of the proponents of the security hypothesis together against 
the criticisms. 
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3.2.4.3 The Internet  
3.2.4.3.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that a series of crimes, which are committed via the Internet, has 
become the new avenue for crime, especially amongst the young people who spend a lot of 
time at home in front of their computers (Aebi and Linde, 2010). Therefore, street crime 
rates dropped. 
3.2.4.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Despite the vast use of the Internet, there has been little research on the relationship between 
the use of the Internet and the crime drop to date (Farrell et al., 2014). Exceptions are the 
studies that were published by Griffiths and Sutton (2013; 2015); however, the evidence they 
provided (Griffiths and Sutton, 2013) was anecdotal. Griffiths and Sutton (2015) revisited 
the Crime Substation Hypothesis that they proposed in 2013. However, they did not conduct 
an experimental study. 
3.2.4.3.3 Critique 
The widespread use of the Internet started in the mid-1990s in the US. However, crime rates 
started to decrease in the US in 1991. Therefore, it seems implausible to suggest that crime 
fell owing to Internet usage (Farrell et al., 2014; Farrell and Birks, 2018). Further, if the 
crime drop is an international phenomenon (Tseloni et al., 2010), the hypothesis should be 
valid in other countries as well. However, the Internet arrived too late (even in Western 
developed countries) for this to be plausible. There was less than one internet user per 1000 
population across the World in 1990 (Aebi and Linde, 2010). Hence, the hypothesis cannot 
explain the crime drop in England and Wales (Farrell et al., 2014).  
3.2.4.4 Phone guardianship 
3.2.4.4.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that crime fell owing to the increased use of phones that provided 
people with more security (Klick et al., 2012). 
3.2.4.4.2 Empirical evidence 
Baumer and Wolff (2014) suggested that the evidence in relation to the effect of using mobile 
phones on crime rates in the US is limited. Klick et al. (2012) associated the decrease in 
crime rates with cell phone ownership. However, they acknowledged that their estimates 
needed to be read with caution as they might have omitted variables that correlated well with 
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cell phone ownership and crime. More recently, Orrick and Piquero (2015) revisited Klick 
et al. (2012) and investigated the effect of using cell phones on the drop in property and 
violent crimes in the US. They found a statistically significant negative relationship between 
phone usage and property crime rates.  
3.2.4.4.3 Critique 
Farrell et al. (2014: 457) argued that “if mobile phones reduce crime via guardianship, we 
might expect any effect to be mainly upon personal crime because phones are carried on the 
person”. It should be noted that a limitation of previous studies is that they use police-
recorded and aggregated crime data at the national level. However, as it has been already 
noted several times, PRCD is not a reliable resource and, as Goldstein (1990) suggested, the 
nature of crime types is different. Therefore, they should be analysed separately and 
thoroughly using alternative data resources (e.g. victimisation surveys). Overall, this 
hypothesis is unlikely to be associated with the burglary drop in England and Wales (Farrell 
et al., 2014). 
3.2.5 Criminal justice system hypotheses 
3.2.5.1 Imprisonment 
3.2.5.1.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that the increase in incarceration coincides with the decrease in 
crime rates. The basic idea is that incarceration deters offenders from committing crime. In 
addition, if offenders are sent to prison, they cannot commit crimes any more (Zimring, 
2007). 
3.2.5.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Some scholars claimed that this hypothesis had a role in the decline in crime rates. For 
example, Levitt (2004) examined ten variables that might be related to the crime drop and 
found that imprisonment has played a significant role in reducing crime rates (58% for 
violent crime, 41% for property crime) in the US. More recently, Brown (2015) concluded 
that 10% of the offenders (n = 994) who participated in the study cited increased 
imprisonment as the reason for the fall in property crime in Australia. On the contrary, 
Baumer and Wolff (2014) suggested that an increased prison population played only a small 
role in inducing the crime drop in the US.  
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3.2.5.1.3 Critique 
Firstly, this hypothesis is limited concerning the timing and external validity (Farrell et al., 
2010; Farrell et al., 2011; van Dijk et al., 2012b; Farrell et al., 2014). For example, prisoner 
rates have been falling since the 1980s in Finland, where crime rates started to decrease in 
the 1990s (van Dijk et al., 2012b). In addition, the prison population was already high in the 
US before the dramatic decline in crime occurred (Farrell, 2013; Farrell et al., 2014). Zimring 
(2007: 619) also argued that “whatever was driving the decline in the United States was also 
operating in Canada. … But … Canada in the 1990s did not increase its imprisonment”. Also, 
the prison population has been steadily rising in England and Wales since the 1940s (Berman, 
2013). If imprisonment is the cause of the crime drop, why it could not stop increasing crime 
rates in the US and England and Wales in the 1980s, and why did crime rates decrease in 
Canada in the 1990s?  
Secondly, this hypothesis fails to explain the variation in decreases in different types of crime. 
For example, Aebi and Linde (2010: 265) noted that “…if an increase in imprisonment 
should have an influence on the crime rates…, it is difficult to understand why this influence 
should be exerted on certain crimes and not on others”. That is, this theory fails to explain 
the increase in phone theft or e-crime in different countries (Farrell et al., 2014). More 
importantly, Rosenfeld and Messner (2009) found no significant relationship between 
burglaries, which is the focus of this thesis, and imprisonment in their comparative study 
between Europe (including England and Wales) and the US.  
3.2.5.2 Death penalty 
3.2.5.2.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that increased use of the death penalty deters future offenders, and 
crime rates fall (Levitt, 2004).  
3.2.5.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Using a panel dataset (1977-1996) covering 3,054 counties in the US, Dezhbakhsh et al. 
(2003) suggested that the relationship between the implementation of capital punishment 
and the decline in homicide in the US is significant. However, according to a comprehensive 
research by Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti (2014), which analysed the relationship between the 
death penalty and lethal violence in 235 countries across six continents between 1950 and 
2010, there is no correlation between capital punishment and the decline in lethal violence 
(see also Levitt, 2004; Rosenfeld and Messner, 2009; Roeder et al., 2015). 
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3.2.5.2.3 Critique 
Ouimet (2002) suggested that although crime rates have declined in both Canada and the US, 
Canada has not employed aggressive policing strategies that some U.S. states have applied. 
More importantly, this hypothesis cannot explain the dramatic decline in burglaries in 
England and Wales, where there is no application of the death penalty. 
3.2.5.3 “More guns, less crime” 
3.2.5.3.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis proposes that as a result of laws allowing concealed weapons, crime fell 
dramatically, owing to the associated deterrence and guardianship (Lott and Mustard, 1997).  
3.2.5.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Lott and Mustard (1997) used cross-sectional time-series data (1977-1992) from the US 
counties and suggested that if those states that did not allow citizens to a carry concealed 
weapon had implemented the right-to-carry a concealed gun provisions in 1992, they would 
have prevented approximately 1,570 murders, 4,177 rapes, and over 60,000 aggravate 
assaults per year (see also Plassmann and Whitley, 2003). However, Ayres and Donohue 
(2003) criticised Lott and Mustard (1997) and argued that they did not acknowledge the fact 
that the presence of guns almost certainly lead to killings and increased crime. In terms of 
statistical analysis, Ayres and Donohue (2003) extended the state and county data, ran more 
rigorous statistical models and concluded that evidence supporting a relationship between 
these laws and crime reduction is limited, sporadic, and extraordinarily fragile. More 
recently, Donohue et al. (2017) conducted a comprehensive assessment using panel data and 
found that laws allowing citizens to carry a concealed weapon increased aggregate violent 
crime rates by 13-15% ten years after adoption. 
3.2.5.3.3 Critique 
Firstly, this hypothesis is limited in relation to external validity. For example, Dills et al. 
(2010: 270) noted that “…hypotheses [this hypothesis is one of them] that find some support 
in US data for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across 
countries” (see also Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2019). Secondly, the hypothesis cannot explain the 
increase in some types of crime (e.g. phone theft and e-crime) (Farrell, 2013). Thirdly, gun 
ownership is mostly associated with violent crimes (e.g. aggravated assault, homicide, 
robbery), not property crimes (Cook and Ludwig, 2002; Kleck, 2004), which are the focus 
of this thesis. More importantly, this hypothesis cannot explain the dramatic decrease in 
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burglaries in England and Wales where carrying a gun (unless you are specialist police or 
army officer) is prohibited. 
3.2.6 Policing-related hypotheses 
3.2.6.1 More police 
3.2.6.1.1 Rationale 
Eck and Maguire (2006: 208) stated that “[a]cross time and place, one of the most common 
reactions to increases in crime is to hire more police officers”. That is, this hypothesis 
suggests that if the number of police officers recruited increases, crime rates decrease. 
3.2.6.1.2 Empirical evidence 
Previous studies about the role of hiring more police officers in the crime drop yielded mixed 
results. Some suggested that recruiting more police officers has an impact on reducing crime 
figures (Marvell and Moody, 1996; Levitt, 2004). Sherman et al. (1998) also concluded the 
same result indirectly, in that “the absence of police is likely to lead to an increase in crime”. 
However, more recently, Roeder et al. (2015: 42) found no significant effect of hiring more 
police officers on crime rates at the national level in the US, stating that:  
“One possible reason for this finding is the simultaneity between these two variables, 
meaning policing and crime can affect each other. For example, in response to more 
crime, a city may hire more police; similarly, when that city hires more police, it 
would expect less crime. It is difficult, statistically speaking, to break this 
simultaneous causal connection and isolate the effect of policing on crime”. 
3.2.6.1.3 Critique 
Although it was asserted that recruiting more police officers reduced violent crime by 12% 
and property crime by 8% in the US (Levitt, 2004), Ouimet (2002: 46) stated that: “[c]rime 
trends in Canada are very similar to those observed in the US…[however] Canada has not 
increased the pro-rata number of police officers”. This happened in Australia and New 
Zealand as well (van Dijk et al., 2012b). That is, there is no simultaneity between increased 
numbers of police and the crime drop in those countries. In addition, Eck and Maguire (2006) 
concluded that there is no evidence to support this hypothesis because violent crime rates 
fell dramatically in big cities in the US where the number of police officers did not increase.  
On a different note, the majority of existing studies come from the US. In a review by 
Bradford (2011), only two studies (out of 13) examining this relationship came from England 
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and Wales. One of them analysed the relationship between more police and the decline in 
robberies (Machin and Marie, 2011), whilst the focus of the other was limited to London 
(Draca et al., 2011). Therefore, further analysis in this regard is needed.  
3.2.6.2 Community policing 
3.2.6.2.1 Rationale 
Community policing (or neighbourhood policing in the UK) aims to reduce crime by 
working with the community (Tilley, 2008).  
“Community policing requires organisational decentralisation, patrol designed to 
facilitate two-way communication between the police and public, a commitment to 
broadly focused problem-oriented policing, responsiveness to citizens’ demands, 
problems and priorities, and help for neighbourhoods to solve crime problems on 
their own” (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997, cited in Tilley, 2008: 377, emphasis added). 
3.2.6.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Previous research regarding the impact of neighbourhood policing on crime rates yielded 
mixed results. For instance, Sherman et al. (1998) concluded that while Neighbourhood 
Watch (also known as block watch, apartment watch, home watch and community watch) 
and community meetings do not work, door-to-door initiatives do. In addition, Bennett et al. 
(2008: 34) conducted both a narrative review and a meta-analysis and concluded that: 
“The main findings of our narrative review were that just over half of the schemes 
evaluated (19) showed that Neighbourhood Watch was effective in reducing crime, 
while only six yielded negative effects. The main finding of the meta-analysis was 
that Neighbourhood Watch was associated with a relative reduction in crime of 
between 16 and 26 per cent”.  
A systematic review by Gill et al. (2014: 423), which covered 25 studies, concluded that “the 
results of this systematic review of community-oriented policing (COP) strategies provide 
robust evidence that community policing increases satisfaction with police, elements of 
police legitimacy, and citizen perceptions of disorder…[but] we do not find evidence that 
COP reduces fear of crime or officially recorded crime”. 
3.2.6.2.3 Critique 
Neighbourhood policing in the UK has a long history (Bennett et al., 2006; 2008; 2009) but 
“[e]fforts to introduce earlier forms of community policing in England and Wales have been 
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characterised by implementation failure, as well as cultural and organisational 
marginalisation” (Quinton and Morris, 2008: 3). After this failure, the National Reassurance 
Policing Programme (NRPP) came onto the policing agenda and was first carried out at the 
ward level from 2003 to 2006 (Quinton and Morris, 2008; Longstaff et al., 2015). After an 
evaluation study (Tuffin et al., 2006) produced positive findings, the UK government wanted 
to roll it out in England and Wales between 2005 and 2008 (Quinton and Morris, 2008). 
However, this target “did not last long” due to the economic crisis (Longstaff et al., 2015: 
3). The important point to note is that efforts to roll out neighbourhood policing do not 
coincide with the dramatic decline in crime rates, which started in the mid-1990s. Second, 
although Neighbourhood Watch, an element of neighbourhood policing, was found effective 
by some studies, there are two main limitations to the studies included in Bennett et al. (2008). 
These include (1) having “rarely wholly equivalent or sometimes not equivalent” 
comparison and experimental areas; and (2) using PRCD (Bennett et al., 2008: 34). 
Therefore, the results of those studies should be read with caution. 
3.2.6.3 Intelligence-led policing 
3.2.6.3.1 Rationale 
Intelligence-led policing aims to reduce crime rates through targeting repeat, prolific and 
dangerous offenders and hot spots (Sparrow, 2016). 
3.2.6.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Research on the impact of intelligence-led policing on the crime drop is limited. For example, 
John and Maguire (2004) examined the early efforts (a 21-month project funded by the 
Targeted Policing Initiative) of mainstreaming intelligence-led policing in three police 
forces (Lancashire, Surrey and the West Midlands) between 2001 and 2002. They concluded 
that “In short, the NIM [National Intelligence Model] was not yet being applied in the 
manner envisaged by its designers, and it would, therefore, be unreasonable to make any 
firm judgements about the ‘effectiveness’ of the Model on the basis of, for example, 
movements in crime rates in the three ‘pilot’ forces” (John and Maguire, 2004: 41). 
3.2.6.3.3 Critique 
The implementation of intelligence-led policing is far from problem-free (John and Maguire, 
2004). A quote from an interviewee clearly shows the difficulty of understanding 
intelligence-led policing in practice: “‘I gave up on the CD-ROM, couldn’t understand it. I 
love intelligence and wanted to learn, but the terminology was very user-unfriendly. It is 
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academically approached with little thought for the people actually using it” (Bullock et al., 
2006: 19). Secondly, as discussed above, the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing is not 
known due to limited research. Thirdly, widespread implementation of intelligence-led 
policing does not coincide with the crime drop as “…the NIM became the required business 
model of police services in England and Wales in April 2004” (Ratcliffe, 2008: 274, 
emphasis added). “Intelligence-led policing is still evolving in a definitional sense…As a 
result, an evaluation of intelligence-led policing is currently difficult as the goalposts are still 
moving” (Ratcliffe, 2008: 278). Therefore, it is unlikely that intelligence-led policing is one 
of the mechanisms behind the dramatic crime drop that started in England and Wales in the 
mid-1990s. 
3.2.6.4 Hot spots policing 
3.2.6.4.1 Rationale 
Using hot spots policing, the police aim to prevent crime through channelling resources into 
hot spots where crime is concentrated (Sparrow, 2016). 
3.2.6.4.2 Empirical evidence 
Early studies examining the effect of hot spots policing did not produce promising results. 
However, more recent studies showed that hot spots policing can have a significant impact 
on crime. A systematic review by Braga et al. (2014: 19), which included 19 studies, 
concluded that:  
“[T]he results of our updated systematic review and meta-analysis provide strong 
support for the basic conclusions of the original Campbell review [Braga et al., 1997]; 
hot-spots policing programs generate modest crime control gains and are likely to 
produce a diffusion of crime control benefits into areas immediately surrounding 
targeted high-activity crime places”.  
Importantly, Braga et al. (2014) concluded that if the POP approach is applied at hot spots, 
the effect is more significant. For instance, a randomised control trial conducted by Taylor 
et al. (2011) compared different types of policing strategies at hot spots and found that crime 
rates dropped by 33% owing to the implementation of a problem-oriented approach 90 days 
after the application.  
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3.2.6.4.3 Critique 
Existing studies only looked at the short-term effect of hot spots policing on crime at a certain 
place and time (Weisburd and Telep, 2014). They also tested mainly whether hot spots 
policing contributed to the New York City crime drop (e.g. Eck and Maguire, 2006; Zimring, 
2011) but failed to reach a firm conclusion about its role due to limited data (e.g. Weisburd 
et al., 2014).  
3.2.6.5 Repeat victimisation 
3.2.6.5.1 Rationale 
This hypothesis is reviewed under policing-related hypotheses because the scanning stage 
of the SARA framework (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1) identifies recurrent problems and 
their characteristics (e.g. repeat burglary victimisation). In other words, POP encourages 
implementers to target repeat victimisation. This hypothesis suggests that a large proportion 
of the fall in crime rates is associated with a fall in repeat victimisation (Thorpe, 2007). 
3.2.6.5.2 Empirical evidence 
Previous research showed that the distribution of crime is not equal (Weisburd, 2015). That 
is, a victim of burglary, for example, is very likely to experience a burglary again 
(Ellingworth et al., 1997; Pease, 1998; Tseloni and Pease, 2005). However, “[t]here is scarce 
evidence on the victimisation divide [or crime inequalities] in relation to the crime drop” 
(Hunter and Tseloni, 2016: 2). 
3.2.6.5.2 Critique 
According to the limited research regarding the role of the drop in repeat victimisation in the 
overarching crime drop, this hypothesis sounds rational. Ignatans (2015: 245) suggested that 
“the reduction in repeat victimisation may demonstrate the effectiveness of targeted crime 
prevention techniques” in England and Wales, such as POP that aims to reduce recurrent 
crime problems (Goldstein, 1990). Therefore, this present thesis seeks to identify whether 
there is a relationship between the long-term drop in repeat burglary victimisations and POP, 
which has not been examined to date, particularly in the context of England and Wales.  
3.2.6.6 Summary of policing-related hypotheses  
3.2.6.6.1 Empirical evidence 
The impact of policing on crime has been argued for decades. Some scholars suggested that 
police do not matter (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Bayley, 1994; Levitt, 2004). 
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Conversely, some suggested that police do matter (Kelling and Sousa, 2001; Skogan and 
Frydl, 2004; Spelman, 2005; Rosenfeld et al., 2007; Zimring, 2007; 2011). Eck and Maguire 
(2006) largely supported the first view. They concluded that an increase in the number of 
police officers and community policing “probably had no influence on national rates of 
violent crime”. In addition, zero-tolerance policing had “little …effect on violent crime in 
New York, and no evidence at nationwide”. However, they concluded that directed patrols 
in hot spots and POP are plausible hypotheses.  
Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) argued that Eck and Maguire’s (2006) conclusions are a 
reflection of limited and poor-quality research. There is a growing body of robust research 
suggesting that some of the innovative policing strategies, which have been applied in the 
US, the UK, Australia and other developed countries over the last three decades, reduce 
crime (Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Tilley, 2010; Weisburd et al., 
2010; Braga et al., 2014; Weisburd and Telep, 2014). Regarding the UK context, a review 
by Goldblatt and Lewis (1998: 1) had already asserted that “It had become increasingly clear 
that research evidence produced over the previous 40-50 years indicated that certain 
approaches to reducing crime would be more effective than others. It was not true that 
‘nothing works’”. Regarding the US context, Kelling and Sousa (2001: 18-19) concluded 
that the police have a significant role in reducing crime rates along with other factors such 
as “demographics, drug use patterns, imprisonment rates, prosecutorial and court policies, 
the economy, probation and parole policies, weapon availability and so on”. In terms of the 
crime drop, Kelling and Sousa (2001) suggested that effective policing strategies are broken-
windows policing, CompStat, and problem-solving-based initiatives, if they are applied 
meticulously. Though Harcourt and Ludwig (2006; 2007) reanalysed the Kelling and Sousa 
(2001) data and did not find that broken-windows policing produced significant reductions 
in serious crimes in New York City between 1989 and 1998. 
A review of publications in policing from various countries (Versteegh et al., 2013) 
suggested that integration and synchronisation of community policing, POP and 
intelligence-led policing seems to be promising. They concluded that policing could affect 
crime rates and certainly matters. Furthermore, Brown (2015) interviewed 994 offenders to 
understand the causes of the property crime decline in Australia. According to these 
offenders, some of the causes are as follows (Brown, 2015: 1-4): 
• improved security (31%, n = 145) 
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• improved policing (20%, n = 94)  
• increased affluence (11%, n = 51) 
• increased imprisonment (10%, n = 46) 
• improved community responses (8%, n = 36) 
• changes in drug use (7%, n = 31) 
• changes in the market for stolen goods (4%, n = 17) 
• changes in crime recording (1%, n = 5). 
According to the above list, improved policing is the second-most frequently given response, 
which was divided into two by Brown (2015: 4): (1) better policing (10%, n = 45) and (2) 
more policing (7%, n = 35). Finally, Ignatans (2015: 331) suggested that “it appears that 
policing strategies and prevention of repeat victimisation are the likely factors behind the 
decrease in crime rates”.  
3.2.6.6.2 Critique 
The first critique of policing strategies is that the emergence of some of the policing 
strategies does not coincide with the crime drop. For example, Ouimet (2002) argued that 
police forces only started to apply some of the innovative policing strategies (e.g. CompStat) 
after the 1990s crime drop. Secondly, there are cities or countries that experienced a decline 
in crime but did not implement the policing strategies that were suggested as one of the 
reasons for the crime drop elsewhere. For example, although Canadian crime trends moved 
in tandem with the US crime trends, Canadian criminal justice agencies did not implement 
policing approaches that were applied in the US, such as zero-tolerance policing (Farrell et 
al., 2014; Tonry, 2014). Farrell et al. (2014) cited Eck and Maguire (2006) to support this 
idea. However, Eck and Maguire (2006) did not criticise, for example, POP, which is the 
primary focus of the current study. They even concluded that POP is a plausible policing 
strategy. Another critical point is that Eck and Maguire (2006) only examined violent crime, 
which is outside of the scope of the current study.  
The argument in relation to the timing of policing strategies may be correct for strategies 
developed after the mid-1990s. However, the researcher argues that Goldstein developed 
POP in 1979, and since then it has been implemented across various countries including the 
US, the UK, Scandinavia, Continental Europe, South America, Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008; Eck, 2014). Therefore, it precedes the decline in 
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burglaries in England and Wales and “reached enough police agencies at the beginning of 
the 1990s” (Eck and Maguire, 2006: 244). 
Finally, it should be noted that “…most of what police deal with is incidents that are non-
criminal in nature” (Scott et al. 2016: 254). Therefore, while it is evident that some of the 
policing strategies are effective in certain circumstances and particular contexts, spending 
too much time on non-criminal incidents might have prevented the police from substantially 
reducing burglaries in England and Wales.  
3.2.6.6.3 Gaps in knowledge 
Existing studies examining the effect of policing strategies on the crime drop mainly 
focussed on New York City (Bowling, 1999; Kelling and Sousa, 2001; Rosenfeld et al., 2007;  
Zimring, 2011; Weisburd et al., 2014). There is a lack of research investigating whether there 
is a long-term relationship between the falls in crime rates and policing strategies at the 
national level in the US (Roeder et al., 2015), Australia (Brown, 2015), and, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, in the UK. Particularly, there has been no research examining the 
long-term relationship between POP and the crime drop either at the national or PFA (or 
lower) level in England and Wales (Telep and Weisburd, 2012; Weisburd and Majmundar, 
2018). Therefore, it seems that proposing the idea that policing strategies have not affected 
the crime drop is an overstatement. In addition, according to rigorous evaluations, there are 
policing strategies which are effective in reducing crime and disorder (e.g. Skogan and Frydl, 
2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2008; Weisburd et al., 2010; Tilley, 2010; 
Weisburd and Telep, 2014; Braga et al., 2014).  
There is one more vital point to be noted before concluding this section. Existing studies 
show that there has seen considerable development regarding policing over the last decades. 
There are now various innovative policing strategies to be applied to reduce or prevent crime. 
For example, Sparrow (2016) asked senior police managers to list the policing styles they 
use for their operations. The list is as follows:  
• community policing 
• neighbourhood policing 
• problem-oriented policing 
• broken-windows policing 
• zero-tolerance policing 
• hot spots policing 
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• situational crime prevention 
• intelligence-led policing 
• predictive policing 
• CompStat 
• evidence-based policing. 
Sparrow also noted that these strategies are used simultaneously. Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to determine the effect of any particular policing strategy (Telep and Weisburd, 
2016). However, according to Sparrow (2016), these policing strategies are reduced forms 
of POP (see also Kirby, 1997; Bullock, 2007; Tilley, 2008; Scott et al., 2008). Eck (2006: 
127) also stated that “there is no alternative to a problem-oriented approach”. Overall, it 
seems that the overarching policing strategy in England and Wales has been POP, which is 
why the present study examines whether there was a relationship between POP and the 
burglary drop in England and Wales.  
3.3 Burglary risk and protective factors 
Most of the hypotheses that have been discussed in this chapter are concerned with the crime 
drop at the country level. This section briefly reviews burglary risk and protective factors at 
the household and lower area level (e.g. neighbourhood). For example, routine activity and 
social disorganisation theories (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) suggest that a household may 
attract a burglary for a number of reasons (Tseloni and Thompson, 2018: 109-110), including: 
• the physical features of a property (including physical security) and its immediate 
surroundings 
• the household’s socio-economic characteristics, such as household composition 
and income 
• the household’s routine activities, such as whether they are away from home a lot 
• the population profile of the neighbourhood 
• the interplay of all the above. 
Previous studies (Kennedy and Forde 1990; Rountree and Land 1996; Ellingworth et al. 
1997; Osborn and Tseloni 1998; Tseloni 2006; 2014) have examined the above factors in 
detail. Tseloni (2014) summarised the independent risk and protective factors associated 
with household crimes in general, and burglary in particular. The risk (indicated via R) and 
protective (indicated via P) factors associated with household crimes are as follows: 
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• being a lone parent (R)  
• living in an inner city (R)  
• being a social renter (R) 
• living in a terraced house (R) 
• household affluence, which is indicated by having three or more cars (R)  
• household affluence, which is indicated by an over £30,000 household income (R) 
• area affluence, which is indicated by the average number of cars per household in the 
area (P) 
• victimisation history (e.g. prior burglary and assault) (R). 
When household crimes are disaggregated into burglary, the risk (indicated via R) and 
protective (indicated via P) factors associated with burglary (including attempted burglaries) 
are as follows (Tseloni, 2006; 2014; Tseloni and Thompson, 2018): 
• being a lone parent (R)  
• living in an inner city (R)  
• being a social renter (R) 
• living in a flat, second floor or above (P) 
• household affluence, which is indicated by having three or more cars (R)  
• length of residence in an area, 1-2 years (R) 
• area affluence, which is indicated by the average number of cars per household in the 
area (P) 
• high area poverty (R) 
• percentage of young people (15-24) in an area (R) 
• high population density (R) 
• victimisation history (e.g. prior burglary, assault and car theft) (R) 
When burglary with entry (the focus of this thesis) and attempted burglary are separated, the 
risk (indicated via R) and protective (indicated via P) factors associated with burglary with 
entry are as follows (Tseloni, 2014): 
• being a lone parent (R) 
• being a social renter (R) 
• household affluence, which is indicated by having three or more cars (R)  
• living in a terraced house (R) 
87 
 
• household reference person’s ethnicity, ethnic minority (P) 
• household reference person’s socio-economic status, non-manual (R) 
• victimisation history (e.g. prior burglary and car theft). 
There are also interacting risk and protective factors associated with crime victimisation. For 
example, an affluent couple with children experiences more crimes compared to a non-
affluent couple with children. Likewise, a non-affluent elderly couple living in a deprived 
inner city area experiences more property victimisations compared to a non-affluent elderly 
couple living in an affluent area (Tseloni, 2014). Therefore, context is crucial for 
victimisation studies. Overall, previous research (Simmons et al., 2002, cited in Tseloni et 
al., 2018) found that: 
 “The young are at more risk than the old; single adult households with children are 
more at risk than those without children; the poorer are at more risk than the richer; 
renters are at more risk than owner-occupiers; the unemployed are more at risk than 
the employed; those living in flats or maisonettes are more at risk than those living in 
detached houses; those who go out more are at greater risk than those spending more 
time at home; those living in inner cities are more at risk than those living in rural 
areas; those in public (also known as social or council) housing are more at risk than 
those living in private housing; and those living in areas with high levels of physical 
disorder are more at risk than those living in areas with low levels”. 
This present study, therefore, controls for the above attributes of households and areas when 
assessing whether POP had a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations in 1997 and 2003/04, separately, in Chapter 7. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter (along with Chapter 2) provide the basis to develop the primary hypothesis of 
this thesis: there will be a relationship between the implementation of POP and the drop in 
both CSEW and PRCD burglaries at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 
2007/08. For this, it critically reviewed existing crime drop hypotheses under six headings. 
It can be argued that most of the hypotheses discussed in this chapter do not seem to explain 
the crime drop England and Wales has experienced since the 1990s. Concerning policing, 
previous research suggested that situational crime prevention techniques reduce crime. The 
relationship between POP and situational crime prevention is also well recognised (Scott, 
2000; Goldstein, 2003). However, most of the existing studies are not rigorous (Weisburd et 
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al., 2010), and they broadly examined the effects of specific POP responses (e.g. situational 
crime prevention techniques) on specific crime types within a limited period. The long-term 
impact of POP on crime is still not known, as Weisburd and Majmundar (2018: 15) asserted: 
“there has not been study of whether a problem-oriented approach used widely in a city 
would reduce overall crime in that jurisdiction”. Therefore, a thorough analysis is needed to 
identify whether POP played a role in the burglary drop in England and Wales whilst 
controlling for burglary risk and the protective factors (e.g. characteristics of households and 
PFAs) that were identified in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 conducted a thorough literature review on POP and the crime drop, and 
identified a significant gap in knowledge: no research has explored the role of problem-
oriented policing (POP) in the crime drop in England and Wales or, indeed, across the world 
to date (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018). Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to explore 
whether there was a relationship between the implementation of POP and the burglary drop 
at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/0813.  
The empirical component of the thesis is divided into three phases (chapters 5-7). This 
chapter details the data and methods used in chapters 5-7 in order to accomplish the main 
aim and objectives of the thesis (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). The structure of the chapter is 
as follows. Firstly, an overview of the data used in the three phases is provided, followed by 
a detailed presentation of individual data sources. Secondly, the chapter discusses the 
selection of the variables used in Chapter 7, which tests whether POP had a statistically 
significant effect on burglaries between 1995 and 2003/04. Thirdly, a detailed analysis plan 
(research design) for three phases is provided. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided. 
4.2 Overview of data  
Phase one (Chapter 5) develops a methodology for the identification of highly POP-
committed police forces in England and Wales over time. For this, it uses two indicators of 
commitment to POP selected by the researcher. These indicators include: 
• problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award 
schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 2008 14 
(https://popcenter.asu.edu/) 
• problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces in England and Wales as 
part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes which applied a 
problem-oriented approach, such as  
 
13 The reasons for choosing burglary and certain time periods (1988-2007/08 in Chapter 6; 1995-2003/04 in 
Chapter 7) to be analysed and the units of analysis can be found in sections 4.8.1, 4.9.2 and 4.9.3, respectively.  
14 The first problem-oriented project submission to the award schemes by a police force (the West Midlands) 
in England and Wales was in 1997. Since the last point in time to be analysed is 2007/08, the present study 
uses problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the award schemes between 1997 and 2008. 
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a. the Safer Cities Programme (1988-1998) (Tilley and Webb, 1994; Ekblom et 
al., 1996; Sutton, 1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001)  
b. the Crime Reduction Programme (1999-2002) (Tilley et al., 1999)  
i. the Reducing Burglary Initiative (1999-2002) (Hope et al., 2004; 
Millie and Hough, 2004; Homel et al., 2004; Hirschfield, 2007) 
ii. the Targeted Policing Initiative (1999-2000) (Bullock et al., 2002; 
Bullock and Tilley, 2003).   
Phase one also reviews the related literature to supplement and triangulate the findings from 
the analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP and identify the policing strategies 
of police forces to be able to distinguish the effect of POP on burglaries in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Phase two (Chapter 6) is an initial attempt to explore whether POP has played a role in the 
burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales or otherwise. It uses both the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) (ten sweeps from 1996 to 2007/08) and police-
recorded crime data (PRCD) (from 1988 to 2007/08) to compare trends in burglaries 
amongst the most similar PFAs15 in England and Wales.  
Phase three (Chapter 7) employs two separate statistical analyses: (1) multilevel negative 
binomial regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Tseloni, 2006) and (2) Pearson (point-
biserial) correlation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013), respectively, to examine whether there 
was a statistically significant relationship between POP and burglaries between 1995 and 
2003/04. For the first analysis, Phase three uses the 1998 and 2003/04 CSEW sweeps, the 
1991 and 2001 UK Censuses and police workforce (strength) statistics (the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy - CIPFA). For the second analysis, it uses the 
CSEW sweeps from 1996 to 2003/04. Both analyses use problem-oriented projects to 
construct the independent variable. The following sections detail these data sources, 
acknowledges their limitations, and provides reasons for selecting them. 
4.3 Problem-oriented projects 
Previous research concerning the implementation fidelity of POP in England and Wales is 
limited. For example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary examined the state of 
problem solving in the police service nationally (HMIC, 1998), which was followed up by 
another report (HMIC, 2000) to monitor the associated progress. Read and Tilley (2000) 
 
15 See Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2 for a definition. 
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then published a research report that accompanied the inspection. They produced and used 
a problem-solving checklist for their inspection (see Appendix 4.1). However, they did not 
report the level of commitment of police forces to POP separately. Some years later, Bullock 
et al. (2006) examined the development of POP in Lancashire and Hampshire16 and found 
that six factors were significant in its development and delivery within these police forces:  
1. leadership and management 
2. practical help 
3. analysis and evaluation 
4. training 
5. spreading good practice 
6. rewards and incentives.  
Therefore, for an ideal categorisation of all 42 police forces in terms of their 
(organisational)17 commitment to POP, sending the ‘problem-solving checklist’ to them 
would be the first option; examining whether the six factors that were found to be significant 
in the development and delivery of POP in Lancashire and Hampshire are present in all 42 
police forces would be the second. However, both options were not feasible due to limited 
time and resources and retrospective nature of the current study. Therefore, to overcome this 
limitation, the researcher selected two indicators of commitment to POP that are available 
to the public (Sections 4.3.1.3 and 4.3.2.3 provide more reasons for selecting these indicators 
along with the limitations to using them). 
4.3.1 Projects submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley awards 
The first indicator that Chapter 5 (Phase one) uses is problem-oriented projects that were 
submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award schemes by police forces in England and Wales 
between 1997 and 2008. Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 explain the development of the award 
schemes and review the nature of the projects, respectively. 
4.3.1.1 Development of the Goldstein and Tilley awards 
The Goldstein Award scheme was first introduced in 1993 to identify outstanding police 
forces and officers in the US and around the world (e.g. the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, 
 
16 Bullock et al. (2006: 12) noted that Lancashire and Hampshire “can be considered to be amongst the UK’s 
very best in terms of the vigour and resources that have gone into it [POP]”. 
17 The commitment to POP can be categorised into two groups: ‘organisational’ and ‘individual’ commitment. 
This thesis is concerned with organisational commitment to POP as assessing individual police officers’ 
commitment to POP is beyond the researcher’s capability due to the retrospective nature of the study. 
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and the UK) that are effective in reducing crime, disorder, and fear of crime via application 
of a problem-oriented approach. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) 
administered the Goldstein Award scheme between 1993 and 2007. The Tilley Award 
scheme was launched in 1999 by the then UK Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime 
Unit to share good examples in relation to the implementation of POP across police forces 
and partner agencies in the UK (https://popcenter.asu.edu/). The Tilley Award scheme 
ultimately ceased in 2010 due to financial issues. However, South Yorkshire Police received 
a Police Transformation Fund Award (£6.35 million) in 2017 and officially opened the Tilley 
Award for application on 7th September 2018 for the first time in eight years (South 
Yorkshire Police, 2018). 
The process of entering a project to the award schemes is as follows (Bullock et al., 2006). 
Police forces and their partner organisations are invited to submit projects that apply a 
problem-oriented approach to reduce crime and disorder. They can also submit projects on 
organisational support and partnership working in relation to POP. The overarching aim of 
the award schemes by this invitation is to share the best POP projects and support frontline 
delivery of POP and partnership. Once the invitation is announced, police forces submit their 
projects that they consider as exemplars of the problem-oriented approach. Applicants are 
required to use a standard application form which should include the following information 
(Bullock et al., 2006): 
• details of the project (the title, police force, partner agency involvement, contact details 
and the names of endorsing senior representatives) 
• a summary of the project (explanation of the problem, the main responses to the problem 
and results - maximum 400 words) 
• a more extended project report (maximum 4000 words) 
• an endorsement letter from a senior representative (Assistant Chief Constable or above 
– this indicates that the project was found sufficiently successful to be submitted). 
Once the projects are submitted, they are examined by a judging panel including senior 
police officers, academics with expertise in POP, and previous award winners. Both schemes 
apply a similar judgement procedure to select ‘finalist’ and ‘winner’ projects from all 
submissions (‘others’). The judging panel uses the following criteria whilst assessing the 
projects:  
• objectives of the project (s) 
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• use (quality) of data to define the problem (s) 
• depth of analysis of the problem (s) 
• providing realistic responses to the problem (s) 
• depth of evaluation of the response (s) 
• working with community and partner organisations 
• written presentation 
• coherence of the project (s) (https://popcenter.asu.edu/; Bullock et al., 2006).  
Based on the above criteria, the project entries (‘the others’) are shortlisted (‘the finalists’) 
for further consideration. Following that, the judging panel assesses and scores ‘the finalists’. 
The scores range from 0 (no credit) to 7 (superior). Each judge’s scores are collated, and the 
three highest scores are determined as ‘the winners’ (Bullock et al., 2006). Having identified 
‘the winners’, they are announced at annual national POP conferences in the US and the UK. 
Police forces and officers are given a certificate as an incentive and ‘the winners’ of the 
Tilley Award scheme receive funding to attend conferences (including the Goldstein Award 
scheme in the US) to present their outstanding projects (Bullock et al., 2006).  
4.3.1.2 Nature of projects  
Since this thesis explores the relationship between POP and the burglary drop at the PFA 
level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08, the analysis is limited to the projects 
submitted to the award schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 
2008. The total number of the award entries to be reviewed in Phase one is 771 once 
duplications are removed (745 Tilley Award and 26 Goldstein Award submissions). In terms 
of the lengths of the projects, while a handful started during the same year as being submitted 
to the award schemes, the majority began two or more years before. The projects targeted a 
variety of crime problems ranging from particular crime types in specific areas, such as car 
theft in a car park, to overall crime in specific neighbourhoods or estates. Anti-social 
behaviour and youth-related nuisance seemed to be the main problems tackled over time. 
With regard to burglary, one hundred and thirteen projects targeted burglary.  
The quality of the projects varied as well. In other words, the projects had problems with 
each step of the SARA framework (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1). Bullock et al. (2006) 
analysed a randomly selected 150 (out of 503) problem-oriented projects that were submitted 
to the Tilley Award scheme between 1999 and 2005. They identified that: 
1. The projects targeted an extensive range of crime problems. 
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2. While at least one partner agency was mostly involved at some stage, the majority of the 
projects had been carried out by police forces. 
3. The quality of analysis in the projects varied widely, more in-depth analysis of the data 
was required in many cases. 
4. The projects mainly used police recorded crime data. 
5. Problems regarding data sharing between partners and the quality of the data had been 
encountered in most cases. 
6. Analysts did not use the literature effectively, which could have helped understand the 
nature of the crime problems. 
7. The objectives of the projects were relatively well specified. 
8. Most responses had been applied well or reasonably well. 
9. The majority of the projects tended to involve reactive responses. 
10. Less than half of the projects evaluated the responses. 
11. The quality of evaluations was generally poor. 
However, they concluded that despite the above limitations, the efforts and enthusiasm of 
individual officers were laudable.  
4.3.1.3 Limitations and reasons for selection 
There are a number of limitations (along with the limitations noted in Section 4.3.1.2) to the 
use of these projects as an indicator of commitment to POP. Firstly, these projects are biased 
towards success because police forces are inclined to submit influential projects to win 
competitions. This means there might be other problem-oriented projects that have not been 
submitted to the award schemes. Secondly, the ideal indicator of commitment to POP is the 
proof of application of POP, as Goldstein envisaged. However, the majority of the projects 
submitted to the award schemes are far from representative of the typical POP application 
(Bullock et al., 2006, see Section 4.3.1.2). This said, that Bullock et al. (2006: 65) suggested 
that the number of projects submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein award schemes by 
Lancashire between 1999 and 2005 (n = 135) reflected “the commitment of this force to 
adopt problem-oriented policing (emphasis added)”. This is because, although the projects 
have limitations, the idea behind using them in this thesis is to measure the level of 
commitment of all 42 police forces to POP with the available data, not to examine the effects 
of those projects on burglary rates over time (see Section 4.3 for more general reasons for 
selecting the indicators). More importantly, “[t]he unit of work in problem-solving is known 
as a ‘problem,’ a ‘problem-solving project’ or a ‘POP project’” (Scott, 2000: 88). Overall, it 
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is argued that the more police forces submitted problem-oriented projects to the award 
schemes, the more they were committed to the implementation of POP. 
4.3.2 Projects applied as part of government-supported crime reduction programmes 
The second indicator of commitment to POP selected by the researcher to be used in Phase 
one is the projects which were applied by police forces as parts of large-scale government-
supported crime reduction programmes that utilised problem-oriented approaches. These 
programmes include the Safer Cities Programme, the Crime Reduction Programme, the 
Targeted Policing Initiative, and the Reducing Burglary Initiative. Investigating the projects 
that were applied under these programmes supplement and triangulate the findings from the 
analysis of the first indicator.  
4.3.2.1 The Safer Cities Programme 
The Safer Cities Programme was introduced as part of a more comprehensive programme 
(Actions for Cities) to tackle a wide range of crimes, including residential burglary (Tilley, 
1992). The first phase of the programme was launched in 1988 and finished in 1995 and 
covered 20 cities or boroughs (in the case of London) in England and Wales. Phase one was 
funded and managed by the Home Office. The second phase, which funded 30 projects as 
part of the Single Regeneration Budget, started in December 1993 under the supervision of 
the Department of Environment (Sutton, 1996) and ended in 1998 (Hirschfield et al., 2001). 
A central feature of Phase two was again applying burglary reduction initiatives (Mawby, 
2001). Direct Line Insurance (Webb, 1997, cited in Mawby, 2001) funded a target-hardening 
burglary prevention initiative that operated in Plymouth, Merthyr Tydfil, Lambeth, 
Greenwich, Blackburn, Burnley and Manchester (Mawby, 2001).  
4.3.2.2 The Crime Reduction Programme 
Following a comprehensive literature review which identified a gap in knowledge in relation 
to what works in crime prevention (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998), the then Labour government 
legislated the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 and introduced the Crime Reduction 
Programme (Homel et al., 2004). The programme consisted of 18 streams and sought to 
encourage crime reduction projects to learn what works in crime prevention between 1999 
and 2002. The total budget for the programme was around £400 million, out of which £24 
million was spent on funding 246 anti-burglary projects to target neighbourhoods in England 
and Wales with a high number of burglaries. Another eight million was spent on the ‘Locks 
for Pensioners’ project to improve home security measures for pensioners living in low-
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income households in neighbourhoods with a high number of burglaries. Additionally, one 
million was spent on distraction burglary projects to reduce distraction burglary amongst the 
elderly. Finally, one million was spent on staffing a distraction burglary taskforce (Bullock 
and Tilley, 2003).  
Similar to the Safer Cities Programme (Ekblom et al., 1996), “[m]uch of the Crime 
Reduction Programme has followed the logic of problem-oriented policing…” (Bullock and 
Tilley, 2003: 11). From its streams, Phase one analyses the projects that were applied as part 
of the Targeted Policing Initiative (Bullock et al., 2002), and the Reducing Burglary 
Initiative (Hope et al., 2004; Millie and Hough, 2004; Hirschfield, 2007) as the Targeted 
Policing Initiative explicitly aimed to mainstream POP across the country, and the Reducing 
Burglary Initiative specifically targeted burglary using a problem-oriented approach. 
4.3.2.3 Limitations and reasons for selection 
Whilst acknowledging that there is a need for police forces to demonstrate a commitment to 
POP in order to be successful, there are a lot of other factors that determine success in grant 
applications. It is highly likely that there are forces who are committed to POP but whose 
track record in securing funding does not reflect this. In addition, there might be police forces 
simply ticking boxes in relation to the Home Office and senior officers within their force to 
secure funding.  
With the above limitations in mind, there are a number of general and particular reasons for 
selecting these projects as the second indicator of commitment to POP. General reasons are 
as follows. Firstly, these are the only publicly available and the most appropriate sources to 
identify the level of commitment of all 42 police forces to POP in England and Wales 
retrospectively. Secondly, both the projects submitted to the award schemes and the projects 
funded as part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes applied a 
problem-oriented approach. Thirdly, the projects mainly targeted repeat incidents, victims 
or targets (e.g. Kirkholt project), which is an effective way of reducing crime rates, as 
Goldstein (1979, 1990) proposed. Fourthly, the majority of the projects targeted burglaries 
as Laycock and Farrell (2003: 222) summarised: 
“The requirement for the period 1996/7 was that forces should have developed a 
strategy to tackle repeat victimisation, and most chose to concentrate upon residential 
and other forms of burglary. This was probably because most of the published 
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research had been centred on domestic burglary reduction, and reducing burglary was, 
by then, one of the central government priorities” (emphasis added). 
Finally, the researcher argues that police forces that received funding for the projects as part 
of government-supported programmes applied POP on a larger-scale compared to others. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that these projects improved the state of POP within police 
forces that received funding when compared to others (see Section 4.3 for more general 
reasons for selection).  
Particular reasons for selecting these projects as an indicator of commitment to POP are as 
follows. Firstly, Ekblom et al. (1996) evaluated the first phase of the Safer Cities Programme 
creating an ‘action intensity score’, which refers to “the average amount of funds acting on 
each household over a given year” (Ekblom et al., 1996: 7, see also Bowers et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Phase one identifies each PFA where Safer Cities projects were applied and 
calculates the total amount of funding received for the projects by police forces. Secondly, 
the RBI was one of the streams of the Crime Reduction Programme. One of the conditions 
for the RBI projects to be funded was to apply them in areas comprising 3,000-5,000 
households with a high number of burglaries (at least twice the national PRCD burglaries 
for each of the previous three years). If a small area experienced at least 100 burglaries per 
year, it was also eligible for funding (Tilley et al., 1999). Importantly, “criteria for selection 
included the novelty of the proposed strategy, the context (type of problem, location etc.) in 
which established methods were to be applied and the quality of the available data and data 
system” (Tilley et al., 1999: 2). Therefore, it can be argued that bidders were required to 
demonstrate their problem-solving skills to receive funding for an RBI project. Therefore, 
Phase one identifies police forces which received funding for the RBI projects and calculates 
the total amount of funding received for the projects by police forces. Finally, the proposals 
for the TPI projects were reviewed by a team of Home Office staff, policy officials and an 
external examiner based on the requirements noted in Table 4.1 (see also Homel et al., 2004). 
The application requirements clearly show that the reviewers were seeking to determine 
whether police forces were able to implement a problem-oriented approach to tackle the 
problems that they were seeking funding for. Therefore, the researcher argues that receiving 
funding for the TPI projects is an indicator of commitment to POP. Overall, it is argued that 
although the projects have some limitations, the researcher’s method is a ‘necessary evil’ to 
progress knowledge.  
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Table 4.1: Application requirements for TPI project proposals 
Round-one 
To provide a description of the problem 
To indicate how the problem related to the findings from local crime and disorder audits and strategies 
To show how the problem related to the local policing plan 
To spell out how the problem would be tackled, specifying in particular whether the project would make use of: 
-structured crime/incident data 
-new structure/arrangements and  
-innovative tactics 
To show what crime reduction targets could be achieved 
To note related initiatives 
To list other factors affecting the area 
To indicate what resources would be required 
Round-two 
An outline of the size and the nature of the problem 
A description of why the problem was worth tackling 
An explanation of why the problem was amenable to a problem-oriented approach 
Objectives/targets for dealing with the problem 
An outline of funding required 
Details of planned or ongoing initiatives 
A timetable 
Source: Bullock et al. (2003: 12) 
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4.4 The related literature 
Phase one finally reviews the related literature to supplement and triangulate the findings 
from the analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP and identify the policing 
strategies adopted by police forces in order to distinguish the effects of POP on burglaries in 
Chapters 6 and 7. It particularly reviews: 
1. a number of projects that were submitted by police forces to the award schemes which 
explicitly reported the implementation of POP within police forces18 
2. books and government reports that summarise the history of POP in England and Wales 
and that assess the level of implementation of POP in some police forces in England and 
Wales (e.g. Leigh et al., 1996; 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock et al., 2006) 
3. peer-reviewed articles (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton, 2009a; 2009b) that reviewed 366 
of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) reports to determine the policing 
styles of police forces in England and Wales prior to August 2001. 
In terms of identification of policing styles of police forces, the chapter criticises previous 
studies listed in the third bullet point above and revises their findings. For this, it uses peer-
reviewed published research, a number of Tilley Award submissions (which were POP-
related organisational plans of police forces) and unpublished POP-related organisational 
plans of police forces19. The researcher acknowledges that the projects that were submitted 
to the award schemes and organisational plans are not peer-reviewed studies. However, they 
are nevertheless valuable as the projects were submitted to the award schemes with 
endorsement letters from senior representatives (Assistant Chief Constable level or above) 
which indicates that the projects were recognised within police forces as being successful 
and worthy of submission (Bullock et al., 2006). In addition, they are currently the only 
publicly available and most appropriate sources from which to conduct such an analysis. 
4.5 The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) 
The CSEW was previously known as the British Crime Survey (BCS). However, it has been 
called the CSEW since April 2012 to more appropriately reflect its geographical coverage 
(Flatley, 2014). It measured crime victimisations via face-to-face interviews until 1992. 
Since 1994, Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing and Computer-Assisted Self-
administered Interviewing (for sensitive questions) have been implemented (ONS, 2018). 
 
18 https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/unpublished-documents-case-studies. 
19 Ibid. 
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The CSEW was first conducted in 1982. Until 2001, eight sweeps were conducted, since 
when it has become an annual survey (Flatley, 2014). The CSEW “is viewed as a gold-
standard survey of its kind” (Flatley, 2014: 199). Ten sweeps of the CSEW (from 1996 to 
2007/08) are used in Chapter 6, which compares trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries 
in POP-committed PFAs with trends in their most similar PFAs that were not committed to 
POP to the same extent. Six sweeps of the CSEW (1996-2003/04) are utilised in Chapter 7, 
which tests whether there was a statistically significant effect of POP on the mean number 
of burglary victimisations (also controlling characteristics of households and PFAs and the 
number of police officers per 1000 residents in PFA) between 1995 and 2003/04. 
4.5.1 Sampling and coverage 
The sampling population of the CSEW consisted of residents aged over 16 living in England 
and Wales until January 2009. After that time, it was extended and now currently covers 
children aged between 10-15 years as well (Tseloni and Tilley, 2016), but which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The CSEW sampling frame from which the sample is selected is the 
Postcode Address File, “which is widely accepted as the best general population sampling 
frame in England and Wales” (ONS, 2018: 5). Once an eligible household is determined20, 
an interviewer randomly selects an adult from that household for an interview. If it is 
applicable, the interviewer also randomly selects a child aged 10 to 15 years from the same 
household for an interview (ONS, 2018). Again, children aged 10 to 15 years are outside the 
scope of the thesis. Although the CSEW response rates vary from year to year, they have 
been consistently high, and the target sample sizes are always accomplished (ONS, 2018). 
There are 43 PFAs in England and Wales, and Table 4.2 presents the sample sizes (adults) 
achieved for the CSEW sweeps for 42 PFAs from 1996 to 2007/0821. The last row represents 
the total sample size for each sweep. The sample sizes of 1996, 1998 and 2000 CSEW 
sweeps at the PFA level are relatively low. However, the sample size of the CSEW then 
gradually improved from 2000 to 2007/08 (both at the PFA level and the national level) to 
increase the precision of estimates for PFAs (Lynn and Eliot, 2000). 
 
20  The CSEW does not cover the population living in vacant properties, second homes, non-residential 
addresses, care homes and student halls. 
21 City of London is merged with the Metropolitan in the CSEW (ONS, 2018). The CSEW does not include a 
PFA-related variable prior to 1996 (Hele, 2019, personal email, 6 February 2019). 
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Table 4.2: The CSEW sample size (adults) by PFA, 1996-2007/08 
Police Forces 1996 1998 2000 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Avon & Somerset 452 410 460 921 922 891 982 1,127 1,049 969 
Bedfordshire 147 187 306 474 623 759 1,068 1,085 977 1,055 
Cambridgeshire 274 264 299 583 589 735 1,018 1,068 1,023 989 
Cheshire 280 289 367 653 753 774 983 1,060 1,041 964 
Cleveland 141 97 320 590 763 816 964 971 1,041 1,067 
Cumbria 160 118 304 548 644 777 1,034 1,080 931 1,031 
Derbyshire 212 334 341 630 729 733 1,017 981 1,040 1,054 
Devon & Cornwall 507 495 567 873 883 838 1,000 979 995 1,059 
Dorset 68 25 305 581 694 788 1,043 1,033 988 903 
Durham 178 312 318 568 737 777 1,002 959 1,047 991 
Dyfed Powys 70 88 323 570 721 686 944 1,028 1,000 1,102 
Essex 383 388 531 876 919 915 1,078 1,028 1,011 1,011 
Gloucestershire 181 165 327 594 655 764 1,045 1,014 1,019 991 
Greater Manchester 837 750 880 1,313 1,414 1,556 1,374 1,535 1,540 1,553 
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Table 4.2: The CSEW sample size (adults) by PFA, 1996-2007/08 (continued) 
Police Forces 1996 1998 2000 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Gwent 213 125 345 701 779 821 896 1,041 1,042 1,004 
Hampshire 442 420 611 981 1,002 1,009 1,047 1,096 1,075 995 
Hertfordshire 163 209 322 579 635 719 999 1,167 1,065 1,058 
Humberside 356 275 325 646 725 765 1,017 1,034 986 1,009 
Kent 419 426 526 882 934 883 1,024 1,072 1,016 979 
Lancashire 349 279 472 760 840 902 1,031 1,125 1,071 979 
Leicestershire 266 309 280 614 652 738 990 1,077 992 993 
Lincolnshire 306 161 327 563 817 755 945 1,086 1,039 1,015 
Merseyside 549 409 479 847 905 858 1,021 1,056 1,013 1,011 
Metropolitan 2,559 2,385 2,186 2,921 3,322 3,449 3372 3,370 3,527 3,634 
Norfolk 244 205 319 560 775 836 982 997 1,036 982 
North Wales 202 275 314 599 748 771 883 1,043 1,001 1,071 
North Yorkshire 172 126 305 577 607 731 995 999 1,021 1,037 
Northamptonshire 171 74 333 630 682 692 904 1,064 1,013 1,104 
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Table 4.2: The CSEW sample size (adults) by PFA, 1996-2007/08 (continued) 
Police Forces 1996 1998 2000 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Northumbria 652 546 543 779 867 826 934 1,032 1,066 1,028 
Nottinghamshire 388 285 359 586 678 759 882 1,033 1,093 1,050 
South Wales 367 302 445 726 755 737 918 1,098 1,045 1,075 
South Yorkshire 465 462 469 701 863 813 968 998 1,078 1,025 
Staffordshire 395 388 401 740 628 718 948 1,017 999 1,106 
Suffolk 165 172 299 653 701 723 953 1,083 1,098 992 
Surrey 263 58 285 720 800 827 920 1,012 1,068 963 
Sussex 583 417 519 877 828 693 1,029 1,041 1,080 1,069 
Thames Valley 723 693 710 983 1,178 1,210 1,272 1,233 1,238 1,195 
Warwickshire 201 129 311 724 698 776 1,069 1,074 1,104 1,057 
West Mercia 147 279 425 640 766 811 908 1,074 1,054 999 
West Midlands 962 760 779 1,341 1,396 1,449 1,544 1,595 1,398 1,543 
West Yorkshire 545 654 733 1,118 1,110 1,096 1,124 1,264 1,241 1,219 
Wiltshire 189 199 340 602 742 755 993 1,067 1,042 1,052 
Total 16,346 14,944 19,410 32,824 36,479 37,931 45,120 47,796 47,203 46,983 
Response Rate* 83% 79% 74% 73% 74% 75% 75% 75% 75% 76% 
Sources: Researcher’s calculations, the CSEW, 1996-2007/08  
(*) ONS, 2018  
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4.5.2 Reference periods 
Prior to 2000, respondents reported their crime-related experiences in the previous calendar 
year (for example, the 1996 CSEW measured the crime-related experiences of the 
respondents between January 1995 and December 1995 through interviews conducted in 
1996). However, when the CSEW changed to continuous survey (2001/02 onwards), the 
respondents reported their crime-related experiences in the 12 months prior to being 
interviewed (for example, the 2002/03 CSEW measured crime-related experiences of the 
respondents between April 2001 and February 2003 through interviews conducted between 
April 2002 to March 2003) (ONS, 2018). Therefore, the CSEW sweeps are not directly 
comparable. Since the CSEW sweeps before 2001/02 report crime victimisations in the 
previous calendar year (for example, the 1996 sweep reported crime victimisations in 1995), 
the tables and figures will be labelled accordingly. 
4.5.3 Questionnaire structure 
The CSEW questionnaire has six parts: (1) sampled Household Details, (2) Main 
Questionnaire, (3) Demographics and Media Consumption Section, (4) Special Modules 
covering themed topics, (5) Victim Forms, and (6) ad hoc special topics modules. In order 
to cover as many themes as possible, the Special Modules are completed by a random sub-
sample of the entire annual CSEW sample and/or alternate from year to year (Tseloni and 
Tilley, 2016). If respondents report crime experiences in the screener questions of the Main 
Questionnaire, they can then complete a maximum of five or six Victim Forms, depending 
on the year (ONS, 2018). They report the most serious crimes first ((1) rape and sexual 
assault, (2) robbery, (3) assault, (4) theft from a person, (5) burglary, (6) theft from a 
dwelling, (7) vehicle theft, and (8) vandalism) (Hales, 1993, cited in Tseloni and Tilley, 
2016). 
4.5.4 Questions asked  
For the interviews, all respondents are asked to reply to the screener questions of the Main 
Questionnaire to record their crime experiences. The wording of the questions regarding 
crime experiences has been consistent over time to ensure their comparability (ONS, 2018), 
which means that there has been no change in the definition of burglary over the period the 
thesis analyses. However, specific terms, such as burglary, are not used in the surveys. For 
instance, the following questions are asked to determine whether a respondent has been a 
victim of burglary: 
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• If anyone got into the current residence to steal/try to steal? (YES/NO). If YES,  
o How many times has this happened? 
• If anyone got into the previous residence to steal/try to steal? (YES/NO). If YES, 
o How many times has this happened? 
If a respondent answers the above questions from the screener questionnaire as YES, victim 
forms are completed (a maximum of five or six depending on the year). This study uses the 
screener questionnaires since it is only interested in the number of victimisations rather than 
the nature or pattern of burglary.    
4.5.5 Types of incidents reported 
There are two kinds of incidents that the CSEW records: (a) household incidents, and (b) 
personal incidents. Answers to questions asked to a respondent per household refer to 
household incidents, and the current study deals with household burglary with entry 
(excluding attempted burglaries)22. On the other hand, personal incidents refer to crimes 
committed against respondents and their possessions (Flatley, 2014; Tilley and Tseloni, 
2016). Personal incidents are outside the scope of this research.  
4.5.6 Household weights 
The CSEW raw data is first weighted by Kantar Public (CSEW contractor), after which the 
ONS applies calibration weighting to adjust for differential non-response (ONS, 2018). 
There are two main weights: (1) the core household weight, and (2) the core individual 
weight. This study uses the core household weight in Phase two (Chapter 6). It is calculated 
as follows: “Core household weight equals w1 (weight to compensate for unequal address 
selection probabilities between PFAs - given some areas are more populated than others) 
multiplied by w2 (“address non-response weight” to compensate for the observed variation 
in response rates between different types of neighbourhood - based on region and 
neighbourhood classification indicators) multiplied by w3 (dwelling unit weight, which 
relates to the number of dwelling units in a household, to compensate for situations in which 
only one dwelling unit can be selected in multiple “dwelling unit” households)” (ONS, 2018: 
93). 
 
22 See Section 4.8.1 for reasons. 
 106 
 
4.5.7 Validity of the CSEW 
Statisticians, criminologists and the UK government have largely drawn upon two data 
sources to measure crime: the CSEW and PRCD. The CSEW, as the only crime-related 
national statistics in England and Wales, is more widely used to analyse crime trends 
compared to PRCD. It has been “viewed as a gold-standard survey” (Flatley, 2014: 199) as 
PRCD has several shortcomings, such as political pressure, the dark figure (unreported 
crimes), and changes in recording processes (Tilley et al., 2018). The CSEW has had a 
considerable influence on criminological thinking and understanding of victimisation risk 
and repeat victimisation (Flatley, 2014). There is a substantial body of peer-reviewed studies 
(using the CSEW) which have shaped crime prevention policies (e.g. Tseloni et al., 2018). 
The success of those studies depends on the associated wealth of data as the CSEW provides 
socio-demographic characteristics of individuals, households and areas, the nature and 
consequences of victimisation experience, and public attitudes to crime and crime-related 
issues (Flatley, 2014).  
4.5.8 Limitations of the CSEW 
Despite its reputation as a gold-standard survey, there are inevitable methodological 
limitations to the CSEW, such as “sampling error, and the inherent imprecision around 
survey estimates” (Flatley, 2014: 199). A respondent’s lack of ability to recall incidents and 
the possibility of misinforming interviewers are further inherent limitations. Moreover, 
participants may not want to report incidents in detail, especially in relation to sex offences. 
Furthermore, participants may misinterpret questions and interviewers may record responses 
in the wrong way. Coders who determine crime categories may give the wrong codes to 
crimes as well (Flatley, 2014). 
4.6 Police data 
The thesis also uses PRCD burglaries as the level of reporting of burglaries to the police 
compared to other offence types is relatively high (ONS, 2017). This data has been derived 
from publicly available Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Home Office publications. 
In particular, Chapter 6 uses PRCD in order to compare trends in both CSEW and PRCD 
burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs with the trends in the most similar PFAs to them  
but which were not committed to POP to the same extent. The definition of police-recorded 
burglary has been consistent over time (ONS, 2017)23. Chapter 7 also uses police workforce 
 
23 See Section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 and Appendix 1.1. 
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(strength) data to construct a variable at the PFA level: the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA (Sozer and Merlo, 2013).  
4.6.1 Limitations of police recorded crime data 
There are a number of limitations to PRCD. Firstly, “[u]nlike the CSEW, recorded crime 
figures do not include crimes that have not been reported to the police or incidents that the 
police decide not to record” (Flatley, 2017: 5). This was “the primary motive for launching 
the survey [the CSEW] over 30 years ago” (Flatley, 2014: 194). Further limitations of the 
PRCD are as follows: (a) “non-standardised recording practice across police forces and over 
time” and (b) “changes in offence classification and legal definitions over time” (Tseloni 
and Tilley, 2016: 4). For instance, van Dijk et al. (2012b: 305) argued that “almost 
everywhere a degree of statistical net widening seems to have taken place, which has inflated 
the police count of violent crime. In our view, police figure of violent crime has, in recent 
years, been increasingly inflated”.  
4.6.2 Concluding remarks regarding police-recorded crime data 
Although there are several limitations to PRCD, the researcher argues that burglary is one 
of the crime types that are not affected by these limitations to any considerable extent. The 
related literature suggests that citizens consistently report burglaries to the police, 
particularly for insurance purposes (Tarling and Morris, 2010). Therefore, although this 
study utilises the CSEW as the main data source for the analysis, it also uses PRCD to test 
whether there is a relationship between POP and burglary rates and to compare and identify 
the differences between trends in the two data sources at the PFA level in England and Wales 
between 1988 and 2007/08. 
4.7 The UK Census data 
The UK Census is conducted every ten years to count population and households (since 
1801). Currently, the ONS conducts the Census via questionnaires. Householders complete 
questionnaires and send them back either via post or the Internet. “Census statistics help 
paint a picture of the nation and how we live. They provide a detailed snapshot of the 
population and its characteristics”24. That is, they can be used for a comprehensive, detailed, 
and importantly, comparative analysis (ibid). Chapter 7 uses the 1991 and 2001 UK 
Censuses to construct structural control variables at the PFA level in 1997 and 2003/04, 
 
24 https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census. 
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separately. Census data come from the official labour market statistics of the ONS.25  
4.8 Variable selection 
Chapter 7 employs regression analysis. Therefore, on the left-hand side of the equation, there 
is a dependent variable, which here is the number of burglary victimisations that a household 
experiences within a reference period. On the right-hand side of the equation are the 
independent variable and control variables. After briefly discussing the dependent and 
independent variables, this section justifies the selection of the control variables used in 
Chapter 7. The control variables are divided into two groups: (1) departmental control 
variables, and (2) structural control variables. The structural control variables have two 
levels: (1) micro/household and (2) macro/PFA. Figure 4.1 portrays the structure of the 
variables. 
4.8.1 Dependent variable 
This section explains a number of general and specific reasons for selecting burglary with 
entry for use as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis. Details of the nature of the 
dependent variable used in Chapters 6 and 7 can be found in sections 4.9.2 and 4.9.3. The 
general reasons are as follows. Firstly, considering the projects submitted to the Goldstein 
and Tilley award schemes by police forces in England and Wales26 and the related literature 
(Laycock and Farrell, 2003)27, a considerable number of these projects targeted burglary. In 
addition, the large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes that were 
discussed in Section 4.3.2 funded a number of anti-burglary projects that used a problem-
oriented approach (e.g. the Reducing Burglary Initiative). For instance, Read and Tilley 
(2000: v) reported that “the commonest targets for problem-solving amongst the initiatives 
returned [from the questionnaire conducted across 43 PFAs in England and Wales] were 
burglary, vehicle crime, drugs and youth”. Secondly, the “survey identification of persons 
whose homes have been burglarised probably is more accurate than identification of any 
other offences” (Schneider, 1981: 832). 
Thirdly, although they are not limited to burglary, the impacts of burglary victimisation are 
not only financial (Dubourg et al., 2005) but also psychological (Maguire, 1980; Beaton et 
al., 2000).  
 
25 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/. 
26 https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/case-studies-and-databases. 
27https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/situational-crime-prevention-database-home. 
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Figure 4.1: Structure of the variables used in Chapter 7 
 
The specific reason is as follows. The CSEW has two categories concerning burglary in a 
dwelling: (1) burglary with entry; (1a) burglary with loss; (1b) burglary with no loss; and (2) 
attempted burglary. PRCD has five categories: (1) burglary in a dwelling; (2) attempted 
burglary in a dwelling; (3) distraction burglary in a dwelling; (4) attempted distraction 
burglary in a dwelling; and (5) aggravated burglary in a dwelling. In other words, although 
the CSEW provides disaggregated data (e.g. burglary with loss), PRCD does not. Therefore, 
it makes more sense to focus on burglary with entry considering the associated data 
availability.  
4.8.2 Independent variable 
The independent variable, which is created, for the first time, by the researcher in Chapter 5, 
is the level of commitment of police forces to POP. It has four categories coded as (3) high-
commitment, (2) medium-commitment, (1) low-commitment and (0) no-commitment to 
POP. This variable is crucial to our examination of whether POP has a statistically 
significant independent effect on burglaries - whilst controlling for characteristics of 
households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA - in 
England and Wales in 1997 and 2003/04, separately, or otherwise. To construct this variable, 
Variables
Dependent Independent Control
Departmental Structural
Micro/Household Macro/PFA
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the researcher selects and uses two indicators of commitment to POP. The researcher also 
reviews the related literature (e.g. Leigh et al., 1996; 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 
2000; Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Bullock et al., 2006; Heaton, 2009a) to complement the 
findings from the analysis of the two indicators (see Section 4.9.1 for details).  
4.8.3 Control variables 
This thesis uses two types of control variables: (1) departmental, and (2) structural. There is 
one departmental control variable: the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA. 
The data for the departmental control variable comes from the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) police actuals, which were provided by the third 
supervisor of this thesis (Dr James Hunter). Structural control variables have two levels. 
Micro-/household-level structural control variables come from the 1998 and 2003/04 CSEW 
sweeps and macro/PFA-level structural control variables come from the 1991 and 2001 UK 
Censuses. 
4.8.3.1 Departmental control variable 
The departmental control variable of this study is the number of police officers per 1000 
residents in a PFA. The hypothesis of ‘more police, less crime’ depends on opportunity-
related theories such as rational choice theory. According to this theory, offenders first weigh 
up the costs and benefits of committing a crime relative to legal alternatives and then commit 
the crime if they think they will profit from it (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). One of the 
possible costs that potential offenders consider is the risk of being arrested by police officers 
on the streets whilst committing burglary.  
However, demonstrating an effect of more police on crime/burglary is not an easy task and 
previous research yielded mixed results. On the one hand, Eck and Maguire (2006: 209) 
criticised this hypothesis by stating “Some of the cities experiencing the greatest reductions 
in crime did do without increasing the number of officers”; on the other, several studies 
suggested a negative relationship between the number of police officers and crime (Lin, 
2009), particularly residential burglary (Marvell and Moody, 1996; Lindstrom, 2013).  
Eck and Maguire (2006) found that previous studies used different analysis 
strategies/designs (e.g. cross-sectional versus longitudinal), sample sizes (e.g. 15 versus 
1000), time periods (e.g. one year versus 10 years), dependent (e.g. aggregate versus 
individual crimes) and independent variables to measure police strength (e.g. number of 
police officers, number of police employees, and police expenditures) to analyse the 
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relationship between number of police officers and crime. The majority did not check 
simultaneity, although “The most difficult problem facing researchers attempting to unravel 
the relationship between police and crime is to determine if more police reduce crime or if 
more crime increases police hiring” (Eck and Maguire, 2006: 209). Importantly, all studies 
they reviewed used police recorded crime data. Recently, Machin and Marie (2011) also 
asserted that there are weaknesses in research designs and analyses of previous studies that 
did not consider many of the issues that might affect both police numbers and crime (e.g. 
social change, deployment of the police resources in the prevention, investigation and 
detection of burglary). Bradford (2011: 5) also suggested that “Despite improvements 
compared with earlier years, almost all [studies] suffer from potentially significant 
methodological and conceptual flaws.” 
Although the evidence supporting the assertion that more police reduce burglaries is not 
strong, this study uses number of police officers per 1000 residents as a departmental control 
variable while exploring the effects of POP on burglaries recorded by the 1998 and 2003/04 
CSEW sweeps. Details about the calculation of the departmental control variable can be 
found in Section 4.9.3. 
4.8.3.2 Structural control variables 
According to the victimisation theories, there are a number of factors affecting victimisation. 
These can be classified as:  
• demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals and their households 
• individuals’ routine activities (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Miethe et al., 1987; Kennedy 
and Forde, 1990) 
• characteristics of areas (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Trickett 
et al., 1992; Tseloni, 2006) 
• interactions of these factors (Kennedy and Forde, 1990; Trickett et al., 1995; Tseloni et 
al., 2002).  
Therefore, drawing upon previous research (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Sampson and Groves, 
1989; Kennedy and Forde, 1990; Trickett et al., 1992; Trickett et al., 1995; Osborn and 
Tseloni, 1998; Tseloni et al., 2002; Kershaw and Tseloni, 2005; Tseloni, 2006), and using 
the 1998 and 2003/04 CSEW sweeps (for micro-structural control variables) and the 1991 
and 2001 UK Censuses (for macro-structural control variables), a number of structural 
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control variables can be constructed. It is hoped that controlling the number of structural 
control variables along with the departmental control variable will strengthen the analysis, 
which aims to identify whether POP had a statistically significant independent effect on 
burglaries in England and Wales in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. 
4.8.3.2.1 Household-level structural control variables 
This section discusses the selection of micro-/household-level structural control variables by 
referring to the related theory for each variable. Details regarding the preparation of the 
variables and their respective categories (dummy variables) that enter the statistical models 
in Chapter 7 at the household level can be found in Section 4.9.3 and Appendix 4.2. 
Individuals can protect their households through social or physical guardianship (Meier and 
Miethe, 1993). Length of residence in an area can be given as an example of social 
guardianship. This is because living in an area for a long time increases the chance of having 
strong social networks, which reduces the risk of victimisation (Trickett et al., 1995). In 
addition, the number of adults and children under 16 in a household and whether the house 
is empty during the weekday proxy guardianship. The idea is that the more a household is 
left unoccupied, the more likely it is for that household to experience victimisation (Trickett 
et al., 1995; Osborn and Tseloni, 1998).   
The characteristics of individuals and their households determine their suitability, 
accessibility and desirability to be targeted by an offender (Miethe and Meier, 1990). For 
instance, type of area (e.g. inner city, urban, or rural) and type of accommodation (e.g. 
detached house, semi-detached house, flat, etc.) proxy the accessibility concept (Tseloni, 
2006). For a burglar, it takes more time to reach a household in a rural area when compared 
to an inner city area as offenders typically select targets that are closer to their home 
addresses (Bowers and Johnson, 2017). Similarly, it necessitates more effort for an offender 
to access a flat compared to a cottage (Tseloni and Thompson, 2018). 
The value of targets refers to desirability. Therefore, annual household income, socio-
economic status (social class) of the head of household, tenure, and number of cars indicate 
desirability/attractiveness (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1.3)  
Family disruption is one of the factors decreasing informal social control and collective 
efficacy in a community, which may be a burglary protective factor (Hirschfield and Bowers, 
1997). As a result, delinquency and crime rates increase (Sampson and Groves, 1989; 
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Hirschfield et al., 1995). Therefore, lone parent household is also included in the analysis as 
a proxy for family disruption at the household level.  
Ethnic heterogeneity affects crime rates due to a lack of trust amongst ethnic groups in a 
community (Sampson and Groves, 1989). It also affects social ties in a community that may 
lead to increased crime rates. Therefore, it is included in the analysis at both household- and 
PFA level (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.5.3).  
Finally, age of the head of household is included as victimisation risks decrease by age 
(Tseloni et al., 2002; Tseloni, 2006). 
4.8.3.2.2 Area-level structural control variables 
Constructing macro/PFA level structural control variables (in addition to micro-/household-
level structural control variables) are crucial to be able to provide a more comprehensive 
picture of burglary victimisation. Data relating to these variables come from the 1991 and 
2001 UK Censuses. Details regarding the preparation of the variables that enter the statistical 
models in Chapter 7 at the PFA level can be found in Section 4.9.3. 
Social disorganisation theory argues that “socioeconomic status, residential mobility, ethnic 
heterogeneity, family disruption” (Sampson and Groves, 1989: 774), and urbanisation (Shaw 
and McKay, 1942; Osborn et al., 1992) are the key factors contributing to crime and 
delinquency. Drawing upon previous research (e.g. Tseloni, 2006) a number of variables 
indicative of poverty are selected. They include:  
1. the percentage of lone parent households 
2. households without a car 
3. households renting from a housing association 
4. households renting from a local authority 
5. the mean number of people per room.  
On the other hand, owner-occupied households and households with a professional28 head 
are chosen as an indicator of affluence (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1.3).  
 
28 “This major group covers occupations whose main tasks require a high level of knowledge and experience 
in the natural sciences, engineering, life sciences, social sciences, humanities and related fields. The main tasks 
consist of the practical application of an extensive body of theoretical knowledge, increasing the stock of 
knowledge by means of research and communicating such knowledge by teaching methods and other means. 
Most occupations in this major group will require a degree or equivalent qualification, with some occupations 
requiring postgraduate qualifications and/or a formal period of experience-related training” (ONS, 2010: 53). 
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Low residential stability may increase the likelihood of becoming a victim of a crime since 
it may indicate a low level of community/social guardianship (Trickett et al., 1995). The 
percentage of households renting privately and the percentage of households that moved in 
the last 12 months are included in the study as a proxy of residential mobility.  
Another factor affecting crime rates is ethnic heterogeneity, as discussed previously. At this 
level, ethnic diversity indicates the percentage of Black and Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and 
Bangladeshi) and people from other backgrounds in a PFA. 
Urbanisation is another proxy of a lack of social control in the community. In urbanised 
areas, social participation, integration and control of delinquency are low (Shaw and Mckay, 
1942). In the present study, this is indicated by population density (Tseloni, 2006: 210). 
Young people aged between 16-24 are considered to be motivated offenders (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979) because of the long history of the age-crime curve, which has been observed 
to consistently adopt a similar shape over the decades (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; 
Matthews and Minton, 2018). That is, the proportion of people who commit crime increases 
in adolescence and teenage years and then falls from the early twenties (Moffitt, 1993; 
Loeber et al., 2012). 
In addition to the PFA-level structural control variables coming from the UK Census data, a 
variable, region, which is derived from the CSEW, is included “to capture omitted effects 
operating at a higher level of aggregation” (Tseloni, 2006: 211). 
Although a number of key factors associated with burglary at the household and PFA levels 
have been identified for inclusion in the analysis, the researcher acknowledges “the 
complexity of the natural and built environment, the political, economic, social and cultural 
contexts and structures of areas and the actions of individuals and corporate bodies within 
areas” (Bottoms and Wiles, 1992, cited in Trickett et al., 1995: 274). That is, this study is 
limited to the variables discussed above due to the lack of data.  
4.9 Analysis plan 
The empirical analysis consists of three phases. Each phase addresses different research 
questions using different methods. Each of them constitutes a separate chapter. Details of 
the three phases are provided in the following sections. 
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4.9.1 Phase one 
Phase one (Chapter 5) argues that “simply counting the number of agencies that claim to be 
using … [a policing strategy] … is a poor indicator of the diffusion of the innovation” (Eck 
and Maguire, 2006: 245). As such, Chapter 5 addresses the following three research 
questions:  
1. Which police forces in England and Wales were highly committed to POP? 
2. What were the policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales? 
3. What was the level of commitment of police forces in England and Wales to POP in 
1997 and 2003/04, separately?  
Chapter 5 makes an original contribution to knowledge by addressing the above questions. 
To do so, Chapter 5 conducts a descriptive analysis of the two indicators of commitment to 
POP selected by the researcher and reviews the related literature to triangulate and 
supplement the findings from the analysis of the two indicators. The first indicator of 
commitment to POP is the number of problem-oriented projects submitted to the Tilley and 
Goldstein Award schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 2008. 
There are 889 projects available on https://popcenter.asu.edu/. Once the duplications are 
removed, there are 771 projects to be reviewed in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 identifies the total 
number of project submissions for each police force between 1997 and 2007/08. Following 
that, Chapter 5 categorises police forces into four groups in terms of the level of commitment 
to POP (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2 for details). It then selects highly POP-committed police 
forces to be included in the analysis of Chapter 6, which compares trends in both CSEW and 
PRCD burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs (according to the first indicators) with the 
trends in their most similar PFAs (see Section 4.9.2 for a definition), which were not 
committed to POP to the same extent. Chapter 5 also uses the project submissions to identify: 
• the type of crime targeted in each project 
• the number of anti-burglary projects submitted by each police force 
• the starting and submission year of each project. 
Following the analysis of the first indicator, Chapter 5 analyses the second indicator of 
commitment to POP (problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces as parts 
of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes). These include: 
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• the Safer Cities Programme projects (Tilley and Webb, 1994; Ekblom et al., 1996; Sutton, 
1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001) 
• the Reducing Burglary Initiative projects (Hope et al., 2004; Millie and Hough, 2004; 
Homel et al., 2004; Hirschfield, 2007)  
• the Targeted Policing Initiative projects (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock and Tilley, 2003). 
Similar to the analysis of the first indicator, Chapter 5 identifies police forces that received 
funding for the government-supported projects. Following this, Chapter 5 calculates the total 
number of projects and their budget for each police force. Chapter 5 then selects police forces, 
which received a considerable amount of funding for the projects, to be included in the 
analysis of Chapter 6, which compares trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries in highly 
POP-committed PFAs (according to the second indicator) with the trends in their most 
similar PFAs, which were not committed to POP to the same extent. Whilst analysing the 
two indicators of commitment to POP, Chapter 5 also proposes ten hypotheses to be tested 
in Chapter 6. 
Reviewing the related literature (e.g. Leigh et al., 1996, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 
2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006), Chapter 5 finally triangulates and 
supplements the findings from the analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP. It 
also revisits previous studies on policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales 
(Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton, 2009a; 2009b), which reviewed 366 HMIC reports 
published between 1990 and August 2001 and revises their findings. Based on the findings 
from the above analyses, Chapter 5 finishes with constructing the independent variable of 
the analysis of Chapter 7: the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 
2003/04.  
It should be emphasised that although the researcher cited scholars who argued that all other 
forms of proactive policing strategies are a reduced form of POP (e.g. Sherman and Eck, 
2002; Eck, 2014; Sparrow, 2016) in the literature review chapters whilst relating POP to 
other innovative policing strategies, the level of commitment of police forces to POP was 
calculated by considering explicit POP-related activities of police forces prior to 1997 and 
2003/04, separately, and the related literature that explicitly reported police forces that 
applied POP at some point in time. This is because the researcher acknowledges the fact that 
taking a very broad definition of POP makes measuring POP in police forces more difficult 
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and other so-called reduced forms of policing would need to be represented in the 
commitment variables.  
4.9.2 Phase two 
Phase two (Chapter 6) is an initial exploration of the role of POP in the burglary drop in 
England and Wales. Based on the findings from the analysis of the two indicators of 
commitment to POP and the related literature review in Phase one, this phase compares 
trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs with the trends 
in their most similar PFAs, which were not committed to POP to the same extent, between 
1988 and 2007/08. Phase two addresses the following research question: 
Was the drop in both CSEW and police recorded burglaries between 1988 and 2007/08 
much greater in highly POP-committed PFAs compared to their most similar PFAs, 
which were not committed to POP to the same extent? 
The reason for choosing 1988 as the first point in time to be analysed is that the Safer Cities 
Programme, which applied a problem-oriented approach, started in 1988 and finished in 
1998 (Ekblom et al., 1996, Sutton, 1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001). The reason for choosing 
2007/08 as the end point for analysis is that CSEW data at the PFA level is only publicly 
available from 1995 onwards (using the CSEW 1996) to 2007/08 (inclusive)29. Furthermore, 
although both CSEW and PRCD burglaries started to decrease in 1993, both data sources 
cover the sharpest burglary drop measured by the CSEW, 1997-2001/02 (Tseloni et al., 2017; 
see also Chapter 3, Figure 3.2). After a dramatic decrease, burglary trends remained 
relatively flat between 2006/07 and 2008/09 (see Figure 3.2). Therefore, using the CSEW 
2007/08 as the end point for the analysis is an appropriate cut-off. Furthermore, in addition 
to the Safer Cities Programme (1988-1998), the decrease in burglaries coincides with the 
implementation of small- (e.g. project submissions to the award schemes between 1997 and 
2008) and large-scale problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces between 
1999 and 2002 (see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Overall, the researcher argues that there might 
be a relationship between the implementation of POP and the burglary drop in England and 
Wales between 1988 and 2007/08.  
It should be noted that whilst conducting the trend analysis and testing the hypotheses that 
are proposed in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 takes two important issues into account: (1) 
 
29 Hele (2019, personal email, 6 February 2019). 
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introduction year of POP within each PFA and (2) the level of commitment of police forces 
to POP. In addition, throughout the analysis in Chapter 6, ‘Most Similar Groups (MSGs)’ 
are used to make a more meaningful comparative analysis. The definition of MSGs is as 
follows: 
“Most Similar Groups (MSGs) are groups of police force areas that have been found 
to be the most similar to each other based on an analysis of demographic, social and 
economic characteristics which relate to crime. …MSGs are designed to help make 
fair and meaningful comparisons between forces. Forces operate in very different 
environments and face different challenges. It can be more meaningful to compare a 
force with other forces which share similar social and economic characteristics, than, 
for example, a neighbouring force” (HMICFRS, 2017, emphasis added). 
The crime-related variables that were used to create MSGs are as follows:  
• ‘hard-pressed’ neighbourhoods 
• percentage of terraced households 
• output area density 
• percentage of overcrowded households 
• percentage of single-parent households 
• population sparsity 
• long-term unemployed (HMICFRS, 2017).  
Sampson and Groves (1989) suggested that these variables are highly correlated with 
burglary. Therefore, using MSGs for the analysis enables the researcher to identify whether 
POP had an impact on the burglary drop whilst implicitly controlling for certain related risk 
factors. At the time of writing, there were two MSGs (HMICFRS, 2017). The first MSGs 
were developed in 2003 using the 2001 Census. The second MSGs were revised by using 
more up-to-date data (the 2011 Census). The methodology and variables of both MSGs 
remained unchanged (HMICFRS, 2017). Chapter 6 uses the first MSGs since it focusses on 
the period from 1988 to 2007/08.  
As an example, the most similar police forces to Lancashire are as follows: Leicestershire, 
Kent, Nottinghamshire, West Yorkshire, Essex, Northamptonshire, and Hertfordshire (see 
Appendix 4.3 for other groups). Here, it is essential to note that when two MSGs, which 
include the same police force (e.g. Essex), are compared, they may nevertheless not be 
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identical. For example, the Bedfordshire group includes Hertfordshire, Sussex, Hampshire, 
Essex, Thames Valley and Kent. However, the group of Essex includes police forces which 
are not included in the Bedfordshire group such as Avon and Somerset, Leicestershire, 
Devon and Cornwall and Cambridgeshire. The reason for this is that police forces are sorted 
according to their similarity to each other within a group. In other words, while the first two 
police forces within a group are the most similar to each other, the similarity between the 
first and the last police force within that group is the weakest (although the strength of this 
similarity is still strong enough to place the last force with the first force rather than 
allocating it to an alternative cluster).  
Phase two uses both the CSEW and PRCD to compare trends in the mean number of 
burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs with the trends in their most similar PFAs, which 
were not committed to POP to the same extent, over time. To calculate the mean number of 
burglaries per PFA using the screener questionnaires of the CSEW sweeps (1996-2007/08), 
a new ‘burglary’ variable is computed by combining the following four questions: 
• If anyone got into the current residence to steal/try to steal (YrHoThef)? (YES/NO). If 
YES 
o How many times have you been a victim of (NYrHThef)? 
• If anyone got into the previous residence to steal/try to steal (Prevthef)? (YES/NO). If 
YES 
o How many times have you been a victim of (NPrevthe)? 
The computed burglary variable takes the values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more. After computing 
the variable, the mean number of burglaries in the reference period per PFA is calculated 
using SPSS 24.0 (IBM Corp., 2016). Household weights are used. 
To calculate the mean number of PRCD burglaries in a PFA, Chapter 6 uses PRCD by 
community safety partnership and PFA 1990-2001/02 (Home Office, 2016a) and 2002/02-
2014/15 (Home Office, 2016b) and household projections for England and Wales local 
authority districts (which are aggregated to PFAs) (MHCLG, 2016). Using Microsoft Excel, 
the mean number of recorded burglaries per PFA is calculated using the following formula: 
the number of burglaries in a dwelling in a PFA/number of households in a PFA. 
Having calculated the mean number of burglaries per PFA using both the CSEW and PRCD, 
Phase two creates time-series figures using Microsoft Excel to compare trends in the mean 
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number of burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs with the trends in their most similar 
PFAs, which were not committed to POP to the same extent, over time. 
Chapter 6 also compares trends in repeat burglary victimisations in highly POP-committed 
PFAs with the trends in their most similar PFAs, which were not committed to POP to the 
same extent, over time. To calculate the proportion of all burglary victims that suffered more 
than one burglary in the reference period in a PFA, the screener questionnaires from the 
CSEW sweeps are used. This time, the computed burglary variable takes the values of 0, 1, 
2 or more (e.g. non-victim, single victimisation, and repeat victimisation). The calculation 
is as follows: the number of repeat burglary victimisations (2 or more) is divided by the 
number of total burglary victimisations (1 or more) and then multiplied by 100. Household 
weights are used. One limitation to be noted is that the CSEW only measures repeat 
victimisation in the reference period. 
4.9.3 Phase three 
Due to the complex nature of crime, studies that aim to examine whether a crime prevention 
intervention affects crime rates should control characteristics of individuals, households, and 
areas that might affect crime rates (see Section 4.8 for variable selection). As such, after an 
initial analysis in Phase two that explores whether POP played a role in the burglary drop in 
England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/0830 , Phase three addresses the following 
research question: 
Did POP have a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations (also considering household composition and police force area 
characteristics and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA) 
between 1995 and 2003/04?  
In other words, Phase three conducts two separate analyses to address the above research 
question: (1) multilevel negative binomial regression to determine whether POP had a 
statistically significant independent effect on the mean number of burglaries whilst 
controlling for the characteristics of both households and PFAs and the number of police 
officers per 1000 residents in a PFA in England and Wales in 1997 and 2003/04, separately, 
 
30 Phase two uses the most similar PFA groups to make more meaningful comparisons (HMICFR, 2017). 
However, those groups were developed using statistical models based on demographic, economic and social 
characteristics which relate to crime at the PFA-level (HMICFR, 2017). Therefore, Phase three goes one step 
further and control both household and PFA characteristics whilst analysing the relationship between POP and 
burglaries. 
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and (2) Pearson Correlation (Point Biserial correlation) to check bivariate correlations 
between POP (as a dichotomous variable) and the mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 
2003/04.  
The characteristics of households (micro-/household level structural control variables) come 
from the CSEW sweeps (1998 and 2003/04); the characteristics of PFAs (macro-/area-level 
structural control variables) come from the UK Censuses (1991 and 2001); and the number 
of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA come from the police workforce statistics 
(CIPFA). In this phase, the software packages used are SPSS 24 (IBM Corp., 2016) and 
MLwiN 3.03 (Rasbash et al., 2019). 
There are various reasons for selecting two points in time (1997 and 2003/04) for multilevel 
negative binomial regression. The reason for choosing 1997 as the first point in time to be 
examined is that only one police force (Surrey) was implementing POP on a large scale in 
England and Wales in 1996 (Leigh et al., 1996). Therefore, using the 1996 CSEW sweep, 
which is the first sweep providing data at the PFA level and that measures the crime 
victimisations in 1995, would not be appropriate. Instead, the researcher proposes that if 
Surrey was the only police force implementing POP on a large scale in 1996, it makes more 
sense to measure whether POP affected burglaries using the CSEW 1998, which measures 
the crime victimisations in 1997. There are four main reasons for selecting 2003/04 as the 
second point in time to be analysed. Firstly, all police forces were required to apply the 
National Intelligence Model (or ILP) by April 2004 (Maguire and John, 2006; Bullock et al., 
2006). Secondly, neighbourhood policing gained popularity after 2006 (Bullock et al., 2006; 
Longstaff et al., 2015). In other words, there was a competition between policing styles, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish the effects of policing strategies on crime. Thirdly, 
the decrease in burglaries is remarkable between 1997 and 2003/04 (see Chapter 3, Figure 
3.2). Finally, Chapter 5 suggests that the level of commitment of police forces to POP was 
higher in 2003/04 compared to 1997 (see Appendix 5.4). Overall, it is considered that an in-
depth analysis of the effect of POP on burglaries in 1997 and 2003/04, separately, will give 
more accurate results in terms of the impact of POP on burglaries, if any. 
4.9.3.1 Variable harmonisation and data cleaning 
In order to ensure comparability between the 1998 and 2003/04 CSEW sweeps, variable 
harmonisation/recoding is carried out for some of the variables (see Appendix 4.2 for details). 
Table 4.3 presents the original names of the household structural control variables and their 
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Table 4.3: Household-level structural control variables 
Variable name in the CSEW 
Variable name explanation Categories 
1998 2003/04 
Hohage Hrpage Age  Count (16-99) 
Ethnicid31 Ethnic Ethnicity 
White 
Black 
Asian 
Other/Mixed/Chinese 
Nadults Nadults Number of Adults 
1 
2  
3+ 
Nchil Nchil Number of Children 
0 
1+  
See Appendix 4.2 Lone Parent 
Yes 
No 
Tenharm Tenharm Housing Tenure 
Owner 
Social Rented Sector 
Private Rented Sector 
Tothhinc Tothhin1 Household Income 
Under £4,999 
£5,000-£9,999 
£10,000-£29,999 
£30,000 or more 
No Response 
 
 
31 Ethnicity of respondents, not Head of Household. 
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Table 4.3: Household-level structural control variables (continued) 
Variable name in the CSEW 
Variable name explanation Categories 
1998 2003/04 
Hohclass Hrpsec2 Social Class of the Head of Household 
Professional 
Intermediate  
Routine 
Never worked/inadequate description/armed forces 
Cartot32 Cartot Number of Cars 
0 
1 
2 
3+ 
Accharm1 Acctyp Type of Accommodation 
Detached 
Semi-detached 
Terraced 
Flat/Maisonette/Other 
Not Coded (only 2003) 
Weekday Weekday 
Number of Hours Away from Home on a 
Day 
Under 3 Hours 
3-7 hours 
More than 7 Hours 
Ysadharm Ysadharm Number of Years in a Residence 
Under 2 Years 
2-5 Years 
6-10 Years 
More than 10 years 
See Appendix 4.2 
 
Area Type 
Inner City 
Urban 
Rural 
 
32 Missing cases were treated as zero because this question was only asked of respondents who owned or had regular use of a car during the reference period. 
 124 
 
respective categories that are used for recoding in Chapter 7. Data is cleaned via SPSS 24.0 
(IBM Corp., 2016). During the process of data cleaning, ‘do not know’ and ‘refused’ 
responses are recoded as missing (unless stated otherwise) and therefore omitted from the 
further analysis. Dummy variables are created for categorical structural control variables at 
the household level. 
4.9.3.2 Constructing PFA-level variables 
After identifying the household-level structural control variables (see Section 4.8.3.2.1) and 
recoding and cleaning them to ensure comparability between the CSEW 1998 and 2003/04 
sweeps (see Appendix 4.2), the PFA-level structural control variables coming from the UK 
Censuses (1991 and 2001, see Section 4.8.3.2.2) are merged with the household-level 
structural control variables. The preparation process of the PFA-level structural control 
variables is as follows. Firstly, the data at the district level come from official labour market 
statistics (https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/). Secondly, the districts of each PFA are 
determined. Finally, data at the district level are aggregated to construct a variable at the 
PFA level.  
In addition to the PFA-level structural control variables, there is one departmental control 
variable that is merged with the household-level variables: the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA (Sozer and Merlo, 2013). This variable is constructed through the 
following calculation: (1) aggregation of the number of sergeants and constables33, (2) 
division of this sum with the number of people living in the relevant PFA, and (3) 
multiplication of this result with 1000 (e.g. Avon and Somerset for 2003/04: 
((486+2,570)/1,508,100)*1000)=2.03). 
4.9.3.3 Principal component analysis 
Having recoded and cleaned the household-level structural control variables; constructed the 
PFA-level structural and departmental control variables and merged them, Phase three 
(Chapter 7) continues with a principal component analysis (PCA) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2013) because there is multicollinearity, which indicates a high correlation (e.g. .90) between 
the continuous structural control variables at the PFA level in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. 
Firstly, all continuous structural control variables at the PFA level are standardised to a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to the PCA. Therefore, they contribute equally 
to the overall score of components that are constructed from the PCA (Osborn et al., 1992; 
 
33 These officers are in charge of frontline work and may have a deterrence effect. 
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Tseloni, 2006; Pease and Tseloni, 2014). Thereafter, the researcher follows Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2013: 661) to employ the PCA: 
• selecting and measuring a set of variables 
• preparing the correlation matrix 
• extracting a set of factors from the correlation matrix 
• determining the number of factors 
• rotating the factors to increase the interpretability 
• interpreting the results. 
After conducting the PCA, a large set of variables at the PFA level reduces to a few 
components to be used as structural control variables at the PFA level.  
4.9.3.4 Multilevel negative binomial regression 
Phase three applies two-level (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) 
negative binomial regression modelling (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) to test the relationship 
between the mean number of burglaries (dependent variable) and the level of commitment 
of police forces to POP (independent variable) whilst controlling for characteristics of 
households (level-1) and PFAs (level-2) and the number of police officers per 1000 residents 
in a PFA in 1997 and 2003/04, separately.  
Figure 4.2: Structure of the data used in Chapter 7 
There are a number of reasons for choosing this statistical method. Firstly, exposure to crime 
is due to where you live as well as who you are (Pease and Tseloni, 2014). Hence, the 
structure of the data (which is due to the CSEW sampling selection, see Section 4.5.1) is 
hierarchical (two-level), as portrayed in Figure 4.2. Once Figure 4.2 is scrutinised, it can be 
seen that there are two PFAs and six households residing in those PFAs. Likewise, there are 
4234 PFAs in England and Wales, and the number of respondent households residing in those 
 
34 City of London is merged with the Metropolitan in the CSEW (ONS, 2018). 
PFA1
Household1 Household2 Household3
PFA2
Household4 Household5 Household6
 126 
 
PFAs differs in each sweep of the CSEW (see Table 4.2). Given the structure of the data, the 
most appropriate method for use is multilevel modelling.  
Secondly, the literature suggests that crime is not a random event, and is highly concentrated 
(Forrester et al. 1998; Pease and Tseloni, 2014; Weisburd, 2015). That is, the same 
individuals, households and places experience the majority of crimes. If crime was a random 
event, a Poisson model, which assumes crimes are random and independent (Nelson, 1980, 
cited in Thompson, 2014) would be used. Thirdly, the dependent variable of the current 
study is an overdispersed count variable as the variance exceeds the mean (see Table 4.4). 
Therefore, negative binomial regression modelling is used (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998). 
Table 4.4: Observed frequency distribution of burglary victimisations (unweighted35) 
1997 2003/04 
Number of incidents Frequency % Number of incidents Frequency % 
0 14,262 97.2 0 36,947 98.4 
1 356 2.4 1 542 1.4 
2 40 0.3 2 34 0.1 
3 7 0.0 3 10 0.0 
4 4 0.0 4 9 0.0 
5+ 9 0.1 5+ 8 0.0 
Total 14,678 100.0 Total 37,550 100.0 
Mean 0.036 Mean 0.020 
Variance 0.058 Variance 0.029 
The negative binomial model is as follows (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998: 314): 
Pr (Yij = yij) =  Γ (yij + ν )ννλijyij                                          yij = 0, 1, …..                  [1] 
        Yij!Γ (ν)(ν + λij)ν+yij 
Where ν = 1/α is the precision parameter and Γ is the gamma function. 
In this instance, the outcome variable yij is a count variable, which gives the number of 
burglary victimisations a particular household experiences within the reference period. In 
particular, y takes on values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more where i denotes the household and j 
denotes the PFA.  
Overall, “the hierarchical negative binomial model which can identify the amount of 
explained and unexplained heterogeneity between individuals or households and between 
 
35 Sampling weights are not used as suggested by Pillinger (2011). 
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areas and the nature of area crime rates clustering is the most complete currently available 
method of modelling crime” (Pease and Tseloni, 2014: 36). Put colloquially, by using 
multilevel negative binomial regression modelling, one can examine the effects of the: 
• independent variable on the dependent variable 
• control variables at the household level on the dependent variable 
• control variables at the PFA level on the dependent variable 
• interactions between the variables at different levels. 
The reference household of the analysis has the following attributes. The age of the head of 
the reference household (HRP) was 51 in 1997 and 52 in 2003/04 (the sample mean age), 
and s/he is white with no children. The annual income of the household with two adults is 
between £10,000 and £29,999. The reference household has two cars, is of a professional 
social class and lives in an owned detached house in a rural South East area. The reference 
household is left unoccupied for more than 7 hours during the day, and the length of 
residence is more than 10 years. 
Phase three follows five steps to conduct a multilevel negative binomial regression: (1) 
examining how well models fit the data, (2) making predictions, (3) interpreting coefficients, 
(4) calculating expected mean number of burglary victimisations for the reference household, 
and (5) calculating the intra-class correlation. The following sections detail the above 
process. 
4.9.3.4.1 Assessing model fit 
Phase three fits four models for 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Once a new model is 
estimated, a model fit assessment is conducted to examine whether the new model better fits 
the data than the previous model. For this, firstly, deviance (joint chi-square values) and 
relevant degrees of freedom (number of variables entering the models) for each model are 
calculated. Following that, the deviance values of the models are subtracted from each other. 
The difference between the degrees of freedom is also calculated. Finally, p-values are 
calculated through MLwiN36 to determine which model best fits the data. The level of 
statistical significance is based on the p-values (0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.10; 0.01 < p-value ≤ 0.05; 
and p-value ≤ 0.01) (Trickett et al., 1995). As an example, the following calculation tests 
whether fictitious Model 2 better fits the data compared to fictitious Model 1 in 1997: 
 
36 The command used in MLwiN to calculate p-value is as follows: cpro (deviance1-deviance2) (df1-df2). 
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Difference in deviance = 1687.000 - 127.000 = 1560.000 
Difference in degrees of freedom = 31 – 1 = 30 
Calculated p-value = 0.00 < 0.01 
4.9.3.4.2 Making predictions 
All household and PFA characteristics enter the models to predict their effects on the mean 
number of burglaries in both 1997 and 2003/04, separately. 
4.9.3.4.3 Interpreting coefficients 
The independent variable and all structural control variables at the household level that enter 
the models in Phase three are categorical (except for continuous age). Categorical variables 
consist of dummy variables. Those dummy variables denote a category within a particular 
variable. If they fall into that category, they take the value one, otherwise zero. Categorical 
variables have n-1 dummy variables since one category is selected as the reference/base 
category (Suits, 1957). For instance, the ethnicity variable has four categories: (1) White, (2) 
Black, (3) Asian, and (4) Other/Mixed/Chinese. White is the base category, and the 
remaining categories are created as dummy variables to denote the remaining categories. In 
addition to the categorical variables at the household level, there are a number of continuous 
variables at the PFA level entering the models. 
Once the above variables (both dummy and continuous) enter the models, they have either a 
positive or a negative estimated coefficient. The association between independent and 
control variables and the mean number of burglary victimisations is investigated by taking 
the exponential of these estimated coefficients (exp(b), see Equation 2 in the following 
section). The statistical significance of each estimate (based on a Wald test which is chi-
squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom) is provided (Greene, 1997, cited in Tseloni, 
2006). “The constant term summarises the effects of all the reference categories of the 
included nominal variables on the expected mean number of [burglaries] assuming zero age 
of the head of household and zero values for all the area census characteristics” (Tseloni, 
2006: 218).  
In sum, two-level negative binomial regression modelling is employed because of the nested 
structure of the data where households (level 1) are nested within PFAs (level 2) (see also 
Section 4.5.1). In addition, the overdispersed and concentrated structure of the dependent 
variable, which is a count variable, necessitates the usage of negative binomial regression 
rather than Poisson modelling.  
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4.9.3.4.4 Calculating expected mean number of burglaries for the Reference 
Household 
In this phase, the expected mean number of burglary victimisations for the reference 
household is calculated using the following formula:  
λij= exp (bxij) + eij                                                                                             [2]  
where eij 
~ Γ (ν).  
In addition, its variance is given by var (Yij)= λij + αλij2                                  [3] 
which allows for overdispersion (Tseloni, 2006).  
As an example, the mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced is 
calculated using the following formula: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 = Exp⁡(Intercept + a ∗ HRPMeanAge + b ∗ HRPMeanAge^2) 
which only takes the age of HRP of a potential victim household into account. 
4.9.3.4.5 Calculating intra-class correlation 
Phase three also calculates the intra-class correlation (ICC) (Snijders and Bosker, 1999) 
using the following formula:  
ᑭ =
σu0
2
σu0
2 +µ̂𝑖𝑗+⁡?̂?𝑖𝑗
2 ∗𝛼
                                                                                          [4] 
Where  
σu0
2  is level-2 variance; 
µ̂𝑖𝑗  is the mean number of burglaries; 
𝛼   is estimated random parameter. 
ICC gives the correlation of burglaries between two randomly selected households residing 
in the same randomly chosen PFA (Snijders and Bosker, 1999) and indicates persistent area 
unexplained heterogeneity (Tseloni and Pease, 2015). 
4.9.3.5 Pearson (point-biserial) correlation 
Phase three also checks bivariate correlations between POP (as a dichotomous variable: No-
POP and POP forces) and the mean number of burglaries (as a continuous variable) from 
1995 to 2003/04 via a special case of Pearson correlation (point-biserial) as the point bi-
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serial correlation is used to define the strength of the linear relationship between one 
continuous and one dichotomous variable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
To conduct the analysis, the researcher first checks whether the assumptions of the point bi-
serial correlation analysis hold. For example, the mean number of burglaries is not normally 
distributed for No-POP and POP forces from 1995 and 2003/04, as assessed by visual 
inspection of Normal Q-Q Plots. Therefore, a ‘logarithmic’ transformation (by taking the 
log10 of the scores of the dependent variable) is applied to convert the data to normality 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). After this transformation, a second visual inspection of 
Normal Q-Q Plots suggests that the mean number of burglaries is approximately normally 
distributed for No-POP and POP forces from 1995 and 2003/04. The additional two 
assumptions of the point bi-serial correlation – having no significant outliers of the 
dependent variable in the two groups of the independent variable and homogeneity (e.g. the 
variance is equal in each group of the independent variable) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) 
– are also met between 1995 and 2003/04. Nonetheless, the results presented in Chapter 7 
(Section 7.4.4) should be interpreted with caution due to the above data transformation.  
4.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter set out the methodology of the empirical component of the current study that 
employs statistical analysis of secondary data to explore the role of POP in the burglary drop 
at the PFA level in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08. Firstly, the chapter 
reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of the data sources that are used in this thesis. 
Secondly, it discussed the reasons for selecting independent variables that enter the statistical 
models in Phase three. It also provided the reasons for selecting burglary and certain time 
periods for analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. It finally outlined the analysis plan. 
Phase one (Chapter 5) conducts a descriptive analysis of two indicators of commitment to 
POP selected by the researcher and reviews the related literature to identify highly POP-
committed police forces. It also revisits previous research on policing styles of police forces 
and revises their findings. Based on the findings of these analyses, it finally constructs an 
independent variable (the level of commitment of all 42 police forces to POP) to be used in 
Phase three. Phase two (Chapter 6) is an initial exploration of the extent to which POP has 
or has not played a role in the burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales over 
time. It compares trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries in highly POP-committed 
PFAs with the trends in their most similar PFAs, which were not committed to POP to the 
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same extent. Finally, Phase three (Chapter 7) employs both two-level negative binomial 
regression and Pearson correlation to examine whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the implementation of POP and the mean number of burglaries (also 
controlling for characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA) from 1995 to 2003/04.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSING THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT OF POLICE FORCES TO POP 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first phase of the empirical analysis in this thesis. It first conducts an 
original analysis for the first time to identify highly POP-committed police forces using two 
indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher:  
• problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award 
schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 2008 37 
(https://popcenter.asu.edu/) 
• problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces in England and Wales as 
part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes which applied a 
problem-oriented approach, such as  
a. the Safer Cities Programme (1988-1998) (Tilley and Webb, 1994; Ekblom et 
al., 1996; Sutton, 1996; Hirschfield et al., 2001) 
b. the Crime Reduction Programme (1999-2002) (Tilley et al., 1999) 
i. the Reducing Burglary Initiative (1999-2002) (Hope et al., 2004; 
Millie and Hough, 2004; Homel et al., 2004; Hirschfield, 2007) 
ii. the Targeted Policing Initiative (1999-2000) (Bullock et al., 2002; 
Bullock and Tilley, 2003).   
Secondly, it reviews the related literature to complement and triangulate the findings from 
the analysis of the two indicators of commitment. Whilst conducting this analysis, the 
researcher also proposes ten hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6. Thirdly, it revisits previous 
studies on policing styles of police forces in England and Wales (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; 
Heaton, 2009a; 2009b) and revises their findings. Fourthly, based on the findings from the 
above analyses, it constructs the independent variable of the analysis in Chapter 7: the level 
of commitment of police forces to POP. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented. 
 
37 The first problem-oriented project submission to the award schemes by a police force (the West Midlands) 
in England and Wales was in 1997. Since the last point in time to be analysed is 2007/08, the present study 
uses problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the award schemes between 1997 and 2008. 
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5.2 Analysing indicator one: problem-oriented project submissions to the awards38 
Police forces in England and Wales submitted their problem-oriented projects primarily to 
the Tilley Award scheme. However, some of them also submitted their projects, which they 
submitted to the Tilley Award scheme, to the Goldstein Award scheme. In addition, some of 
the police forces submitted their projects to the Tilley Award schemes twice. Once the 
duplications are removed, the total number of the projects to be analysed in this chapter is 
771.  
This section categorises 771 problem-oriented projects into six categories (see Table 5.1):  
1. Tilley Award Winner (TAW) 
2. Goldstein Award Winner (GAW) 
3. Tilley Award Finalist (TAF) 
4. Goldstein Award Finalist (GAF) 
5. Tilley Award Other (TAO) 
6. Goldstein Award Other (GAO).  
The difference between the categories is as follows. The project entries (‘the others’) are 
shortlisted (‘the finalists’) for further consideration. Following that, a judging panel assesses 
and score ‘the finalists’. The scores range from 0 (no credit) to 7 (superior). Each judge’s 
scores are collated, and the three highest scores are determined as ‘the winners’ (Bullock et 
al., 2006). Table 5.1 includes the Goldstein Award scheme categories, although the primary 
choice of the police forces was to submit their projects to the Tilley Award scheme. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, the Tilley Award scheme started in 1999, before which 
police forces submitted their projects to the Goldstein Award scheme. Secondly, e-copies of 
some of the project submissions by police forces in England and Wales only appeared in the 
Goldstein Award collection. 
Table 5.1 shows that the majority of the project submissions consists of TAO submissions 
(704) followed by TAW submissions (21). This result is not surprising as the police forces 
in England and Wales submitted their problem-oriented projects primarily to the Tilley 
Award scheme. Importantly, categorising projects as ‘others’ does not necessarily mean they 
are too trivial to be included in the analysis. Previous research suggests that even weakly 
applied projects reduce crime rates (Weisburd et al., 2010). 
 
38 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 for a detailed discussion on the award schemes and the project submissions. 
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Table 5.1: Tilley and Goldstein Award submissions by PFA, 1997-2008 
Police Force TAW GAW TAF GAF TAO GAO 
Total Number of 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Submissions 
Commitment 
Lancashire  8  6 1 147 4 166 21.5% H 
Metropolitan  1 1 1 4 51 6 64 8.3% H 
Cleveland      40 3 43 5.6% H 
Merseyside  1    40 1 42 5.4% H 
Cumbria      42  42 5.4% H 
Avon and Somerset 4  3  33  40 5.2% H 
Greater Manchester 1   1 29  31 4.0% M 
South Wales      28  28 3.6% M 
Northumbria      28  28 3.6% M 
West Midlands  1    24 2 27 3.5% M 
South Yorkshire      19  19 2.5% M 
Hampshire   1 2  15 1 19 2.5% M 
Surrey     1 16  17 2.2% M 
Sussex  1  1  14  16 2.1% M 
North Wales      15 1 16 2.1% M 
Staffordshire  2  2 1 9  14 1.8% M 
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Table 5.1: Tilley and Goldstein Award submissions by PFA, 1997-2008 (continued) 
Police Force TAW GAW TAF GAF TAO GAO 
Total Number of 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Submissions 
Commitment 
Devon & Cornwall  1    11  12 1.6% M 
Nottinghamshire      12  12 1.6% M 
West Yorkshire    1  11  12 1.6% M 
Essex      9  9 1.2% M 
Northamptonshire    1  7  8 1.0% L 
Norfolk      8  8 1.0% L 
Suffolk      7  7 0.9% L 
Kent      7  7 0.9% L 
Hertfordshire      7  7 0.9% L 
Derbyshire      7  7 0.9% L 
Humberside    1  5  6 0.8% L 
Leicestershire  1    5  6 0.8% L 
Gwent      6  6 0.8% L 
Dorset      6  6 0.8% L 
Cheshire      6  6 0.8% L 
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Table 5.1: Tilley and Goldstein Award submissions by PFA, 1997-2008 (continued) 
Police Force TAW GAW TAF GAF TAO GAO 
Total Number of 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Submissions 
Commitment 
Wiltshire      5  5 0.6% L 
West Mercia      5  5 0.6% L 
Thames Valley      5  5 0.6% L 
Gloucestershire      5  5 0.6% L 
Cambridgeshire      5  5 0.6% L 
Lincolnshire      4  4 0.5% L 
Durham      4  4 0.5% L 
Dyfed-Powys      3  3 0.4% L 
North Yorkshire      2  2 0.3% L 
Warwickshire      1  1 0.1% L 
Bedfordshire      1  1 0.1% L 
City of London        0 0.0% N 
Total 21 2 18 8 704 18 771 100,0%  
Sources: Researcher’s calculations, https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/case-studies-and-databases, 1997-2008 
Note: (1) TAW: Tilley Award Winners; GAW: Goldstein Award Winners; TAF: Tilley Award Finalists; GAF: Goldstein Award Finalists; TAO: 
Tilley Award Others; and GAO: Goldstein Award Others. (2) H: High; M: Medium; L: Low; N: No 
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For instance, the number of ‘winner’, ‘finalist’ and ‘other’ projects submitted by Lancashire 
between 1997 and 2008 was 8, 7 and 151, respectively. According to Bullock et al. (2006: 
65), the total number of submissions by Lancashire between 1999 and 2005 (n = 135) reflects 
“the commitment of this force to adopt problem-oriented policing”. Nevertheless, it is 
essential to note that although it cannot be said that the projects categorised as ‘other’ are 
trivial and ineffective, all projects submitted to the award schemes are biased towards 
success since they were ultimately submitted to win an award. This also alerts us to the fact 
that there might be other projects which were not submitted to the award schemes (Eck and 
Madensen, 2013). Therefore, any analysis on the effect of POP on crime rates drawing upon 
the project submissions must take publication bias into account (Eck and Gallagher, 2016) 
as well as other possible missing projects. However, this issue is outside the scope of the 
current descriptive analysis and indeed this thesis since the main idea of using the award 
submissions here is to identify the level of commitment of police forces to POP with the 
available data. 
Table 5.1 also suggests that all police forces, except the City of London, submitted at least 
one project at some time between 1997 and 2008. The majority of the submissions come 
from Lancashire, Metropolitan, Cleveland, Merseyside, Cumbria and Avon and Somerset. 
Lancashire submitted projects in each year from 1999 to 2008. In contrast, Bedfordshire, 
Warwickshire, North Yorkshire, Dyfed-Powys, Durham and Lincolnshire submitted only a 
few problem-oriented projects. In the period spanning two decades, the City of London 
Police did not submit any projects. 
Lancashire merits special mention here because this constabulary made its mark in the 
history of the award schemes by submitting a total of 166 projects (21.5%) between 1997 
and 2008 (an average of 14 projects submitted per year). In other words, the total number of 
projects submitted by Lancashire was much higher than the total number of projects that 
were entered in the award schemes by other police forces. According to the proportion of 
‘winner’ and ‘finalist’ projects, Lancashire was more successful compared to other police 
forces as well (see Table 5.1). These results reflect the commitment of Lancashire to the 
implementation of POP (see also Bullock et al., 2006). However, Bullock et al. (2006: 59) 
noted that  
“Implementation has, nevertheless, been challenging, and it would be a mistake to 
think even in Lancashire…that problem-oriented policing has become embedded in 
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an unproblematic manner across the board. It appears largely to be associated with 
certain types of officers (beat officers) and to vary in intensity by Basic Command 
Unit”39. 
It is yet vital to note that after the introduction of intelligence-led policing to the policing 
agenda in England and Wales, “senior police managers in Lancashire were not keen to 
abandon the force’s commitment to POP and decided therefore to base their implementation 
of the NIM [National Intelligence Model] explicitly on the POP principles which had already 
been widely instilled among operational staff” (John and Maguire, 2003: 64). It can, 
therefore, be argued that Lancashire was rigorously committed to POP.  
After an overview of the project submissions, the chapter categorises police forces into four 
groups in terms of their level of commitment to POP using the total number of project 
submissions of police forces: (H) high-commitment, (M) medium-commitment, (L) low-
commitment and (N) no-commitment (see Table 5.1). The researcher argues that although 
submitting more projects does not necessarily mean that those police forces applied POP as 
Goldstein envisaged, using the total number of submissions is a reasonable way of 
determining the level of commitment to the implementation of POP (see Chapter 4.3.1.3 for 
more reasons). Since this is the first time such an identification has been established, the 
researcher determines the cut-off points for each category. The cut-off point of 5.2% has 
been chosen to determine highly POP-committed police forces because there is a significant 
difference in the percentage of total project submissions between Avon and Somerset (5.2%) 
and Greater Manchester (4.0%). A cut-off point of 1.0% has been chosen to determine police 
forces with low commitment to POP. The researcher argues that 1.0% is a psychological 
threshold. Police forces falling in the group between 5.2% and 1.0% in terms of the 
percentage of total project submissions are included in the medium commitment group. 
Whilst identifying the level of commitment to POP, the researcher also takes the ‘winner’ 
and ‘finalist’ projects into account. That is, police forces with high commitment became 
either ‘winner’ or ‘finalist’ more frequently than their counterparts. The total number of 
TAW projects is 21, 14 of which were submitted by six police forces with high commitment 
(in particular, Lancashire won the Tilley Award eight times). Similarly, there are 18 TAF 
projects, ten of which were submitted by six police forces with high commitment (in 
particular, Lancashire became a finalist six times). These results indicate that those six police 
 
39 See Chapter 2, Section 2.8.3 for a definition. 
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forces were highly committed to POP. 
Overall, according to the above descriptive analysis, Lancashire, Metropolitan, Cleveland, 
Merseyside, Cumbria and Avon and Somerset can be determined as being highly POP-
committed police forces (5.2% cut-off point). Chapter 6 will compare trends in both CSEW 
and PRCD burglaries in these six PFAs with the trends in their most similar PFAs which 
were not committed to POP to the same extent. Hence, the first hypothesis to be tested in 
Chapter 6 is: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs 
(according to the indicator one) when compared to their most similar PFAs which were not 
committed to POP to the same extent. 
The overarching hypothesis is broken down into six sub-hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Lancashire when 
compared to the most similar PFAs to it which were not committed to POP to the same extent. 
Hypothesis 1.2: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in the Metropolitan when 
compared to Greater Manchester. 
Hypothesis 1.3: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Cleveland when compared 
to Northumbria. 
Hypothesis 1.4: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Merseyside when 
compared to the West Midlands. 
Hypothesis 1.5: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Cumbria when compared 
to North Wales. 
Hypothesis 1.6: There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Avon and Somerset when 
compared to Essex. 
Before identifying the highly POP-committed police forces using the large-scale 
government-supported crime reduction programmes (the second indicator) and reviewing 
the related literature later in this chapter, the following section will thoroughly review the 
project submissions and will address the following three questions:  
1. What types of crime were targeted by the projects? 
2. When were the projects applied? 
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3. Where were the projects applied?  
5.2.1 What types of crime were targeted, when and where? 
The problem-oriented projects tackled a variety of problems such as burglary, car crime, 
gang culture, drug markets, antisocial behaviour, prostitution, vandalism, and so on. E-
copies of the Tilley and Goldstein Awards submissions can be accessed through the centre 
for the POP website (https://popcenter.asu.edu/). Since the primary focus of this study is to 
analyse the role of POP in the decrease in burglaries in England and Wales over time, it is 
essential to examine anti-burglary projects in detail.  
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.340 display when the anti-burglary ‘winner’, ‘finalist’ and ‘other’ 
projects were submitted to the award schemes, respectively. The tables following the figures 
present both when those projects were implemented and submitted to the award schemes to 
be able to identify the effects of the projects on burglaries in PFAs where the projects were 
implemented over time more accurately. 
The length of the winner projects in terms of time varied. For example, the ‘winner’ anti-
burglary project, which was submitted by Devon and Cornwall in 2000, had been launched 
in 1999, one year before being submitted to the awards. The ‘winner’ anti-burglary project, 
which was submitted by Avon and Somerset in 2002, had been started in 2000, two years 
before being submitted to the awards. The ‘winner’ anti-burglary project, which was 
submitted by Lancashire in 2002, had been launched in 1998, four years before being 
submitted to the awards. Finally, the ‘winner’ anti-burglary project, which was submitted by 
Lancashire in 2007, had been launched in 2004, three years before being submitted to the 
awards. Given the variation between starting and submission years of the projects, it is 
hypothesised that there will be a gradual decrease in burglaries in PFAs (where the winner 
projects were implemented) between the project starting year and submission year 
(Hypothesis 2). 
All finalist anti-burglary projects had been started at least one year before being submitted 
to the awards (see Table 5.3). Therefore, it is hypothesised that there will be a gradual 
decrease in burglaries in PFAs (where the finalist projects were implemented) between the 
project starting year and submission year (Hypothesis 3).   
 
40 The reason for having decimal numbers in the y-axis of figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 is that projects targeting more 
than one crime problems are divided into the number of crime problems targeted. 
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Figure 5.1: Total number of anti-burglary winner submissions by year, 1997-2008  
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, https://popcenter.asu.edu/, 1997-2008 
 
 
Table 5.2: Anti-burglary winner submissions by PFA and year, 1997-2008 
Police Force Starting Year Submission Year 
Devon and Cornwall 1999 2000 
Avon and Somerset 2000 2002 
Lancashire 1998 2002 
Lancashire 2004 2007 
Source: https://popcenter.asu.edu/ 
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Figure 5.2: Total number of anti-burglary finalist submissions by year, 1997-2008 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, https://popcenter.asu.edu/, 1997-2008 
 
 
Table 5.3: Anti-burglary finalist submissions by PFA and year, 1997-2008 
Police force Starting Year Submission Year 
Avon and Somerset 1997 1999 
Lancashire 1999 2000 
Northamptonshire 1999 2001 
Lancashire 2001 2003 
Lancashire 2002 2004 
Staffordshire 2002 2005 
Avon and Somerset 2004 2006 
Hampshire 2003 2006 
Lancashire 2004 2006 
Metropolitan N/A 2006 
Lancashire 2006 2008 
Source: https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/case-studies-and-databases  
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Concerning the projects categorised as ‘others’, 48% of these had been launched one year 
before they were submitted to the awards; 28% had been started two years before they were 
submitted, and 22% had been undertaken three or more years before they were submitted. 
Only 2% were started in the same year when they were submitted to the award schemes.  
Figure 5.3: Total number of anti-burglary other submissions by year, 1997-2008 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, https://popcenter.asu.edu/, 1997-2008 
 
The majority of the projects aimed to have a sustainable impact on crime rates after being 
submitted. However, the data as to whether they achieved their aims are limited in the e-
copies of the projects. Hence, it has not been possible to conclude their enduring effects.  
Finally, Table 5.4 shows that most of the anti-burglary projects were submitted in 1999, 
2004 and 2008. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the decreases in burglaries in England and 
Wales in 1999, 2004 and 2008 will be greater when compared to other years (Hypothesis 
4). 
Having ascertained when the anti-burglary problem-oriented projects had been started and 
submitted, it is also important to identify in what kinds of places the projects were applied. 
The majority of the projects were implemented in specific areas where crime was clustered. 
While 92% of the projects were applied in specific areas, only 8% were applied throughout 
the PFA in question. The reason for targeting specific areas might be the fact that when 
problem-oriented methods are applied in hot spots, they are more effective in terms of 
reducing crime rates (Braga et al., 2014). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s
 144 
 
Table 5.4: Total number of anti-burglary submissions by category and year, 1997-200841 
Years Winner Finalist Other Total 
1997 -- -- -- -- 
1998 -- -- 0.33 0.33 
1999 -- 0.33 13.13 13.46 
2000 0.33 1.00 9.31 10.64 
2001 -- 0.33 9.13 9.46 
2002 1.33 -- 8.80 10.13 
2003 -- 0.33 11.63 11.96 
2004 -- -- 16.79 16.79 
2005 -- 1.00 5.47 6.47 
2006 -- 1.16 6.60 7.76 
2007 0.33 -- 8.12 8.45 
2008 -- 0.33 14.29 14.62 
Total 1.99 4.48 103.6 110.07 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, https://popcenter.asu.edu/, 1997-2008 
 
Overall, analysis of the projects submitted to the award schemes (the first indicator of 
commitment to POP) indicates that the highly POP-committed police forces were Lancashire, 
the Metropolitan, Cleveland, Merseyside, Avon and Somerset, and Cumbria. The section 
also finds that the projects targeted a variety of problems such as burglary, car crime, gang 
culture, drug markets, antisocial behaviour, prostitution, vandalism, and so on. However, the 
section focusses on anti-burglary projects, and the majority of those projects were applied at 
least one year before they were submitted to the award schemes. The analysis also suggests 
that the majority of the projects were applied in small areas which might be a result of the 
fact that when problem-oriented methods are applied in hot spots, they are more effective in 
terms of reducing crime rates (Braga et al., 2014). The following section will identify highly 
POP-committed police forces using the second indicator of commitment (large-scale 
government-supported crime reduction programmes). 
 
41 The reason for having decimal numbers in Table 5.4 is that projects targeting more than one crime are 
divided into the number of crimes targeted.  
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5.3 Analysing indicator two: problem-oriented crime reduction programmes 
This section identifies highly POP-committed police forces by analysing the large-scale 
government-supported crime reduction programmes. These include the Safer Cities 
Programme, the Crime Reduction Programme, and two specific schemes emerging out of 
the Crime Reduction Programme: The Targeted Policing Initiative and the Reducing 
Burglary Initiative. They are chosen as indicators of commitment to POP for the reasons 
given in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.3. 
5.3.1 The Safer Cities Programme 
Table 5.5 presents PFAs (n = 20) which received funding for Phase one Safer Cities projects 
(including burglary reduction initiatives) with their budgets. The Metropolitan, the West 
Midlands, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, Avon and Somerset, Merseyside, Cleveland, 
Northumbria, Nottinghamshire, Humberside, Derbyshire and Leicestershire received 
funding to implement some Safer Cities projects. Table 5.6 shows PFAs where Phase two 
anti-burglary Safer Cities projects were implemented. Budget information is not publicly 
available for Phase two projects. It is important to note that all Safer Cities projects applied 
a problem-oriented approach using a variety of tactics ranging from target-hardening 
(situational) responses to offender-oriented activities (Ekblom et al., 1996; Sutton, 1996). In 
addition, the timing of the Safer Cities Programme coincides with the crime drop as “just 
under 300 [with an average of £8,700 funding] out of 500 burglary schemes were underway 
or completed by Summer 1992”, with the remaining projects being completed by 1995 when 
burglaries started to drop dramatically (Ekblom et al., 1996: xi; see Chapter 3, Figure 3.2). 
By 1995, 51.2% of the 2,300 Safer Cities projects with an identifiable physical target were 
targeted on dwellings. In terms of crime types, 33.3% of the projects targeted burglaries. 
Overall, 500 schemes (with a value of £4.4 million) were targeting domestic burglary 
(Ekblom et al., 1996). Therefore, it is hypothesised that there will be a greater decrease in 
burglaries in PFAs that received funding for the Safer Cities projects compared to their most 
similar PFAs between 1988 and 1998 (Hypothesis 5). 
5.3.2 The Targeted Policing Initiative 
The Targeted Policing Initiative (TPI) was one of the main streams of the Crime Reduction 
Programme (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.2). The TPI funded 59 projects (with a value of 
£30 million) over three years to reduce crime rates through the explicit use of POP (Bullock 
et al., 2002; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Homel et al., 2004). Two rounds of competitive 
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Table 5.5: Phase one Safer Cities projects by city/borough, PFA and budget, 1989-1993 
No. City/Borough Police Force Safer Cities (£) Levered-in (£) 
1 Lewisham The Metropolitan 1,195,759 1,318,822 
2 Islington The Metropolitan 642,290 177,033 
3 Wandsworth The Metropolitan 495,781 79,810 
4 Tower Hamlets The Metropolitan 134,365 19,405 
5 Hammersmith and Fulham The Metropolitan Not available Not available 
6 Coventry The West Midlands 879,573 842,512 
7 Birmingham The West Midlands 628,915 191,678 
8 Wolverhampton The West Midlands 595,950 1,792,268 
9 Rochdale Greater Manchester 796,574 595,860 
10 Salford Greater Manchester 496,704 162,867 
11 Bradford West Yorkshire 928,883 1,105,612 
12 Bristol Avon and Somerset 894,864 245,563 
13 Wirral Merseyside 855,624 1,692,081 
14 Hartlepool Cleveland 806,087 939,404 
15 Middlesbrough Cleveland Not available Not available 
16 Sunderland Northumbria 774,052 1,698,066 
17 Nottingham Nottinghamshire 709,839 1,067,024 
18 Hull Humberside 697,480 528,942 
19 Derby Derbyshire Not available Not available 
20 Leicester Leicestershire Not available Not available 
Total (£) 11,532,740 12,456,947 
Sources: Sutton (1996); Tilley and Webb (1994); Tilley (2016, personal e-mail); Mawby (2001)
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Table 5.6: Phase two anti-burglary Safer Cities projects by city/borough and PFA, 1994-
1998 
No. City/Borough Police Force 
1 Plymouth Devon and Cornwall 
2 Merthyr Tydfil South Wales 
3 Lambeth  The Metropolitan 
4 Greenwich The Metropolitan 
5 Blackburn Lancashire 
6 Burnley Lancashire 
7 Manchester Greater Manchester 
Sources: Sutton (1996); Tilley and Webb (1994); Tilley (2016, personal e-mail); Mawby 
(2001). 
bidding were held to fund the projects. The first round was held in early 1999 and funded 11 
projects. The second round was held in 2000 and funded 27 projects (Bullock and Tilley, 
2003). Table 5.7 presents the total number of TBI projects and the total amount of funding 
received for the TBI projects by police force between 1999 and 2002; further details about 
these projects can be found in Appendix 5.2. Although the TPI did not specifically target 
burglary (Hirschfield et al., 2001), some of the police forces received funding for projects 
targeting acquisitive crime in general and burglary in particular. Greater Manchester and 
Kent received funding for a project targeting acquisitive crime in 1999 and Avon and 
Somerset, and Derbyshire and West Yorkshire received funding for an anti-burglary TPI 
project in 2000 (see Appendix 5.2). Therefore, it is hypothesised there will be a steeper 
decrease in burglaries in Greater Manchester and Kent after 1999 and Avon and Somerset, 
Derbyshire and West Yorkshire after 2000 compared to their most similar PFAs owing to 
the implementation of anti-burglary TPI projects (Hypothesis 6). 
5.3.3 The Reducing Burglary Initiative 
The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) was intended to reduce burglaries in targeted areas 
where they were the most prevalent. It ran between 1999 and 2002 and covered around two 
million households in England and Wales. There were three competitive rounds. Round one 
(1999), which funded 63 RBI projects, covered around 220,000 households that experienced 
around 18,000 burglaries in 1998. Round two (1999), which funded 161 projects, covered 
approximately 600,000 households that experienced nearly 44,000 burglaries per year. 
Round three (2000), which funded 23 projects, covered around 1.3 million households (The 
National Archives, 2006).  
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Table 5.7: Total number of TPI projects and the amount of funding received by PFA, 1999-2002 
Police Force 
Total Number of 
TPI Projects 
Total Amount of 
Funding Received (£) 
Police Force 
Total Number of 
TPI Projects 
Total Amount of 
Funding Received (£) 
Metropolitan 10 6,500,000 West Mercia 1 512,000 
Merseyside 5 2,322,000 Derbyshire 2 485,000 
Sussex 2 1,906,000 Humberside 2 457,000 
Greater Manchester 3 1,387,000 Hampshire 1 411,000 
Avon and Somerset 2 1,280,000 Northumbria 2 373,000 
Kent 2 1,206,000 Lincolnshire 1 268,000 
Nottinghamshire 1 1,199,000 Surrey 1 222,000 
West Yorkshire 3 1,196,000 North Wales 1 188,000 
Northamptonshire 1 1,095,000 Cheshire 1 186,000 
Devon and Cornwall 2 1,031,000 North Yorkshire 1 186,000 
South Wales 2 1,000,000 Warwickshire 1 174,000 
Cumbria 1 637,000 Cambridgeshire 1 167,000 
West Midlands 2 607,000 Lancashire 1 103,000 
Source: Researcher’s Creation, the National Archives (2003a; 2003b) 
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Table 5.8: Total number of RBI projects and the amount of funding received by PFA, 1999-2002 
Police Force 
Total Number of 
RBI Projects 
Total Amount of 
Funding Received (£) 
Police Force 
Total Number of 
RBI Projects 
Total Amount of 
Funding Received (£) 
West Midlands  40 £3,103,787 Durham  3 £108,800 
Metropolitan  32 £1,089,960 Staffordshire  2 £198,452 
West Yorkshire  27 £4,830,295 Bedfordshire  2 £143,300 
South Yorkshire  18 £2,272,851 Dorset  2 £72,149 
Greater Manchester 17 £1,756,933 Lincolnshire  2 £126,000 
Northumbria  11 £740,861 South Wales  2 £74,400 
Cleveland  10 £588,410 Suffolk  2 £54,700 
Nottinghamshire  8 £2,621,701 Norfolk  2 £49,800 
Avon and Somerset 8 £930,400 Kent  2 £29,400 
Lancashire  8 £439,600 Sussex  1 £176,126 
Humberside  6 £1,650,719 Essex  1 £79,145 
Devon and Cornwall  6 £380,100 Gloucestershire  1 £39,352 
Merseyside  6 £340,000 North Wales  1 £33,300 
Leicestershire  6 £289,590 North Yorkshire  1 £17,065 
Thames Valley  5 £350,130 Cumbria  1 £13,300 
Derbyshire  4 £656,200 West Mercia  1 £10,100 
Northamptonshire  4 £205,666 Cheshire  1 £8,500 
Cambridgeshire  4 £131,800    
Sources: Researcher’s Creation, The National Archives (2003c; 2006) 
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Table 5.8 presents the total number of RBI projects and the total amount of funding received 
for the RBI projects by police forces between 1999 and 2002. In particular, the West 
Midlands, the Metropolitan and West Yorkshire drew attention. The West Midlands received 
funding for 40 RBI projects (16% of all RBI projects with a value of £3,103,787); the 
Metropolitan for 32 RBI projects (13% of all RBI projects with a value of £1,089,960); and 
West Yorkshire for 27 RBI projects (11% of all RBI projects with a value of £4,830,295). 
“Criteria for selection included the novelty of the proposed strategy, the context (type of 
problem, location etc.) in which established methods were to be applied and the quality of 
the available data and data system” (Tilley et al., 1999: 2). Given the criteria to receive 
funding for a project, the researcher argues that the more funding a police force receives, the 
more it is committed to POP (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.3 for further reasons). This is 
because West Yorkshire received funding for 26 projects, but the total amount of funding 
for those projects was much greater than the total amount of funding the West Midlands 
received for 40 projects and the Metropolitan received for 32 projects. Similarly, 
Nottinghamshire received £2,621,701 for eight projects, while South Yorkshire received 
£2,272,851 for 18 projects (see Table 5.8). In sum, while the total number of projects applied 
by a police force is important, the total amount of funding received for those projects should 
also be taken into account. 
Having identified which police forces received funding for the RBI projects (see Appendix 
5.3 for details), the West Midlands, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire (in addition to the 
police forces selected in Section 5.2.1) are selected for inclusion in further analysis in 
Chapter 6 to explore the role of POP in the burglary drop, especially between 1999 and 2002. 
The hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6 are as follows:  
Hypothesis 7: There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in the West Midlands compared 
to its most similar PFAs between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in West Yorkshire compared to 
its most similar PFAs between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in South Yorkshire compared 
to its most similar PFAs between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
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5.4 Reviewing the related literature  
This section reviews the related literature to identify highly POP-committed police forces 
and triangulates the findings from the analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP. 
It starts by reviewing a remarkable report (Leigh et al., 1996), which not only summarises 
the implementation history of POP in England and Wales but also reviews a large-scale 
demonstration project, which was started in a Leicestershire Basic Command Unit42 in 1995. 
Table 5.9: Early implementers of POP in England and Wales 
Police force Dates for Implementation 
Surrey 1982 
Metropolitan 1983-84 
Northumbria 1991-94 
Thames Valley 1992 
West Yorkshire 1994 
Merseyside 1995 
Source: Leigh et al. (1996) 
Table 5.9 shows the early implementers of POP. Leigh et al. (1996) stated that Surrey started 
to implement POP in 1982 and, at the time of writing the report (1996), only Surrey was 
implementing POP on a large-scale in England and Wales. The Metropolitan applied POP 
between 1983 and 1984. Northumbria established a dedicated Community Policing Unit, 
which ran from 1991 to 1994, to solve the underlying causes of problems in an estate. After 
the first attempt, Gateshead West Area Command of Northumbria Police introduced a 
Community-Oriented Problem-Solving (COPS) initiative, which followed the principles of 
POP, in 1998 (Northumbria Police, 1999). “It was developed by examining our existing 
procedures and policies carrying out research in other Police Forces and agencies in England 
and the U.S.A. as well as taking into account good practice identified by the Police Research 
Group” (ibid:1). Thames Valley was implementing POP, at least partly, since 1992, but was 
planning to adopt POP force-wide in 1997. In West Yorkshire, POP was introduced in 
Killingbeck, Leeds in 1994. Finally, in Merseyside, two proactive teams of officers were 
tasked to tackle problems in the Toxteth Sub-Division in 1995 (Leigh et al., 1996). 
Leigh et al. (1998) published a follow-up report in 1998, which described the introduction 
of POP in Cleveland force-wide and the developments of POP in Merseyside. As noted 
 
42 See Chapter 2, Section 2.8.2. for a definition. 
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above, Merseyside’s interest in POP started in 1995 with ‘Operation Pivot’ (see Table 5.9). 
Thereafter, a small project team was established in 1997 to facilitate the mainstreaming of 
POP in Merseyside, and that team recommended that Merseyside should adopt a problem-
solving approach as a force-wide philosophy from April 1998 (Gresty et al., 1997). 
Merseyside’s team visited seven police forces that had already adopted a problem-solving 
approach, to carry out consultations. Those police forces were Surrey, Northumbria, 
Cleveland, Thames Valley, West Mercia, Leicestershire and the West Midlands (Gresty et 
al., 1997). In addition, “…since 1995 PRG [Police Research Group] has serviced a quarterly 
meeting of officers from diverse forces implementing or thinking of implementing POP. 
Cleveland and Leicestershire have provided core members. Officers from Surrey, Thames 
Valley, Northumbria, Merseyside, Devon and Cornwall, Lancashire, Warwickshire, Greater 
Manchester ... have also attended from time to time” (Leigh et al., 1998: 6). Leigh et al. 
(1998: 1) confirmed that following the publication of the first report “there has been an 
explosion of interest in POP in the past two to three years”.  
This section also reviews a number of project submissions to the award schemes, which were 
about organisational plans to implement POP (https://popcenter.asu.edu/). To remind the 
reader, these projects were submitted with an endorsement letter from a senior representative 
(Assistant Chief Constable or higher), which indicates that the projects were recognised 
within the forces as being successful and worthy of submission (Bullock et al., 2006). For 
example, a project that was submitted by Lancashire (2001a) noted that after the then 
Superintendent Mike Barton, who had been a keen exponent of POP (Durham Police, 
2019)43, was seconded to the training department of Lancashire Police in 1997, he was 
invited to conferences to introduce or reintroduce POP in a number of police forces including: 
• Avon and Somerset   
• Cumbria 
• Devon and Cornwall 
• Hertfordshire 
• Leicestershire 
• Merseyside 
• The Metropolitan 
• West Yorkshire 
 
43 https://durham.police.uk/about-us/our-organisation/pages/our-executive.aspx [Accessed on 24 April 2019]. 
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• North Wales 
• North Yorkshire 
• South Wales 
• Suffolk 
• Thames Valley 
• The West Midlands. 
Following his visits to the police forces, Superintendent Mike Barton concluded that: 
“I have researched the Forces where I have visited, and all are positive that the 
presentation led to actual problem solving on the ground…All are using the Beer 
Mat44 as a model to sell POP. So, the Beer Mat is now [1999] being used across the 
UK to engage doubters and shift paradigms to problem orientation, a dream that I had 
at the start that I am proud to have achieved” (Lancashire Police, 2001a: 14, emphasis 
added).  
His conclusion supports Leigh et al. (1998) and shows that many police forces were 
implementing POP by 1999. In addition, Scott (2000) wrote a remarkable report on POP 
with “the most comprehensive bibliography that has been compiled on problem-oriented 
policing” (Goldstein, 2000: vi, cited in Scott, 2000). In the report, he listed police forces 
prominently associated with POP, drawing upon the files and personal knowledge of himself 
and Goldstein, and various publications. Scott (2000) complements the above findings as 
police forces that are prominently associated with POP in the report are: 
• Cleveland 
• Lancashire 
• Leicestershire 
• The Metropolitan 
• Merseyside 
• Surrey  
• Thames Valley. 
The section also reviews more recent studies on POP (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et 
al., 2006; Tilley and Scott, 2012). Bullock et al. (2006) analysed the implementation of POP 
 
44 This is a model that the then Superintendent Mike Barton developed to address the problem of ‘selling’ POP 
to the doubters and provide ideas for ‘converts’ to ‘sell’ POP to others. 
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in Lancashire and Hampshire. They stated that Hampshire started to implement POP in 2002 
and has been one of the police forces most prominently associated with POP. Tilley and 
Scott (2012: 124) summarised senior police officers in the UK, who have implemented POP 
within their organisations: 
“Many past and present senior police officers in the UK, for example, Mike Barton 
(Lancashire and Durham), Dr Stuart Kirby (Lancashire), Dr Steve Brookes 
(Leicestershire), Pauline Clare (Lancashire), Sir Kenneth Newman (MPS), Ian 
Macpherson (Norfolk and MPS), Sir Charles Pollard (Thames Valley), and Sir Paul 
Stephenson (Lancashire and MPS), have attempted to have their organisations 
implement it….Barrie Irving, when heading the British Police Foundation was also 
highly supportive in the UK”. 
 
Table 5.10: Police forces which were implementing POP during the 1990s and the 2000s 
Police Force Source 
Surrey, Metropolitan, Northumbria, Thames Valley, West 
Yorkshire, Merseyside 
Leigh et al. (1996) 
Surrey, Northumbria, Cleveland, Thames Valley, West 
Mercia, Leicestershire, West Midlands 
Gresty et al. (1997) 
Cleveland, Leicestershire, Surrey, Thames Valley, 
Northumbria, Merseyside, Devon and Cornwall, 
Lancashire, Warwickshire, Greater Manchester 
Leigh et al. (1998) 
Avon and Somerset, Cumbria, Devon and Cornwall, 
Hertfordshire, Leicestershire, Merseyside, 
Metropolitan, West Yorkshire, North Wales, North 
Yorkshire, South Wales, Suffolk, Thames Valley, West 
Midlands 
Lancashire Police (2001a) 
Cleveland, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Metropolitan, 
Merseyside, Surrey, Thames Valley 
Scott (2000) 
Lancashire, Hampshire Bullock et al. (2006) 
Lancashire, Durham, Leicestershire, Metropolitan, 
Norfolk 
Tilley and Scott (2012) 
 
Overall, analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP and the related literature seems 
to be suggesting that the same police forces were committed to POP over time (see Table 
5.10). Particularly, it seems that Cleveland, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Merseyside, the 
Metropolitan, Surrey and Thames Valley started to implement POP earlier when compared 
to other police forces and kept being committed to POP over time (Scott, 2000). In addition, 
Hampshire started to implement POP in 2002 and have been one of its exponents. Therefore, 
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this section hypothesises that there will be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Cleveland, 
Hampshire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Surrey and Thames 
Valley compared to their most similar PFAs owing to be an early implementer of POP 
(Hypothesis 10). 
5.5 Policing strategies of police forces 
Sections 5.2-5.4 identified highly POP-committed police forces using two indicators of 
commitment to POP introduced by the researcher and reviewing the related literature, 
separately. This section is concerned with the identification of policing strategies adopted 
by police forces over time. However, previous research on policing strategies of police forces 
in England and Wales is limited to only a few papers (e.g. Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton, 
2009a; 2009b). This section reviews these limited previous studies and revises their findings 
drawing upon previous research45 to distinguish the effect of POP on burglaries over time.  
Hale et al. (2004) examined 366 HMIC reports published between 1990 and August 2001 to 
identify policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales. They focussed on the 
most recent full inspection reports published between 1998 and 2001. To ensure the 
development of a style within a police force, they checked all previous reports since 1990.  
A year later, Hale et al. (2005) published a follow-up paper which examined three HMIC 
families of forces (the most similar police force groups) to determine the extent of 
consistency between policing styles within the group. Hale et al. (2004) suggested that there 
were four policing styles that police forces were applying before 2001: intelligence-led 
policing (ILP), POP, partnership policing (Part) and geographic policing (Geog). Based on 
Hale et al. (2004; 2005), Heaton (2009a) 46  published an article and provided a table 
presenting policing styles of all 42 police forces (see Table 5.11). However, the researcher 
argues that there are a number of problems with their findings. Notably, it seems that Hale 
et al. (2004) misdefined policing styles; Heaton (2009a) misidentified policing styles of 
some of the police forces; Hale et al. (2004; 2005) and Heaton (2009a) did not mention when 
police forces introduced particular policing styles (particularly POP) within each PFA over 
time; and none of these studies examined the level of commitment of police forces to those 
policing styles. The following paragraphs discuss these limitations in detail. 
 
45 Previous studies include peer-reviewed articles, project submissions to the Tilley and Goldstein Award 
schemes and Home Office reports. 
46 Heaton is the second author of Hale et al. (2004) and third author of Hale et al. (2005). 
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According to Hale et al. (2004: 298) geographic policing “relies upon officers becoming 
sensitive to community needs and taking long-term responsibility for problem-solving, 
frequently in consultation with other agencies” (see Brownlee and Walker, 1998 for a 
detailed description). Although they defined this policing style as a geographic policing style, 
this is precisely what POP is (see Goldstein, 1979; 1990). For example, the then 
Superintendent Mike Nelson “firmly endorsed and enforced a sector-based geographic 
structure ensuring local accountability through a Sector inspector and promoted the ethos of 
problem-oriented policing” in Avon and Somerset at the beginning of 1997 (Avon and 
Somerset Police, 1999: 2). That is, Avon and Somerset implemented POP within 
neighbourhoods. One might define this kind of policing strategy as small-scale POP (or 
problem-solving policing) (Clarke, 1997; Scott, 2000) rather than geographic policing. 
However, defining this policing style as geographic policing is a misdefinition.  
One of the policing styles Hale et al. (2004) defined was partnership policing. Partnership is 
one of the core components of POP (Goldstein, 1979; 1990). Goldstein himself emphasised 
that “it [POP] calls for the police to be more aggressive partners with other public agencies” 
(Goldstein, 1979: 257; see also Townsley et al., 2003). There is even a book entitled 
‘Problem-Oriented Policing and Partnerships: Implementing an Evidence-Based Approach 
to Crime Reduction’ (Bullock et al., 2006), which could have been entitled “Just About 
Everything There is to Know About Problem-Oriented Policing in the UK” (Bryett, 2007: 
840). Indeed, after the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which requires the establishment of 
formal partnerships amongst the police, local authority, probation and health services, “the 
terms ‘problem-oriented partnership’ or ‘problem-oriented policing and partnership’ have 
come to be preferred to ‘problem-oriented policing’ though the underlying meaning remains 
the same” (Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010: 2, see also Newburn, 2002; Tilley, 2010; Tilley and 
Scott, 2012). Hale et al. (2004) also gave the Safer Cities Programme as an example of 
partnership policing, but the original report (Ekblom et al., 1996) explicitly noted that the 
Safer Cities Programme used a problem-solving approach, which first analysed crime 
problems/patterns and set objectives, then adopted tailor-made responses, and finally 
evaluated whether the response had actually worked. The above process refers to the SARA 
framework, which is a common way of implementing POP (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1). 
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Table 5.11: Policing strategies adopted by police forces before August 2001 
No. Police Force Policing Style No. Police Force Policing Style 
1 Avon and 
Somerset 
Geog/ILP 
22 
Lincolnshire ILP 
2 Bedfordshire Geog/ILP 23 Merseyside ILP/POP/Geog 
3 Cambridgeshire Geog/ILP 24 The Metropolitan Various 
4 Cheshire ILP 25 Norfolk Geog 
5 Cleveland POP/Part 26 North Wales ILP 
6 Cumbria ILP 27 North Yorkshire ILP 
7 Derbyshire None 28 Northamptonshire Geog/ILP/Part 
8 Devon and 
Cornwall 
None 
29 
Northumbria ILP/Part 
9 Dorset None 30 Nottinghamshire ILP 
10 Durham ILP/POP/Part 31 South Wales None 
11 Dyfed Powys Geog/ILP/Part 32 South Yorkshire None 
12 Essex None 33 Staffordshire ILP/POP/Part 
13 Gloucestershire Geog 34 Suffolk Geog/ILP 
14 Greater 
Manchester 
ILP/POP/Part 
35 
Surrey Geog/ILP 
15 Gwent Geog 36 Sussex Geog/POP 
16 Hampshire ILP 37 Thames Valley POP/Part/ILP 
17 Hertfordshire ILP/POP 38 Warwickshire ILP/Geog/Part 
18 Humberside Geog 39 West Mercia ILP/Part 
19 
Kent ILP 
40 The West 
Midlands 
Geog 
20 Lancashire Geog/POP/ILP 41 West Yorkshire ILP/Part 
21 Leicestershire Geog 42 Wiltshire Geog/ILP/Part 
Source: Heaton (2009a: 166) 
Heaton (2009a) misidentified the policing styles of some of the police forces. Firstly, 
although the first large-scale POP development project was conducted in Leicestershire from 
1995 to 1997, Heaton (2009a) claimed that before August 2001, the policing style of 
Leicestershire was geographic policing. This also reinforces the above argument about the 
discrepancy in the definitions of policing styles. In short, the policing style of Leicestershire 
was explicitly POP, but Heaton (2009a) misidentified it as being geographic policing. 
Secondly, Heaton (2009a) misidentified the policing style of Surrey and noted that Surrey 
had operated a geographic policing system for many years. However, Leigh et al. (1996: 12) 
noted that Surrey was “the only force currently [1996] implementing POP on a large scale 
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and in a way that closely resembles Goldstein’s concepts. Indeed, Surrey has a longer history 
of interest in the tenets of POP than any other force in England and Wales”. Thirdly, a team 
from Merseyside visited seven police forces, which had already implemented POP, to learn 
lessons from them. They included Surrey, Northumbria, Cleveland, Thames Valley, West 
Mercia, Leicestershire and the West Midlands (Gresty et al., 1997). So, it seems that the 
policing styles of Northumbria, West Mercia and the West Midlands were also POP. 
However, Heaton (2009a) misidentified the policing styles of those police forces as 
ILP/partnership policing, ILP/partnership policing, and geographic policing, respectively. 
Indeed, a project submission to the Tilley Award scheme by Northumbria Police (1999: 1) 
clearly stated that:  
“Community-Orientated Problem Solving (C.O.P.S.) was introduced into the 
Gateshead West Area Command of Northumbria Police [in 1997] to improve the 
quality of service provided to the community and to reduce demand. It follows the 
principles of Problem Orientated Policing (P.O.P.) and utilises the S.A.R.A. problem-
solving model”. 
Fourthly, Heaton (2009a) claimed that North Wales implemented only ILP before August 
2001. However, a project submission to the Tilley Award scheme by North Wales Police 
clearly shows that Gwynedd in North Wales (which is the second biggest geographical area 
in Wales) was implementing POP in 1999 (North Wales Police, 1999). Fifthly, West 
Yorkshire Police (1999: ii) noted that “POP has been embraced throughout the Division 
[Eccleshill], at all levels”. Finally, Cambridgeshire Police (1999: 5) stated that “POP is 
ingrained in everyday practice through a myriad of inter-locking daily habits. Results of 
assessments at every level led to an expansion of POP to the Division”.  
There also seem to be problems with police forces which did not apply any policing styles. 
For instance, Heaton (2009a) claimed that South Yorkshire did not implement any policing 
strategies before August 2001. However, a project submitted to the Tilley Award scheme by 
South Yorkshire Police (2001) stated that they had established “the Community Safety and 
Problem-Oriented Policing Department” in 2000. In addition, Dorset Police (1999: 1) noted 
that “[i]t could be argued that the advent of the Charminster Beat Team Project [1998], based 
on the principles of problem-oriented policing (POP), marked a significant moment in the 
policing of the Bournemouth Division”. Likewise, Devon and Cornwall introduced POP in 
early 1999 (Devon and Cornwall Police, 2000). The above quotes contradict Heaton (2009a) 
 159 
 
and reinforce the researcher’s argument concerning misidentification of policing styles of 
some the police forces.  
Finally, Hale et al. (2004; 2005) and Heaton (2009a) did not make any mention of when 
police forces introduced the policing styles they had identified (particularly POP) within 
each PFA over time. In addition, none of these studies examined the level of commitment of 
police forces to the policing styles. Ironically, although Hale et al. (2004; 2005) and Heaton 
(2009a) did not provide any data in relation to the year the policing styles within the PFAs 
were introduced and the level of commitment of police forces to policing styles, Heaton 
(2009a) analysed the relationship between policing styles and reduction in crime between 
1992 and 2000. The researcher argues that without determining the year a policing style was 
introduced and the level of commitment to that policing style in a PFA, it is not possible to 
determine the effect of that policing style on crime over time. Besides, Heaton (2009a) used 
police-recorded crime data (PRCD), which has various limitations (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.6). 
Overall, it seems that although Hale et al. (2004) categorised policing styles into four groups, 
geographic and partnership policing styles are not themselves distinct from POP. That is 
why there are many problems with the categorisation of police forces in Table 5.11. Hale et 
al. (2004) should have categorised partnership and geographic policing as POP, or at least 
small-scale POP (or problem-solving policing). Police forces can implement more than one 
policing style simultaneously. However, if POP is applied at a lower level, this does not 
mean that it is geographic policing; rather, it is small-scale POP or problem-solving policing 
(Scott, 2000). It is therefore problematic when Hale et al. (2004) put a police force that 
applies ILP at a lower level within the group of police forces applying ILP and a police force 
which applies POP at a lower level within the group of police forces applying geographic 
policing. If one does so, it is highly likely that the impact of POP on crime rates within a 
PFA would be underestimated, as previous research suggested that even weak applications 
of POP (e.g. problem-oriented projects) can reduce crime rates (Weisburd et al., 2010; Braga, 
2014; Laycock and Tilley, 2018). The same logic applies to partnership policing. It seems 
that the number of police forces that were implementing POP outnumbers the number of 
police forces that were applying ILP before August 2001, once geographic and partnership 
policing styles are categorised as POP and policing styles of some of the police forces are 
corrected. This argument is in line with a finding from Read and Tilley (2000): nearly all 
police forces purported to endorse POP by 2000. 
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Table 5.12: Revised policing strategies of police forces before August 2001  
No. Police Force Policing Style 
Introduction 
Year of POP 
No. Police Force Policing Style 
Introduction 
Year of POP 
1 Avon and Somerset POP/ILP 1997 12 Essex None N/A 
2 Bedfordshire POP/ILP 1998 13 Gloucestershire POP N/A 
3 Cambridgeshire POP/ILP 1999 14 Greater Manchester ILP/POP Early 2000s 
4 Cheshire ILP N/A 15 Gwent POP 1999 
5 Cleveland POP 1996 16 Hampshire ILP 2002 
6 Cumbria ILP/POP 1997 17 Hertfordshire ILP/POP 1999 
7 Derbyshire None N/A 18 Humberside POP N/A 
8 Devon and Cornwall POP 1999 19 Kent ILP N/A 
9 Dorset POP 1998 20 Lancashire POP/ILP 1998 
10 Durham ILP/POP N/A 21 Leicestershire POP 1995 
11 Dyfed Powys POP/ILP N/A 22 Lincolnshire ILP N/A 
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Table 5.12: Revised policing strategies of police forces before August 2001 (continued) 
No. Police Force Policing Style 
Introduction 
Year of POP 
No. Police Force Policing Style 
Introduction 
Year of POP 
23 Merseyside ILP/POP 1995 33 Staffordshire ILP/POP 1998 
24 Metropolitan Various 2001 34 Suffolk POP/ILP 1998 
25 Norfolk POP N/A 35 Surrey POP/ILP 1982 
26 North Wales ILP/POP 1999 36 Sussex POP 1997 
27 North Yorkshire ILP N/A 37 Thames Valley POP/ILP 1992 
28 Northamptonshire POP/ILP N/A 38 Warwickshire ILP/POP N/A 
29 Northumbria ILP/POP 1997 39 West Mercia ILP/POP 1997 
30 Nottinghamshire ILP/POP 2001 40 West Midlands POP 1997 
31 South Wales None N/A 41 West Yorkshire ILP/POP 1994 
32 South Yorkshire POP 2000 42 Wiltshire POP/ILP N/A 
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A revised version of Table 5.11 is therefore needed (see Table 5.12). Geographic policing 
and partnership policing are exchanged for POP, and the policing styles of some of the police 
forces are corrected. These included Cumbria, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, North Wales, 
Nottinghamshire, and South Yorkshire. Details about the year POP was introduced within 
each PFA and the level of commitment of police forces to POP can be found in the following 
section. 
Overall, it seems that limited previous research (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton; 2009a; 
2009b) misdefined policing styles, misidentified policing styles of some of the police forces, 
did not mention when police forces introduced policing styles within each PFA over time 
(except for a few cases), and exaggerated the application of ILP and trivialised the 
implementation of POP by police forces in England and Wales. Most importantly, previous 
research did not examine the level of commitment of police forces to policing styles. 
5.6 Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP 
This section makes an original contribution to knowledge and constructs the independent 
variable (the level of commitment to POP) of the analysis in Chapter 7, which examines 
whether POP had a statistically significant independent effect on the mean number of 
burglaries in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Whilst constructing the independent variable, 
the section considers: 
1. the introduction year of POP in a PFA 
2. the total number of project submissions to the award schemes 
3. the total number of large-scale government-supported crime reduction projects and the 
amount of funding received for them.  
Each police force is given a numerical score depending on their commitment to POP (3 = 
high commitment; 2 = medium commitment; 1 = low; and 0 = no-commitment) in 1997 and 
2003/04, separately. It should be noted that there were different commitment measurements 
for 1997 and 2003/04; in other words, while the researcher uses the literature on POP prior 
to 1997 and the Safer Cities projects to construct the independent variable for 1997,  the 
2003/04 independent variable is constructed using the literature on POP after 1997, the 
projects that were applied as part of Crime Reduction Programme, and the projects that were 
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submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley Award schemes. The detailed rationale for scoring47 
is as follows: 
• If a police force introduced POP force-wide before 1997, the 1997 score is 3 (high 
commitment). 
• If a police force introduced POP before 1997 but not force-wide, the 1997 score is 2 
(medium commitment). 
• If a police force was not mentioned in the related literature before 1997 but received 
funding for the Safer Cities projects, the 1997 score is 1 (low commitment). 
• If a police force was not mentioned in the related literature before 1997 and did not 
receive funding for the Safer Cities projects, the 1997 score is 0 (no commitment). 
• If the year POP was introduced to a PFA after 1997 is known, and that police force 
submitted a significant number of projects to the award schemes or applied projects with 
high budgets under the Crime Reduction Programme (e.g. Avon and Somerset, see 
Appendix 5.4), the 2003/04 score is 3 (high commitment). 
• If the year POP was introduced to a PFA after 1997 is known, and that police force 
submitted a few projects to the award schemes or applied a few projects under the Crime 
Reduction Programme (e.g. Cambridgeshire, see Appendix 5.4), the 2003/04 score is 2 
(medium commitment). 
• If the year POP was introduced to a PFA before/after 1997 is not known, and that police 
force submitted a few projects to the award schemes and applied projects with high 
budgets under the Crime Reduction Programme (e.g. Humberside, see Appendix 5.4), 
the 2003/04 score is 2 (medium commitment). 
• If the year POP was introduced to a PFA before/after 1997 is not known, and that police 
force submitted a few projects to the award schemes or applied a few projects under the 
Crime Reduction Programme (e.g. Lincolnshire, see Appendix 5.4), the 2003/04 score is 
1 (low commitment). 
• If a police force did not apply POP at all, the 2003/04 score is 0 (no commitment). 
 
47 See the ‘explanation’ column of Appendix 5.4 for the rationale for the given scores corresponding to the 
level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04. 
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5.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter reported the findings of an original multifaceted analysis on POP-commitment 
of police forces in England and Wales. Firstly, it identified highly POP-committed police 
forces using two indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher and from 
reviewing the related literature. In particular, it analysed 771 problem-oriented projects that 
were submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award schemes by police forces between 1997 
and 2008 (the first indicator). The researcher argued that with limitations of using these 
projects in mind, the total number of project submissions indicates the level of commitment 
to POP (see also Bullock et al., 2006). After identifying the total number of project 
submissions by police forces, the researcher categorised police forces into four groups in 
terms of commitment to POP: high-, medium-, low- and no commitment. Thereafter, the 
researcher selected highly POP-committed police forces to be included in the analysis of 
Chapter 6.  
The second indicator was problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces as 
part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes (e.g. the Safer Cities 
Programme, the Targeted Policing Initiative and the Reducing Burglary Initiative). The 
literature suggested that to be able to save funding for those projects police forces were 
required to demonstrate their problem-solving skills. Therefore, the researcher argued that 
although there are limitations to using those projects, receiving funding for large-scale 
projects indicates the level of commitment to POP as well. After identifying the police forces 
which received funding for the projects and the total amount of funding they received, the 
researcher selected highly POP-committed police forces for inclusion in the analysis in 
Chapter 6.  
Following the above analyses, the chapter reviewed the related literature to supplement and 
triangulate the findings from the analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP. The 
chapter then shed new light on a body of research (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton, 2009a; 
Heaton, 200b) which established the policing styles of police forces in England and Wales 
before August 2001 and examined the effects of policing styles on crime between 1992 and 
2000. The researcher concluded that previous research (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton; 
2009a; 2009b) misdefined policing styles, misidentified policing styles of some of the police 
forces, did not mention when police forces introduced policing styles within each PFA over 
time (except for a few cases), did not examine the level of commitment of police forces to 
policing styles, and exaggerated the application of ILP and trivialised the implementation of 
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POP by police forces in England and Wales. Drawing upon that criticism, the chapter revised 
Table 5.11, which was adapted from Heaton (2009a). According to the revised table (see 
Table 5.12), the majority of the police forces had implemented some form of POP at some 
point in time before 2001, which is consistent with the findings in the literature (Read and 
Tilley, 2000). 
Based on the findings from the above analyses, the chapter finally constructed the 
independent variable for the analysis in Chapter 7 (the level of commitment of police forces 
to POP), which assesses whether POP had a statistically significant effect on burglaries (also 
controlling characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA) between 1995 and 2003/04. Each police force was given a 
numerical score depending on their commitment to POP (3 = high commitment, 2 = medium 
commitment, 1 = low commitment, and 0 = no commitment). In conclusion, this chapter 
made an original contribution to knowledge and provided the basis for an initial analysis of 
the extent to which POP played a role in the burglary drop in England and Wales in Chapter 
6 or otherwise, and the statistical modelling in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POP AND THE BURGLARY 
DROP: A COMPARATIVE TREND ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 identified highly POP-committed police forces, revisited previous research 
regarding policing styles of forces over time and revised their findings, and determined the 
level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Based on the 
findings and hypotheses from Chapter 5, this chapter is merely an initial exploration of the 
extent to which POP played a role in the burglary drop at the PFA level in England and 
Wales or otherwise before conducting a comprehensive statistical analysis in Chapter 7. In 
other words, the goal is to obtain an initial indication of whether there is any relationship 
between the level of POP commitment and burglary levels through addressing the following 
research question:  
Was the drop in both CSEW and police-recorded burglaries between 1988 and 2007/0848 
much greater in highly POP-committed PFAs compared to their most similar PFAs, 
which were not committed to POP to the same extent?  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. It starts with an overview of trends in burglaries 
at the national level and briefly discusses whether there was a relationship between POP and 
the burglary drop at that level. It then tests the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 5 along with 
two additional hypotheses regarding repeat victimisation in four sections: (a) Testing 
hypotheses: problem-oriented project submissions (1), (b) Testing hypotheses: problem-
oriented project submissions (2), (c) Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented crime reduction 
programmes, and (d) Testing hypotheses: the related literature. The chapter concludes by 
providing an appropriate summary. 
6.2 Overview of crime trends 
Figure 6.1 shows that burglaries recorded by the CSEW decreased by 59% from 1993 to 
2007/08. PRCD burglaries also decreased steeply (60%) between 1993 and 2007/08 (ONS, 
2017).  
 
48 The reasons for analysing the role of POP in the burglary drop between 1988 and 2007/08 can be found in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2. 
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Figure 6.1: Number of burglaries (thousands), the CSEW and PRCD, 1981-2015/16 
 
Source: Adapted from ONS (2017) 
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that attempted to explain the crime drop experienced, especially in the industrialised Western 
countries (including the UK) and noted that there is no one consistent explanation for this 
phenomenon. Some of the crime drop hypotheses may be candidates to explain the fall in 
crime in England and Wales, and some may not. Most importantly, it is still not known 
whether POP has had any effect on the burglary drop in England and Wales, particularly at 
the PFA level. Weisburd and Majmundar (2018: 15) noted that “there has not been study of 
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that jurisdiction” (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018: 15-16).  
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• The Safer Cities Programme started in 1988 and finished in 1998 (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.1). 
• Police forces submitted 771 problem-oriented projects to the award schemes between 
1997 and 2008 (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2). 
• The Targeted Policing Initiative (TPI) funded 59 projects (with a value of £30 million) 
between 1999 and 2002/03 to reduce crime rates through the explicit use of POP (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2). 
• The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), which targeted 2.18 million households in 
England and Wales, was applied between 1999 and 2002/03 (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.3).  
The decrease in burglaries between 2003/04 and 2007/08 could also be associated with the 
TPI and RBI projects as it is not outside of the realms of possibility that a project continues 
to have an impact after it finishes. The next section investigates whether there was a 
relationship between POP and the burglary drop at the PFA level. 
6.3 Testing hypotheses 
This section is divided into four sub-sections to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 5. 
Throughout the analysis, those most similar PFA groups are used to make more meaningful 
comparisons between police forces (HMICFRS, 2017). As noted in Chapter 4 (see Section 
4.9.2), the crime-related variables that were used to create those groups are highly correlated 
with burglary (Sampson and Groves, 1989). Therefore, using those groups for the analysis 
enables the researcher to identify whether POP had an impact on the burglary drop whilst 
implicitly controlling for burglary-related risk factors. 
The overarching period to be analysed in this chapter is 1988-2007/08. The reasons for 
choosing this period for analysis can be found in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.9.2). There are 
also particular periods within the overarching period to be analysed, which will be explained 
in each of the following sub-sections.  
6.3.1 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented project submissions (1) 
Figures 6.2 to 6.10 compare trends in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries in highly POP-
committed PFAs (which were identified in Chapter 5 using problem-oriented project 
submissions to the award schemes) with the trends in burglaries in the most similar PFAs to 
them which were not committed to POP to the same extent. The figures may also provide 
comparisons to the national burglary rates for interested readers. Figures 6.11 to 6.16 
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examine whether there was a gradual decrease in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs 
which became winners or finalists of the award schemes. Regarding the figures, the reader 
should consider the following notes throughout the chapter: 
• The CSEW does not provide data at the PFA level prior to 1995 (using the CSEW 1996). 
• The interpolated years for the CSEW data in Figure 6.3 and the subsequent figures are 
1996, 1998 and 2000. 
• Household weights are used to calculate the mean number of CSEW burglaries. Police-
recorded figures account for population size (number of households) in PFAs. 
• See Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2 for detailed information regarding the calculations of the 
mean number of CSEW and PRCD burglaries. 
There are also two important points to be noted before conducting the analysis. Firstly, the 
year POP was introduced within each PFA should be considered to suggest that there is a 
relationship between the implementation of POP and the burglary drop in those PFAs. 
Secondly, it is vital to identify whether a police force applies more than one policing style 
in order to distinguish the effect of POP on burglaries. Considering these two issues, the 
particular periods to be examined here are: 
1. ‘flexible’ 
2. introduction year of POP-2003/04 
3. 2004/05-2007/08.  
The ‘flexible’ time period uses the year POP was introduced in a PFA49 as the starting year. 
The end year is also flexible depending on the particular comparison of police forces. For 
example, Leicestershire introduced POP in 1995 (Leigh et al., 1998) and Lancashire in 1998 
(Lancashire Police, 2000; 2001a; 2001b). Therefore, the present study examines whether 
there was a greater reduction in burglaries in Leicestershire compared to Lancashire from 
1995 to 1998.  
The second period also uses the year POP was introduced in a PFA as the starting year. The 
reason for selecting the end year as 2003/04 for this period is that all police forces were 
required to apply the National Intelligence Model (NIM) or intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
by April 2004 (Maguire, 2004). As noted in the previous paragraph, it is essential to identify 
whether a police force applies more than one policing strategy to distinguish the effect of 
 
49 See Appendix 5.4 for the introduction year of POP within each PFA. 
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POP on burglaries.  
There are three reasons for selecting the 2004/05-2007/08 period. Firstly, although all police 
forces were supposed to apply ILP by April 2004, it seems that this did not, in fact, 
materialise. For example, John and Maguire (2004) examined the early efforts of 
mainstreaming ILP in three ‘pilot’ police forces (Lancashire, Surrey and the West Midlands) 
between 2001 and 2002. They concluded that “In short, the NIM was not yet being applied 
in the manner envisaged by its designers, and it would, therefore, be unreasonable to make 
any firm judgements about the ‘effectiveness’ of the Model on the basis of, for example, 
movements in crime rates in the three ‘pilot’ forces” (ibid:41). Secondly, the CSEW data at 
the PFA level is available to the public only from 1995 (using the CSEW 1996) to 2007/08 
(inclusive)50. Thirdly, and importantly, the number of project submissions to the award 
schemes after 2004 suggests that police forces kept applying POP (see Chapter 5, figures 
5.1-5.3).  
The six highly POP-committed police forces and the most similar PFAs to them that are 
analysed in this section are: 
1. Lancashire versus Leicestershire; Kent; Nottinghamshire; and Hertfordshire 
(Hypothesis 1.1) 
2. Metropolitan versus Greater Manchester (Hypothesis 1.2) 
3. Cleveland versus Northumbria (Hypothesis 1.3) 
4. Merseyside versus the West Midlands (Hypothesis 1.4) 
5. Cumbria versus North Wales (Hypothesis 1.5) 
6. Avon and Somerset versus Essex (Hypothesis 1.6). 
This section focusses on Lancashire for two main reasons:  
1. Lancashire has been one of the leading police forces in the implementation of POP in the 
UK and across the world (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2000). 
2. Lancashire submitted much more problem-oriented projects than the most similar PFAs 
to it (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1).  
 
50 Hele (2019, personal email, 6 February 2019). 
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Following this, the analysis continues with comparisons of the Metropolitan, Cleveland, 
Merseyside, Cumbria, and Avon and Somerset with the most similar PFAs to them, 
respectively. 
6.3.1.1 Lancashire versus Leicestershire Police 
Leicestershire introduced POP in 1995 (Leigh et al., 1996). Lancashire started to apply POP 
in 1998 (Lancashire Police, 2000; 2001a; 2001b). Therefore, there would be a greater 
decrease in burglaries in Leicestershire between 1995 and 1998.  
Between 1995 and 1998, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in Lancashire (-37%) was much 
greater than the decrease in Leicestershire (-5%). However, the decrease in PRCD burglaries 
in Leicestershire (-36%) was greater than the decrease in Lancashire (-32%) (see Figure 6.2).  
After Lancashire introduced POP in 1998, it submitted more projects than Leicestershire. 
However, it should be noted that Leicestershire was one of the earliest implementers of POP 
in the UK (Leigh et al., 1996). Nonetheless, there would be a greater decrease in burglaries 
in Lancashire compared to Leicestershire between 1998 and 2001/0251 
Between 1998 and 2001/02, CSEW burglaries in Lancashire increased by 6%, whilst they 
decreased by 69% in Leicestershire. The percentage change in PRCD burglaries in 
Leicestershire was -29%, while it was -2% in Lancashire (see Figure 6.2). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1.1 was rejected according to both data sources between 1998 and 2001/02. 
However, as noted above, Leicestershire also implemented POP rigorously, although it did 
not submit very many projects. It is therefore difficult to conclude whether POP influenced 
the burglary drop in this case. 
Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, while CSEW burglaries in Lancashire dropped by 34%, they 
increased by 29% in Leicestershire. The decrease in PRCD burglaries was much greater in 
Lancashire (-50%) when compared to Leicestershire (-24%) (see Figure 6.2). It seems that 
integrating POP and ILP in Lancashire was a better method to reducing burglaries. However, 
it is difficult to distinguish the effect of POP from ILP. Though, as Sparrow (2016) suggested, 
ILP is a reduced form of POP. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 was tentatively accepted according 
to both data sources between 2002/03 and 2007/08. 
 
51 Lancashire was one of the ‘pilot’ police forces to implement intelligence-led policing between 2001 and 
2002 (John and Maguire, 2004). 
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Figure 6.2: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and 
Leicestershire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
 
Figure 6.3: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and Kent, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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6.3.1.2 Lancashire versus Kent Police 
Kent had been implementing ILP since the mid-1990s and Lancashire introduced POP in 
1998. Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in Lancashire when compared to Kent 
after 1998. 
Between 1998 and 2001/02, while CSEW burglaries in Kent substantially decreased (-71%), 
they increased in Lancashire (6%). The percentage change in PRCD burglaries in Kent (-
28%) was also greater than the percentage change in PRCD burglaries in Lancashire (-2%) 
(see Figure 6.3). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 was rejected according to both data sources 
between 1998 and 2001/02. 
Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, however, CSEW burglaries in Kent increased by 49% while 
they decreased by 34% in Lancashire. In addition, the percentage change in PRCD burglaries 
in Lancashire (-50%) was much greater than the percentage change in Kent (-25%) (see 
Figure 6.3). These findings suggest that integrating POP and ILP in Lancashire was a better 
strategy to reducing burglaries compared to implementing ILP only in Kent between 2002/03 
and 2007/08. Hypothesis 1.1 was therefore accepted according to both data sources between 
2002/03 and 2007/08.  
6.3.1.3 Lancashire versus Nottinghamshire Police 
Nottinghamshire introduced POP in 2001 (Nottinghamshire Police, 2001) and in Lancashire 
in 1998. Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in Lancashire when compared to 
Nottinghamshire, especially between 1998 and 2001/02.  
Between 1998 and 2001/02, while CSEW burglaries increased by 6% in Lancashire, they 
decreased by 32% in Nottinghamshire. However, PRCD burglaries decreased by 2% in 
Lancashire, while they increased by 3% in Nottinghamshire (see Figure 6.4). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1.1 was accepted according to PRCD but rejected according to the CSEW 
between 1998 and 2001/02.  
Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, while CSEW burglaries decreased sharply (-34%) in 
Lancashire, they increased steeply (61%) in Nottinghamshire. In addition, while the 
percentage change in PRCD burglaries in Lancashire was -50%, it was -43% in 
Nottinghamshire (see Figure 6.4). Hypothesis 1.1 was therefore accepted according to both 
data sources between 2002/03 and 2007/08.  
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Figure 6.4: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and 
Nottinghamshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.5: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire and 
Hertfordshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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6.3.1.4 Lancashire versus Hertfordshire Police 
Hertfordshire introduced POP in 1999 (Hertfordshire Police, 2001) and Lancashire in 1998. 
According to the project submissions, Lancashire was more committed to POP. Therefore, 
there would be a greater decrease for Lancashire compared to Hertfordshire from 1999 
onwards. 
Between 1999 and 2001/02, while CSEW burglaries in Hertfordshire decreased by 8%, they 
increased by 37% in Lancashire. PRCD burglaries increased in both PFAs. However, the 
increase was much greater in Hertfordshire (39%) compared to Lancashire (13%) (see Figure 
6.5). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 was tentatively accepted according to PRCD but rejected 
according to the CSEW between 1999 and 2001/02. 
Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, the percentage change in CSEW burglaries in Lancashire 
(-34%) was slightly more than the percentage change in Hertfordshire (-33%). In addition, 
PRCD burglaries in Lancashire decreased by 50% while they decreased by 17% in 
Hertfordshire (see Figure 6.5). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 was accepted according to both 
data sources between 2002/03 and 2007/08.  
6.3.1.5 The Metropolitan versus Greater Manchester Police 
The Metropolitan relaunched POP across all boroughs in 2001 (The Metropolitan Police, 
2002). Greater Manchester started to implement POP with some vigour in the early 2000s 
(Bullock et al., 2006). Project submissions suggest that the Metropolitan was more 
committed to POP (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1). Therefore, there would be a sharper decrease 
in burglaries in the Metropolitan when compared to Greater Manchester between 2001/02 
and 2007/08. 
Between 2001/02 and 2003/04, while CSEW burglaries decreased markedly (40%) in the 
Metropolitan, they increased by 3% in Greater Manchester. The decrease in PRCD 
burglaries in the Metropolitan (9%) was greater than the decrease in Greater Manchester 
(4%) (see Figure 6.6). Thus, Hypothesis 1.2 was accepted according to both data sources 
between 2001/02 and 2003/04.  
Between 2004/05 and 2007/08, Hypothesis 1.2 was rejected according to both data sources. 
The decreases in CSEW (44%) and PRCD burglaries (22%) in Greater Manchester were 
greater than the falls in the Metropolitan (33%; 7%, respectively) (see Figure 6.6).  
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Figure 6.6: Mean number of burglaries in the Metropolitan and 
Greater Manchester, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08  
Figure 6.7: Mean number of burglaries in Cleveland and 
Northumbria, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08  
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6.3.1.6 Cleveland versus Northumbria Police 
Northumbria had a dedicated Community Policing Unit to tackle the underlying causes of 
community problems between 1991 and 1994 (Leigh et al., 1996). Cleveland piloted POP 
between October 1996 and March 1997 and applied it across all beats from 1998 (Leigh et 
al., 1998). Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in burglaries in Cleveland 1998 
onwards. 
PRCD burglaries began to drop in both police forces in 1992. Between 1998 and 2003/04, 
the decrease in CSEW burglaries in Cleveland was 57%, while it was 50% in Northumbria. 
On the other hand, the percentage change in PRCD burglaries was greater in Northumbria (-
34%) when compared to Cleveland (-29%) (see Figure 6.7). Hence, Hypothesis 1.3 was 
accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD between 1998 and 2003/04. 
Between 2004/05 and 2007/08, while CSEW burglaries in Cleveland decreased by 35%, 
they dropped by 20% in Northumbria. However, the percentage change in PRCD burglaries 
was greater in Northumbria (-38%) when compared to Cleveland (-24%) (see Figure 6.7). 
Hence, Hypothesis 1.3 was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD 
between 2004/05 and 2007/08.  
6.3.1.7 Merseyside versus the West Midlands Police 
Merseyside started to implement POP in 1995 (Leigh et al., 1996). The West Midlands 
introduced POP in 1997 (Leigh et al., 1998). The West Midlands was one of the ‘pilot’ police 
forces in terms of implementing ILP between 2001 and 2002 (John and Maguire, 2004). 
Therefore, there would be a greater reduction in burglaries in Merseyside, particularly 
between 1995 and 2001/02. 
Between 1995 and 2001/02, CSEW burglaries reduced by 27% in Merseyside, while they 
increased by 9% in the West Midlands. Similarly, the decrease in PRCD burglaries was 
greater in Merseyside (-35%) when compared to the West Midlands (-33%). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1.4 was accepted according to both data sources between 1995 and 2001/02. 
Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in the West Midlands 
(-49%) was greater than the decrease in Merseyside (-39%). On the contrary, the drop in 
PRCD burglaries in Merseyside (-43%) was greater than the fall in the West Midlands (-34%) 
(see Figure 6.8). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.4 was rejected according to the CSEW but 
accepted according to PRCD between 2002/03 and 2007/08. 
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Figure 6.8: Mean number of burglaries in Merseyside and the West 
Midlands, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
 Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.9: Mean number of burglaries in Cumbria and North Wales, 
the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08  
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6.3.1.8 Cumbria versus North Wales Police 
Cumbria and North Wales introduced POP in 1999 (North Wales Police, 1999; Lancashire 
Police, 2001a). According to the project submissions, Cumbria was more committed to POP. 
Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in burglaries in Cumbria compared to North 
Wales after 1999. 
Between 1999 and 2003/04, the drop in CSEW burglaries in Cumbria was much greater 
(-77%) when compared to North Wales (-1%). In addition, while PRCD burglaries decreased 
in Cumbria (22%), they increased in North Wales (7%) (see Figure 6.9). Hence, Hypothesis 
1.5 was accepted according to both data sources between 1999 and 2003/04. 
Between 2004/05 and 2007/08, while CSEW burglaries in Cumbria decreased substantially 
(-69%), they increased markedly in North Wales (307%). In addition, the decrease in PRCD 
burglaries in Cumbria (-45%) was greater than the decrease in North Wales (-27%) (see 
Figure 6.9). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.5 was accepted according to both data sources between 
2004/05 and 2007/08. 
6.3.1.9 Avon and Somerset versus Essex Police 
The then Superintendent Mike Nelson promoted the ethos of POP in Avon and Somerset at 
the beginning of 1997 (Avon and Somerset Police, 1999). On the other hand, Essex is one 
of those police forces that did not apply a specific policing style to fight crime prior to 2001 
(Heaton, 2009a) and has not been mentioned in the POP-related literature (e.g. Leigh et al., 
1996; 1998; Gresty et al., 1997; Scott, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; 
Tilley and Scott, 2012). Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in burglaries in Avon 
and Somerset after 1997.  
Between 1997 and 2003/04, the percentage change in CSEW burglaries in Avon and 
Somerset (-39%) was greater than the percentage change in CSEW burglaries in Essex 
(-34%). Similarly, the decrease in PRCD burglaries in Avon and Somerset (-37%) was much 
greater than the decrease in Essex (-3%) (see Figure 6.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.6 was 
accepted according to both data sources between 1997 and 2003/04. 
Between 2004/05 and 2007/08, the decrease in CSEW burglaries was the same (-7%) in both 
police forces. However, while PRCD burglaries in Avon and Somerset decreased by 11%, 
they increased by 3% in Essex. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.6 was accepted according to PRCD 
between 2004/05 and 2007/08, but it was difficult to conclude whether POP influenced the 
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burglary drop when the CSEW was used.  
Figure 6.10: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset and Essex, the CSEW and 
PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08  
Table 6.1 summarises the results in relation to Hypotheses 1.1 to 1.6. To conclude, although 
Lancashire was seemingly more committed to POP compared to the most similar PFAs to it 
(according to the problem-oriented project submissions), results were mixed depending on 
the data source. Importantly, Hypothesis 1.1 was accepted according to both data sources 
between 2002/03 and 2007/08 when the implementation of POP in Lancashire was more 
developed (Bullock et al., 2006). In addition, Hypotheses 1.2 to 1.6 were accepted in most 
cases. These findings indicate that POP did indeed play a role in the burglary drop. However, 
identifying the extent of its role is difficult at this stage. 
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Table 6.1: Was there a greater decrease in burglaries in POP-committed PFAs? 
Hypothesis Police forces Period 
Data Source 
CSEW PRCD 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Leicestershire 
1998-2001/02 Rejected Rejected 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Leicestershire 
2002/03-2007/08 Accepted Accepted 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Kent 
1998-2001/02 Rejected Rejected 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Kent 
2002/03-2007/08 Accepted Accepted 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Nottingham 
1998-2001/02 Rejected Accepted 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Nottingham 
2002/03-2007/08 Accepted Accepted 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Hertfordshire 
1999-2001/02 Rejected Accepted 
1.1 
Lancashire versus 
Hertfordshire 
2002/03-2007/08 Accepted Accepted 
1.2 
Metropolitan versus 
Greater Manchester 
2001/02-2003/04 Accepted Accepted 
1.2 
Metropolitan versus 
Greater Manchester 
2004/05-2007/08 Rejected Rejected 
1.3 
Cleveland versus 
Northumbria 
1998-2003/04 Accepted Rejected 
1.3 
Cleveland versus 
Northumbria 
2004/05-2007/08 Accepted Rejected 
1.4 
Merseyside versus 
West Midlands 
1995-2001/02 Accepted Accepted 
1.4 
Merseyside versus 
West Midlands 
2002/03-2007/08 Rejected Accepted 
1.5 
Cumbria versus 
North Wales 
1999-2003/04 Accepted Accepted 
1.5 
Cumbria versus 
North Wales 
2004/05-2007/08 Accepted Accepted 
1.6 
Avon and Somerset 
versus Essex 
1997-2003/04 Accepted Accepted 
1.6 
Avon and Somerset 
versus Essex 
2004/05-2007/08 N/A Accepted 
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6.3.2 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented project submissions (2) 
This section examines whether individual anti-burglary award submissions affected CSEW 
and PRCD burglaries (see Appendix 5.1, Hypotheses 2 and 3) considering starting and 
submission years of the projects (see Table 6.2). The researcher argues that these projects 
might have affected burglaries due to being exemplar projects recognised by a committee. 
The following sub-sections examine the effects of the projects in the respective PFAs in turn. 
Table 6.2: Anti-burglary winner and finalist award submissions by starting and submission 
year and PFA 
 
Police force 
Winner Projects Finalist Projects 
Starting/Submission Year Starting/Submission Year 
Avon and Somerset • 2000/2002 
• 1997/1999 
• 2004/2006 
Lancashire 
• 1998/2002 
• 2004/2007 
• 1999/2000 
• 2001/2003 
• 2002/2004 
• 2004/2006 
• 2006/2008 
• 2006/2009 
Devon and Cornwall • 1999/2000 - 
Hampshire - • 2003/2006 
Northamptonshire - • 1999/2001 
Staffordshire - • 2002/2005 
 
6.3.2.1 Avon and Somerset Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Avon and 
Somerset between 1997 and 1999; 2000 and 2002; and 2004 and 2006. 
CSEW burglaries in Avon and Somerset increased between 1995 and 1997; decreased 
between 1997 and 1999; went up between 1999 and 2001/02; and fell between 2001/02 and 
2007/08. PRCD burglaries in Avon and Somerset decreased markedly from 1996 to 2000; 
increased steeply between 2000 and 2001/02; then fell substantially between 2001/02 and 
2006/07 (see Figure 6.11). Overall, CSEW and PRCD burglaries fluctuated in Avon and 
Somerset during the periods noted above. Therefore, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected 
according to both data sources. 
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6.3.2.2 Lancashire Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Lancashire 
between 1998 and 2002; 1999 and 2000; 2001 and 2003; 2002 and 2004; 2004 and 2006; 
2004 and 2007; 2006 and 2008; and 2006 and 2009 (namely between 1998 and 2009). 
However, both CSEW and PRCD burglaries fluctuated between 1998 and 2007/08 (see 
Figure 6.12). Therefore, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected according to both data sources 
between 1998 and 2007/08.  
6.3.2.3 Devon and Cornwall Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Devon and 
Cornwall between 1999 and 2000. Hypothesis 2 was rejected according to the CSEW as 
CSEW burglaries increased between 1999 and 2000. However, it was accepted according to 
PRCD, as PRCD burglaries decreased in Devon and Cornwall between 1999 and 2000 (see 
Figure 6.13).  
6.3.2.4 Hampshire Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Hampshire 
between 2003/04 and 2007/08. CSEW and PRCD burglaries in Hampshire fluctuated 
between 2003/04 and 2007/08 (see Figure 6.14). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was rejected 
according to both data sources. 
6.3.2.5 Northamptonshire Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Northamptonshire 
between 1999 and 2001/02. However, Hypotheses 3 was rejected according to the CSEW, 
as CSEW burglaries increased between 1999 and 2001/02. It was also rejected according to 
PRCD, as PRCD burglaries fluctuated between 1999 and 2001/02 (see Figure 6.15). 
6.3.2.6 Staffordshire Police 
According to Table 6.2, there would be a gradual decrease in burglaries in Staffordshire 
between 2002/03 and 2005/06. However, Hypothesis 3 was rejected according to the CSEW, 
as CSEW burglaries fluctuated between 2002/03 and 2005/06. On the contrary, it was 
accepted according to PRCD, as the decrease in PRCD burglaries between 2002/03 and 
2005/06 was gradual (see Figure 6.16). 
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Figure 6.11: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.12: Mean number of burglaries in Lancashire, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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Figure 6.13: Mean number of burglaries in Devon and Cornwall, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.14: Mean number of burglaries in Hampshire, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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Figure 6.15: Mean number of burglaries in Northamptonshire, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.16: Mean number of burglaries in Staffordshire, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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6.3.2.7 England and Wales 
In Chapter 5, it was found that most of the anti-burglary projects were implemented in 1999, 
2004 and 2008 (see figures 5.1-5.3). Hence, it was hypothesised that the decreases in 
burglaries in England and Wales in 1999, 2004 and 2008 would be greater when compared 
to other years (Hypothesis 4). Figure 6.17 shows that the decreases in burglaries in those 
years were always greater than the previous year. This might have been a general trend, or 
POP might have affected burglaries as the decrease in burglaries in 2004/05 and 2007/08 
came after a slight increase in burglaries in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, it was difficult to 
accept or reject Hypothesis 4. 
Figure 6.17: Mean number of burglaries in England and Wales, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Table 6.3 summarises the results in relation to Hypotheses 2-4. It suggests that Hypotheses 
2 and 3 were rejected in all cases according to the CSEW. However, they were accepted in 
two cases, according to PRCD. Overall, they were rejected in most cases. This is because, 
although both CSEW and PRCD burglaries fell substantially over time, the decrease was not 
gradual. Accepting or rejecting Hypothesis 4 was difficult without further information. 
 
 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
M
e
an
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
u
rg
la
ri
e
s
England and Wales CSEW England and Wales Recorded
 188 
 
Table 6.3: Was there a gradual decrease in burglaries in PFAs that became a winner or 
finalist? 
 
Police Force 
Hypothesis 
Data Source 
CSEW PRCD 
Avon and Somerset 2 (Winner) and 3 (Finalist) Rejected Rejected 
Lancashire 2 (Winner) and 3 (Finalist) Rejected Rejected 
Devon and Cornwall 3 (Finalist) Rejected Accepted 
Hampshire 2 (Winner) Rejected Rejected 
Northamptonshire 3 (Finalist) Rejected Rejected 
Staffordshire 3 (Finalist) Rejected Accepted 
England and Wales 4 N/A N/A 
 
6.3.3 Testing hypotheses: problem-oriented crime reduction programmes 
This section tests Hypotheses 5 to 9 (see Appendix 5.1). It starts by comparing trends in 
PRCD burglaries52 in PFAs (which received a greater amount of funding for Safer Cities 
projects when compared to their most similar PFAs) with the trends in the most similar PFAs 
to them between 1988 and 1998 (see Figures 6.18 and 6.19). Thereafter, it compares trends 
in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs (which received a greater amount of funding for the 
TPI and the RBI projects when compared to their most similar PFAs) with the trends in the 
most similar PFAs to them over time (particularly from 1999 to 2002/03, see figures 6.20-
6.26). 
6.3.3.1 The Safer Cities Programme 
The PFAs included in this section are the Metropolitan, the West Midlands and Greater 
Manchester (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1). Figures 6.18 and 6.19 show that although the 
Metropolitan, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester received a considerable amount 
of funding for the Safer Cities projects (see Chapter 5, Table 5.5), PRCD burglaries increased 
in the Metropolitan (between 1988 and 1991), Greater Manchester and the West Midlands 
(between 1989 and 1992). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was rejected between 1988 and 1993. 
 
52 Since the CSEW does not provide data at the PFA level before 1995, PRCD is used. 
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Figure 6.18: Police recorded burglaries in the Metropolitan and 
Greater Manchester, 1988-1998 
Source: ONS, 1988-1998 
Figure 6.19: Police recorded burglaries in the West Midlands and 
Greater Manchester, 1988-1998 
Source: ONS, 1988-1998 
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6.3.3.2 The Targeted Policing Initiative  
This section tests Hypothesis 6 (there would be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Greater 
Manchester and Kent after 1999 and Avon and Somerset, Derbyshire and West Yorkshire 
after 2000 when compared to the most similar PFAs to them owing to the implementation 
of anti-burglary TPI projects). 
Between 1999 and 2000, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in West Yorkshire (-34%) was 
greater than the decrease in Greater Manchester (-19%). On the other hand, while PRCD 
burglaries decreased in Greater Manchester by 5%, West Yorkshire saw an increase in 
burglaries by 1% (see Figure 6.20). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was rejected according to the 
CSEW but accepted according to PRCD for Greater Manchester between 1999 and 2000.  
Between 1999 and 2000, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in Kent (-36%) was greater than 
the decrease in Leicestershire (-28%). On the other hand, the decrease in PRCD burglaries 
in Leicestershire (-18%) was greater than the decrease in Kent (-3%) (see Figure 6.21). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to 
PRCD for Kent between 1999 and 2000. 
Between 2000 and 2001/02, while CSEW burglaries in Avon and Somerset substantially 
increased (60%), CSEW burglaries in Essex decreased markedly (-27%). On the other hand, 
the increase in PRCD burglaries in Avon and Somerset (28%) was much greater than the 
increase in Essex (2%) (see Figure 6.22). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was rejected according to 
both data sources for Avon and Somerset between 2000 and 2001/02. 
Between 2000 and 2001/02, while CSEW burglaries decreased by 19% in Derbyshire, they 
increased in Cumbria by 3%. However, PRCD burglaries increased in both police forces, 
where the increase was greater in Derbyshire (9% versus 3%) (see Figure 6.23). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD for 
Derbyshire between 2000 and 2001/02. 
Between 2000 and 2001/02, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in West Yorkshire (-68%) was 
much greater than the decrease in CSEW burglaries in Greater Manchester (-39%) (see 
Figure 6.20). However, while PRCD burglaries in West Yorkshire increased (15%), they 
decreased in Greater Manchester (-6%) (see Figure 6.20). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was 
accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD for West Yorkshire 
between 2000 and 2001/02. 
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Figure 6.20: Mean number of burglaries in Greater Manchester and 
West Yorkshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.21: Mean number of burglaries in Kent and Leicestershire, 
the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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Figure 6.22: Mean number of burglaries in Avon and Somerset and 
Essex, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.23: Mean number of burglaries in Derbyshire and Cumbria, 
the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
M
e
an
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
u
rg
la
ri
e
s
Avon & Somerset CSEW Avon & Somerset Recorded
Essex CSEW Essex Recorded
England and Wales CSEW England and Wales Recorded
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
M
e
an
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
u
rg
la
ri
e
s
Derbyshire CSEW Derbyshire Recorded
Cumbria CSEW Cumbria Recorded
England and Wales CSEW England and Wales Recorded
 193 
 
6.3.3.3 The Reducing Burglary Initiative  
Chapter 5 identified that the West Midlands received funding for 40 RBI projects with a 
value of £3,103,787; West Yorkshire for 27 with a value of £4,830,295; and South Yorkshire 
for 18 with a value of £2,272,851. Figures 6.24 to 6.26 compare trends in both CSEW and 
PRCD burglaries in these PFAs with the trends in the most similar PFAs to them between 
1999 and 2002/03 (see Appendix 5.1, Hypotheses 7-9).  
6.3.3.3.1 The West Midlands versus Greater Manchester Police 
Whilst the West Midlands received £3,103,787 for 40 RBI projects Greater Manchester 
received £1,756,933 for 17 RBI projects between 1999 and 2002. Therefore, the percentage 
change in burglaries would be greater in the West Midlands between 1999 and 2002/03 
(Hypothesis 7).  
Between 1999 and 2002/03, the decrease in CSEW burglaries in the West Midlands (-25%) 
was greater than the fall in CSEW burglaries in Greater Manchester (-23%). On the other 
hand, while PRCD burglaries decreased in the West Midlands (-25%), they increased in 
Greater Manchester (2%) (see Figure 6.24). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was accepted according 
to both data sources.  
6.3.3.3.2 West Yorkshire versus Greater Manchester Police 
Whilst West Yorkshire received £4,830,295 for 27 RBI projects Greater Manchester 
received £1,756,933 for 17 RBI projects. Hence, there would be a greater decrease in 
burglaries in West Yorkshire compared to Greater Manchester between 1999 and 2002/03 
(Hypothesis 8). 
Between 1999 and 2002/03, the percentage change in CSEW burglaries in West Yorkshire 
(-44%) was greater than the percentage change in Greater Manchester (-23%). On the other 
hand, PRCD burglaries increased in both PFAs, but the increase in West Yorkshire (20%) 
was greater than the increase in Greater Manchester (2%) (see Figure 6.25). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8 was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD. 
6.3.3.3.3 South Yorkshire versus South Wales Police 
Whilst South Yorkshire received £2,272,851 for 18 RBI projects South Wales received 
funding for 2 RBI projects valued at £74,400. Therefore, there would be a greater decrease 
in burglaries in South Yorkshire when compared to South Wales between 1999 and 2002/03 
(Hypothesis 9). 
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Figure 6.24: Mean number of burglaries in the West Midlands and 
Greater Manchester, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.25: Mean number of burglaries in West Yorkshire and 
Greater Manchester, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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Between 1999 and 2002/03, CSEW burglaries increased in both PFAs. However, the 
increase in CSEW burglaries in South Yorkshire (17%) was less than that in South Wales 
(75%). On the other hand, while PRCD burglaries in South Yorkshire increased by 9%, they 
decreased by 5% in South Wales (see Figure 6.26). Therefore, Hypothesis 9 was accepted 
according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD. 
Figure 6.26: Mean number of burglaries in South Yorkshire and South Wales, the CSEW 
and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Table 6.4 summarises the results in relation to Hypotheses 6 to 9. Hypothesis 6 was accepted 
in three cases (out of five), according to the CSEW. However, it was rejected in four cases 
(out of five) according to PRCD. Hypothesis 7 was accepted according to both data sources. 
Hypotheses 8 and 9 were accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD. 
These results imply that POP might have played a role in the burglary drop (especially 
according to the CSEW) between 1999 and 2002/03. 
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Table 6.4: Was there a greater decrease in PFAs that received funding for anti-burglary 
TPI and RBI projects between 1999 and 2002/03? 
 
Police forces 
  
Period 
Data Source 
Hypothesis CSEW PRCD 
Greater Manchester versus 
West Yorkshire 
6 1999-2000 Rejected Accepted 
Kent versus Leicestershire 6 1999-2000 Accepted Rejected 
Avon and Somerset versus Essex 6 2000-2001/02 Rejected Rejected 
Derbyshire versus Cumbria 6 2000-2001/02 Accepted Rejected 
West Yorkshire versus  
Greater Manchester 
6 2000-2001/02 Accepted Rejected 
The West Midlands versus  
Greater Manchester 
7 1999-2002/03 Accepted Accepted 
West Yorkshire versus  
Greater Manchester 
8 1999-2002/03 Accepted Rejected 
South Yorkshire versus  
South Wales 
9 1999-2002/03 Accepted Rejected 
6.3.4 Testing hypotheses: the related literature 
This section tests Hypothesis 10 (see Appendix 5.1). In other words, Figures 6.27 to 6.29 
compare the trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs (which were early implementers 
of POP and prominently associated with POP), with the trends in the most similar PFAs to 
them. According to Leigh et al. (1998) and Scott (2000), these PFAs are:  
• Cleveland 
• Lancashire 
• Leicestershire 
• Merseyside 
• Metropolitan 
• Surrey 
• Thames Valley. 
Hampshire is also one of the police forces prominently associated with POP (Bullock et al., 
2006). Trends in burglaries in these PFAs, except for Surrey and Thames Valley, have 
already been analysed in this chapter. Therefore, this section focuses on Surrey, Thames 
Valley and Hampshire and the most similar PFAs to them.  
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6.3.4.1 Surrey versus Dorset Police 
“Surrey has a longer history of interest in the tenets of POP than any other force in England 
and Wales” (Leigh et al., 1996: 5). Dorset introduced POP in 1998 (Dorset Police, 1999). 
Therefore, there would be a greater decrease in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in Surrey 
compared to Dorset between 1991 and 1998.  
Between 1991 and 1998, the percentage change in PRCD burglaries in Surrey was -43%, 
while it was -26% in Dorset. Between 1995 and 1998, while CSEW burglaries in Surrey 
decreased substantially (68%), they increased in Dorset (17%) (see Figure 6.27). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 10 was accepted according to PRCD between 1991 and 1998 and, according to 
the CSEW, between 1995 and 1998. However, Hypothesis 10 was rejected according to 
PRCD between 1995 and 1998 as the decrease in PRCD burglaries was greater in Dorset 
compared to Surrey (-44% versus -24%, respectively). 
6.3.4.2 Thames Valley versus Hampshire Police 
Thames Valley started to implement POP in 1992 and was planning to apply it force-wide 
in 1997 (Leigh et al., 1996). On the other hand, Hampshire introduced POP in 2002 (Bullock 
et al., 2006). Therefore, the percentage change in burglaries would be greater in Thames 
Valley between 1992 and 2002/03.  
Between 1992 and 2002/03, the percentage change in PRCD burglaries in Hampshire 
was -60%, while it was -36% in Thames Valley. Between 1995 and 2002/03, the decrease 
in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries was greater in Hampshire. Therefore, Hypothesis 10 
was rejected according to both data sources. 
6.3.4.3 Hampshire versus Sussex Police 
Hampshire started to implement POP in 2002 and then became one of the most committed 
police forces to POP in England and Wales (Bullock et al., 2006). Therefore, the percentage 
change in burglaries would be greater in Hampshire compared to Sussex between 2003/04 
and 2007/08.  
Between 2003/04 and 2007/08, while the percentage change in CSEW burglaries in 
Hampshire was -67%, it was -42% in Sussex. On the contrary, the percentage change in 
PRCD burglaries in Sussex (-48%) was much greater than the percentage change in 
Hampshire (-27%). Therefore, Hypothesis 10 was accepted according to the CSEW but 
rejected according to PRCD between 2003/04 and 2007/08.  
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Figure 6.27: Mean number of burglaries in Surrey and Dorset, the 
CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Figure 6.28: Mean number of burglaries in Thames Valley and 
Hampshire, the CSEW and PRCD, 1991-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
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Figure 6.29: Mean number of burglaries in Hampshire and Sussex, the CSEW and PRCD, 
1991-2007/08 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1991-2007/08 
Table 6.5 summarises the results in relation to Hypothesis 10. It suggests that Hypothesis 10 
was accepted in two cases according to the CSEW but rejected in most cases according to 
PRCD. 
Table 6.5: Did being an early implementer of POP matter? 
 
Police forces 
 
Period 
Data Source 
CSEW PRCD 
Surrey versus Dorset 1991-1998 N/A Accepted 
Surrey versus Dorset 1995-1998 Accepted Rejected 
Thames Valley versus Hampshire 1992-2002/03 N/A Rejected 
Thames Valley versus Hampshire 1995-2002/03 Rejected Rejected 
Hampshire versus Sussex 2003/04-2007/08 Accepted Rejected 
 
6.3.5 Testing hypotheses: repeat victimisation 
POP suggests that targeting repeat victimisation should be one of the core aims of policing 
to reduce crime rates (Goldstein, 1990) since “it provides useful information about where 
and when to go, and what to do, to prevent crimes” (Grove et al., 2012: 11; see also Sampson, 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
M
e
an
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
u
rg
la
ri
e
s
Hampshire CSEW Hampshire Recorded
Sussex CSEW Sussex Recorded
England and Wales CSEW England and Wales Recorded
 200 
 
2003). Importantly, repeat victimisation was one of the police performance indicators in the 
UK in the mid-1990s (Farrell et al., 2000; Laycock, 2000). “By 1998, all forces claimed to 
be able to identify some repeat victims, and all forces claimed an ability to identify repeat 
victims of domestic burglary (except for the City of London Police where commercial 
burglary was a higher priority)” (Laycock, 2000: 20). This section tests Hypotheses 11 and 
12 (see Appendix 5.1). 
Figure 6.30 presents the trend in the proportion of repeat burglary victimisations (henceforth 
repeat burglaries) at the national level (England and Wales) from 1995 to 2007/08 (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2 for the calculation). It suggests that repeat burglaries at the national 
level fluctuated but decreased by 4% between 1995 and 2007/08. Therefore, Hypothesis 11 
was accepted at the national level. The sharpest drop in repeat burglaries (-8%) was 
experienced between 1999 and 2003/04, which might suggest a tenuous link with POP as 
targeting repeat victims was a police performance indicator across the country during that 
period (Tilley, 2002). However, the reason for the increase between 2003/04 and 2005/06 is 
unknown. 
Figure 6.30: Proportion of repeat burglaries in England and Wales, the CSEW, 1995-
2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1996-2007/08 
The remainder of this section compares trends in repeat burglaries53 in Leicestershire, Surrey, 
Thames Valley and West Yorkshire (early implementers of POP in the UK) with trends in 
the most similar PFAs to them to test Hypotheses 11 and 12.  
 
53 See Appendix 6.1 for the CSEW sample size (adults, unweighted) and the proportion of all burglary victims 
who suffered more than one burglary in the reference period in PFAs (weighted) from 1995 to 2007/08. 
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6.3.5.1 Leicestershire versus Kent Police 
Leicestershire introduced POP in 1995 (Leigh et al., 1996) and became one of the POP-
committed police forces in the UK (Scott, 2000). Kent had been applying ILP since the mid-
1990s (Maguire, 2004).  
Repeat burglaries in Leicestershire decreased by 13% between 1995 and 2003/04 and by 4% 
between 1995 and 2007/08. Therefore, Hypothesis 11 was accepted for Leicestershire. In 
relation to Hypothesis 12, while repeat burglaries in Kent decreased by 24%, they fell by 13% 
in Leicestershire between 1995 and 2003/04. Therefore, Hypothesis 12 was rejected between 
1995 and 2003/04. 
6.3.5.2 Surrey versus Dorset Police 
Surrey’s interest in POP started in 1982, and indeed Surrey was the only police force 
implementing POP on a large scale in 1996 (Leigh et al., 1996). Dorset introduced POP in 
1998 (Dorset Police, 1999). Therefore, the percentage change in repeat burglaries would be 
greater in Surrey than Dorset.  
Hypothesis 11 was accepted for Surrey as the proportion of repeat burglaries was zero in 
both 1995 and 2007/08. Concerning Hypothesis 12, Surrey saw an increase in repeat 
burglaries between 1997 and 1999. Following that, repeat burglaries continuously decreased 
until 2007/08 (except for a slight increase between 2001/02 and 2002/03). In Dorset, repeat 
burglaries substantially increased between 1997 and 2002/03 and subsequently fluctuated 
between 2002/03 and 2007/08. In 2007/08, while the proportion of repeat burglaries in 
Dorset was 15%, it was zero in Surrey. Therefore, Hypothesis 12 was accepted. 
6.3.5.3 Thames Valley versus Hampshire Police 
Thames Valley started to implement POP in 1992 and was planning to apply it force-wide 
in 1997 (Leigh et al., 1996). Hampshire introduced POP in 2002 (Bullock et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the percentage change in repeat burglaries would be greater in Thames Valley 
compared to Hampshire, especially between 1995 and 2002/03. 
Hypothesis 11 was accepted for Thames Valley as the proportion of repeat burglaries went 
down from 13% to 4% between 1995 and 2007/08. Hypothesis 11 was also accepted for 
Hampshire as repeat burglaries dropped substantially just one year after Hampshire 
introduced POP. 
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Figure 6.31: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Leicestershire and 
Kent, the CSEW, 1995-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1996-2007/08 
Figure 6.32: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Surrey and Dorset, the 
CSEW, 1995-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1996-2007/08 
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Figure 6.33: Proportion of repeat burglaries in Thames Valley and 
Hampshire, the CSEW, 1995-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1996-2007/08 
Figure 6.34: Proportion of repeat burglaries in West Yorkshire and 
Greater Manchester, the CSEW, 1995-2007/08 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, ONS, 1996-2007/08 
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In relation to Hypothesis 12, the decrease in repeat burglaries in Hampshire (-18%) was 
greater than the decrease in Thames Valley (-8%) between 1995 and 2002/03. However, the 
number of repeat burglaries in Thames Valley was always lower over the same period. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 12 was accepted between 1995 and 2002/03. In addition, after 
Hampshire introduced POP in 2002, repeat burglaries decreased substantially between 
2003/04 and 2006/07.  
6.3.5.4 West Yorkshire versus Greater Manchester Police 
West Yorkshire introduced POP in 1994 (Leigh et al., 1996). In addition, an important 
burglary reduction programme, which specifically targeted repeat burglaries, ran from 
October 1994 to March 1996 in West Yorkshire (Chenery et al., 1997). Greater Manchester 
started to apply POP in the early 2000s (Bullock et al., 2006). 
Hypothesis 11 was accepted for West Yorkshire as repeat burglaries dropped from 9% to 8% 
between 1995 and 2007/08. However, it was rejected for Greater Manchester as repeat 
burglaries fluctuated after 2000 and the proportion of repeat burglaries was 17% in 2007/08. 
A tenuous relationship between POP and the decrease in repeat burglaries in West Yorkshire 
was likely. While repeat burglaries decreased in West Yorkshire (-6%) they increased by 9% 
in Greater Manchester between 1995 and 2003/04. Therefore, Hypothesis 12 was accepted 
between 1995 and 2003/04. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 summarise the results in relation to Hypotheses 11 and 12. Hypothesis 11 
was accepted in all cases. Hypothesis 12 was accepted in three cases (out of four). Overall, 
it seemed there was a tenuous relationship between POP and the decrease in repeat burglaries 
in PFAs where POP started to be implemented earlier than others.  
Table 6.6: Was there a gradual decrease in repeat burglaries at the national and PFA levels 
between 1995 and 2007/08? 
Police Force The CSEW 
England and Wales Accepted 
Leicestershire Accepted 
Surrey Accepted 
Thames Valley Accepted 
Hampshire Accepted 
West Yorkshire Accepted 
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Table 6.7: Was there a greater decrease in repeat burglaries in PFAs that were early 
implementers of POP? 
Police Force Period The CSEW 
Leicestershire versus Kent 1998-2003/04 Rejected 
Surrey versus Dorset 1997-2007/08 Accepted 
Thames Valley versus Hampshire 1995-2002/03 Accepted 
West Yorkshire versus Greater Manchester 1995-2003/04 Accepted 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter firstly reviewed the trends in burglaries at the national level and briefly 
discussed whether there was a relationship between POP and the burglary drop at the 
national level. Following that, it explored the same relationship at the PFA level testing the 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 5 along with two additional hypotheses regarding repeat 
victimisation. The results were mixed depending on the data sources used and period 
analysed. However, the researcher suggested that there seemed to be a tenuous relationship 
between the implementation of POP and the fall in both CSEW and PRCD burglaries as the 
hypotheses were accepted in most of the cases considered. For example, Hypothesis 1.1 
(Lancashire versus its most similar PFAs) was accepted according to both the CSEW and 
PRCD between 2002/03 and 2007/08 when the implementation of POP in Lancashire was 
more developed (Bullock et al., 2006). Similarly, Hypotheses 1.2-1.6 were accepted in most 
cases (see Table 6.1). 
The chapter also compared trends in repeat burglaries in PFAs, which were acknowledged 
to be early implementers of POP in the UK (Leigh et al., 1996; Scott, 2000) with trends in 
the most similar PFAs to them. The results suggested that there appeared to be a relationship 
between POP and the drop in repeat burglaries in POP-committed PFAs between 1995 and 
2007/08.  
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter represents an initial exploration of the 
relationship between the level of POP commitment and burglary levels at the PFA level in 
England and Wales. However, there is a whole set of factors that may explain burglary trends. 
In this respect, Chapter 7 will analyse whether POP had a statistically significant effect on 
burglaries (also controlling for characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of 
police force officers per 1000 residents in a PFA) in England and Wales between 1995 and 
2003/04. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DID POP HAVE A STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON 
BURGLARIES? 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 was an initial attempt to examine the extent to which POP played a role in the 
burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales or otherwise. For fair and meaningful 
comparisons between police forces, it used the most similar PFA groups (HMICFRS, 2017), 
comparing their respective CSEW and PRCD burglaries to test a number of hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 5. However, it did not check whether POP had a statistically significant 
effect on burglaries over time. This chapter, therefore, goes one step further and thoroughly 
examines whether POP had a statistically significant effect on burglary rates between 1995 
and 2003/04. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics 
of households and PFAs for 1997 and 2003/04, separately, are first presented and interpreted. 
Secondly, it conducts a principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce a set of continuous 
structural control variables at the PFA level into a few components to eliminate the 
multicollinearity problem amongst them for 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Thirdly, it applies 
multilevel negative binomial regression to identify the effects of POP on the mean number 
of burglary victimisations whilst controlling for the characteristics of households and PFAs 
and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA in 1997 and 2003/04, 
separately. It also tests bivariate correlations between POP and the mean number of 
burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04. Finally, results from multilevel negative binomial 
modelling and Pearson correlation analysis are presented.  
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of households and PFAs 
that entered the statistical models in this chapter. In other words, these are the burglary risk 
and protective factors that were identified drawing upon routine activity and social 
disorganisation theories (see Chapter 4, Section 4.8). Except for age (continuous) and lone-
parent (dichotomous) variables, all household-level variables had dummy variables with one 
category selected as the base category (base categories are in brackets). ‘Do not know’ and 
‘refused’ responses were excluded from the analysis except for income.  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of characteristics of households and PFAs, 1997 and 
2003/04 
Household characteristics 1998 2003/04 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age of head of household 50.9 (17.4) 52.09 (17.0) 
 % % 
Ethnicity (White) 93.5 94.2 
Black 2.5 2.5 
Asian 2.3 1.8 
Other ethnicities 1.7 1.5 
Number of adults (2 Adults) 51.7 52.8 
One adult 33.0 32.2 
Three or more adults 15.3 15.0 
Number of children (No Children) 69.6 71.9 
One or more children 30.4 28.1 
Lone parent 6.1 5.5 
Tenure (Owner) 64.7 72.0 
Social renting 24.5 18.7 
Private renting 10.8 9.3 
Income (£10,000-£29,999) 41.7 32.7 
Under £5,000 16.1 7.5 
Between £5,000 and £9,999 18.2 13.1 
Over £30,000 16.8 25.4 
No response 7.3 21.2 
Social class of head of household (Professional) 32.1 35.8 
Intermediate Occupations 43.0 18.1 
Routine Occupations 20.9 39.3 
Never Worked/Not Classified 3.9 6.8 
Number of cars (2 Cars) 22.5 26.9 
No car 27.7 23.0 
One car 45.3 43.0 
Three or more cars 4.5 7.0 
Type of accommodation (Detached) 19.4 24.5 
Semi-detached house 32 32.8 
Terraced house 30.7 26.8 
Flat or maisonette or other 17.9 11.8 
Not coded N/A 4.1 
House Empty During Day (More Than 7 Hours) 42.4 42.7 
Less than 3 hours 30.5 30.8 
Between 3 and 7 hours 27.1 26.6 
Length of Residence (More than 10 years) 47.5 48.4 
Less than 2 years 18.8 16.5 
2-5 years 17.1 18.4 
5-10 years 16.6 16.7 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of characteristics of households and PFAs, 1997 and 
2003/04 (continued) 
Household Characteristics 1998 2003/04 
 % % 
Type of Area (Rural) 21.2 25.2 
Inner city 23.7 8.9 
Urban 55.1 65.8 
Police Force Area Characteristics (Census) % % 
% Renting privately 7.5 8.3 
% Renting from a housing association 3.3 5.7 
% Renting from a local authority 20.4 12.9 
% Single adult non-pensioner households 11.8 15.1 
% Ethnic diversity 6.4 7.1 
% People aged between 16 and 24 12.8 10.7 
% Movers 9.7 12.0 
% Lone parent households 3.8 6.3 
% Households without a car 33.3 25.8 
% Owner households 66.9 69.8 
% Professional head of households 23.1 26.5 
Population density 12.7 9.7 
Mean number of people per room 0.5 0.4 
Number of police officers per 1000 residents 2.2 2.3 
 % % 
Level of commitment to POP (no-commitment) 34.9 2.3 
Low commitment 36.0 24.4 
Mid commitment 18.7 34.4 
High commitment 10.5 38.9 
Region (South East) 18.7 18.5 
North 7.2 8.4 
Yorkshire and Humberside 10.2 9.0 
North West 11.6 10.7 
East Midlands 7.8 9.7 
West Midlands 10.4 9.9 
East Anglia 4.3 6.1 
South West 8.6 10.6 
Wales 5.3 8.0 
Greater London 15.9 9.0 
Final Sample Size (Raw Number) 14,678 37,550 
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This is because the households that did not respond to the income question constituted a 
substantial number of the total responses. Particularly, it was high in 2003/04 (21.2%), which 
may have affected the results of the analysis. The total number of cases (after dropping 
missing cases) was presented in the last row of the table. An important point to note is that 
there was a six-year gap between the data sources used for 1997. That is, while variables at 
the household level came from the 1998 CSEW sweep, characteristics of PFAs came from 
the 1991 UK Census for 1997. The reader should bear in mind that this would reduce the 
magnitude of the relationship between victimisation and area (not household) characteristics 
(Tseloni and Pease, 2015). However, the gap between the data sources used for 2003/04 was 
reasonable (the 2003/04 CSEW sweep and the 2001 UK Census) compared to the gap 
between the 1998 CSEW and the 1991 UK Census. 
Descriptive statistics regarding the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
households that entered the statistical models changed from 1997 to 2003/04. The mean age 
of the Head of Household (HOH) increased slightly from around 51 in 1997 to 52 in 2003/04. 
Regarding ethnicity, the proportion of Black HOH in an area was the same (2.5%) in both 
1997 and 2003/04. The percentage of Asian HOH decreased from 2.3% to 1.8%. Likewise, 
the proportion of HOH from other ethnic backgrounds slightly declined from 1.7% to 1.5%. 
The percentage of households with one adult and three or more adults dropped (from 33.0% 
to 32.2%, and from 15.3% to 15.0%, respectively). By contrast, the proportion of households 
with two adults increased from 51.7% to 52.8%. The percentage of households with children 
also decreased from 30.4% to 28.1%. The proportion of households with lone parents fell 
slightly from 6.1% to 5.5%. Both the proportion of social and private rented households 
declined (from 24.5% to 18.7%; from 10.8% to 9.3%, respectively). While the number of 
households with an income less than £5,000, between £5,000 and £ 9,999, and between 
£10,000 and £29,999 each decreased substantially, the percentage of respondents with a 
household income of over £30,000 increased from 16.8% to 25.4%. These figures indicated 
that household income increased between 1997 and 2003/04. However, the steep rise in the 
proportion of respondents who did not answer the income question should be borne in mind. 
The increase in household income was in line with the increase in the percentage of 
households (a) with a professional head (from 32.1% to 35.8%), and (b) with two or more 
cars (from 22.5% to 26.9%). However, the proportion of HOH with an intermediate 
occupation decreased dramatically from 43% to 18.1%, which seemed to be due to the 
increase in the proportion of HOH with a routine or manual occupation from 20.9% to 39.3%. 
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The proportion of detached and semi-detached households increased (from 19.4% to 24.5%, 
and from 32.0% to 32.8%, respectively). However, the percentage of terraced households 
and flats decreased (from 30.7% to 26.8%, and from 17.9% to 11.8%, respectively).   
These changes in the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of households might 
have affected the burglary drop that occurred in England and Wales between 1997 and 
2003/04. This is because, some of these characteristics attract motivated offenders in the 
absence of guardians, and some indicate accessibility, where perpetrators are able to easily 
commit crimes against those properties. In addition, some turn properties into 
desirable/attractive targets in the eyes of potential offenders. Finally, proximity to potential 
offenders is also an important risk factor in becoming a victim of burglary (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.8).  
An ageing population may proxy guardianship and may reduce burglaries since older people 
tend to stay in their homes more compared to young people (Tseloni et al., 2002); hence, 
burglars are deterred. In addition, households with three or more adults can protect them 
more effectively when compared to households with only one adult. Furthermore, 
households with children are at lower risk of burglary victimisation (Osborn et al., 1992). 
However, the increase in the mean sample age from 1997 to 2003/04 was slight, and the 
proportion of households with three or more adults decreased marginally. The percentage of 
households with children also fell from 30.4% to 28.1%. Therefore, it is unlikely that these 
attributes played a significant role in the burglary drop between 1997 and 2003/04.  
In addition to the characteristics discussed above, house occupancy and length of residence 
in an area proxy social guardianship (Tseloni, 2006). That is, properties are at reduced risk 
of burglary victimisation when they are occupied more. In addition, the longer individuals 
live in the same area the more they are safe, which is due to community stability. The 
descriptive statistics of the ‘house empty during daytime’ variable showed that there was no 
significant change from 1997 to 2003/04. The proportion of the dummy variables in relation 
to the ‘length of residence in an area’ variable did not change dramatically either. Therefore, 
it is also unlikely that these variables affected the burglary drop between 1997 and 2003/04.    
Type of accommodation is a proxy of accessibility, which is associated with household 
crimes (Bennet and Wright, 1984). To give an example, a burglar might access a property in 
an inner city much more easily than a property in a rural area. Descriptive statistics regarding 
the changes in the proportion of accommodation types may explain part of the burglary drop 
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because while the proportion of detached and semi-detached households increased, the 
percentage of terraced households and flats decreased, which are at more risk than a detached 
or semi-detached building (Tseloni, 2006).  
One of the risk factors associated with burglary victimisation is desirability. Annual 
household income, which is also related to social class, tenure, and number of cars, indicate 
desirability. As noted above, the proportion of owner households, households with an 
income of over £30,000, households with a professional head, and households with two or 
more cars all increased considerably. By contrast, the proportion of social and private rented 
households decreased. It can be therefore argued that properties became more desirable and 
attractive in the eyes of motivated offenders. Therefore, the changes in these factors may 
have affected the burglary rates from 1997 to 2003/04.  
Type of area also determines individuals’ exposure to crime as it refers to proximity to 
potential offenders (Meier and Miethe, 1993). Individuals living in inner city areas are most 
at risk compared to those living in rural areas since offenders tend to commit their crimes in 
places close to where they live (Townsley and Sidebottom, 2010). Table 7.1 demonstrates 
that the percentage of households living in rural areas increased from 21.2% to 25.2%. By 
contrast, the proportion of households living in inner city areas decreased dramatically, while 
the percentage of households living in urban areas increased substantially. These results 
show that although the proportion of households living in inner city areas fell dramatically, 
individuals were at high risk of burglary victimisation in 2003/04 due to living in urban areas 
that potential offenders could also reach easily (Wiles and Costello, 2000). Consequently, 
the change in this variable is not likely to be a key driver of the burglary drop. The descriptive 
statistics of characteristics of areas showed the same pattern with the characteristics of 
households by and large. All of the inferences made here were tested in detail through 
multilevel negative binomial regression modelling later in the chapter.  
7.3 Principal component analysis 
Before conducting a multilevel negative binomial regression analysis, the correlation 
between continuous structural control variables at the PFA level was checked. It was 
observed that there was multicollinearity between them (see Appendices 7.1 and 7.2). 
Therefore, a PCA was conducted to eliminate the multicollinearity problem by reducing 
those variables down to a few components (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
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Table 7.2: KMO and Bartlett's test (1), 1997 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .738 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 384490.060 
df 78 
Sig. .000 
Table 7.3: Component matrix (1), 1997 
 
Component 
1 2 
Population density .940  
Owner households -.926  
Mean number of people per room .899  
Lone parent households .891  
Single adult non-pensioner households .870  
Renting from a housing association .864  
Households without a car .850  
Ethnic diversity .819  
Renting from a local authority .723 -.559 
People aged between 16 and 24 .675  
Professional head of households  .891 
Movers  .885 
Renting privately  .750 
Table 7.4: KMO and Bartlett's test (2), 1997 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .744 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 309728.372 
df 66 
Sig. .000 
Table 7.5: Component matrix (2), 1997 
 
Component 
1 2 
Population density .942  
Owner households -.907  
Lone parent households .902  
Mean number of people per room .896  
Renting from a housing association .875  
Single adult non-pensioner households .869  
Households without a car .853  
Ethnic diversity .821  
People aged between 16 and 24 .669  
Movers  .906 
Professional head of households  .904 
Renting privately  .734 
 
 213 
 
7.3.1 Principal component analysis, 1997 
To select and measure a set of variables as the first step, outliers on continuous structural 
control variables at the PFA level were checked. It was observed that there were two 
variables which had outliers: (1) the percentage of black people, and (2) the percentage of 
people from other ethnic backgrounds (Chinese, Mixed, and Others). Therefore, they were 
excluded from the analysis, along with the percentage of Asian people variable. However, 
ethnicity is an important factor to be tested in an analysis. Therefore, a new variable (ethnic 
diversity) was added to the analysis. This variable consisted of all ethnic backgrounds (Black, 
Asian, and Others) in an area, and had no outliers.  
Having decided which variables would enter the PCA, the factorability of the dataset was 
assessed. The first important criterion for this was the sample size. According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2013), 300 or more cases provide a good sample size for a PCA. Data for the 
1997 analysis were available from 14,678 respondents. Therefore, the first criterion was met 
satisfactorily. Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity (BTS) were employed (see Table 7.2). Although the value of the 
KMO was greater than 0.6, which was an indicator of good analysis, and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity was significant, the researcher did not use these results. This was because the 
percentage of households renting from a local authority variable loaded on both components 
at the 0.5-level (see Table 7.3). Therefore, it was excluded from the PCA (Laveist et al., 
2009) but was kept for multilevel negative binomial regression (as a separate variable at the 
PFA level). After that, the analysis was carried out again. Table 7.4 demonstrates that the 
dataset was factorable (KMO = 0.744; BTS < 0.005) and no variables loaded on both 
components at the 0.5-level (see Table 7.5).  
7.3.1.1 Extracting components 
After selecting and measuring a set of variables and preparing the correlation matrix, the 
next step was to extract components. There are three main criteria to extract components: (1) 
the Eigenvalue rule, (2) Catell’s scree test (scree plot), and (3) cumulative variance. 
According to the Eigenvalue rule, all components with an Eigenvalue under 1 are dropped. 
According to Catell’s scree test, components above the point where the curve makes an 
elbow are retained. Cumulative variance proposes that total cumulative variance should be 
at least 70%. Using these three criteria, two components were extracted for 1997. Hence, the 
selection of two components in 1997 was supported (see Table 7.6 and Figure 7.1). 
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Table 7.6: Eigenvalues and total variance explained, 1997 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Loadings Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.124 59.366 59.366 7.124 59.366 59.366 6.937 57.809 57.809 
2 2.813 23.440 82.806 2.813 23.440 82.806 3.000 24.997 82.806 
3 0.983 8.191 90.997           
4 0.331 2.755 93.753           
5 0.258 2.147 95.899           
6 0.175 1.461 97.360           
7 0.103 0.862 98.222           
8 0.091 0.762 98.984           
9 0.063 0.528 99.512           
10 0.033 0.272 99.784           
11 0.020 0.167 99.951           
12 0.006 0.049 100.000             
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Figure 7.1: Scree plot showing the number of components extracted, 1997 
 
 
7.3.1.2 Rotating components 
The next step was to rotate the components to increase their interpretability. There are two 
types of rotation: (a) orthogonal, and (b) oblique. While orthogonal rotation assumes that 
components are not correlated, oblique rotation assumes such a correlation. The orthogonal 
rotation was utilised to obtain dimensions that were independent of each other. Three 
different orthogonal rotation techniques are available in SPSS. These techniques slightly 
differ as Tabachnick and Fidell (2001: 595-614) explains:  
The goal of the varimax rotation is to maximise the variance of factor loadings by 
making high loadings higher and low ones lower for each factor… Quartimax does 
for variables what varimax does for factors… Equamax is a hybrid between varimax 
and quartimax that tries simultaneously to simplify the factors and the variables.   
All three orthogonal rotation techniques were used, and almost the same component structure 
resulted in each time. Accordingly, the varimax rotation technique, which is the most 
commonly used one, was utilised. Table 7.5 reports the variables and their factor loadings 
for 1997. 
7.3.1.3 Interpretation of the components 
Table 7.5 and 7.6 and Figure 7.1 demonstrated that two components were extracted for 1997. 
The first two components accounted for 83% of the total variance (see Table 7.6) where the 
first component consisted of nine variables:  
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1. population density per hectare 
2. percentage of owner-occupied households (negative loading) 
3. percentage of lone parent households 
4. mean number of people per room 
5. percentage of households renting from a housing association 
6. percentage of households with a single non-pensioner adult 
7. percentage of households without a car 
8. ethnic diversity in an area 
9. percentage of population aged between 16 and 24.  
It was felt that a new variable, urban diversity and deprivation, should be created as a 
combination of these nine variables.  The second component consisted of three variables that 
loaded positively:  
1. percentage of people who moved in the previous year (movers) 
2. percentage of households with a professional head 
3. percentage of households renting privately. 
It was felt that these three variables indicated a lack of informal social control in community 
and neighbourhood stability. Therefore, it was labelled as lack of community stability. After 
extracting the components, component scores were calculated via SPSS. 
Table 7.7: Multicollinearity test among extracted components and variables excluded from 
PCA, 1997 
Collinearity Statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
Renting from a local authority .252 3.968 
Lack of community stability .492 2.031 
Urban diversity and deprivation .340 2.937 
a. Dependent Variable: Burglary 
 
Table 7.8: Correlation matrix, 1997 
   1 2 3 
1 Renting from a local authority 1   
2 Lack of community stability -.510 1  
3 Urban diversity and deprivation .699 .000 1 
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The final step was to test the multicollinearity between the two extracted components and 
the renting from a local authority variable that had been excluded from the PCA previously. 
If there was no multicollinearity among them, these variables would be used as separate 
control variables in multilevel negative binomial regression modelling. Table 7.7 showed 
that there was no multicollinearity among them as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for 
each was less than 4 (O’brien, 2007, see also Table 7.8 for a correlation matrix). Hence, they 
were retained for further analysis.  
7.3.2 Principal component analysis, 2003/04 
The process that was followed for 1997 was repeated for 2003/04. Firstly, outliers were 
tested, with three variables found to contain them: (1) percentage of single adult non-
pensioner households, (2) ethnic diversity in an area, and (3) population density. They also 
loaded on more than one component at the 0.5-level (see Table 7.10). Therefore, they were 
excluded from the PCA (LaVeist et al., 2009), but kept for further analysis.  
Having identified the variables to be included in the PCA, the factorability of the dataset was 
checked. The sample size of the 2003/04 CSEW sweep was 37,550. Therefore, the first 
criterion was successfully supported. Then, the KMO and BTS were conducted (see Table 
7.11 for the results). Although the value of KMO was not at the desired level (but acceptable), 
the PCA was carried out for 2003/04 as the result of BTS was found to be significant (p < 
0.005). 
7.3.2.1 Extracting components 
According to the Eigenvalue rule, Catell’s scree test, and cumulative variance, two 
components were extracted (see Table 7.13 and Figure 7.2). 
7.3.2.2 Rotating the components 
Using the varimax rotation technique, Table 7.12 shows that six variables loaded on the first 
component, whilst the second component consisted of four variables. There were no 
variables loaded on both components at the 0.5-level. Therefore, the next step was to 
interpret this table to create two new components. 
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Table 7.9: KMO and Bartlett's test (1), 2003/04 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .688 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 806350.207 
df 78 
Sig. .000 
Table 7.10: Component matrix (1), 2003/04 
 
Component 
1 2 
Households without a car .970  
Lone parent households .906  
Owner households -.893  
Renting from a local authority .876  
Population density .772 .579 
People aged between 16 and 24 .730  
Single adult non-pensioner households .712 .659 
Mean number of people per room .525  
Renting privately  .869 
Professional head of households  .818 
Movers  .810 
Renting from a housing association  .709 
Ethnic diversity .616 .668 
Table 7.11: KMO and Bartlett's test (2), 2003/04 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .518 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 498865.105 
df 45 
Sig. .000 
Table 7.12: Component matrix (2), 2003/04 
 
Component 
1 2 
Households without a car .975  
Lone parent households .907  
Owner households -.896  
Renting from a local authority .869  
People aged between 16 and 24 .746  
Mean number of people per room .528  
Renting privately  .874 
Movers  .851 
Professional head of households  .789 
Renting from a housing association  .717 
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Table 7.13: Eigenvalues and total variance explained, 2003/04 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Loadings Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.471 44.709 44.709 4.471 44.709 44.709 4.343 43.430 43.430 
2 2.848 28.483 73.192 2.848 28.483 73.192 2.976 29.762 73.192 
3 0.838 8.378 81.570           
4 0.686 6.860 88.430           
5 0.503 5.032 93.461           
6 0.362 3.618 97.079           
7 0.183 1.830 98.909           
8 0.074 0.740 99.650           
9 0.032 0.321 99.971           
10 0.003 0.029 100.000           
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Figure 7.2: Scree plot showing the number of components extracted, 2003/04 
 
 
7.3.2.3 Interpretation of the components 
In 2003/04, the first two components accounted for 73% of the total variance (see Table 
7.13). The variables that constituted the first component were:  
1. percentage of households without a car 
2. percentage of lone parent households 
3. percentage of owner-occupied households (negative loading) 
4. percentage of households renting from a local authority 
5. percentage of population aged between 16 and 24 
6. mean number of people per room. 
It was felt that these six variables could be conceptualised as poverty (see also Tseloni, 2006). 
The variables that constituted the second component were: 
1. percentage of households renting privately 
2. percentage of people who moved in the previous year (movers) 
3. percentage of households with a professional head 
4. percentage of households residing in a housing association accommodation. 
Although renting from a housing association is an indicator of poverty, living in those kinds 
of households can be interpreted as a lack of informal social control in a community and 
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neighbourhood stability. Therefore, this component was labelled lack of community stability. 
However, the lack of community stability variable in 1997 slightly differed from the one in 
2003/04 because the former did not include ‘percentage of households renting from a 
housing association’ variable. After extracting the components, component scores were 
calculated via SPSS.  
Finally, multicollinearity among the extracted two components and the variables that had 
been excluded from the PCA previously was checked for further analysis. If there was no 
multicollinearity among those variables (population density, proportion of single-adult non-
pensioner households, and ethnic diversity), they would enter the models. 
Table 7.14: Multicollinearity test among extracted components and variables excluded from 
PCA, 2003/04 
Collinearity Statistics 
 Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Poverty .156 6.409 .196 5.097 .460 2.172 
Lack of community stability .222 4.515 .229 4.358 .441 2.269 
Ethnic diversity .150 6.674 .211 4.733 .291 3.442 
Single-adult non-pensioner 
households 
.075 13.268 .086 11.568 - - 
Population density .069 14.592 - - - - 
a. Dependent Variable: Burglary 
 
Table 7.15: Correlation matrix, 2003/04 
   1 2 3 4 5 
1 Poverty 1 - - - - 
2 Lack of community stability .000 1 - - - 
3 Ethnic diversity .584 .607 1 - - 
4 Single-adult non-pensioner households .698 .628 .886 1 - 
5 Population density .751 .539 .905 .939 1 
However, Table 7.14 showed that there was multicollinearity between the extracted 
components and the variables that had been excluded previously as the VIF for the 
percentage of single-adult non-pensioner households and population density exceeded ten 
(see also Table 7.15). When population density was removed, the VIF for single-adult non-
pensioner households still exceeded 10. Therefore, both were removed from the analysis. 
When they were removed, the VIF for poverty, lack of community stability and singe-adult 
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non-pensioner households was found to be less than 4, which indicated an absence of 
multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). 
7.3.3 Summary of principal component analysis 
The PCA was carried out for 1997 and 2003/04 separately to eliminate the multicollinearity 
problem among continuous structural control variables at the PFA level before they entered 
the statistical models. The PCA extracted two components for each year. They were ‘urban 
diversity and deprivation’ and ‘lack of community stability’ for 1997; and ‘poverty’ and 
‘lack of community stability’ for 2003/04. Although the same variables at the PFA level (13 
variables for each year) were selected to ensure comparability between 1997 and 2003/04, 
the PCA ended up with two components for each year. However, the ‘lack of community 
stability’ component extracted in 1997 was slightly different from the one extracted in 
2003/04. The PCA results were feed into the model as PFA-level variables (see tables 7.17-
7.18). 
7.4 Modelling strategy 
The analysis was conducted stepwise, at each step, a model was estimated (see tables 7.17 - 
7.19). Step 1 started with the base model (Model 1), which included only the constant. In 
Step 2, the characteristics of households were added to Model 1 to estimate Model 2. In Step 
3, the characteristics of PFAs and the independent variable (the level of commitment of 
police forces to POP) were added to Model 2 to estimate Model 3, which was the saturated 
model. In Step 4, to estimate Model 4 (Reduced Model) if at least one dummy variable of 
the categorical variables of Model 3 were statistically significant (p-value < 0.1), all dummy 
variables for those categorical variables were retained, otherwise excluded from the analysis. 
Similarly, continuous variables with a p-value greater than 0.10 were excluded from the 
analysis. Step 5 analysed whether there were interactions between the independent variable 
and the variables of Model 4, which had a statistically significant effect on the mean number 
of burglaries at the time of inclusion (p-value < 0.1, chi-squared distributed with 1 degree of 
freedom). The chapter also calculated the expected mean number of burglary victimisations 
for the reference household (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9.3.4.4) and intra-class correlations 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.9.3.4.5). 
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7.4.1 The effect of POP on burglary rates in 1997 
7.4.1.1 Base model (Model 1), 1997 
The analysis started with Model 1 (Base Model), which did not include any explanatory 
variables. The mean number of burglaries that the reference households experienced was 
0.033 (only the intercept was used). The level-2 variance was 0.17 (Standard Error (SE) = 
0.06). A Wald test, as a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, gave a value of 7.645, 
with a two-tailed p-value of 0.006. This two-tailed value was halved since the random 
parameters can only take positive values (Tseloni and Pease, 2015). Therefore, when it was 
halved, we had a one-tailed p-value of 0.003 (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999: 90-91; Tarling, 
2009: 31-32). The ICC was 0.83. That meant there were significant differences between 
PFAs, and therefore multilevel modelling was needed (Tarling, 2009).  
7.4.1.2 Adding household characteristics (Model 2), 1997 
All household characteristics (structural control variables at the household level, n = 31) 
were added to Model 1. Model 2 better fitted the data compared to Model 1 (p-value < 0.001). 
The expected mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.034. 
The level-2 variance was 0.08 (SE = 0.05; Wald test = 2.771 with a one-tailed p-value of 
0.005). The ICC was 0.62. These results indicated that level-2 explanatory variables could 
enter Model 2 (Tarling, 2009).  
7.4.1.3 Adding PFA characteristics (Model 3), 1997 
All characteristics of PFAs (structural control variables at the PFA level, n = 3), ‘the number 
of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA’ and ‘the level of commitment to POP’ 
variables were added to Model 2. Model 3 better fitted the data than Model 2 (p-value < 
0.01). The mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.030. 
The level-2 variance was 0.00 (SE = 0.00; Wald test = 0.000 with a one-tailed p-value of 
0.5). The ICC was 0.00. Since the variance at level-2 was not statistically significant, the 
researcher did not add any further variables to Model 3. 
In this step, bivariate correlations between the level of commitment of police forces to POP 
and the mean number of burglaries were also assessed (see Table 7.18, POP Only Model). 
Police forces with a commitment to POP at any level experienced a higher number of 
burglaries when compared to police forces that were not committed to POP at all in 1997. 
However, this relationship was only statistically significant for police forces with a 
commitment to POP at the medium level. They experienced higher burglaries (by 75%) 
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when compared to police forces that were not committed to POP at all (see Table 7.18, POP 
Only Model). 
7.4.1.4 Dropping insignificant variables (Model 4), 1997 
Model 4 was the Reduced Model. The household-level variables that were excluded from 
Model 3 due to having a p-value greater than 0.10 were:  
1. lone parent households 
2. number of children 
3. household annual income 
4. type of accommodation 
5. house empty during the day 
6. area type. 
The PFA-level variables that were excluded from Model 3 due to having a p-value greater 
than 0.10 were: 
1. urban diversity  
2. number of police officers per 1000 residents. 
Model 4 did not better fit the data than Model 3 (p-value > 0.1). The mean number of 
burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.025. The ICC was 0.11 but the 
level-2 variance (0.004; SE = 0.002; Wald test = 0.031 with a one-tailed p-value of 0.4) was 
not statistically significant. Therefore, the researcher did not add any further variables to 
Model 4. 
7.4.1.5 Adding cross-level interactions, 1997 
This step (using Model 4) tested whether there were significant interactions between the 
independent variable (the level of commitment of police forces to POP) and the remaining 
variables that had statistically significant effects on the mean number of burglaries. None of 
the interactions was significant.  
7.4.2 The effect of POP on burglary rates in 2003/04 
7.4.2.1 Base model (Model 1), 2003/04 
The mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.018. The 
level-2 variance was 0.16 (SE = 0.05; Wald test = 10.587 with a one-tailed p-value of 0.000). 
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The ICC was 0.90. This means there were significant differences between PFAs, and 
therefore multilevel modelling was needed (Tarling, 2009).  
7.4.2.2 Adding household characteristics (Model 2), 2003/04 
All household characteristics (structural control variables at level-1, n = 32) entered Model 
1. Model 2 better fitted the data than Model 1 (p-value < 0.001). The mean number of 
burglaries the reference household experienced was 0.006. The level-2 variance was 0.11 
(SE = 0.04; Wald test = 5.750 with a one-tailed p-value of 0.008). The ICC was 0.94. This 
result indicated that level-2 explanatory variables could enter Model 2 (Tarling, 2009: 121). 
7.4.2.3 Adding PFA characteristics (Model 3), 2003/04 
All characteristics of PFAs (structural control variables at level-2, n = 3), ‘the number of 
police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA’ and ‘the level of commitment to POP’ variables 
were added to Model 2. Model 3 better fitted the data than Model 2 (p-value < 0.001). The 
mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.008. The ICC 
was 0.72 but the level-2 variance (0.02; SE = 0.02; Wald test = 1.0797 with a one-tailed p-
value of 0.15) was not statistically significant. Therefore, the researcher did not add any 
more variables.  
In this step, bivariate correlations between the level of commitment of police forces to POP 
and the mean number of burglaries were also assessed. The results suggested that there were 
no statistically significant differences between the levels of commitment to POP in terms of 
affecting the mean number of burglaries in 2003/04.  
7.4.2.4 Dropping insignificant variables (Model 4), 2003/04 
Model 4 was the Reduced Model. The household-level variables that were excluded from 
Model 3 due to having a p-value greater than 0.10 were:  
1. ethnicity 
2. lone parent households 
3. type of accommodation 
4. house empty during the day 
5. length of residence at an address 
6. type of area. 
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The PFA-level variables that were excluded from Model 3 due to having a p-value greater 
than 0.10 were: 
1. ethnic diversity 
2. lack of community stability 
3. level of the commitment of police forces to POP. 
Model 4 better fitted the data than Model 3 (p-value of 0.001). The mean number of 
burglaries that the reference household experienced was 0.005. The ICC was 0.93. The level-
2 variance was 0.08 (SE = 0.04; Wald test = 4.171 with a one-tailed p-value of 0.02). 
Therefore, the researcher added interactions to the Reduced Model. 
7.4.2.5 Adding cross-level interactions, 2003/04 
This step (using Model 4) tested whether there were significant interactions between the 
‘number of police officers per 1000 residents’ variable and the remaining variables that had 
statistically significant effects on the mean number of burglaries. None of the interactions 
was significant. 
7.4.3 Summary of multilevel negative binomial regression 
Four models in total were estimated to assess the effect of POP on the mean number of 
burglary victimisations in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. In each step, the mean number of 
burglaries that the reference household experienced and the ICC were calculated (see Table 
7.16). Furthermore, the model fits were assessed. In both years, subsequent models always 
better fitted the data than previous models, except for Model 4 in 1997 (see Table 7.17). 
Table 7.16: Mean number of burglaries that the reference household experienced and ICC 
values, 1997 and 2003/04 
Years Models 1 2 3 4 
1997 
Mean number of burglaries 0.033 0.034 0.030 0.025 
ICC 0.83 0.62 0.00 0.11 
2003/04 
Mean number of burglaries 0.018 0.006 0.008 0.005 
ICC 0.90 0.94 0.72 0.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 227 
 
Table 7.17: Model fit tests, 1997 and 2003/04 
1997 
 
Model/Differences 
 
 
Joint Chi-Square Values/Differences 
 
Degrees of  
freedom 
(df)/Differences 
1 1697.066 *** 1 
2 127.875 *** 31 
1-2 1569.191*** 30 
3 150.841 *** 38 
2-3 22.966 *** 7 
4 136.574 *** 23 
3-4 14.267 (Not significant) 15 
 
Table 7.17: Model fit tests, 1997 and 2003/04 (continued) 
2003/04 
 
Model/Differences 
 
 
Joint Chi-Square Values/Differences 
 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(df)/Differences 
1 2990.745 *** 1 
2 207.155 *** 32 
1-2 2783.590*** 31 
3 253.889 *** 39 
2-3 46.734*** 7 
4 289.8762 *** 19 
3-4 45.8053*** 20 
 
7.4.4 Results 
7.4.4.1 Did POP have a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations between 1995 and 2003/04? 
This chapter thoroughly examined whether the implementation of POP had a statistically 
significant effect on the mean number of burglary victimisations whilst controlling for 
characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 1000 residents 
in a PFA in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Tables 7.18 and 7.19 presented the findings for 
1997 and 2003/04, respectively. To ease the interpretation of the results, the exponentials of 
the estimated coefficients (exp(b)) were provided in the tables together with an indication of 
their respective statistical significance, which was calculated via Wald tests (Tseloni and 
Pease, 2015). 
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Table 7.18: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 1997 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
Constant 0.03*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 
Household Characteristics 
HOH Age -  0.95** 0.94** 0.95** 
HOH Age^2  - 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
Ethnicity (White)         
Black  - 0.81 0.78 0.87 
Asian  - 1.88** 1.84* 1.98** 
Other  - 1.46 1.53 1.68 
Number of Adults (2 Adults)         
One Adult  - 1.42** 1.46** 1.51** 
Three or more Adults  - 0.74 0.74 0.77 
Number of Children (No Children)         
One or more Children  - 0.96 0.97 - 
Lone-parent Households  - 1.02 1.00 - 
Tenure (Owner)         
Social Rented  - 1.50** 1.52** 1.59*** 
Private Rented  - 2.08*** 2.09*** 2.17*** 
Household Income (£10,000-£29,000)         
Under £5,000  - 1.11 1.07 - 
£5,000-£9,999  - 0.89 0.87 - 
Over £30,000  - 0.83 0.83 - 
No Response  - 0.94 0.93 - 
HRP Social Class (Professional)         
Intermediate Occupations  - 0.76* 0.78* 0.80 
Routine Occupations  - 1.02 1.04 1.06 
Never Worked/Not Classified  - 0.99 0.96 1.00 
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Table 7.18: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 1997 (continued) 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
Household Characteristics 
Number of Cars (2 Cars)     
No Car  - 0.69* 0.68* 0.74 
One Car  - 0.64** 0.63** 0.67** 
Three or more Cars  - 0.83 0.85 0.82 
Type of Accommodation (Detached)         
Semi-detached  - 0.80 0.79 - 
Terraced  - 0.94 0.91 - 
Flat/Maisonette/Other  - 0.93 0.90 - 
House Empty during Day (More than 7 Hours)        
Less than 3 Hours  - 0.97 0.95 - 
3-7 Hours  - 0.94 0.94 - 
Length of Residence (More than 10 Years)         
Less than 2 Years  - 1.08 1.07 1.06 
2-5 Years  - 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
5-10 Years  - 0.98 0.97 0.96 
Type of Area (Rural)         
Inner City  - 1.49* 1.37 - 
Urban  - 1.23 1.20 - 
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Table 7.18: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 1997 (continued) 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
PFA Characteristics 
Renting from a Local Authority - - 0.73** 0.89 
Lack of Community Stability (from PCA) - - 0.81** 0.87 
Urban Diversity and Deprivation (from PCA) - - 1.28 - 
Number of Police Officers per 1000 Residents - - 0.97 - 
Level of Commitment to POP (No-commitment)        
High commitment to POP 1.34 - 1.06 1.20 
Mid commitment to POP 1.75*** - 1.59** 1.74 
Low commitment to POP 1.21 - 0.99 1.20 
Random Parameters 
𝑣 (standard error) 18.56 (0.55) 12.61 (0.48) 12.02 (0.47) 12.71 (0.49) 
𝜎𝑢0
2  (standard error) 0.03 (0.03) 0.08 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00) 0.004 (0.002) 
Additional estimates for representative sample household 
Mean burglary victimisations - 0.034 0.030 0.025 
Intra-class correlation, ICC - 0.62 0.00 0.11 
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Table 7.19: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 2003/04 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
Household Characteristics 
HOH Age - 0.95** 0.96** 0.95*** 
HOH Age^2 - 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 
Ethnicity (White)        
Black - 0.64 0.62 - 
Asian - 0.82 0.74 - 
Other - 1.07 0.97 - 
Number of Adults (2 Adults)        
One Adult - 1.63*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 
Three or more Adults - 1.35* 1.35** 1.30* 
Number of Children (No Children)        
One or more Children - 1.40** 1.40** 1.34** 
Lone-parent Households - 1.02 1.01 - 
Tenure (Owner)        
Social Rented - 1.36** 1.36** 1.39** 
Private Rented - 1.61*** 1.62*** 1.70*** 
Household Income (£10,000-£29,000)        
Under £5,000 - 1.60** 1.64** 1.56** 
£5,000-£9,999 - 1.38* 1.42** 1.35* 
Over £30,000 - 1.58*** 1.59*** 1.66*** 
No Response - 1.17 1.18 1.17 
HRP Social Class (Professional)        
Intermediate Occupations - 1.27* 1.28* 1.26* 
Routine Occupations - 1.13 1.12 1.08 
Never Worked/Not Classified - 1.32 1.34 1.29 
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Table 7.19: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 2003/04 (continued) 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
Household Characteristics 
Number of Cars (2 Cars)         
No Car - 1.66** 1.67*** 1.59** 
One Car - 1.28* 1.30* 1.25 
Three or more Cars - 1.10 1.09 1.10 
Type of Accommodation (Detached)     
Semi-detached - 0.88 0.88 - 
Terraced - 0.81 0.81 - 
Flat/Maisonette/Other - 0.84 0.83 - 
Not Coded  - 1.03 1.08 - 
House Empty during Day (More than 7 Hours)       
Less than 3 Hours - 0.81 0.82 - 
3-7 Hours - 0.87 0.89 - 
Length of Residence (More than 10 Years)       
Less than 2 Years - 1.20 1.22 - 
2-5 Years - 1.15 1.18 - 
5-10 Years - 0.87 0.87 - 
Type of Area (Rural)       
Inner City - 1.42* 1.29 - 
Urban - 1.00 0.97 - 
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Table 7.19: Estimated fixed effects of household and area characteristics for the prediction of the number of burglaries, 2003/04 (continued) 
Model POP only 2 3 4 
 Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
PFA Characteristics 
Ethnic Diversity -  - 1.18 - 
Lack of Community Stability (from PCA) -  - 0.93 - 
Poverty (from PCA) -  - 1.33* 1.26 
Number of Police Officers per 1000 Residents -  - 0.69** 0.92 
Level of Commitment to POP (No-commitment)         
High commitment to POP 1.22 - 0.95 - 
Mid commitment to POP 0.75 - 0.60 - 
Low commitment to POP 0.71 - 0.61 - 
Random Parameters 
𝑣 (standard error) 27.13 (0.58) 20.10 (0.54) 16.66 (0.49) 18.67 (0.51) 
𝜎𝑢0
2  (standard error) 0.06 (0.03) 0.11 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02) 0.08 (0.04) 
Additional estimates for representative sample household 
Mean burglary victimisations - 0.006 0.008 0.005 
Intra-class correlation, ICC - 0.94 0.72 0.93 
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Examination of the bivariate correlation between the independent variable (the level of 
commitment of police forces to POP) and the mean number of burglary victimisations in 
1997 suggested that police forces with a commitment to POP at any level experienced a 
greater number of burglaries when compared to police forces that were not committed to 
POP at all. However, this relationship was statistically significant for only police forces with 
a medium commitment to POP. They experienced more burglaries (by 75%) when compared 
to police forces that were not committed to POP at all (see Table 7.18, POP Only Model). 
This relationship remained when characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of 
police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA were controlled (see Table 7.18, Model 3).  
In 2003/04, the results suggested that police forces with a high commitment to POP 
experienced higher burglaries when compared to police forces that were not committed to 
POP at all. However, this relationship was not statistically significant (see Table 7.19, POP 
Only Model). Contrary to 1997, police forces with a commitment to POP at the medium and 
low-level had fewer burglaries when compared to police forces that were not committed to 
POP at all in 2003/04. However, these relationships did not reach significance (see Table 
7.19, POP Only Model). When the characteristics of households and PFAs and the number 
of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA were controlled, police forces with a 
commitment to POP at any-level experienced fewer burglaries when compared to police 
forces that were not committed to POP at all. However, these relationships were not 
statistically significant (see Table 7.19, Model 3). 
The chapter also examined bivariate correlations between POP (as a dichotomous variable: 
No-POP and POP forces) and the mean number of burglary victimisations (as a continuous 
variable) using Pearson (point-biserial) correlation from 1995 to 2003/04. The results 
suggested that there was a statistically significant correlation between POP and the mean 
number of burglary victimisations in 1997 only. In particular, police forces that applied POP 
experienced more burglaries in 1997. In the remainder of the years, there was no statistically 
significant correlation between POP and the mean number of burglaries. However, it should 
be noted that although there was no statistically significant relationship between POP and 
mean number of burglaries, police forces that applied POP had fewer burglaries in 2003/04 
(see Table 7.20). 
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Table 7.20: Pearson (point-biserial) correlations between POP and the mean number of 
burglaries 
Year Correlation Coefficient Sig. 
1995 0.029 0.857 
1997 0.353 0.032 
1999 0.206 0.191 
2001/02 0.013 0.934 
2002/03 0.095 0.551 
2003/04 -0.079 0.617 
 
The chapter also controlled the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA whilst 
examining the effect of POP on burglaries. In both years, police forces with a greater number 
of police officers per 1000 residents experienced fewer burglaries. However, this 
relationship was statistically significant in 2003/04 only (see Tables 7.18 and 7.19, Model 
3). This finding is in line with previous research (Marvell and Moody, 1996; Sherman et al., 
1998; Levitt, 2004).  
7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter reported the findings of an original analysis that tested whether POP had a 
statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary victimisations between 1995 
and 2003/04. Firstly, the chapter conducted a PCA. Following that, the chapter applied 
multilevel negative binomial regression modelling to analyse the effect of POP on burglary 
victimisations whilst controlling for the characteristics of households and PFAs and the 
number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. The 
chapter then tested bivariate correlations between POP (as a dichotomous variable) and the 
mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04. 
In 1997, the POP Only Model suggested police forces that were committed to POP at any 
level experienced a greater number of burglaries when compared to police forces that were 
not committed to POP at all in 1997. However, this relationship was only statistically 
significant for police forces that were committed to POP at the medium level. This 
relationship remained when the characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of 
police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA were controlled.  
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In 2003/04, according to POP Only Model police forces with a high commitment to POP 
also experienced a greater number of burglaries when compared to police forces with no 
commitment to POP. Contrary to 1997, police forces with a medium- or low commitment to 
POP had fewer burglaries compared to the base category. However, these relationships were 
not statistically significant. When the characteristics of households and PFAs and the number 
of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA were controlled, police forces that were 
committed to POP at any level had fewer burglaries compared to police forces with no 
commitment to POP. However, these relationships did not reach significance. 
Results of the analysis examining the bivariate correlations between POP and the mean 
number of burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04 suggested that police forces that implemented 
POP experienced a greater number of burglaries between 1995 and 2002/03. However, this 
relationship was statistically significant in 1997 only. In 2003/04, police forces that applied 
POP had fewer burglaries. However, this relationship was not statistically significant.  
Finally, it was found that police forces with a greater number of police officers per 1000 
residents experienced fewer burglaries in both 1997 and 2003/04. However, this relationship 
was statistically significant in 2003/04 only. These findings, along with the findings 
presented in chapters 5 and 6, are discussed in the final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter first returns to the overarching aim of the study. Secondly, it summarises the 
main findings of Chapters 5-7. Thirdly, it acknowledges the limitations of the study and 
discusses their possible effects on the results. Fourthly, the chapter presents a number of 
implications (theory, policy and methodology) that might be used by the police and other 
crime reduction agencies. Fifthly, the chapter highlights the original contributions to 
knowledge that this thesis has made. Sixthly, suggestions are made for future research in 
order to advance our understanding regarding the role of problem-oriented policing (POP) 
in the crime drop in England and Wales. The chapter finishes with a number of concluding 
remarks.  
8.2 Overarching aim 
Police forces in England and Wales have been implementing POP since the 1980s (Leigh et 
al., 1996; 1998; Tilley and Scott, 2012; South Yorkshire Police, 2018). Significantly, its 
application has been encouraged by the UK government either implicitly or explicitly 
through funding large-scale crime reduction programmes that applied a problem-oriented 
approach (e.g. the Safer Cities Programme and the Crime Reduction Programme; see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for details). Moreover, police forces submitted 771 problem-oriented 
projects to the Goldstein and Tilley Award schemes between 1997 and 2008 (see Chapter 5, 
Table 5.1).  
On a different note, burglary rates have dropped substantially in England and Wales since 
1993. The estimated number of Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) burglaries 
peaked in 1993 (2,445,000) and fell sharply over time until 2005 (1,057,000). The trend in 
burglaries remained relatively flat between 2005 and 2011. However, they fell to a record 
low (650,000) between 2011 and 2017 (ONS, 2017).  
Scholars have proposed various hypotheses to explain the crime drop and these were 
critically reviewed under six headings in Chapter 3: (1) economic, (2) offender-based, (3) 
substance abuse, (4) security and opportunity-related, (5) criminal justice system, and (6) 
policing-related. However, the majority of such are far from providing reasonable answers 
to the question of why crime has fallen so substantially in England and Wales since the 1990s 
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(Farrell et al., 2014). More importantly, none of the previous studies has tested whether POP 
has played a role in the crime drop in England and Wales, and indeed across the world 
(Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018). The overarching aim of this present study was, therefore, 
to explore the role of POP in the burglary drop at the PFA level in England and Wales 
between 1988 and 2007/0854 thoroughly in a time of renewed interest in POP (Laycock and 
Tilley, 2018; South Yorkshire Police, 2018).  
The researcher selected ‘triangulation’ (Denzin, 1989) as the overarching strategy to achieve 
the overarching aim of the thesis. That is, various theories (theory triangulation), data 
sources (data triangulation), and data-analysis strategies (data-analysis triangulation) were 
used to fulfil the aforementioned overarching aim. The theoretical framework of the thesis 
consisted opportunity-related theories (routine activity theory, rational choice theory and 
situational crime prevention), social disorganisation theory and the “New Public 
Management” (NPM) concept. The reasons for selecting these theories are briefly explained 
in the paragraph after next. 
The core argument that the researcher made throughout was that merely analysing the role 
of POP in the burglary drop within police forces that claim to be using it is poor analysis. 
This is because police culture is resistant to change (Goldstein, 1990), and when they 
practice an innovative strategy they tend to do it superficially (Weisburd et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the researcher identified the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 
and 2003/04 (separately) and other policing strategies used prior to 2001 to accurately 
determine whether POP affected burglaries using two indicators of commitment to POP 
(problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley awards and large-
scale crime reduction programmes that applied a problem-oriented approach) and the related 
literature (data triangulation). 
The reason for selecting opportunity-related theories was twofold. Firstly, opportunity-
related theories are used to design effective POP interventions (Braga, 2008). In other words, 
these theories and POP have affinities. Secondly, there are a number of factors affecting 
victimisation: (1) demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals and their 
households; (2) individuals’ routine activities; (3) characteristics of areas; and (4) possible 
interactions of these factors. In other words, both individual and area characteristics are 
 
54 The reasons for choosing burglary and certain time periods (1988-2007/08 in Chapter 6; 1995-2003/04 in 
Chapter 7) to be analysed and the units of analysis can be found in Chapter 4, sections 4.8.1, 4.9.2 and 4.9.3, 
respectively. 
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important predictors of crime (Tseloni et al., 2002). Therefore, this thesis conducted 
multilevel negative binomial regression modelling to model burglaries (using the 1998 and 
2003/04 CSEW sweeps) over household (using the 1998 and 2003/04 CSEW sweeps) and 
police force area characteristics (using the 1991 and 2001 UK Censuses), which affect 
burglary rates according to routine activity and social disorganisation theories, respectively, 
the number of police officers per 1000 residents, and the level of commitment of police 
forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, separately (theory and data triangulation). 
Finally, the NPM concept is used to understand the factors that affected the advent of POP 
on the policing agenda in the UK as the NPM promotes an innovative problem-solving 
management model like POP to effect organisational change in policing (Ashby et al., 2007). 
A number of reforms in policing, which reflect the NPM concept, have influenced the police 
service in the UK since the 1990s (e.g. Sheehy Inquiry). The relationship between POP and 
the NPM, and the relationship between the NPM and routine activity theory and social 
disorganisation theory were discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.5). In brief, it 
can be argued that these reforms have changed the way in which the police respond to crime 
and collaborate with other government agencies and the community in England and Wales. 
Overall, drawing upon a rich array of data sources, theories, and data-analysis strategies, this 
study thoroughly examined whether POP had a role in the burglary drop in England and 
Wales between 1988 and 2007/08 and the results were summarised in the following section. 
8.3 Summary of findings 
With the above argument in mind, the overarching empirical research question of the study 
was: 
Was there a relationship between the implementation of POP and the fall in both 
Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and police recorded burglaries in 
England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08? 
The empirical component of the study was divided into three phases to address the 
overarching empirical research question (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9 for details). For the first 
time, the first phase (Chapter 5) identified highly POP-committed police forces in England 
and Wales using two indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher:  
1. problem-oriented projects that were submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein Award 
schemes by police forces in England and Wales between 1997 and 2008 
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2. problem-oriented projects that were applied by police forces in England and Wales as 
part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction programmes which applied a 
problem-oriented approach (e.g. the Safer Cities Programme, the Reducing Burglary 
Initiative (RBI) and the Targeted Policing Initiative (TPI)). 
Chapter 5 also reviewed the related literature to supplement and triangulate the findings from 
the analysis of the two indicators. Following that, Chapter 5 revised the results of previous 
research on policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales. Finally, drawing upon 
the findings from the analysis of the two indicators of commitment and the related literature, 
Chapter 5 categorised all 42 police forces into four groups in terms of level of commitment 
POP (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6 and Appendix 5.4). 
Following that, the second phase (Chapter 6) compared trends in both CSEW and PRCD 
burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs with the trends in their most similar PFAs, which 
were not committed to POP to the same extent. This phase was an initial exploration of the 
extent to which POP did or did not play a role in the burglary drop in England and Wales 
before conducting a comprehensive statistical analysis in Chapter 7. 
The third phase (Chapter 7) investigated whether POP (as a nominal variable with four 
categories) had a statistically significant independent effect on burglary victimisations whilst 
controlling for the characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers 
per 1000 residents in a PFA in 1997 and 2003/04, separately. Chapter 7 also tested bivariate 
correlations between POP (as a dichotomous variable) and the mean number of burglaries 
from 1995 to 2003/04. Theories that underpinned both POP and the study included 
opportunity-related theories (rational choice and routine activity theories, situational crime 
prevention), social disorganisation theory and the new public management concept (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for details). 
Overall, each phase answered different sub-questions using various methods to address the 
overarching empirical research question. Sections 8.3.1-8.3.3 summarise the main findings 
from each phase, respectively. 
8.3.1 Phase one 
Which police forces in England and Wales were highly committed to POP? 
According to the analysis of the first indicator, the highly POP-committed police forces were 
Lancashire, the Metropolitan, Cleveland, Merseyside, Cumbria, and Avon and Somerset. 
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Notably, Lancashire has been the most committed police force to POP in England and Wales 
over the last two decades. This finding is in line with previous research (Scott, 2000; Bullock 
et al., 2006). Specifically, Bullock et al. (2006) examined the development of POP in 
Lancashire and noted that Lancashire “can be considered to be amongst the UK’s very best 
in terms of vigour and resources that have gone into it [POP]” (Bullock et al., 2006: 12).  
The results of the analysis of the second indicator were as follows. Review of the Safer Cities 
Programme revealed that the Metropolitan, the West Midlands, Greater Manchester, West 
Yorkshire, Avon and Somerset, Merseyside, Cleveland, Northumbria, Nottinghamshire, 
Humberside, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Devon and Cornwall, South Wales and Lancashire 
received funding for anti-burglary Safer Cities projects. The review of the TPI projects 
showed that although the main aim of this initiative was not specifically to target burglaries, 
Greater Manchester, Kent, Avon and Somerset, Derbyshire and West Yorkshire received 
funding for anti-burglary TPI projects in different years ranging from 1999 to 2002. Finally, 
the review of the RBI projects identified that the West Midlands, the Metropolitan, West 
Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Greater Manchester had been granted the majority of projects 
between 1999 and 2002. That is, these police forces were more committed to POP when 
compared to the most similar police forces to them, which did not receive funding for 
projects that were applied as part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction 
programmes. 
The analysis of the two indicators of commitment to POP was also complemented and 
triangulated through reviewing the related literature. The findings of the review supported 
the above results; that is, the majority of the police forces in England and Wales have, in 
fact, applied some form of POP since the 1980s (see Leigh et al., 1996; Gresty et al., 1997; 
Leigh et al., 1998; Scott, 2000; Lancashire Police, 2001a; Bullock et al., 2006; Tilley and 
Scott, 2012, see Chapter 5, Table 5.10). Overall, it was concluded that the above police 
forces have been consistently committed to POP in general and anti-burglary problem-
oriented projects in particular since the 1980s.  
What were the policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales? 
Phase one also revised the findings from limited previous studies on policing strategies of 
police forces (Hale et al., 2004; 2005; Heaton, 2009a; 2009b), which reviewed and 
interpreted 366 HMIC inspection reports published between 1990 and August 2000.  Phase 
one argued that although previous research categorised policing styles into four groups 
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(intelligence-led policing, POP, partnership policing and geographic policing), geographic 
and partnership policing strategies do not actually represent a different policing style to POP. 
Previous research also misidentified the policing styles of some of the police forces, did not 
mention when police forces introduced policing methods, and exaggerated the application 
of intelligence-led policing whilst trivialising the implementation of POP by police forces in 
England and Wales. Most importantly, previous research did not identify the level of 
commitment of police forces to policing styles. The researcher argued that the majority of 
police forces had actually applied POP to some extent while some implemented intelligence-
led policing (see Chapter 5, Table 5.12). This argument is in line with previous research 
(Read and Tilley, 2000) which concluded that nearly all police forces had ultimately 
purported to endorse POP by 2000. 
What was the level of commitment of police forces in England and Wales to POP in 
1997 and 2003/04? 
To date, there has been no research examining the level of commitment of all 42 police 
forces in England and Wales to POP individually. Phase one filled this substantial gap in 
knowledge and categorised police forces into four groups in terms of level of commitment 
to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, separately (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6 and Appendix 5.4). 
Overall, the analysis suggested that police forces in England and Wales were more 
committed to POP in 2003/04 than in 1997 (see Appendix 5.4). This result is a reflection of 
the number of projects submitted to the Tilley and Goldstein award schemes and problem-
oriented projects that were applied by police forces as part of large-scale government-
supported crime reduction programmes over time (see Chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.3), and 
indeed previous research concerning the process evaluation of POP within some police 
forces in England and Wales (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4). However, it should be noted that 
although the level of commitment to POP (as measured in this study) increased from 1997 
to 2003/04, this does not necessarily mean that police forces applied POP as Goldstein (1979, 
1990) originally envisaged.  
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8.3.2 Phase two 
Was the drop in both CSEW and police recorded burglaries between 1988 and 2007/08 
much greater in highly POP-committed PFAs compared to their most similar PFAs, 
which were not committed to POP to the same extent? 
Having identified highly POP-committed police forces according to the two indicators of 
commitment to POP and the related literature in Phase one, the initial analysis to explore the 
role of POP in the burglary drop in England and Wales in Phase two was conducted in eight 
steps: 
1. comparing trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs 
(according to the first indicator of commitment), with trends in their most similar PFAs, 
which were not committed to POP to the same extent (particularly Lancashire versus the 
most similar police forces to it) 
2. analysing the effects of some of the individual problem-oriented projects, which were 
submitted to the award schemes by police forces in England and Wales, on CSEW and 
PRCD burglaries 
3. exploring whether the decreases in burglaries in England and Wales in 1999, 2004 and 
2008 were greater when compared to other years 
4. comparing trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs, which received a greater 
amount of funding for Safer Cities projects when compared to their most similar PFAs, 
with trends in their most similar PFAs  
5. comparing trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs that received a greater amount 
of funding for the TPI projects when compared to their most similar PFAs, with trends 
in their most similar PFAs 
6. comparing trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs, which received a greater 
amount of funding for the RBI projects when compared to their most similar PFAs, with 
trends in their most similar PFAs  
7. comparing trends in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs that were prominently 
associated with POP in the related literature with trends in their most similar PFAs 
8. comparing trends in the percentage of repeat burglary victimisations in PFAs that were 
early implementers of POP with trends in their most similar PFAs. 
Phase two used both the CSEW and PRCD. The results were mixed depending on the data 
source used and the period examined. It should be stressed that most similar police force 
 244 
 
groups were used to make more meaningful comparisons between police forces (see Chapter 
4, Section 4.9.2). In addition, the introduction year of POP within a PFA was taken into 
account whilst undertaking the analysis. Here, the main results are summarised.  
Step 1 mainly focused on Lancashire since it was the most committed police force to POP 
in England and Wales according to Phase one and previous research (Bullock et al., 2006). 
It was hypothesised that there would be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Lancashire when 
compared to the most similar PFAs to it which were not committed to POP to the same extent 
(Hypothesis 1.1). According to the results, there was a much greater decrease in burglaries 
in Lancashire when compared to its most similar PFAs, particularly after 2001/02, 
potentially due to the implementation of POP. When the CSEW was used, the hypothesis 
was accepted in four cases (out of eight) and in six cases when PRCD was used. Overall, in 
four cases, the hypothesis was accepted according to both data sources (see Chapter 6, Table 
6.1).   
Step 1 also compared trends in burglaries in the Metropolitan, Cleveland, Merseyside, Avon 
and Somerset, Cumbria with the trends in their most similar police forces. Hypothesis 1.2 
(there will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in the Metropolitan when compared to Greater 
Manchester) was accepted between 2001/02 and 2003/04, according to both data sources; 
however, it was rejected between 2004/05 and 2007/08 according to both data sources (see 
Chapter 6, Table 6.1). Hypothesis 1.3 (there will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in 
Cleveland when compared to Northumbria) was accepted according to the CSEW but 
rejected according to PRCD between 1998 and 2007/08 (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). 
Hypothesis 1.4 (there will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Merseyside when compared 
to the West Midlands) was accepted between 1995 and 2001/02 according to both data 
sources. However, it was rejected, according to the CSEW, and accepted, according to 
PRCD, between 2002/03 and 2007/08 (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). Hypothesis 1.5 (there will 
be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Cumbria when compared to North Wales) was accepted 
between 1999 and 2007/08 according to both data sources (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). Finally, 
Hypothesis 1.6 (there will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Avon and Somerset when 
compared to Essex) was accepted between 1997 and 2007/08 according to both data sources 
(see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). 
In sum, the hypotheses tested in Step 1 were accepted in 11 cases (out of 18) according to 
the CSEW and 13 cases (out of 18) according to PRCD. In nine cases, they were accepted 
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according to both data sources; conversely, they were rejected in three cases according to 
both data sources. These results indicate that POP-committed police forces had greater 
reductions in burglaries compared to their most similar PFAs, which were not committed to 
POP to the same extent (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). 
Step 2 tested Hypothesis 2 (there will be a gradual decrease in CSEW and PRCD burglaries 
in PFAs (winners) between the project starting year and submission year) and Hypothesis 3 
(there will be a gradual decrease in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in PFAs (finalists) between 
the project starting year and submission year). According to the CSEW, Hypotheses 2 and 3 
were rejected in all 6 cases. On the other hand, they were rejected in four cases and accepted 
in two cases according to PRCD (see Chapter 6, Table 6.3). This result might be due to the 
fact that small-scale projects did not affect the overarching burglary rates in those PFAs. 
Step 3 tested whether there were greater decreases in burglaries in England and Wales in 
1999, 2004 and 2008 when compared to other years (Hypothesis 4) as the number of anti-
burglary projects was higher in those years. According to the findings, the decrease in 
burglaries in those years was always greater than the previous year. This might have been a 
general trend, or POP might have affected burglaries as the decrease in burglaries in 2004/05 
and 2007/08 came after a slight increase in burglaries in the early 2000s. In sum, it was 
suggested that it was difficult to accept or reject Hypothesis 4 (see Chapter 6, Table 6.3). 
Step 4 tested Hypothesis 5 (there will be a greater decrease in burglaries in PFAs that 
received funding for the Safer Cities projects compared to the most similar PFAs to them 
between 1988 and 1998). Hypothesis 5 was rejected in all cases (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.3.3.1). Although Ekblom et al. (1996) concluded that the schemes reduced burglary, it was 
not likely that those projects influenced the overarching burglary trends in those PFAs. This 
is probably because although some projects were city-wide, most schemes were local 
(Ekblom et al., 1996). 
Step 5 tested Hypothesis 6 (there will be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Greater 
Manchester and Kent after 1999 and Avon and Somerset, Derbyshire and West Yorkshire 
after 2000 compared to their most similar PFAs due to the implementation of anti-burglary 
TPI projects). Hypothesis 6 was rejected according to the CSEW but accepted according to 
PRCD for Greater Manchester between 1999 and 2000. It was accepted according to the 
CSEW but rejected according to PRCD for Kent between 1999 and 2000. It was accepted 
according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD for West Yorkshire between 2000 
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and 2001/02. It was rejected according to both data sources for Avon and Somerset between 
2000 and 2001/02. It was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD 
for Derbyshire between 2000 and 2001/02 (see Chapter 6, Table 6.4). In sum, the results 
were mixed depending on the data source used. According to the CSEW, anti-burglary TPI 
projects might have affected the overarching burglary drop in those PFAs. Harris et al. (2003) 
found a significant reduction in average monthly recorded burglaries after the Market 
Reduction Approach55 tactics were applied in a town; however, they questioned this result 
as there were similar reductions across the police force, too. Indeed, the PRCD results in 
Step 5 supported Harris et al. (2003). 
Step 6 tested Hypotheses 7-9: 
• There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in the West Midlands when compared to 
the most similar PFAs to it between 1999 and 2002 due to the implementation of the RBI 
projects. 
• There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in West Yorkshire when compared to the 
most similar PFAs to it between 1999 and 2002 due to the implementation of the RBI 
projects. 
• There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in South Yorkshire when compared to the 
most similar PFAs to it between 1999 and 2002 due to the implementation of the RBI 
projects. 
Hypothesis 7 was accepted according to both data sources. Hypotheses 8 and 9 were 
accepted according to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD (see Chapter 6, Table 6.4).  
In sum, according to the CSEW, the RBI projects might have had an effect on the burglary 
drop in those PFAs. This finding is in line with previous research (Hirschfield, 2007) which 
analysed 21 RBI projects and found a significant effect on burglary rates. 
In Step 7, Hypothesis 10 (there will be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Cleveland, 
Lancashire, Leicestershire, the Metropolitan, Surrey and Thames Valley when compared to 
the most similar PFAs to them due to be an early implementer of POP) was split into three 
since the trends in burglaries in Cleveland, Lancashire and the Metropolitan had already 
been compared with the trends in their most similar PFAs in the previous steps. That is, it 
was hypothesised there would be a greater decrease in burglaries (1) in Surrey compared to 
 
55 “A strategic, systematic and routine problem-solving framework for action against the roots of theft” (Sutton 
et al., 2001: iii). 
 247 
 
Dorset between 1991 and 1998; (2) in Thames Valley compared to Hampshire between 1992 
and 2002/03; and (3) in Hampshire compared to Sussex between 2003/04 and 2007/08. 
According to PRCD, the first hypothesis was accepted between 1991 and 1998. Between 
1995 and 1998, the first hypothesis was accepted according to the CSEW but rejected 
according to PRCD. The second hypothesis was rejected between 1992 and 2002/03, 
according to PRCD. It was also rejected between 1995 and 2002/03 according to both data 
sources. Finally, the third hypothesis was accepted between 2003/04 and 2007/08 according 
to the CSEW but rejected according to PRCD (see Chapter 6, Table 6.5). In sum, according 
to the CSEW, prominent supporters of POP saw greater reductions in burglaries compared 
to their most similar PFAs in two cases (out of three). According to PRCD, it seems that it 
did not matter to be an early implementer of POP. It should also be noted that Hampshire 
saw greater reductions in burglaries compared to its most similar PFA (Thames Valley) 
before starting to implement POP in 2002. Due to a lack of research on this topic, the findings 
of the current study cannot be linked with previous research. 
Finally, Step 8 tested Hypotheses 11 and 12: 
• There will be a gradual decrease in repeat burglaries at the national and PFA levels 
between 1995 and 2007/08. 
• There will be a greater decrease in repeat burglary victimisations in PFAs, which were 
early implementers of POP, compared to their most similar PFAs. 
Hypothesis 11 was accepted in all six cases (see Chapter 6, Table 6.6). Hypothesis 12 was 
accepted in three cases (out of four) (see Chapter 6, Table 6.7). This finding is in line with 
previous research (Forrester et al., 1988), which found a substantial drop in the level of repeat 
residential burglaries after implementing POP tactics (see Section 8.5.2 below). 
8.3.3 Phase three 
Did POP have a statistically significant effect on the mean number of burglary 
victimisations between 1995 and 2003/04? 
After an initial exploration of the relationship between POP and the fall in burglary rates in 
England and Wales in Phase two, a comprehensive statistical analysis was conducted in 
Phase three. The results of the multilevel negative binomial regression modelling suggested 
police forces with a commitment to POP at any level had more burglaries compared to police 
forces that were not committed to POP at all in 1997. However, this relationship was only 
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statistically significant for police forces with a medium-level commitment to POP (see 
Chapter 7, Table 7.18, POP Only Model). This relationship remained when characteristics 
of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA were 
controlled (see Chapter 7, Table 7.18, Model 3). In 2003/04, although police forces that 
applied POP experienced fewer burglaries compared to police forces that did not apply POP 
at all (when characteristics of households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 
1000 residents in a PFA were controlled), the relationship did not reach significance (see 
Chapter 7, Table 7.19, Model 3). The results from 2003/04 seem to be supporting the 
findings of the analysis in Chapter 6 which suggested that there were greater reductions in 
burglaries in POP-committed PFAs when compared to their most similar PFAs, which were 
not committed to POP to the same extent. Finally, the analysis of bivariate correlations 
between POP and the mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04 gave similar results 
(see Chapter 7, Table 7.20).  
8.4 Limitations of the study  
This research thoroughly examined the role of POP in the burglary drop in England and 
Wales between 1988 and 2007/8 using a variety of data sources, methods and theories. 
Indeed, to the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first of its kind. However, there are 
inevitable limitations to this research that should be acknowledged.  
Firstly, although the researcher had planned to analyse the role of POP in the falls in both 
burglaries and vehicle-related crimes, due to time limitations the researcher examined the 
relationship between POP and burglaries only and the statistical analysis in Chapter 7 did 
not report a statistically significant negative relationship between POP and burglaries in 
1997 and 2003/04. However, there might have been statistically significant differences in 
reductions in other types of crime (particularly crime types that are suitable for being targeted 
with situational crime prevention tactics) between POP-committed PFAs and the most 
similar PFAs to them.  
Secondly, the study used secondary data to measure burglary. Particularly, the PRCD used 
in Chapter 6 has some notable limitations, such as unreported crime (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.6.1 for other limitations). The researcher argued that burglary is one of the crime types that 
is not affected by these limitations and sought to minimise the impact of these shortcomings 
on the results by using the CSEW, which is “viewed as a gold-standard survey” (Flatley, 
2014: 199). 
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Thirdly, the level of commitment of police forces to POP was identified using two indicators 
of commitment, which were chosen by the researcher, and by reviewing the related literature. 
The researcher acknowledges that there is a possibility that the measurement of the force-
level commitment was just too crude to test the nuances of the relationship between POP-
related activities and burglary reduction. There were various mismatches in terms of 
temporal and spatial scales of the mechanisms at play which could have well undermined 
the ability of the methods to represent a fair test of the hypotheses. 
Further, there are particular limitations of the first indicator (problem-oriented projects 
submitted to the Goldstein and Tilley Award schemes). Firstly, the projects submitted to the 
award schemes are biased towards success as they are self-nominated. Secondly, although 
they are good examples of POP application, they are not necessarily representative of the 
ideal of POP envisioned by Herman Goldstein (1990). The researcher sought to minimise 
the impact of these limitations on the analysis by using problem-oriented projects that were 
applied by police forces as part of large-scale government-supported crime reduction 
programmes (Indicator 2) and reviewing the related literature to supplement and triangulate 
the findings from the first indicator. However, the second indicator has its limitations as well, 
even though the researcher argued that the more funding a police force received, the more it 
was committed to POP. The researcher acknowledged that “a well ‘polished’ bid [is] not 
always a good indicator of the best projects” (Tilley et al., 1999: vi). There might be police 
forces that applied POP but did not receive funding; conversely, there might be police forces 
simply ticking boxes in relation to the Home Office and senior officers within their force to 
secure funding. These limitations suggest that another researcher might use other indicators 
of commitment to POP (e.g. cumulative intensity measure of POP activity) and can conclude 
different results. Nevertheless, the researcher believes that the best available data sources 
were used in the absence of the possibility of primary data collection due to the retrospective 
nature of the study. In addition, since a categorisation regarding the level of commitment to 
POP has not previously been made, the researcher’s method is a ‘necessary evil’ to progress 
knowledge. 
Fourthly, as Tilley and Scott (2012) stated, it is difficult to differentiate the policing styles 
of police forces and their effects on crime over time. The researcher acknowledges this issue. 
That is why the researcher revisited previous research on policing styles of police forces in 
England and Wales and revised their findings, and deliberately focussed on highly POP-
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committed police forces to identify the relationship between POP and the burglary drop in 
England and wales.  
Fifthly, the researcher could have used other variables to control for other possible crime 
drop hypotheses (particularly the security hypothesis). However, merging the CSEW and 
other data sets that could be used to control for the effects of other hypotheses was not 
possible due to data availability. In terms of controlling for the security hypothesis, the 
researcher acknowledges the importance of the security hypothesis but notes that it operates 
at the household level, whereas the core aim of this thesis was to analyse the effect of POP 
on burglaries at the PFA level and that this data was not available for the analysis. 
Sixthly, the researcher could have used change in levels of burglary across time as the 
dependent variable rather than correlating overall levels of burglary with POP at two 
different time points in separate models. Police forces in England and Wales have been 
implementing POP since the 1980s. However, the CSEW data at the PFA level was available 
from 1998 to 2007/08. Therefore, it was not possible to examine the effect of POP-related 
activities of police forces prior to 1997 on the change in levels of burglary across time (e.g. 
1980-1997) using multilevel modelling. The thesis could have used the change in levels of 
burglary between 1997 and 2003/04 as the dependent variable to explore the role of POP in 
the burglary drop if it was solely interested in whether POP (as a policing strategy) had an 
effect on burglaries. However, one of the main aims of this present thesis was to examine 
the effect of POP on burglaries considering the level of commitment of police forces to POP. 
However, the commitment of police forces can clearly vary across time. Therefore, 
constructing a commitment level for a certain year (i.e. 2003/04) and using overall levels of 
burglary from the 2003/04 CSEW was the most appropriate way to produce accurate results.  
Seventhly, the researcher could have modelled time-lagged effects. Due to the data 
availability, the present thesis could not apply time series analysis, which could have been 
used to test the relationship between POP and burglaries because it can be used when 50 or 
more observations are repeatedly made (i.e. burglaries for 50 years using the CSEW). With 
regard to using a lagged dependent variable in multilevel modelling (or mixed models), 
Allison (2017) suggested that researchers cannot put a lagged value of the dependent variable 
as a predictor as in a mixed model this usually leads to severe bias. Furthermore, modelling 
time-lagged effects was not necessarily needed. This is because the researcher calculated the 
level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 considering the POP-related activities 
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of police forces prior to 1997. Similarly, the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 
2003/04 was calculated considering the POP-related activities of police forces prior to 
2003/04. Therefore, the models tested the effect of POP on burglaries using the ultimate 
level of commitment to POP in 1997 and 2003/04 as measured in this thesis. 
Finally, testing the relationship between POP and burglaries at the PFA level might have 
masked the role of POP in the burglary drop at a lower level. However, the researcher argues 
that conducting a rigorous study that will investigate the role of POP in the crime drop at a 
lower geographic level across all police forces in England and Wales is beyond the capacity 
of any researcher at the Ph.D. level. 
8.5 Theoretical contribution 
This research aimed to make an original contribution to the existing policing and the crime 
drop literature. It first identified a gap in knowledge that previous studies have not explored 
the role of POP in the crime drop across the world (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018) (see 
chapters 2 and 3) and critically reviewed the existing crime drop hypotheses (Chapter 3) to 
be able to explore the relationship between POP and burglary rates at the PFA level in 
England and Wales more accurately. The overarching hypothesis of the study was, therefore, 
that there would be a relationship between POP and the burglary drop in England and Wales 
between 1988 and 2007/08. In order to accept or reject this hypothesis, different methods 
and data sources were used. As a result, the researcher proposes three main explanations 
regarding the relationship between POP and the burglary drop in England and Wales: (1) 
POP-related leadership in policing, (2) policies targeting repeat victimisation, and (3) a 
disconnect between theory and implementation of POP and some other factors (e.g. police 
workload). The effect of number of police officers on burglaries is also discussed.  
8.5.1 POP-committed senior leadership in policing 
Senior police leaders are the key figures in enabling a change in mindset of police forces, 
which have historically always been resistant to change as an organisation (Goldstein, 1990). 
For example, only POP-committed senior leaders can overcome difficulties such as internal 
resistance to change and partial implementation of POP. Senior police leaders are, therefore, 
crucial to operationalise POP (Goldstein, 2003; Laycock and Tilley, 2018).  
The literature consistently suggested that if POP is applied rigorously in a jurisdiction, it is 
primarily due to having a senior leader promoting its principles (Goldstein, 1990; Read and 
Tilley, 2000; Bullock et al., 2006). In line with the literature, the results presented in Chapter 
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6 suggested that having greater reductions in CSEW and PRCD burglaries in a number of 
POP-committed PFAs (especially Lancashire) compared to the most similar PFAs to them 
over time was owing to have senior police leaders who supported the POP philosophy (see 
Chapter 5, Table 5.10). For example, previous research (John and Maguire, 2003: 64) 
reported that “senior police managers in Lancashire were not keen to abandon the force’s 
commitment to POP, and decided therefore to base their implementation of the NIM 
[National Intelligence Model] explicitly on the POP principles which had already been 
widely instilled among operational staff” (see also Leigh et al., 1996; 1998; Scott, 2000; 
Tilley and Scott, 2012). As noted in Section 8.3.2, there was a much greater decrease in 
burglaries in Lancashire compared to it’s the most similar PFAs to it, particularly after 
2001/02. Overall, it seems that the crucial role of senior police leaders with regard to 
operationalising POP and reaching the crime reduction objectives of police forces has been 
confirmed. Therefore, senior police leaders who do not prefer to implement POP in their 
area of responsibility should be encouraged to review the POP-related literature (at least). 
They will encounter the fact that even if POP is applied weakly, it reduces crime in certain 
circumstances (see Weisburd et al., 2010).  
8.5.2 Policies targeting repeat victimisation 
The overall decrease in repeat burglary victimisations in England and Wales was evident 
between 1995 and 2007/08 (Thorpe, 2007; see also Chapter 6, Figure 6.30). However, 
Thorpe (2007) was not concerned with the cause of the fall in repeat burglary victimisations. 
Therefore, Chapter 6 filled this substantial gap and examined the role of POP in the falls in 
repeat burglary victimisations. Chapter 6 suggested that there might have been a relationship 
between the implementation of POP and the decrease in repeat burglary victimisations (using 
the CSEW) in POP-committed PFAs between 1995 and 2007/08.  
The reason for this finding is as follows. As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the core aims of 
POP is reducing repeat victimisation (Goldstein, 1990). Using the SARA framework, 
recurring problems of concern to the public and the police can be identified. Although all 
police forces claimed that they had a system to target repeat victimisation (Laycock and 
Farrell, 2003), it seems that a few POP-committed police forces prioritised targeting repeat 
burglary victimisations. For other police forces, it might be the fact that they did not target 
their tactics at the protection of victims, or their tactics otherwise had a weak preventive 
mechanism (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Overall, given the success of POP-committed police 
forces in reducing repeat burglary victimisations, all police forces might embrace targeting 
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repeat victimisation as a primary tactic to reduce burglary rates.  
8.5.3 Disconnect between theory and practice of POP and some other factors 
The findings from Chapter 6 seemed to suggest a relationship between POP and the drop in 
burglaries in some POP-committed PFAs. However, Chapter 7 did not find a statistically 
significant negative relationship between POP and burglaries in both 1997 and 2003/04. 
There might be three reasons for this result. Firstly, as noted in Section 8.4, the measure of 
commitment to POP for 1997 and 2003/04 might be imperfect. Secondly, police forces are 
burdened with additional responsibilities along with crime prevention, and they are rarely 
provided with the resources, authority, or the necessary skills to accomplish their expected 
tasks (Goldstein, 2018). Therefore, police forces might have spent most of their time to solve 
community problems other than burglary (e.g. mental health). In addition, police forces 
“focus too much on offenders relative to other aspects of crime and disorder problems” (Eck 
and Gallagher, 2016: 133). Thirdly, although police forces claim that they apply POP, in 
practice, POP is more rhetoric than reality (Bullock et al., 2006). In other words, there might 
have been a disconnect between theory and practice of POP, which might have been due to 
the following five major impediments proposed by Goldstein (2003: 26-34): 
• the absence of a long-term commitment to POP (see also Eck and Gallagher, 2016) 
• the lack of skills within a police agency that are required to analyse problems and 
to evaluate strategies for dealing with those problems 
• the lack of a clear academic connection (see also Fleming et al., 2015 for a 
detailed discussion) 
• the absence of informed outside pressures 
• the lack of financial support (see also Applegate, 2004). 
Considering the three reasons mentioned, it should be noted that the findings of this study 
do not reflect the effect of ideal POP implementation on burglary rates in England and Wales.  
One might also reasonably question why POP-committed police forces experienced higher 
burglaries compared to police forces that were not committed to POP at all in 1997. There 
might be two main reasons for this result. Firstly, police forces committed to POP might 
have been inclined to record more burglaries due to an increased sensitivity to such. 
Secondly, police forces with a higher number of burglaries might have applied POP as a 
remedy to their burglary problem. Although there is no previous research exploring the role 
of POP in the burglary drop at the PFA level, a study which assessed the performance of 
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community policing on crime rates found that the problem-solving dimension of community 
policing was associated with higher crime rates (Sozer, 2009). He also argued that the 
amplifying effect of problem-solving activities might be due to increased sensitivity to crime 
problems. 
With the above discussion in mind, the reader should bear in mind that, “…evidence for 
effectiveness is not a statistical condition for the success of a policy” (Eck and Gallagher, 
2016: 135) as Sparrow (2018: 5) suggested  
“Focusing on statistically significant crime reductions may not recognise or reward 
the best problem-solving performance. The best performance, in a risk control setting, 
means spotting emerging problems early and suppressing them before they do much 
harm. The earlier the spotting, the less significant (in a statistical sense) would be the 
resulting reductions. The very best risk-control performance, therefore, would fail to 
produce substantial reductions, and might not, therefore, be visible under the lenses 
of standard statistical inference”. 
8.5.4 Increasing number of police officers 
Whilst analysing whether POP had had a statistically significant independent effect on 
burglaries in 1997 and 2003/04, the effect of the number of police officers per 1000 residents 
in a PFA on burglaries was controlled. In both years, police forces with a greater number of 
police officers per 1000 residents experienced fewer burglaries. However, this relationship 
was statistically significant only in 2003/04 (see Chapter 7, tables 7.18 and 7.19, Model 3). 
This finding is in line with previous research (Marvell and Moody, 1996; Sherman et al., 
1998; Levitt, 2004, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6.1). Therefore, rather than reducing the 
number of police officers (ONS, 2018), the UK government might consider hiring more 
police officers.  
8.6 Policy implications regarding policing 
Chapter 6 concluded that there seemed to be a relationship between POP and the burglary 
drop and the reduction in repeat burglary victimisations in a number of POP-committed 
PFAs between 1995 and 2007/08 (see Chapter 6, tables from 6.1 to 6.6). Chapter 7 also 
found that although the relationship was not statistically significant police forces that applied 
POP experienced fewer burglaries when compared to police forces that did not apply POP 
at all in 2003/04. Therefore, the results of this study support the implementation of POP by 
police forces in England and Wales and elsewhere. However, as discussed in Section 8.5.3, 
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there is a gap between theory and practice of POP and this gap can be narrowed by several 
means that are discussed in the following sections. 
8.6.1 Increasing awareness regarding the related literature 
Senior and frontline officers should read and comprehend the related literature in relation to 
POP (Clarke and Goldstein, 2003). For example, the What Works consortium, in partnership 
with the College of Policing, has developed an online tool 56  which uses the EMMIE 
framework57 developed by Johnson et al. (2015) to improve the accessibility of the evidence 
base to policy makers and practitioners (Fleming et al., 2015). Police officers can also benefit 
from the Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing (https://popcenter.asu.edu/), which provided 
73 problem-specific guides at the time of writing. When the literature is not read, or such 
available tools are not used (Goldstein, 2003), police forces tend to shout slogans without 
action and waste the wealth of the nations. There needs to be a tradition within policing that 
seeks knowledge and makes use of it (ibid). A system like Evidence Champions Network 
that will link police forces, which implement or want to implement POP can also be created 
(Eck, 2003).  
8.6.2 Having POP-committed senior leaders  
“How does a police agency make the shift to problem-oriented policing? Ideally, the 
initiative will come from police administrators” (Goldstein, 1979: 256). “It requires, 
initially, that the chief executive of an agency fully understands the rationale behind 
problem-oriented policing and be committed to it” (Goldstein, 2003: 27; see also 
Scott, 2000).  
Having senior leaders who support the principles of POP as part of everyday practice within 
their PFAs is crucial (see Section 8.5.1). Those chief officers are also important figures in 
terms of turning the current reactive police culture into a proactive one. They are the ones 
who can motivate personnel and embrace the new ideal (Townsley et al., 2003; Eck, 2014). 
For this, knowing ‘organisational psychology’, which is outside the scope of this thesis, is 
desirable. However, there are some essential facts that senior police officers should consider 
whilst implement POP. They should commit resources, hire specialist crime analysts and 
consider their recommendations. They also should acknowledge the fact that although 
Goldstein argues that POP should be applied primarily by senior management, it has been 
 
56 http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Toolkit.aspx 
57 EMMIE stands for Effect, Mechanism, Moderators, Implementation, and Economic cost. 
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largely implemented by a small group of committed and enthusiastic line officers (Bullock 
et al., 2006). However, relying heavily on individual police officers is not preferable. This 
is because when those committed individuals retire or leave their forces, a sustainability 
problem would occur. Therefore, senior leaders should “lead and institutionalise problem-
solving activities at all levels of the police organisation” (Mazerolle et al., 2013: 556) to 
reduce crime (see also Scott, 2000). 
8.6.3 Establishing partnerships  
Police forces should develop partnerships with other agencies, especially with academia (e.g. 
N8 policing collaboration) (Knuttson, 2013; Eck, 2014; Goldstein, 2018). Goldstein (1979: 
256) suggested: “[t]he police administrator who focuses on the substance of policing should 
be able to count on support from others in key positions in the police field” (see also Tilley 
and Scott, 2012).  Partnership was found to be a more effective way of reducing crime rates 
(Eck and Maguire, 2000; Bullock et al., 2006; Eck, 2014) as it ensures approaching crime 
problems in a more scientific way and from different perspectives. For instance, a problem-
solving officer interviewed by Applegate (2004: 40) who evaluated the process of POP in 
Plymouth explained what partnership means to a police force: “[i]n partnership with other 
organisations and agencies, possibly taking a different look at the problem and aiming to 
resolve that problem in a different way, rather than just throwing manpower at it”.  
8.6.4 Considering the interests of other governmental parties 
According to Scott (2003: 62-63), the gap between the theory and practice of POP can be 
narrowed by considering the interests of: 
• prosecutors, the defence bar, and the judiciary 
• mayors, city managers and other elected officials 
• community groups 
• media 
• academia and police research organisations 
• government funding agencies 
• private industry. 
For instance, if the principles and methods of POP and examples of good problem-oriented 
analysis are explained to the first and second groups of the above list; if the media can engage 
with POP (e.g. through case studies), and if the funding and publication opportunities are 
 257 
 
increased for the fifth group, then the external support for POP may increase (ibid), and POP 
can be implemented more rigorously.  
8.6.5 Increasing perceived time for POP  
Senior police leaders (e.g. Police and Crime Commissioners) should be advised that POP is 
a long-term investment (Goldstein, 2003; Bullock and Tilley, 2003) but is also a cost-
effective way of reducing crime rates as a problem-solving officer interviewed by Applegate 
(2004: 45) noted: “…that’s been fundamental in saving money”. The following sections 
provide recommendations on what POP investment should look like. 
8.6.6 Hiring specialist crime analysts  
A thorough analysis of conditions that give rise to crime problems is essential to reducing 
crime rates according to the POP philosophy (Tilley and Scott, 2012). In other words, 
analysis is at the core of POP (Goldstein, 2003; Clarke and Goldstein, 2003; Sparrow, 2018). 
To be able to conduct a rigorous analysis, police forces should hire more specialist crime 
analysts (Goldstein, 2018) who are capable of analysing different types of crime data (Braga, 
2008; Tilley and Scott, 2012), have extensive knowledge of a variety of statistical and 
mapping tools, are trained in POP, who do not serve other non-crime tasks (Goldstein, 1979; 
Knutsson, 2003; Goldstein, 2003; Laycock and Farrell, 2003) and who are paid well in the 
era of big data (Ridgeway, 2018).  
Universities and research organisations might be the best place to produce such crime 
analysts (Tilley and Scott, 2012). Those people should also be capable of networking with 
practitioners. On the one hand, governments should provide funding to universities and 
police forces to be able to equip people with those skills. On the other hand, governments 
should advise practitioners to open their doors to academics (Goldstein, 2003).  
8.6.7 Providing internal training  
Police forces should also provide internal training on POP to personnel. “The greatest 
potential for improvement in the handling of some problems is in providing police officers 
new forms of specialised training” (Goldstein, 1979: 253) and “… systematic analysis of 
substantive problems requires developing a capacity within the organisation to collect and 
analyse data and to conduct evaluations of the effectiveness of police operations” (Goldstein, 
1979: 256).   
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8.6.8 Increasing incentives  
Incentives play a crucial role in getting the police to take POP seriously (Scott, 2003; 
Goldstein, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Sparrow, 2018). A good example of an incentive for 
the police to implement POP in the UK is the Tilley Award scheme. It is one of the best 
methods of sharing good practice in POP that “will benefit other police agencies and that 
will ultimately contribute to … building a body of knowledge that supports the further 
professionalisation of the police” (Goldstein, 2001, cited in Scott, 2003: 50). After a break 
in service due to financial issues in 2010, the scheme was officially reopened for application 
on 7th September 2018 for the first time in eight years by the Problem Solving and Demand 
Reduction programme, which was set up by South Yorkshire Police in 2017 following a 
successful Police Transformation Fund Award (£6.35 million) (South Yorkshire Police, 
2018). The UK government should continue to support POP-related initiatives such as the 
Tilley Award scheme. 
8.7 Methodological implications 
The overarching aim of this research was to test whether POP played a role in the burglary 
drop in England and Wales between 1988 and 2007/08. To address the overarching aim, the 
researcher argued that “simply counting the number of agencies that claim to be using … [a 
policing strategy]… is a poor indicator of the diffusion of the innovation” (Eck and Maguire, 
2006: 245). Instead, an analysis of whether POP affects crime rates should consider the level 
of commitment of police forces to POP.  
Identifying the level of commitment of police forces to POP was a challenging task to 
accomplish. Drawing upon two indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher 
and reviewing the related literature, the researcher tried to overcome the challenge. However, 
a more rigorous classification of police forces in terms of the level of commitment to POP 
could have been made if a survey, which asks the questions presented in Appendix 4.1, was 
available as a secondary data source like the CSEW. 
The CSEW is a gold-standard data source (Flatley, 2014). However, it clearly needs some 
improvement, particularly with regard to questions asked in relation to policing. The lack of 
questions about police authorities restricted the analysis. This is understandable since it is a 
victimisation survey. However, one of the major objectives of the police is to prevent crime 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). The police authorities (particularly Police and Crime 
Commissioners) are also accountable to the communities they serve (Lister, 2013). For 
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example, the CSEW questions regarding the Neighbourhood Watch programme, which can 
be implemented to reduce burglaries at the Response stage of the SARA framework, can be 
improved (see Tseloni and Tura, 2019). Collectively, employing a survey that assesses the 
state of POP across England and Wales, for example, biennially or improving the questions 
regarding the Neighbourhood Watch programme in the CSEW might be beneficial to the 
examination of the effects of POP on crime over time.  
8.8 Original contribution to knowledge 
The present study has made a number of original contributions to knowledge. Chapter 5 
firstly identified and collated highly POP-committed police forces in England and Wales 
over time for the first time. Secondly, Chapter 5 criticised existing limited research on 
policing strategies of police forces in England and Wales and revised their findings. Thirdly, 
Chapter 5 determined the level of commitment of police forces to POP in 1997 and 2003/04, 
separately. For this, it used two indicators of commitment to POP selected by the researcher 
and reviewed the related literature to supplement and triangulate the findings from the 
analysis of these two indicators. To the researcher’s knowledge, this marks the first time 
such an analysis has been conducted. Fourthly, Chapter 6 used ten sweeps of the CSEW 
along with PRCD to initially investigate the role of POP in the burglary drop at the PFA 
level (using most similar police force groups) in England and Wales between 1988 and 
2007/08. To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first time such a study has been carried 
out (see Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018). Fifthly, Chapter 6 examined the relationship 
between POP and the decrease in repeat burglary victimisations in a number of POP-
committed PFAs between 1995 and 2007/08 and suggested that the decrease in repeat 
burglary victimisations might be a product of POP as it generally focusses on repeat 
victimisation. Therefore, the study particularly showed that the concept of repeat 
victimisation in policing practice is an important factor to be able to solve the crime drop 
puzzle. Finally, Chapter 7 assessed whether POP had had a statistically significant effect on 
burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04. For this, it identified burglary risk factors at the household 
and PFA levels drawing upon the existing literature and relevant theories (routine activity 
and social disorganisation theories). By controlling for the effects of characteristics of 
households and PFAs and the number of police officers per 1000 residents in a PFA, Chapter 
7 assessed whether POP had had a statistically significant independent effect on the mean 
number of burglary victimisations in 1997 and 2003/04, separately, for the first time. Chapter 
7 also examined bivariate correlations between POP and the mean number of burglaries from 
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1995 to 2003/04 for the first time. Overall, the thesis has made a unique contribution to the 
policing and the crime drop literature.  
8.9 Recommendations for future research 
This final section recommends some avenues for future research that are related to the scope 
of the research, data sources and methods that can be used to further investigate the role of 
POP in the crime drop in England and Wales.  
Firstly, future studies can extend the scope of the analysis to other crime problems at the 
PFA level. They might particularly focus on repeat victimisation. For example, future 
research might examine whether POP has affected repeat victimisation of personal crimes. 
Secondly, future research can narrow the scope of the analysis and explore the role of POP 
in the crime drop at a lower geographic level (e.g. police beats). For this, future studies might 
select a police force that has been interested in applying POP more recently (e.g. Durham or 
South Yorkshire). This would enable researchers to examine the state of POP within those 
police forces more accurately through primary data collection (e.g. interviews, observations, 
ethnographic studies).  
8.10 Concluding remarks 
The role of policing in crime reduction has been debated in the existing literature for a long 
time. Whilst some scholars asserted that policing has little or no effect on crime rates, others 
proposed that the primary aim of the police service is to reduce crime rates, and indeed does 
so. Crime is a complex social phenomenon, and many factors influence it. Readers should 
bear in mind that those factors cannot be included in a single study due to data availability 
issues. As Goldstein (1990: 49) suggests “[h]igh quality evaluations of the effectiveness of 
major changes are difficult because of the large number of variables that can affect outcomes 
and because of the enormous effort and cost involved in setting up controlled experiments” 
(see also Scott, 2017). With the above general limitation and the limitations of the current 
study presented in Section 8.4 in mind, the findings of this thesis provide a number of 
contributions to the field of policing and the crime drop: 
1. POP has been one of the main policing strategies preferred by police forces in England 
and Wales since the 1980s. 
2. A number of police forces in England and Wales have been consistently committed to 
POP.  
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3. Some POP-committed police forces experienced greater reductions in burglaries 
compared to their most similar police forces, which were not committed to POP to the 
same extent, over time. 
4. However, police forces that applied POP experienced more burglaries compared to 
others from 1995 to 2002/03. It was only in 2003/04 that police forces that applied POP 
experienced fewer burglaries compared to others, and indeed this was not a statistically 
significant finding. 
Based on the findings presented, the overall conclusion of this study is that there seemed to 
be a relationship between POP and the fall in burglaries and repeat burglaries in a number 
of POP-committed PFAs in England and Wales between 1995 and 2007/08 (see Chapter 6). 
However, there was no statistically significant negative relationship between POP and the 
mean number of burglaries from 1995 to 2003/04 (see Chapter 7). This result does not 
necessarily mean that POP does not reduce crime, as by contrast, Chapter 7 found police 
forces that applied POP experienced fewer burglaries compared to police forces that did not 
implement POP in 2003/04. In addition, there is a wealth of existing evidence suggesting 
POP is an effective policing strategy (e.g. Weisburd et al., 2010). The priorities of the police 
service should thus be reassessed. Targeting repeat victimisation should (continue to) be one 
such priority to reduce crime and bring POP into the policing mainstream. If meticulously 
implemented, POP might also have had a statistically significant negative effect on 
burglaries in England and Wales over time. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.1: Definition of burglary in England and Wales 
Burglary – CSEW  
“The CSEW is a survey of the population resident in households and, as such, information 
collected on burglary offences only relates to domestic burglary; that is, unauthorised entry 
into the victim’s dwelling or non-connected building to a dwelling (for example, a shed or a 
non-connected garage). Non-domestic burglary (for example, theft from business properties) 
is not covered by the CSEW. 
The main CSEW estimates differentiate between burglary in a dwelling and a non-connected 
building to a dwelling. Subcategories are defined as follows: 
• “burglary with entry” comprises burglary where a building was successfully entered, 
regardless of whether something was stolen or not 
• “burglary with loss” comprises burglary where a building was successfully entered, 
and something was stolen 
• “burglary with no loss” comprises burglary where a building was successfully 
entered but nothing was stolen 
• “attempts” comprises incidents where there is clear evidence that the offender made 
an actual, physical attempt to gain entry to a building (for example, damage to locks, 
or broken doors) but was unsuccessful 
Domestic burglary does not include theft by a person who was entitled to be in the dwelling 
at the time the offence occurred (for example, a party guest or worker); such offences are 
classified as theft from a dwelling and are included in the separate category of “other 
household theft”. 
Burglary – police recorded crime 
The police record an incident of burglary if a person enters any building as a trespasser with 
the intent to commit an offence of theft; this includes dwellings and other properties, such 
as sheds, garages not connected to dwellings and businesses. 
Prior to April 2017, police recorded burglary offence categories were split such that 
dwellings (domestic burglary) and buildings other than dwellings (non-domestic burglary) 
were separately identifiable, where:  
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• domestic burglary covers residential premises, including attached buildings such as 
garages 
non-domestic burglary covers non-residential premises, including businesses and public 
buildings, as well as non-attached buildings within the grounds of a dwelling, such as sheds 
and detached garages”. 
Source: Flatley (2017) 
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Appendix 2.1: Before/after studies from the UK  
1. Aspin, Mark. (2006). Trafford Park security initiative- Reducing crime in Trafford Park. 
Safer Trafford Partnership. Tilley Award Submission.  
2. Burton, Steve. (2006). Safer travel at night: Transport for London. London Transport 
Policing and Enforcement Directorate. Herman Goldstein Award Winner.  
3. Cator, Marcus. (2006). Operation Mullion: Reducing anti-social behaviour and crime in 
and around Mayfield School. Hampshire Police. Tilley Award Finalist.  
4. Coombs, Adrian. (2006). Policing the Glastonbury Festival. Avon and Somerset Police. 
Tilley Award Submission.  
5. Davies, Amanda. (2006). Operation clean up. Staffordshire Police. Tilley Award 
Submission.  
6. Donaghy, Jim. (1999). Northfields Project: Project brings peace back to city estate. 
Leicestershire Police. Tilley Award Winner.  
7. Earle, Julie and Alan Edmunds. (2004). Operation Cobra: Tackling vehicle crime in the 
city of Portsmouth. Hampshire Police. Tilley Award Runner-Up.  
8. Hopkins, Matt. (2004). Targeting hotspots of alcohol-related town centre violence: A 
Nottinghamshire case study. Security Journal 17(4): 53-66. 
9. Maguire, Mike and Hilary Nettleton. (2003). Reducing alcohol-related violence and 
disorder: An evaluation of the ‘TASC’ project. London: Home Office Research, 
Development and Statistics Directorate.  
10. Middleham, Neil and Caroline Marston. (2004). Mole hills from mountains. Lancashire 
Police. Herman Goldstein Award Finalist.  
11. Pease, Ken. (1991). The Kirkholt Project: Preventing burglary on a British public 
housing estate. Security Journal 2(2): 73-77.  
12. Forrester, David, Mike Chatterston, and Ken Pease. (1988). The Kirkholt burglary 
reduction project, Rochdale. London: Home Office Crime Prevention Unit.  
13. Pearson, Gareth and Steve Armes. (2004). The Hopwood Triangle: Revitalizing 
a depressed neighbourhood in Lancashire. Lancashire Police. Herman Goldstein 
Award Finalist.  
14. Siggs, Richard. (2005). Operation Dodger: Policing the street community in Brighton 
and Hove. Sussex Police. Tilley Award Winner.  
15. Smith, Andy. (2004). Safe and secure- Twenty-four seven. Staffordshire Police. Tilley 
Award Finalist.  
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Appendix 2.1: Before/after studies coming from the UK (continued) 
16. Smith, Andy. (2005). Nowhere to run to nowhere to hide: Neighborhood burglary 
reduction. Staffordshire Police. Herman Goldstein Award Finalist.  
17. Thistlethwaite, Edward and Paolo Pertica. (2002). The tower project. Lancashire Police. 
Tilley Award Submission.  
18. Thomas, Clive. (2001). Bristol anti-robbery strategy. Avon and Somerset Police. Tilley 
Award Submission.  
Source: Weisburd et al. (2008) 
 
 295 
 
Appendix 4.1: Problem-solving checklist 
Problem identification/Scanning 
Are repeat calls for service and repeat crimes routinely scanned? 
Are efforts to identify and analyse past and emerging problems routine? 
Are simple emerging problems allocated to individuals for their response, either on their own or in conjunction with other agencies? 
Are more complex emerging problems identified/prioritised in routine discussion amongst partners? 
Do partnerships routinely try to anticipate and forestall future problems? 
Causal analysis/Analysis 
Are adequate data collection and sharing arrangements in place to be used in problem identification and analysis? 
Are local analysts available who are familiar with relevant theory, crime reduction literature, and analytic techniques to identify and analyse 
problems? 
Do analysts have the hardware and software they need to do their job? 
Do analysts have a competent source of advice and supervision for their analytic work? 
Do analysts work in partnership with same agency colleagues responsible for dealing with problems, and with those in other agencies and their 
analysts? 
Do staff in supervisory positions have training and experience in analysis? 
Tactic or treatment/Response 
Do partnerships addressing agreed problems have sources of informed advice on possible promising responses? 
Do members of partnerships have a joint budget to implement or pump prime responses to agreed problems? 
Are members of partnerships adaptable in their service delivery patterns where doing so may comprise a promising response to a problem? 
Do those allocated problems have sources of informed advice on possible promising responses? 
Are external sources of advice in problem-solving being drawn on when needed? 
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Appendix 4.1: Problem-solving checklist (continued) 
Output monitoring/Assessment 
Are all problem-solving efforts within the BCU/authority area systematically monitored? 
Are initiatives adjusted in the light of monitoring? 
Is an evaluation strategy in place? 
Are reputable independent evaluators used where significant resource allocation decisions turn on evaluation findings? 
Is care taken not to give unqualified support to extending initiatives that have not been subject to independent competent evaluation? 
Are provisions in place to conduct ‘light’ in-house or student evaluations where only suggestive findings are needed? 
Incentivisation/enablement 
Do members of partnerships encourage their staff routinely to participate in problem-solving? 
Are individuals allocated problems given training in their analysis and in forms of response? 
Are individuals allocated problems given reasonable time to address them? 
Are specialist skills being drawn on and used in problem-solving? 
Does the partnership provide a forum for mutual leverage in problem-solving? 
Does the partnership have agreed on ways of applying leverage where necessary to third parties in implementing responses to problems? 
Is the work of the partnership monitored regularly and members held to account for their problem-solving? 
Are individual agencies being performance measured for their local problem-solving work as well as their attention to national priorities? 
Do supervisors help subordinates with problem-solving and monitor their problem-solving work? 
Are staff oriented to problem-solving, with selection, training and rewards to encourage and enable them? 
Do senior members of agencies know of and understand the problems being addressed? 
Problem-communication to and from other levels 
Is day to day problem-solving monitored and are efforts made to identify broader problems? 
Are problems identified within the area that may reflect broader problems passed ‘up’ for analysis and attention at ‘higher’ levels? 
Source: Read and Tilley (2000)  
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Appendix 4.2: Recoding 
4.2.1: Ethnic Group 
1998 2003/04 Recoding 
Variable name Variable name Variable name 
Ethnicid Ethnic Ethnicity 
White 
  
  
White - British 
White - Irish 
White - Other White Background 
White 
Black-Caribbean 
Black-African 
Black-Other 
Black or Black British - Caribbean 
Black or Black British - African 
Black or Black British - Other Black 
Background 
Black 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
  
Asian or Asian British - Indian 
Asian or Asian British - Pakistani 
Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi 
Asian or Asian British - Other Asian 
Background 
Asian 
Other 
  
  
  
  
Other Ethnic Group 
Mixed - White and Black Caribbean 
Mixed - White and Black African 
Mixed - White and Asian 
Mixed - Any Other Mixed Background 
Other/Mixed/Chinese 
Chinese Chinese 
4.2.2: Income 
1998 2003/04 Recoding 
Variable Name Variable Name Variable Name 
tothnic tothnic1 Household Income 
Nothing/No work or scheme 
Under £2,500 
£2,500-£4,999 
Nothing/No work or scheme 
Under £2,500 
£2,500-£4,999 
Less than £4,999 
£5,000-£9,999 £5,000-£9,999 £5,000-£9,999 
£10,000-£14,999 
£15,000-£19,999 
£10,000-£14,999 
£15,000-£19,999 
£10,000-£19,999 
£20,000-£29,999 
  
£20,000-£24,999 
£25,000-£29,999 
£20,000-£29,999 
£30,000-£49,999 
£50,000 or more 
£30,000-£34,999 
£35,000-£39,999 
£40,000-£44,999 
£45,000-£49,999 
£50,000 or more 
£30,000 or more 
Refused 
Do not know 
Refused 
Do not know 
No response 
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Appendix 4.2: Recoding (continued) 
4.2.3: HOH class 
1998 2003/04 Recoding 
Variable Name Variable Name Variable Name 
Hohclass hrpsec2 HOHclass 
Professional 
Managerial and technical 
occupations 
Large employer and higher 
managerial occupations 
Higher professional occupations 
Lower professional and higher 
technical occupations 
Professional 
Skilled occupations (non-
manual) 
Skilled occupations (manual) 
 
Intermediate occupations 
Small employers and own-
account workers 
Lower supervisory and 
technical occupations 
Intermediate 
Partly skilled occupations 
Unskilled occupations 
Semi-routine occupations 
Routine occupations 
Routine 
Armed forces 
Inadequate description 
Never worked 
Not classified 
Never 
worked/inadequate 
description/armed 
forces 
Note: To recode social class of HOH, the ONS guide to the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification (NS-SEC) was used 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/classificationsandstandards/otherclassifications/the
nationalstatisticssocioeconomicclassificationnssecrebasedonsoc2010).  
4.2.4: Type of Accommodation 
1998 2003/04 Recoding 
Variable Name Variable Name Variable Name 
accharm1 acctyp Accommodation type 
Detached A detached whole house Detached 
Semi A semi-detached whole house Semi-detached 
Terrace 
  
A mid-terrace whole house 
An end of terrace whole house Terraced 
Maisonette 
A purpose-built flat 
A converted flat 
Other 
  
A maisonette 
A purpose-built flat 
A converted flat 
rooms, bedsitter 
A caravan or mobile home 
Flat/Maisonette/Others 
  Unable to code 
Not coded 
  Not coded 
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Appendix 4.2: Recoding (continued) 
4.2.5: Lone parent 
compute lpar=0. 
if ((nchil=1) & (nadults=1)) lpar=1. 
Notes:  
(1) nchil: number of children; nadults: number of adults 
(2) variable name for lone parent is lpar in both years 
 
4.2.6: Area Type 
“There is no specific variable which distinguishes between inner city, urban and rural areas 
contained in the survey pre-2001. Therefore, where the information was not readily 
available, a new variable was derived using the ‘acorn’, ‘incity’ and ‘inner’ variables using 
the following syntax”:  
recode acorn (1 thru 9,27=3) into areatype 
/incity (1=1) into areatype 
/areatype (1,3=copy) (else=2). 
value labels areatype 1'inner' 2'urban' 3'rural'. 
execute. 
Adapted from Thompson (2014: 80). 
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Appendix 4.3: Most similar police force groups 
Avon and Somerset Bedfordshire Cambridgeshire Cheshire 
Essex Hertfordshire Devon & Cornwall Staffordshire 
Hertfordshire Sussex Gloucestershire Northamptonshire 
Kent Hampshire Wiltshire Warwickshire 
Hampshire Essex Avon & Somerset Suffolk 
Cambridgeshire Thames Valley Warwickshire Wiltshire 
Devon & Cornwall Kent Essex Gloucestershire 
Thames Valley Avon & Somerset Kent Devon and Cornwall 
City of London Cleveland Cumbria Derbyshire 
City of London does not have an 
MSG due to the unique nature of 
the force 
Northumbria North Wales Cumbria 
Merseyside Derbyshire North Wales 
South Yorkshire Norfolk Durham 
South Wales Suffolk Norfolk 
West Midlands Staffordshire Staffordshire 
Gwent Cheshire Humberside 
  Durham Suffolk 
Devon and Cornwall Dorset Durham Dyfed Powys 
Cambridgeshire Surrey Humberside Lincolnshire 
Gloucestershire Thames Valley Gwent Norfolk 
Warwickshire Hampshire Derbyshire North Wales 
Wiltshire Sussex South Wales   
Avon & Somerset   South Yorkshire   
Essex   Nottinghamshire   
Kent   Cumbria   
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Appendix 4.3: Most similar police force groups (continued) 
Essex Gloucestershire Greater Manchester Gwent 
Avon & Somerset Wiltshire West Yorkshire Humberside 
Kent Warwickshire West Midlands Durham 
Hertfordshire Devon and Cornwall Northumbria South Yorkshire 
Hampshire Cambridgeshire Merseyside South Wales 
Leicestershire West Mercia South Yorkshire Cleveland 
Devon and Cornwall North Yorkshire     
Cambridgeshire Cheshire     
Hampshire Hertfordshire Humberside Kent 
Sussex Hampshire Durham Leicestershire 
Hertfordshire Sussex Gwent Essex 
Thames Valley Bedfordshire Derbyshire Lancashire 
Bedfordshire Essex South Yorkshire Avon & Somerset 
Essex Avon and Somerset South Wales Hertfordshire 
Avon and Somerset Thames Valley Nottinghamshire Devon and Cornwall 
Kent Kent   Bedfordshire 
Lancashire Leicestershire Lincolnshire Merseyside 
Leicestershire Kent Dyfed Powys West Midlands 
Kent Lancashire Norfolk Cleveland 
Nottinghamshire Essex North Wales Northumbria 
West Yorkshire Northamptonshire Suffolk Greater Manchester 
Essex Nottinghamshire     
Northamptonshire Avon and Somerset     
Hertfordshire Devon and Cornwall     
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Appendix 4.3: Most similar police force groups (continued) 
Metropolitan  Norfolk North Wales North Yorkshire 
Greater Manchester North Wales Cumbria West Mercia 
West Yorkshire Cumbria Norfolk Suffolk 
West Midlands Lincolnshire Derbyshire Wiltshire 
  Dyfed Powys Suffolk Warwickshire 
  Suffolk Lincolnshire Gloucestershire 
  Derbyshire Dyfed Powys Cheshire 
  North Yorkshire   Devon and Cornwall 
Northamptonshire Northumbria Nottinghamshire South Wales 
Staffordshire South Yorkshire South Wales South Yorkshire 
Cheshire South Wales South Yorkshire Nottinghamshire 
Nottinghamshire Cleveland Northamptonshire Northumbria 
Leicestershire Nottinghamshire Leicestershire Cleveland 
Warwickshire Merseyside Lancashire Durham 
Devon and Cornwall Greater Manchester Staffordshire Lancashire 
Kent West Midlands Northumbria Northamptonshire 
South Yorkshire Staffordshire Suffolk Surrey 
South Wales Cheshire North Yorkshire Dorset 
Northumbria Northamptonshire West Mercia Thames Valley 
Nottinghamshire Warwickshire Warwickshire Sussex 
Cleveland Nottinghamshire Cheshire   
Durham Suffolk Norfolk   
Humberside Wiltshire Wiltshire   
Lancashire Gloucestershire Cumbria   
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Appendix 4.3: Most similar police force groups (continued) 
Sussex Thames Valley Warwickshire West Mercia 
Hampshire Hampshire Wiltshire North Yorkshire 
Hertfordshire Sussex Gloucestershire Wiltshire 
Thames Valley Hertfordshire Devon and Cornwall Suffolk 
Bedfordshire Avon and Somerset Cheshire Warwickshire 
Essex Essex Cambridgeshire Gloucestershire 
Avon and Somerset Bedfordshire North Yorkshire Cambridgeshire 
Kent Dorset West Mercia Devon and Cornwall 
West Midlands West Yorkshire Wiltshire  
Greater Manchester Greater Manchester Gloucestershire   
Merseyside Lancashire Warwickshire   
West Yorkshire West Midlands West Mercia   
Northumbria Northumbria North Yorkshire   
Cleveland Leicestershire Devon and Cornwall   
  South Wales Cambridgeshire   
  South Yorkshire Cheshire   
Source: HMICFRS (2017) 
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Appendix 5.1: Hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6 
Hypothesis Indicator Hypotheses 
1 1 
There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in highly POP-committed PFAs (according to indicator one) when 
compared to the most similar PFAs to them which were not committed to POP to the same extent. 
1.1 1 
There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Lancashire when compared to the most similar PFAs to it which 
were not committed to POP to the same extent. 
1.2 1 There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in the Metropolitan when compared to Greater Manchester. 
1.3 1 There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Cleveland when compared to Northumbria. 
1.4 1 There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Merseyside when compared to the West Midlands. 
1.5 1 There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Cumbria when compared to North Wales. 
1.6 1 There will be a sharper decrease in burglaries in Avon and Somerset when compared to Essex. 
2 1 
There will be a gradual decrease in burglaries in PFAs (where the winner projects were implemented) between 
the project starting year and submission year. 
3 1 
There will be a gradual decrease in burglaries in PFAs (where the finalist projects were implemented) between 
the project starting year and submission year. 
4 1 
 The decreases in burglaries in England and Wales in1999, 2004 and 2008 will be greater when compared to other 
years. 
5 2 
There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in PFAs that received funding for the Safer Cities projects compared 
to the most similar PFAs to them between 1988 and 1998. 
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Appendix 5.1: Hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6 (continued) 
Hypothesis Indicator Hypotheses 
6 2 
There will be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Greater Manchester and Kent after 1999 and Avon and Somerset, 
Derbyshire and West Yorkshire after 2000 when compared to the most similar PFAs to them owing to the 
implementation of anti-burglary TPI projects. 
7 2 
There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in the West Midlands when compared to the most similar PFAs to 
it between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
8 2 
There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in West Yorkshire when compared to the most similar PFAs to it 
between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
9 2 
There will be a greater decrease in burglaries in South Yorkshire when compared to the most similar PFAs to it 
between 1999 and 2002 owing to the implementation of RBI projects. 
10 Literature 
There will be a steeper decrease in burglaries in Cleveland, Lancashire, Leicestershire, the Metropolitan, Surrey 
and Thames Valley when compared to the most similar PFAs to them owing to be an early implementer of POP. 
11 Literature There will be a gradual decrease in repeat burglaries at the national and PFA-level between 1995 and 2007/08. 
12 Literature 
There will be a greater decrease in repeat burglary victimisations in PFAs, which were early implementers of 
POP, compared to their most similar PFAs. 
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Appendix 5.2: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects by PFA 
Police Force Scale of Project Targeted Crime Type Round 
Funding 
(£) 
Total 
Funding 
(£) 
Avon and Somerset Central Bristol Robbery and the fear of crime 2 1,005,000 
1,280,000 
Avon and Somerset  
Burglary and distraction burglary; cheque and card 
fraud; organised vehicle crime; and shoplifting 
2 275,000 
Cambridgeshire Cambridge South Cycle theft 2 167,000 167,000 
Cheshire Force-Wide Robbery in rural areas 2 186,000 186,000 
Cumbria  Force-Wide Violent crime in public places 2 637,000 637,000 
Derbyshire Force-Wide Drugs 2 317,000 
485,000 
Derbyshire Force-Wide Distraction burglary 2 168,000 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Force-Wide Violent crime linked to alcohol abuse 2 950,000 
1,031,000 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
East Devon Offender targeting for anti-social behaviour 2 81,000 
Greater Manchester Stockport Acquisitive crime 1 431,000 
1,387,000 Greater Manchester North Trafford Commercial crime 2 456,000 
Greater Manchester Mosside and Long Sight Firearms 2 500,000 
Hampshire Portsmouth Witness intimidation 2 411,000 411,000 
Humberside Bransholme Anti-social and low-level criminal behaviour 1 377,000 
457,000 
Humberside Scunthorpe Reduction in anti-social behaviour 2 80,000 
Kent Medway Acquisitive crime/Stolen goods market 1 450,000 
1,206,000 
Kent North Kent Vehicle crime 2 756,000 
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Appendix 5.2: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects by PFA (continued) 
Police Force Scale of Project Targeted Crime type Round 
Funding 
(£) 
Total 
Funding (£) 
Lancashire Blackpool Reduction in vehicle crime and anti-social behaviour 2 103,000 103,000 
Lincolnshire Force-Wide Arson 2 268,000 268,000 
Merseyside St. Helens Vehicle crime 2 397,000 
2,322,000 
Merseyside Force-Wide Non-residential property crime 2 598,000 
Merseyside Knowsley Crime and disorder  2 145,000 
Merseyside Force-Wide Organised and volume crime 2 1,020,000 
Merseyside  Child Prostitution 2 162,000 
Metropolitan Hackney Crime and fear of crime 1 760,000 
6,500,000 
Metropolitan 
Islington/Camden/South
wark 
Vehicle crime 1 597,000 
Metropolitan Hounslow/Merton 
Racism/Confidence in policing amongst ethnic 
minorities 
1 500,000 
Metropolitan Brent Violent and drug-related crime 2 803,000 
Metropolitan Westminster/Camden Drugs related crime 2 2,000,000 
Metropolitan Haringey 
Disruption and reduction in the crack cocaine and 
open sex markets 
2 775,000 
Metropolitan Hillington Vehicle crime 2 55,000 
Metropolitan Southwark Hate crime 2 688,000 
Metropolitan Sutton Anti-social behaviour and other crimes 2 35,000 
Metropolitan  Hate crime 2 287,000 
North Wales Wrexham Crime on an industrial estate 2 188,000 188,000 
North Yorkshire  Fear of crime in a rural area 2 186,000 186,000 
Northamptonshire Force-Wide Vehicle crime 2 1,095,000 1,095,000 
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Appendix 5.2: The Targeted Policing Initiative projects by PFA (continued) 
Police Force Scale of project Targeted crime type Round 
Funding 
(£) 
Total 
funding (£) 
Northumbria Tynedale Crime and disorder 1 40,000 
373,000 
Northumbria  Rural Crime 2 333,000 
Nottinghamshire Force-Wide Alcohol related violence 2 1,199,000 1,199,000 
South Wales Rhondda Cynon Taff 
Absconding, offending and nuisance behaviour of 
young people 
1 500,000 
1,000,000 
South Wales Cardiff Alcohol-related violence 1 500,000 
Surrey Force-Wide Safety of hospital staff 2 222,000 222,000 
Sussex Brighton Hate crime 2 1,200,000 
1,906,000 
Sussex Brighton Vehicle crime 2 706,000 
Warwickshire  Business crime 2 174,000 174,000 
West Mercia  Stolen goods markets 2 512,000 512,000 
West Midlands  IT system 2 510,000 
607,000 
West Midlands  Antisocial behaviour and other crimes 2 97,000 
West Yorkshire Calderdale Vehicle crime 1 159,000 
1,196,000 West Yorkshire Force-wide Domestic violence/Hate crime 1 483,000 
West Yorkshire Leeds Distraction burglary 2 554,000 
Source: Researcher’s Creation, the National Archives (2003a; 2003b) 
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Appendix 5.3: The Reducing Burglary Initiative projects by PFA 
 
Police Forces 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Distraction Burglary 
Projects 
Total 
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Avon and Somerset 0 0 5 241,600 3 688,800 - - 8 930,400 
Bedfordshire  1 70,200 1 73,100 0 0 - - 2 143,300 
Cambridgeshire  1 76,000 3 55,800 0 0 - - 4 131,800 
Cheshire  0 0 1 8,500 0 0 - - 1 8,500 
City of London  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Cleveland Police 5 340,110 5 248,300 0 0 - - 10 588,410 
Cumbria  0 0 1 13,300 0 0 - - 1 13,300 
Derbyshire  2 120,000 1 44,100 1 492,100 - - 4 656,200 
Devon & Cornwall  2 242,600 3 132,800 1 4,700 - - 6 380,100 
Dorset  0 0 2 72,149 0 0 - - 2 72,149 
Durham  0 0 3 108,800 0 0 - - 3 108,800 
Essex  0 0 1 79,145 0 0 - - 1 79,145 
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Appendix 5.3: The Reducing Burglary Initiative projects by PFA (continued) 
 
Police Forces 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Distraction Burglary 
Projects 
Total 
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Gloucestershire  0 0 1 39,352 0 0 - - 1 39,352 
Greater Manchester 6 342,815 10 1,382,851 1 31,267 - - 17 1,756,933 
Hampshire  0 £0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Hertfordshire  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Humberside  1 135,880 4 684,302 1 830,537 - - 6 1,650,719 
Kent  0 0 1 6,400 1 23,000 - - 2 29,400 
Lancashire  4 233,600 4 206,000 0 0 - - 8 439,600 
Leicestershire  1 60,000 5 229,590 0 0 - - 6 289,590 
Lincolnshire  2 126,000 0 0 0 0 - - 2 126,000 
Merseyside  2 124,300 4 215,700 0 0 - - 6 340,000 
Metropolitan  7 426,880 25 663,080 0 0 - - 32 1,089,960 
Norfolk  0 0 2 49,800 0 0 - - 2 49,800 
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Appendix 5.3: The Reducing Burglary Initiative projects by PFA (continued) 
 
Police Forces 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Distraction Burglary 
Projects 
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North Yorkshire  0 0 1 17,065 0 0 - - 1 17,065 
Northamptonshire  1 60,000 2 113,466 1 32,200 - - 4 205,666 
Northumbria  4 285,812 7 455,049 0 0 - - 11 740,861 
Nottinghamshire 2 444,500 4 2,120,860 2 56,341 - - 8 2,621,701 
South Yorkshire  4 401,605 11 700,944 2 897,537 1 272,765 18 2,272,851 
Staffordshire  0 0 2 198,452 0 0 - - 2 198,452 
Suffolk  0 0 1 33,000 1 21,700 - - 2 54,700 
Surrey  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Sussex  0 0 1 176,126 0 0 - - 1 176,126 
Thames Valley  2 193,300 3 156,830 0 0 - - 5 350,130 
Warwickshire  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
West Mercia  0 0 0 0 1 10,100 - - 1 10,100 
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Appendix 5.3: The Reducing Burglary Initiative projects by PFA (continued) 
 
Police Forces 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Distraction Burglary 
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West Midlands  8 480,480 27 1,246,945 5 1,376,362 - - 40 3,103,787 
West Yorkshire  6 434,970 18 1,155,513 2 2,685,714 1 554,098 27 4,830,295 
Wiltshire  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Dyfed-Powys  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Gwent  0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
North Wales  0 0 1 33,300 0 0 - - 1 33,300 
South Wales  1 62,200 1 12,200 0 0 - - 2 74,400 
TOTAL 62 4,661,252 161 10,974,419 22 7,150,358 - - 245 22,786,029 
Source: Researcher’s Creation, the National Archives (2003c; 2006) 
 
 
 
 313 
 
Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP* 
LofC** 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Avon & Somerset 1997 2 3 Introduced POP in 1997 but not force-wide. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects (value= 
£1,140,427). Submitted 40 projects. Received 
funding for 2 TPI projects (value=£1,280,000) and 
8 RBI projects (value=£930,400) 
Avon and Somerset Police (1999); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Bedfordshire 1998 0 2 Introduced POP in 1998. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 1 project. 
Received funding for 2 RBI projects (value=£143, 
300) 
Bedfordshire Police (1999); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Cambridgeshire 1999 0 2 Introduced POP in 1999. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 6 projects. 
Received funding for 1 TPI projects 
(value=£167,000) and 4 RBI projects 
(value=£131,800) 
Cambridgeshire Police (1999); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Cheshire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 6 projects. Received 
funding for 1 TPI project (value=£186,000) and 1 
RBI project (£8,500) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Cleveland 1996 3 3 One of the early implementers of POP. Received 
funding for Safer Cities projects (value= 
£1,745,491+). Submitted 43 projects. Received 
funding for 10 RBI projects (value=£588,410) 
Leigh et al. (1998); Scott (2000); Bullock et 
al. (2006); Project submissions; Large-scale 
projects 
Cumbria After 
1997 
0 2 Introduced POP after 1997. Did not receive 
funding for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 42 
projects. Received funding for 1 TPI project 
(value=£637,000) and 1 RBI project 
(value=£13,300) 
Lancashire Police (2001a); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Derbyshire N/A 1 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Received funding for Safer Cities 
projects (value is not available). Submitted 7 
projects. Received funding for 2 TPI projects 
(value=£485,000) and 4 RBI projects 
(value=£656,200) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
Devon & Cornwall 1999 1 2 Introduced POP in 1999. Received funding for 
Safer Cities projects (value is not available). 
Submitted 12 projects. Received funding for 2 TPI 
projects (value=£1,031,000) and 6 RBI projects 
(value=£380,100) 
Devon and Cornwall Police (2000); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects  
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Dorset 1998 0 2 Introduced POP in 1998. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 6 projects. 
Received funding for 2 RBI projects 
(value=£72,149). 
Dorset Police (1999); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects  
 
Durham N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 4 projects. Received 
funding for 3 RBI projects (value=£180,800) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects 
Dyfed-Powys N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 3 projects. 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions 
Essex N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 12 projects. Received 
funding for 1 RBI project (value=£79,145) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions 
Gloucestershire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 5 projects. Received 
funding for 1 project (value=£39,352) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Greater 
Manchester 
The 
early 
2000s 
1 3 Mentioned in the related literature prior to 1997. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects 
(value=£2,052,005). Introduced POP in the early 
2000s. Submitted 31 projects. Received funding 
for 3 TPI projects (value=£1,387,000) and for 17 
RBI projects (value=£1,756,933) 
Bullock et al. (2006); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects 
Gwent 1999 0 2 Introduced POP in 1999. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 6 projects. 
Gwent Police (1999); Project submissions 
Hampshire 2002 0 3 Introduced POP in 2002. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Became one of the highly 
POP-committed police forces. Submitted 19 
projects. Received funding for 1 TPI project 
(value=£411,000) 
Bullock et al. (2006); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects 
Hertfordshire 1999 0 1 Introduced POP in 1999. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 7 projects. 
 
Humberside N/A 1 2 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Received funding for Safer Cities 
projects (value=£1,226,422). Submitted 6 projects. 
Received funding for 2 TPI projects 
(value=£457,00) and for 6 RBI projects 
(value=£1,650,719) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
Kent N/A 0 0 Implemented ILP.  Maguire and John (2006) 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Lancashire 1998 1 3 Mentioned in the related literature prior to 1997. 
Received funding Safer Cities projects (value is 
not available). Introduced POP force-wide in 
1998. Submitted 166 projects (21.5% of all 
projects). Received funding for 1 TPI project 
(value=103,000) and for 8 RBI projects 
(value=£439,600) 
Kirkby (1997); Leigh et al. (1998); 
Lancashire Police (2000;2001a;2001b); Scott 
(2000); Bullock et al (2006); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Leicestershire 1995 3 3 One of the early implementers of POP. Received 
funding for Safer Cities projects (value is not 
available). Submitted 6 projects. Received funding 
for 6 RBI projects (value=£380,100) 
Leigh et al. (1996;1998); Scott (2000); 
Bullock et al (2006); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects 
Lincolnshire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 4 projects.  Received 
funding for 1 TPI projects (value=£268,00) and 
for 2 RBI projects (value=£126,000) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
Merseyside 1995 3 3 One of the early implementers of POP. Received 
funding for Safer Cities projects 
(value=£2,547,705). Submitted 42 projects. 
Received funding for 5 TPI projects 
(value=£2,322,000) and for 6 RBI projects 
(value=£340,000) 
Leigh et al. (1996;1998); Gresty et al. (1997);  
Merseyside Police (1999); Scott (2000); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Metropolitan 2001 1 3 Mentioned in the related literature prior to 1997. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects 
(value=£4,063,265+). Introduced POP force-wide 
in 2001. Submitted 64 projects. Received funding 
for 10 TPI projects (value=£6,500,000) and for 32 
RBI projects (value=£1,089,960) 
Metropolitan Police (2002); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Norfolk N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 8 projects. Received 
funding for 2 RBI projects (value=£49,800). 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
North Wales 1999 0 2 Introduced POP in 1999. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 16 projects. 
Received funding for 1 TPI project 
(value=£188,000) and for 1 RBI project 
(value=£33,300)  
North Wales Police (1999); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
North Yorkshire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 2 projects. Received 
funding for 1 TPI project (value=£186,000) and 
for 1 RBI project (value=£17,065) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Northamptonshire N/A 0 2 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities. Submitted 8 projects. Received funding for 
1 TPI project (value=£1,095,000) and for 4 RBI 
projects (value=£205,666) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
Northumbria 1997 2 2 Mentioned in the related literature prior to 1997. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects 
(value=2,472,118). Introduced POP in 1997 but 
not force-wide. Submitted 28 projects. Received 
funding for 2 TPI projects (value=£373,00) and 11 
RBI projects (value=£740,861) 
Leigh et al. (1996); Northumbria Police 
(1999), Bullock et al. (2006); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Nottinghamshire 2001 1 2 Received funding for Safer Cities projects 
(value=£,1,776,863). Introduced POP in 2001. 
Submitted 12 projects.  Received funding for 1 
TPI project (value=£1,199,000) and for 8 RBI 
projects (value=£2,621,000) 
Nottinghamshire Police (2002); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
South Wales N/A 1 2 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Received funding for Safer Cities 
projects (value is not available). Submitted 28 
projects. Received funding for 2 TPI projects 
(£value=1,000,000) and for 2 RBI projects 
(value=£74,400)  
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
South Yorkshire 2000 0 2 Introduced POP in 2000. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 19 projects. 
Received funding for 18 RBI projects 
(value=£2,272,851) 
South Yorkshire Police (2001); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Staffordshire 1998 0 2 Introduced POP in 1998. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 15 projects. 
Received funding for 2 RBI projects 
(value=£198,452) 
Staffordshire Police (1999); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
Suffolk 1998 0 2 Introduced POP in 1998. Did not receive funding 
for Safer Cities projects. Submitted 7 projects. 
Received funding for 2 RBI projects 
(value=£54,700) 
Suffolk Police (1999); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects 
 
Surrey 1982 3 3 Introduced POP in 1982 and was the only police 
force implementing POP on large-scale in 1996. 
Submitted 17 projects; Received funding for 1 TPI 
projects (value=£222,000) 
Leigh et al. (1996); Surrey Police (1999a; 
1999b); Scott (2000); Bullock et al. (2006); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
Sussex 1997 2 2 Introduced POP in 1997 but not force-wide. 
Submitted 16 projects; Received funding for 2 TPI 
projects (value=£1,906,000) and for 1 RBI project 
(value=£176,126) 
Sussex Police (2000); Project submissions; 
Large-scale projects  
Thames Valley 1992 3 3 One of the early implementers of POP. Submitted 
5 projects. Received funding for 5 RBI projects 
(value=£350,130) 
Leigh et al. (1996); Scott (2000); Bullock et 
al. (2006); Project submissions; Large-scale 
projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Warwickshire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 1 project. Received 
funding for 1 TPI project (value=£174,000) 
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Scott (2000); Lancashire Police (2001a); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions; Large-scale projects 
West Mercia 1997 1 2 Mentioned in related literature prior to 1997. Did 
not receive funding for Safer Cities projects. 
Introduced POP in 1997 but not force-wide. 
Submitted 5 projects. Received funding for 1 TPI 
projects (value=£512,000) and for 1 RBI project 
(value=£10,100) 
Gresty et al. (1997); Leigh et al. (1998); 
Bullock and Tilley (2003); West Mercia 
Police (1999); Project submissions; Large-
scale projects 
West Midlands 1997 2 3 Introduced POP in 1997 but not force-wide. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects (value= 
£2,388,218). Submitted 27 projects. Received 
funding for 2 TPI projects (value=£607,000) and 
for 40 RBI project (value=£3,103,787) 
West Midlands Police 
(1999a,1999b,2000,2002); Gresty et al 
(1997); Project submissions; Large-scale 
projects  
West Yorkshire 1994 2 3 Introduced POP in 1994 but not force-wide. 
Received funding for Safer Cities projects (value= 
£2,034,495). Submitted 12 projects. Received 
funding for 3 TPI projects (value=£1,196,000) and 
for 27 RBI projects (value=£4,830,295) 
Leigh et al. (1996); West Yorkshire Police 
(1999); Bullock et al. (2006); Project 
submissions; Large-scale projects 
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Appendix 5.4: Constructing the independent variable: the level of commitment to POP (continued) 
Police Force 
IY of 
POP 
LofC 
Explanation Source 
9
7
 
0
3
/0
4
 
Wiltshire N/A 0 1 Has not been mentioned in the related literature 
prior to 1997. Did not receive funding for Safer 
Cities projects. Submitted 5 projects.  
Leigh et al. (1996; 1998); Gresty et al. (1997); 
Lancashire Police (2001a); Scott (2000); 
Bullock et al. (2006); Tilley and Scott (2012); 
Project submissions 
Notes: 
(*) Implementation Year of POP 
(**) Level of commitment 
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Appendix 6.1: The CSEW sample size (adults, unweighted) and proportion of all victims that suffered more than one burglary in the reference 
period (Weighted), 1995-2007/08 
Police force 
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Avon & Somerset 452 7 410 13 460 14 921 13 922 13 891 12 982 17 1,127 22 1,049 0 969 20 
Bedfordshire 147 25 187 0 306 29 474 14 623 9 759 15 1,068 4 1,085 21 977 14 1,055 21 
Cambridgeshire 274 20 264 17 299 14 583 0 589 9 735 25 1,018 29 1,068 16 1,023 17 989 21 
Cheshire 280 14 289 27 367 0 653 20 753 12 774 10 983 13 1,060 19 1,041 13 964 19 
Cleveland 141 16 97 10 320 38 590 4 763 14 816 10 964 33 971 9 1,041 0 1,067 6 
Cumbria 160 0 118 0 304 13 548 8 644 18 777 0 1,034 0 1,080 21 931 12 1,031 0 
Derbyshire 212 40 334 0 341 38 630 14 729 23 733 0 1,017 14 981 0 1,040 11 1,054 25 
Devon & Cornwall 507 13 495 13 567 40 873 19 883 16 838 13 1,000 34 979 6 995 0 1,059 22 
Dorset 68 0 25 0 305 14 581 27 694 35 788 0 1,043 12 1,033 22 988 11 903 15 
Durham 178 30 312 0 318 20 568 0 737 12 777 0 1,002 0 959 13 1,047 32 991 11 
Dyfed Powys 70 0 88 33 323 0 570 37 721 54 686 28 944 16 1,028 0 1,000 16 1,102 0 
Essex 383 0 388 26 531 0 876 32 919 18 915 0 1,078 0 1,028 48 1,011 10 1,011 0 
Gloucestershire 181 0 165 25 327 0 594 29 655 18 764 25 1,045 0 1,014 22 1,019 14 991 0 
Greater Manchester 837 7 750 10 880 9 1,313 12 1,414 9 1,556 15 1,374 12 1,535 6 1,540 15 1,553 17 
Gwent 213 0 125 12 345 34 701 12 779 31 821 0 896 0 1,041 24 1,042 9 1,004 11 
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Appendix 6.1:  The CSEW sample size (adults, unweighted) and proportion of all victims that suffered more than one burglary in the reference 
period (Weighted), 1995-2007/08 (continued) 
Police force 
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Hampshire 442 28 420 17 611 24 981 31 1,002 10 1,009 22 1,047 20 1,096 13 1,075 9 995 13 
Hertfordshire 163 17 209 25 322 0 579 24 635 0 719 16 999 15 1,167 0 1,065 11 1,058 0 
Humberside 356 24 275 16 325 56 646 19 725 2 765 0 1,017 15 1,034 10 986 16 1,009 10 
Kent 419 38 426 20 526 36 882 0 934 0 883 13 1024 12 1,072 27 1,016 19 979 18 
Lancashire 349 11 279 28 472 0 760 16 840 22 902 7 1031 12 1,125 11 1,071 4 979 19 
Leicestershire 266 22 309 29 280 15 614 27 652 0 738 9 990 0 1,077 18 992 11 993 18 
Lincolnshire 306 0 161 0 327 0 563 0 817 0 755 20 945 18 1,086 0 1,039 15 1,015 19 
Merseyside 549 4 409 24 479 10 847 8 905 6 858 8 1,021 22 1,056 21 1,013 23 1,011 0 
Metropolitan 2,559 24 2,385 18 2,186 13 2,921 18 3,322 13 3,449 1 3,372 10 3,370 11 3,527 15 3,634 3 
Norfolk 244 24 205 21 319 17 560 100 775 20 836 0 982 0 997 24 1,036 10 982 0 
North Wales 202 38 275 0 314 33 599 19 748 47 771 14 883 0 1,043 31 1,001 25 1,071 12 
North Yorkshire 172 0 126 0 305 0 577 23 607 15 731 15 995 0 999 0 1,021 0 1,037 15 
Northamptonshire 171 12 74 0 333 0 630 12 682 7 692 10 904 27 1,064 35 1,013 6 1,104 10 
Northumbria 652 26 546 7 543 23 779 0 867 0 826 8 934 7 1,032 31 1,066 9 1,028 23 
Nottinghamshire 388 16 285 0 359 37 586 0 678 22 759 11 882 16 1,033 14 1,093 20 1,050 11 
South Wales 367 4 302 15 445 17 726 0 755 20 737 0 918 8 1,098 19 1,045 11 1,075 28 
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Appendix 6.1:  The CSEW sample size (adults, unweighted) and proportion of all victims that suffered more than one burglary in the reference 
period (Weighted), 1995-2007/08 (continued) 
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South Yorkshire 465 13 462 37 469 0 701 16 863 17 813 18 968 11 998 13 1,078 11 1,025 15 
Staffordshire 395 0 388 7 401 14 740 21 628 21 718 0 948 32 1,017 0 999 23 1,106 15 
Suffolk 165 0 172 0 299 0 653 0 701 19 723 0 953 18 1,083 0 1,098 0 992 11 
Surrey 263 0 58 13 285 25 720 14 800 14 827 9 920 0 1,012 0 1,068 0 963 0 
Sussex 583 14 417 15 519 9 877 10 828 0 693 12 1029 7 1,041 0 1,080 7 1,069 11 
Thames Valley 723 13 693 5 710 0 983 5 1,178 6 1,210 0 1,272 12 1,233 8 1,238 4 1,195 4 
Warwickshire 201 0 129 0 311 13 724 10 698 16 776 16 1069 12 1,074 12 1,104 0 1,057 10 
West Mercia 147 0 279 69 425 17 640 17 766 0 811 22 908 0 1,074 0 1,054 10 999 37 
West Midlands 962 3 760 3 779 20 1,341 22 1,396 18 1,449 24 1,544 25 1,595 0 1,398 10 1,543 20 
West Yorkshire 545 9 654 10 733 23 1,118 4 1,110 11 1,096 3 1,124 3 1,264 27 1,241 28 1,219 8 
Wiltshire 189 0 199 25 340 0 602 14 742 26 755 0 993 7 1,067 17 1,042 19 1,052 13 
England and Wales 
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Response Rate (%) 83  79  74  73  74  75  75  75  75  76  
Source: Researcher’s calculations, the CSEW, 1996-2007/08 
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Appendix 7.1: Correlation matrix, 1997 
 PFA characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Renting privately 
1.000                         
2 Renting from a housing association 
0.621 1.000                       
3 Renting from a local authority 
-0.131 0.395 1.000                     
4 Single adult non-pensioner households 0.799 0.858 0.365 1.000                   
5 Ethnic diversity  
0.669 0.764 0.311 0.901 1.000                 
6 People aged between 16 and 24 
0.122 0.526 0.473 0.535 0.676 1.000               
7 Migrants  
0.717 0.225 -0.367 0.432 0.334 0.036 1.000             
8 Population density 
0.645 0.870 0.523 0.936 0.900 0.598 0.206 1.000           
9 Lone parent households 
0.261 0.769 0.718 0.672 0.557 0.511 -0.215 0.776 1.000         
10 Households without a car 
0.155 0.649 0.841 0.560 0.451 0.396 -0.322 0.685 0.918 1.000       
11 Owner households 
-0.390 -0.736 -0.851 -0.758 -0.645 -0.548 -0.060 -0.825 -0.809 -0.850 1.000     
12 Mean number of people per room 
0.348 0.727 0.620 0.786 0.832 0.750 0.006 0.842 0.708 0.685 -0.766 1.000   
13 Professional head of households 
0.461 0.117 -0.493 0.315 0.324 0.183 0.718 0.109 -0.369 -0.547 0.188 0.059 1.000 
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Appendix 7.2: Correlation matrix, 2003/04 
 PFA characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Renting privately 
1.000                         
2 Renting from a housing association 
0.607 1.000                       
3 Renting from a local authority 
-0.102 -0.128 1.000                     
4 Single adult non-pensioner households 0.733 0.598 0.446 1.000                   
5 Ethnic diversity  
0.653 0.540 0.355 0.886 1.000                 
6 People aged between 16 and 24 
0.302 0.306 0.533 0.654 0.667 1.000               
7 Migrants  
0.786 0.391 -0.184 0.493 0.456 0.362 1.000             
8 Population density 
0.646 0.622 0.504 0.939 0.905 0.642 0.366 1.000           
9 Lone parent households 
0.089 0.209 0.717 0.551 0.424 0.657 -0.146 0.610 1.000         
10 Households without a car 
0.285 0.267 0.822 0.707 0.560 0.675 0.060 0.747 0.890 1.000       
11 Owner households 
-0.517 -0.448 -0.760 -0.853 -0.729 -0.665 -0.310 -0.876 -0.699 -0.890 1.000     
12 Mean number of people per room 
0.209 0.237 0.390 0.487 0.447 0.329 0.100 0.548 0.381 0.454 -0.478 1.000   
13 Professional head of households 
0.498 0.454 -0.362 0.395 0.439 0.074 0.540 0.311 -0.372 -0.291 -0.019 0.180 1.000 
 
 
